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Street Epistemology - letting people name their thinking errors

0 Bound_up 24 July 2016 07:43PM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Exmjlc4PfEQ

 

Anthony Magnabosco does what he calls Street Epistemology, usually applying it to supernatural (usually religious) beliefs.

 

The great thing about his method (and his manner, guy's super personable) is that he avoids the social structure of a debate, of two people arguing, of a zero-sum one game where person wins at the other's loss.

 

I've struggled with trying to figure out how to let people save face in disputes (when they're making big, awful mistakes), even considering including minor errors (that don't affect the main point) in my arguments so that they could point them out and we could both admit we were wrong (in their case, about things which do affect the main point) and move on.

 

But this guy's technique manages to invite people to correct their own errors (people are SOOOO much more rational when they're not defensive) and they DO it. No awkwardness, no discomfort, and people pointing out the flaws in their own arguments, and then THANKING him for the talk afterwards and referring him to their friends to talk. Even though they just admitted that their cherished beliefs might not deserve the certainty they've been giving them.

 

This is applied to religion in this video, but this seems to me to be a generally useful method when you confront someone making an error in their thinking. Are you forcing people to swallow their pride a little (over and over) when they talk with you? Get that out, and watch how much more open people can be.

Weekly LW Meetups

1 FrankAdamek 22 July 2016 04:00PM

New meetups (or meetups with a hiatus of more than a year) are happening in:

Irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups are taking place in:

The remaining meetups take place in cities with regular scheduling, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berlin, Boston, Brussels, Buffalo, Canberra, Columbus, Denver, Kraków, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Moscow, New Hampshire, New York, Philadelphia, Research Triangle NC, San Francisco Bay Area, Seattle, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Toronto, Vienna, Washington DC, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers and a Slack channel for daily discussion and online meetups on Sunday night US time.

continue reading »

[Link] Suffering-focused AI safety: Why “fail-safe” measures might be particularly promising

4 wallowinmaya 21 July 2016 08:22PM

The Foundational Research Institute just published a new paper: "Suffering-focused AI safety: Why “fail-safe” measures might be our top intervention". 

It is important to consider that [AI outcomes] can go wrong to very different degrees. For value systems that place primary importance on the prevention of suffering, this aspect is crucial: the best way to avoid bad-case scenarios specifically may not be to try and get everything right. Instead, it makes sense to focus on the worst outcomes (in terms of the suffering they would contain) and on tractable methods to avert them. As others are trying to shoot for a best-case outcome (and hopefully they will succeed!), it is important that some people also take care of addressing the biggest risks. This perspective to AI safety is especially promising both because it is currently neglected and because it is easier to avoid a subset of outcomes rather than to shoot for one highly specific outcome. Finally, it is something that people with many different value systems could get behind.

Fallacymania: party game where you notice fallacies in arguments

3 Alexander230 21 July 2016 09:34AM

Fallacymania is a game developed by Moscow LessWrong community. Main goals of this game is to help people notice fallacies in arguments, and of course to have fun. The game requires 3-20 players (recommended 4-12), and some materials: printed A3 sheets with fallacies (5-10 sheets), card deck with fallacies (you can cut one A3 sheet into cards, or print stickers and put them to common playing cards), pens and empty sheets, and 1 card deck of any type with at least 50 cards (optional, for counting guessing attempts). Rules of the game are explained here:

https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BzyKVqP6n3hKQWNzV3lWRTYtRzg

This is the sheet of fallacies, you can download it and print on A3 or A2 sheet of paper:

https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BzyKVqP6n3hKMmtZVHhubXNMUkE

Also you can use this sheet to create playing cards for debaters.

When we created this game, we used these online articles and artwork about fallacies:

http://obraz.io/ru/posters/poster_view/1/?back_link=%2Fru%2F&lang=en&arrow=right
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/rhetological-fallacies/
http://lesswrong.com/lw/e95/the_noncentral_fallacy_the_worst_argument_in_the/

Also I've made electronic version of Fallacymania for Tabletop Simulator (in Steam Workshop):

http://steamcommunity.com/sharedfiles/filedetails/?id=723941480

 

In partially observable environments, stochastic policies can be optimal

4 Stuart_Armstrong 19 July 2016 10:42AM

I always had the informal impression that the optimal policies were deterministic (choosing the best option, rather than some mix of options). Of course, this is not the case when facing other agents, but I had the impression this would hold when facing the environment rather that other players.

