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ArisKatsaris comments on Why Bayesians should two-box in a one-shot - Less Wrong Discussion

1 Post author: PhilGoetz 15 December 2017 05:39PM

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Comment author: ArisKatsaris 17 December 2017 08:15:21PM 3 points [-]

You're using words like "reputation", and understand how having a reputation for one-boxing is preferable, when we're discussing the level where Omega has access to the source code of your brain and can just tell whether you'll one-box or not, as a matter of calculation.

So the source-code of your brain just needs to decide whether it'll be a source-code that will be one-boxing or not. This isn't really about "precommittment" for that one specific scenario. Omega doesn't need to know whether you have precomitted or not, Omega isn't putting money in the boxes based on whether you have precommitted or not. It's putting money based on the decision you'll arrive to, even if you yourself don't know the decision yet.

You can't make the decision in advance, because you may not know the exact parameters of the decision you'll be asked to make (one-boxing & two-boxing are just examples of one particular type of decision). You can decide however whether you're the sort of person who accepts their decisions can be deterministically predicted in advance with sufficient certainty, or whether you'll be claiming that other people predicting your choice must be a violation of causality (it's not).

Comment author: Lumifer 19 December 2017 04:35:13PM *  1 point [-]

So the source-code of your brain just needs to decide whether it'll be a source-code that will be one-boxing or not.

First, in the classic Newcomb when you meet Omega that's a surprise to you. You don't get to precommit to deciding one way or the other because you had no idea such a situation will arise: you just get to decide now.

You can decide however whether you're the sort of person who accepts their decisions can be deterministically predicted in advance with sufficient certainty, or whether you'll be claiming that other people predicting your choice must be a violation of causality (it's not).

Why would you make such a decision if you don't expect to meet Omega and don't care much about philosophical head-scratchers?

And, by the way, predicting your choice is not a violation of causality, but believing that your choice (of the boxes, not of the source code) affects what's in the boxes is.

Second, you are assuming that the brain is free to reconfigure and rewrite its software which is clearly not true for humans and all existing agents.