This is a linkpost for https://entirelyuseless.wordpress.com/2017/09/03/minimizing-motivated-beliefs/
I don't really follow why it should be that beliefs are necessarily voluntary.
Maybe it's a matter of what we each think "belief" means. Can you be a bit more precise? My conception is somewhere in the range of experience of an experience that gives a correspondence between the experienced experience and expected other experiences. Basically that to believe is to expect or make a prediction about future experience and a belief is a reification of the experience of believing. In this sense I don't really see why belief couldn't also be involuntary, for some vague sense of "voluntary" like "feels like I made a choice" since "voluntary" seems a bit of a confused term itself unless you have a firm sense of causality and intention/will.
There's a bit of circularity here, since I acknowledge that it is possible to think about belief in such a way that it would not be voluntary. But I voluntarily choose to think about belief as voluntary, namely as having a definition that implies that it is voluntary, because I think that the consequences of thinking about it this way (both epistemically and instrumentally) are better than the consequences of thinking about it in such a way that it would be involuntary.
The reason both are possible is that saying that someone believes something is a vague g...