But stochastic policies can also be needed if the environment is partially observable, at least if the policy is Markov (memoryless). Consider the following POMDP (partially observable Markov decision process):

There are two states, 1a and 1b, and the agent cannot tell which one they're in. Action A in state 1a and B in state 1b, gives a reward of -R and keeps the agent in the same place. Action B in state 1a and A in state 1b, gives a reward of R and moves the agent to the other state.

The returns for the two deterministic policies - A and B - are -R every turn except maybe for the first. While the return for the stochastic policy of 0.5A + 0.5B is 0 per turn.

Of course, if the agent can observe the reward, the environment is no longer partially observable (though we can imagine the reward is delayed until later). And the general policy of "alternate A and B" is more effective that the 0.5A + 0.5B policy. Still, that stochastic policy is the best of the memoryless policies available in this POMDP.

Open thread, Jul. 18 - Jul. 24, 2016

3 MrMind 18 July 2016 07:17AM

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.


Notes for future OT posters:

1. Please add the 'open_thread' tag.

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one. (Immediately before; refresh the list-of-threads page before posting.)

3. Open Threads should be posted in Discussion, and not Main.

4. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.

Earning money with/for work in AI safety

6 rmoehn 18 July 2016 05:37AM

(I'm re-posting my question from the Welcome thread, because nobody answered there.)

I care about the current and future state of humanity, so I think it's good to work on existential or global catastrophic risk. Since I've studied computer science at a university until last year, I decided to work on AI safety. Currently I'm a research student at Kagoshima University doing exactly that. Before April this year I had only little experience with AI or ML. Therefore, I'm slowly digging through books and articles in order to be able to do research.

I'm living off my savings. My research student time will end in March 2017 and my savings will run out some time after that. Nevertheless, I want to continue AI safety research, or at least work on X or GC risk.

I see three ways of doing this:

  • Continue full-time research and get paid/funded by someone.
  • Continue research part-time and work the other part of the time in order to get money. This work would most likely be programming (since I like it and am good at it). I would prefer work that helps humanity effectively.
  • Work full-time on something that helps humanity effectively.


Oh, and I need to be location-independent or based in Kagoshima.

I know http://futureoflife.org/job-postings/, but all of the job postings fail me in two ways: not location-independent and requiring more/different experience than I have.

Can anyone here help me? If yes, I would be happy to provide more information about myself.

(Note that I think I'm not in a precarious situation, because I would be able to get a remote software development job fairly easily. Just not in AI safety or X or GC risk.)

[Link] NYU conference: Ethics of Artifical Intelligence (October 14-15)

4 ignoranceprior 16 July 2016 09:07PM

FYI: https://wp.nyu.edu/consciousness/ethics-of-artifical-intelligence/

This conference will explore these questions about the ethics of artificial intelligence and a number of other questions, including:

What ethical principles should AI researchers follow?
Are there restrictions on the ethical use of AI?
What is the best way to design morally beneficial AI?
Is it possible or desirable to build moral principles into AI systems?
When AI systems cause benefits or harm, who is morally responsible?
Are AI systems themselves potential objects of moral concern?
What moral framework is best used to assess questions about the ethics of AI?

Speakers and panelists will include:

Nick Bostrom (Future of Humanity Institute), Meia Chita-Tegmark (Future of Life Institute), Mara Garza (UC Riverside, Philosophy), Sam Harris (Project Reason), Demis Hassabis (DeepMind/Google), Yann LeCun (Facebook, NYU Data Science), Peter Railton (University of Michigan, Philosophy), Francesca Rossi (University of Padova, Computer Science), Stuart Russell (UC Berkeley, Computer Science), Susan Schneider (University of Connecticut, Philosophy), Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside, Philosophy), Max Tegmark (Future of Life Institute), Wendell Wallach (Yale, Bioethics), Eliezer Yudkowsky (Machine Intelligence Research Institute), and others.

Organizers: Ned Block (NYU, Philosophy), David Chalmers (NYU, Philosophy), S. Matthew Liao (NYU, Bioethics)

A full schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date.

Registration is free but required. REGISTER HERE. Please note that admission is limited, and is first-come first-served: it is not guaranteed by registration.

Two forms of procrastination

9 Viliam 16 July 2016 08:30PM

I noticed something about myself when comparing two forms of procrastination:

a) reading online discussions,
b) watching movies online.

Reading online discussions (LessWrong, SSC, Reddit, Facebook) and sometimes writing a comment there, is a huge sink of time for me. On the other hand, watching movies online is almost harmless, at least compared with the former option. The difference is obvious when I compare my productivity at the end of the day when I did only the former, or only the latter. The interesting thing is that at the moment it feels the other way round.

When I start watching a movie that is 1:30:00 long, or start watching a series where each part is 40:00 long but I know I will probably watch more than one part a day, I am aware from the beginning that I am going to lose more than one hour of time; possibly several hours. On the other hand, when I open the "Discussion" tab on LessWrong, the latest "Open Thread" on SSC, my few favorite subreddits, and/or my Facebook "Home" page, it feels like it will only take a few minutes -- I will click on the few interesting links, quickly skim through the text, and maybe write a comment or two -- it certainly feels like much less than an hour.

But the fact is, when I start reading the discussions, I will probably click on at least hundred links. Most of the pages I will read just as quickly as I imagined, but there will be a few that will take disproportionally more time; either because they are interesting and long, or because they contain further interesting links. And writing a comment sometimes takes more time than it seems; it can easily be a half an hour for a three-paragraphs-long comment. (Ironically, this specific article gets written rather quickly, because I know what I want to write, and I write it directly. But there are comments where I think a lot, and keep correcting my text, to avoid misunderstanding when debating a sensitive topic, etc.) And when I stop doing it, because I want to make something productive for a change, I will feel tired. Reading many different things, trying to read quickly, and formulating my answers, that all makes me mentally exhausted. So after I close the browser, I just wish I could take a nap.

On the other hand, watching a movie does not make me tired in that specific way. The movies runs at its own speed and doesn't require me to do anything actively. Also, there is no sense of urgency; none of the "if I reply to this now, people will notice and respond, but if I do it a week later, no one will care anymore". So I feel perfectly comfortable pausing the movie at any moment, doing something productive for a while, then unpausing the movie and watching more. I know I won't miss anything.

I think it's the mental activity during my procrastination that both makes me tired and creates the illusion that it will take less time than it actually does. When the movie says 1:30:00, I know it will be 1:30:00 (or maybe a little less because of the final credits). With a web page, I can always tell myself "don't worry, I will read this one really fast", so there is the illusion that I have it under control, and can reduce the time waste. The fact that I am reading an individual page really fast makes me underestimate how much time it took to read all those pages.

On the other hand, sometimes I do inverse procrastination -- I start watching a movie, pause it a dozen times and do some useful work during the breaks -- and at the end of the day I spent maybe 90% of the time working productively, while my brain tells me I just spent the whole day watching a movie, so I almost feel like I had a free day.

Okay, so how could I use this knowledge to improve my productivity?

1) Knowing the difference between the two forms of procrastination, whenever I feel a desire to escape to the online world, I should start watching a movie instead of reading some debate, because thus I will waste less time, even if it feels the other way round.

2) Integrate it with pomodoro? 10 minutes movie, 50 minutes work, then again, and at the end of the day my lying brain will tell me "dude, you didn't work at all today, you were just watching movies, of course you should feel awesome!".

Do you have a similar experience? No idea how typical is this. No need to hurry with responding, I am going to watch a movie now. ;-)

Quick puzzle about utility functions under affine transformations

5 Liron 16 July 2016 05:11PM

Here's a puzzle based on something I used to be confused about:

It is known that utility functions are equivalent (i.e. produce the same preferences over actions) up to a positive affine transformation: u'(x) = au(x) + b where a is positive.

Suppose I have u(vanilla) = 3, u(chocolate) = 8. I prefer an action that yields a 50% chance of chocolate over an action that yields a 100% chance of vanilla, because 0.5(8) > 1.0(3).

Under the positive affine transformation a = 1, b = 4; we get that u'(vanilla) = 7 and u'(chocolate) = 12. Therefore I now prefer the action that yields a 100% chance of vanilla, because 1.0(7) > 0.5(12).

How to resolve the contradiction?

 

The map of cognitive biases, errors and obstacles affecting judgment and management of global catastrophic risks

3 turchin 16 July 2016 12:11PM
“We had two bags of grass, seventy-five pellets of mescaline, five sheets of high powered blotter acid, a salt shaker half full of cocaine, and a whole galaxy of multi-colored uppers, downers, screamers, laughers... and also a quart of tequila, a quart of rum, a case of Budweiser, a pint of raw ether and two dozen amyls. Not that we needed all that for the trip, but once you get locked into a serious drug collection, the tendency is to push it as far as you can.”

The map is based on 100+ page text which lists a 200+ biases and other cognitive problems which may arise during identification and prevention of x-risks. 

The map is very preliminary, after all. Much more biases could be identified. The main idea is to show that there are many biases, so any our judgement about x-risks will be distorted. Larger safety margins though required.

The map also intended to show that we could classify biases and other obstacles, and it could help to navigate us to truth and safety. The goal of the map is to show complexity of prediction and management of future x-risks, as well as help to identify sources of mistakes.

Each box has link on full explanation of the bias.

Boxes which were covered in Eliezer Yudkowsky about cognitive biases article are red.

Numbers in the boxes arrow on paragraphs in the full text.

The Y axis of the map shows stages of x-risk prevention in time, on which certain biases may work. Some biases could influence assessment of risks and other will show themselves in management of dangerous situations.

The X axis gives very rough typology of biases based of their sources.
See Bostrom's article for the similar typology:  

He suggests 3 types of biases: believes, shortcomings of our mind and ignorance.

Sorry that it all looks like tetris. ))

Read pdf with clickable links.


[CORE] Concepts for Understanding the World

2 SquirrelInHell 16 July 2016 10:53AM

Background:

I'm recently doing a big project to increase my scholarship and modeling power for both rationality and traditional "serious" topics. One thing I found very useful is taking notes with a clear structure.

The structure I'm using currently is as follows:

- write down useful concepts,

- write down (as a separate category) useful heuristics & things to do in various situations,

- do not write facts, opinions or anything else (I rely on unaided memory to get more filtering).

Heuristic: learn concepts before facts!

Note that you can be mistaken about facts, but you can't harm your epistemology by learning concepts. Even if a concept turns out to be useless or misleading, you are better off knowing about it, understanding how it's misleading, and being able to avoid the trap when you see it.

Let's share concepts!

Please give (at a minimum) a name and a reference (link). A short description in plain language is also welcome.

 



I started to write these "concept" notes electronically only 2 days ago, so the list below is VERY random and sparse. In any case, let's make this a collective effort :)

[ Added: up-to-date version of the list below is here: http://squirrelinhell.github.io/concepts/ ]



adaptation-executer
➡ organism acts only to execute evolved adaptations
➡ it does not depend on awareness of the goal (maximizing inclusive fitness)

adaptive capacity
➡ ability of a system to adapt to changing environment

akrasia
➡ acting against your own better judgement

Aristotelian epistemology
➡ statements are true or false
➡ truth can be shown by deductive reasoning

base rate neglect
➡ using specific evidence as if it replaced priors

Bayesian epistemology
➡ beliefs have degrees of certainty from 0 to 1
➡ updated upon seeing evidence

behaviorism
➡ an approach that explains behavior by conditioning (rather than thoughts or emotions)

brotherhood
➡ all-male social group with rules that prevent girl-related drama within the group

CDT Stage 1
➡ subject to reflexes
➡ early childhood

CDT Stage 2
➡ reflexes are objects
➡ subject to personal interests (desires, needs, wishes)
➡ childhood to early adolescence

CDT Stage 3
➡ personal interests are objects
➡ subject to relationships/social pressure

CDT Stage 4
➡ relationships are objects
➡ subject to systems (principles, rules, structure, commitments)

CDT Stage 5
➡ systems are objects
➡ can juggle around multiple systems
➡ can handle errors or incompleteness of a system

Chesterton Fence
➡ rule not to do reforms without understanding reasoning behind current state

cognitive ease
➡ how hard it is to think something gets used as a proxy for more complicated judgements

Conservation of Expected Evidence
➡ expectation of posterior probability is equal to prior probability
➡ unlikely strong evidence is balanced by likely weak evidence in the opposite direction
➡ absence of evidence is (weak) evidence of absence

Counterfactual Mugging
➡ Omega says it had tossed a fair coin to determine if you win $10000 or lose $100
➡ you only get $10000 if you would accept loss of $100
➡ it is already known that you lost
➡ do you pay $100?

countersignaling
➡ not signaling X to show that you are above people who signal X
➡ doesn't work when confused with lower level

Curse of Development
➡ when making progress, effectiveness will often decrease before it becomes higher than ever

denominator neglect
➡ in "X out of Y", absolute value of X influences intuitive judgement

dimimishing returns
➡ decreasing marginal output, as input is incrementally increased

Dunnig-Kruger effect
➡ bias in which relatively unskilled persons overestimate their skill a lot

ending on a high note
➡ the last part leaves the strongest impression
➡ either (1) do something positive at the end
➡ or (2) end the interaction after something positive happens

exposure therapy
➡ treatment for anxiety or phobias by forced prolonged exposure while safety is guaranteed

forced legibility
➡ reorganising a complex system which seems irrational, but it was only a failure to understand it

halo effect
➡ seeing something positive or negative influences judgement of all other aspects

homeostasis
➡ property of a system that regulates a variable to keep it at a constant level

honing mode
➡ conversation converges on an idea
➡ focused on corrections and critique

hyperbolic discounting
➡ value(t) = 1/(1 + C * t)
➡ intuition discounts approximately like this
➡ any discounting except exponential is inconsistent under passage of time

inclusive fitness
➡ ability to pass on genes (including genes passed on by relatives)

iterated hurt
➡ someone is hurt by the knowledge that you were willing to hurt them
➡ this works even if there is no actual hurt

jamming mode
➡ conversation is a divergent exploration
➡ based on remixing and building on ideas

Laws of Authority
➡ enforced by a selected powerful entity

Laws of Reality
➡ enforced automatically by the environment

Laws of Society
➡ enforced by group consensus
➡ large majority finds the terms beneficial or acceptable
➡ defectors are punished by volunteers

learned blank
➡ taking for granted lack of skill/knowledge in some area

level reversal
➡ level N+1 is sometimes superficially similar to level N-1
➡ that the next level is counterintuitive is what makes levels recognizable in the first place

loss aversion
➡ intuitive judgement is based on losses and gains relative to a "reference point"
➡ losses weigh around 2 times more than gains

lost purpose
➡ pursuing an instrumental goal that no longer has value

marginal cost
➡ change of cost per one additional unit of produced resource

marginal utility
➡ change of utility per one additional unit of consumed resource

marginalism
➡ a theory that explains prices of products in terms of their marginal utility

meta-contrarianism
➡ being contrarian to a contrarian position
➡ might be more concerned with signaling than accuracy

motivation system
➡ outputs "wanting" and "not wanting"
➡ implemented entirely in S1

mutual knowledge
➡ everyone knows, and they know that everyone knows, and they know that others know that everyone knows, etc.

mystic epistemology
➡ everything is possible
➡ let's believe nothing

Newcomb's problem
➡ Omega prepared a trasparent box and an opaque box
➡ transparent box contains $1000
➡ opaque box contains $1,000,000 iff Omega predicted you will take only the opaque box
➡ do you take both boxes, or only the opaque box?

Nyquist frequency
➡ half of the sampling rate
➡ for every sinusoid with frequency above, there is a sinusoid (alias) that has the same samples and frequency below

Parfit's Hitchhiker
➡ you will be saved from death on a desert by a car driver iff you promise to pay $100 later
➡ the driver can detect lying perfectly
➡ does your decision theory allow you to commit to paying with certainty you won't change it later?

Peter principle
➡ if promotion is based on performance in the current role, then it stabilizes on reaching incompetence

planning system
➡ consciously building chains of actions
➡ can imagine intermediate states

regression to the mean
➡ prediction from a correlated variable is attenuated by amount of correlation
➡ more noise or smaller sample requires bigger adjustment

reinforcement learning
➡ agent interacts with the environment
➡ correct actions are learned from when it gets rewards

Schelling fence
➡ "arbitrary boundary used to prevent a ""slippery slope"" situation"

Schelling point
➡ prediction of what others expect you to think you are expected to do

self-reinforcement
➡ using conditioning to influence your own patterns of behaviour
➡ doesn't work (learning is based on surprise)
➡ some techniques that work might look very similar (they actually manipulate emotions)

Smoking Lesion
➡ alternative world in which smoking is correlated with cancer but does not cause it
➡ there is a genetic lesion that increases chances of both
➡ you don't know if you have it
➡ you want to smoke, but you dislike cancer much more
➡ do you smoke?

societal collapse
➡ disintegration of a human society
➡ often together with most civilization advances

status illegibility
➡ social groups are held together by unclear relative statuses in the middle section

subject-object model
➡ a view of development as a shift from being subject to X, to manipulating X as an object in context
➡ intermediate stages: becoming aware of broader view, having 2 conflicting views, adopting the broader view with occasional lapses

sunk cost fallacy
➡ including resources that have already been spent in a decision about the future

S1 storytelling
➡ System 1 interprets data by constructing plausible stories
➡ it does it more easily with *less* data

System 1
➡ unconscious, effortless thinking
➡ fast, parallel and runs all the time

System 2
➡ conscious, effortful thinking
➡ slow, serial and runs on demand
➡ it can install new patterns of behaviour, but sucks at controlling anything directly
➡ uses working memory

ugh field
➡ mental flinch from thinking about something (or even admitting there is a problem)

vivid probability
➡ unlikely outcomes/events are overweighted when they evoke vivid mental imagery, and neglected otherwise
➡ e.g. explicitly mentioning, adding details, presenting probability as frequency all contribute to overweighing

New LW Meetup: Greenville NC

0 FrankAdamek 15 July 2016 03:45PM

This summary was posted to LW Main on July 15th. The following week's summary is here.

New meetups (or meetups with a hiatus of more than a year) are happening in:

Irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups are taking place in:

The remaining meetups take place in cities with regular scheduling, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berlin, Boston, Brussels, Buffalo, Canberra, Columbus, Denver, Kraków, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Moscow, New Hampshire, New York, Philadelphia, Research Triangle NC, San Francisco Bay Area, Seattle, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Toronto, Vienna, Washington DC, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers and a Slack channel for daily discussion and online meetups on Sunday night US time.

continue reading »

confirmation bias, thought experiment

0 Douglas_Reay 15 July 2016 12:19PM

Why do people end up with differing conclusions, given the same data?

 

Model

The information we get from others can not always be 100% relied upon.  Some of the people telling you stuff are liars, some are stupid, and some are incorrectly or insufficiently informed.  Even in the case where the person giving you an opinion is honest, smart and well informed, they are still unlikely to be able to tell you accurately how reliable their own opinion is.

So our brains use an 'unreliability' factor.  Automatically we take what others tell us, and discount it by a certain amount, depending on how 'unreliable' we estimate the source to be.

We also compare what people tell us about 'known reference points' in order to update our estimates of their unreliability.

If Sally tells me that vaccines cause AIDS and I am very much more certain that this is not the case, than I am of Sally's reliability, then instead of modifying my opinion about what causes AIDS, I modify my opinion of how reliable Sally is.

If I'm only slightly more certain, then I might take the step of asking Sally her reason for thinking that, and looking at her data.

If I have a higher opinion of Sally than my own knowledge of science, and I don't much care or am unaware of what other people think about the relationship between vaccines and AIDS, then I might just accept what she says, provisionally, without checking her data.

If I have a very much higher opinion of Sally, then not only will I believe her, but my opinion of her reliability will actually increase as I assess her as some mould-breaking genius who knows things that others do not.

 

Importantly, once we have altered our opinion, based upon input that we originally considered to be fairly reliable, we are very bad at reversing that alteration, if the input later turns out to be less reliable than we originally thought.  This is called the "continued influence effect", and we can use it to explain a number of things...

 

Experiment

Let us consider a thought experiment where two subjects, Peter and Paul, are exposed to input about a particular topic (such as "Which clothes washing powder is it best to use?") from multiple sources.   Both will be exposed to the same sources, 100 in favour of using the Persil brand of washing powder, and 100 in favour of using the Bold brand of washing powder, but in a different order.

If they both start off with no strong opinion in either direction, would we expect them to end the experiment with roughly the same opinion as each other, or can we manipulate their opinions into differing, just by changing the order in which the sources are presented?

Suppose, with Peter, we start him off with 10 of the Persil side's most reputable and well argued sources, to raise Peter's confidence in sources that support Persil.

We can then run another 30 much weaker pro-Persil sources past him, and he is likely to just nods and accept, without bothering to examine the validity of the arguments too closely, because he's already convinced.

At this point, when he'll consider a source to be a bit suspect, straight away, just because they don't support Persil, we introduce him to the pro-Bold side, starting with the least reliable - the ones that are obviously stupid or manipulative.   Further more, we don't let the pro-Bold side build up momentum.   For every three poor pro-Bold sources, we interrupt with a medium reliability pro-Persil source that's rehashing pro-Persil points that Peter is by now familiar with and agrees with.

After seeing the worst 30 pro-Bold sources, Peter now don't just consider them to be a bit suspect - he considers them to be down right deceptive and mentally categorises all such sources as not worth paying attention to.   Any further pro-Bold sources, even ones that seem to be impartial and well reasoned, he's going to put down as being fakes created by malicious researchers in the pay of an evil company.

We can now, safely, expose Peter to the medium-reliability pro-Bold sources and even the good ones, and will need less and less to refute them, just a reminder to Peter of 'which side he is on', because it is less about the data now, and more about identity - he doesn't see himself as the sort of person who'd support Bold.   He's not a sheep.  He's not taken in by the hoax.

Finally, after 80 pro-Persil sources and 90 pro-Bold sources, we have 10 excellent pro-Bold sources whose independence and science can't fairly be questioned.   But it is too late for them to have much effect, and there are 20 good pro-Persil sources to balance them.

For Paul we do the reverse, starting with pro-Bold sources and only later introducing the pro-Persil side once a known reference point has been established as an anchor.

 

Simulation

Obviously, things are rarely that clear cut in real life.   But people also don't often get data from both sides of an argument at a precisely equal rate.   They bump around randomly, and once one side accumulates some headway, it is unlikely to be reversed.

We could add a third subject, Mary, and consider what is likely to happen if she is exposed to a random succession of sources, each with a 50% chance of supporting one side or the other, and each with a random value on a scale of 1(poor) to 3 (good) for honesty, validity and strength of conclusion supported by the claimed data.

If we use mathematics to make some actual models of the points at which a source agreeing or disagreeing with you affects your estimate of their reliability, we can use a computer simulation of the above thought experiment to predict how different orders of presentation will affect people's final opinion, under each model.   Then we could compare that against real-world data, to see which model best matches reality.

 

Prediction

I think, if this experiment were carried out, one of the properties that would emerge naturally from it is the backfire effect:

" The backfire effect occurs when, in the face of contradictory evidence, established beliefs do not change but actually get stronger. The effect has been demonstrated experimentally in psychological tests, where subjects are given data that either reinforces or goes against their existing biases - and in most cases people can be shown to increase their confidence in their prior position regardless of the evidence they were faced with. "

 

Further Reading

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attitude_polarization
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/nyhan-reifler.pdf
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17470216008416717
http://lesswrong.com/lw/iw/positive_bias_look_into_the_dark/
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14640749508401422
http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Backfire_effect

Wikipedia usage survey results

7 riceissa 15 July 2016 12:49AM

Contents

Background

At the end of May 2016, Vipul Naik and I created a Wikipedia usage survey to gauge the usage habits of Wikipedia readers and editors. SurveyMonkey allows the use of different “collectors” (i.e. survey URLs that keep results separate), so we circulated several different URLs among four locations to see how different audiences would respond. The audiences were as follows:

  • SurveyMonkey’s United States audience with no demographic filters (62 responses, 54 of which are full responses)
  • Vipul Naik’s timeline (post asking people to take the survey; 70 responses, 69 of which are full responses). For background on Vipul’s timeline audience, see his page on how he uses Facebook.
  • The Wikipedia Analytics mailing list (email linking to the survey; 7 responses, 6 of which are full responses). Note that due to the small size of this group, the results below should not be trusted, unless possibly when the votes are decisive.
  • Slate Star Codex (post that links to the survey; 618 responses, 596 of which are full responses). While Slate Star Codex isn’t the same as LessWrong, we think there is significant overlap in the two sites’ audiences (see e.g. the recent LessWrong diaspora survey results).
  • In addition, although not an actual audience with a separate URL, several of the tables we present below will include an “H” group; this is the heavy users group of people who responded by saying they read 26 or more articles per week on Wikipedia. This group has 179 people: 164 from Slate Star Codex, 11 from Vipul’s timeline, and 4 from the Analytics mailing list.

We ran the survey from May 30 to July 9, 2016 (although only the Slate Star Codex survey had a response past June 1).

After we looked at the survey responses on the first day, Vipul and I decided to create a second survey to focus on the parts from the first survey that interested us the most. The second survey was only circulated among SurveyMonkey’s audiences: we used SurveyMonkey’s US audience with no demographic filters (54 responses), as well as a US audience of ages 18–29 with a college or graduate degree (50 responses). We first ran the survey on the unfiltered audience again because the wording of our first question was changed and we wanted to have the new baseline. We then chose to filter for young college-educated people because our prediction was that more educated people would be more likely to read Wikipedia (the SurveyMonkey demographic data does not include education, and we hadn’t seen the Pew Internet Research surveys in the next section, so we were relying on our intuition and some demographic data from past surveys) and because young people in our first survey gave more informative free-form responses in survey 2 (SurveyMonkey’s demographic data does include age).

Previous surveys

Several demographic surveys regarding Wikipedia have been conducted, targeting both editors and users. The surveys we found most helpful were the following:

  • The 2010 Wikipedia survey by the Collaborative Creativity Group and the Wikimedia Foundation. The explanation before the bottom table on page 7 of the overview PDF has “Contributors show slightly but significantly higher education levels than readers”, which provides weak evidence that more educated people are more likely to engage with Wikipedia.
  • The Global South User Survey 2014 by the Wikimedia Foundation
  • Pew Internet Research’s 2011 survey: “Education level continues to be the strongest predictor of Wikipedia use. The collaborative encyclopedia is most popular among internet users with at least a college degree, 69% of whom use the site.” (page 3)
  • Pew Internet Research’s 2007 survey

Note that we found the Pew Internet Research surveys after conducting our own two surveys (and during the write-up of this document).

Motivation

Vipul and I ultimately want to get a better sense of the value of a Wikipedia pageview (one way to measure the impact of content creation), and one way to do this is to understand how people are using Wikipedia. As we focus on getting more people to work on editing Wikipedia – thus causing more people to read the content we pay and help to create – it becomes more important to understand what people are doing on the site.

For some previous discussion, see also Vipul’s answers to the following Quora questions:

Wikipedia allows relatively easy access to pageview data (especially by using tools developed for this purpose, including one that Vipul made), and there are some surveys that provide demographic data (see “Previous surveys” above). However, after looking around, it was apparent that the kind of information our survey was designed to find was not available.

I should also note that we were driven by our curiosity of how people use Wikipedia.

Survey questions for the first survey

For reference, here are the survey questions for the first survey. A dummy/mock-up version of the survey can be found here: https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/PDTTBM8.

The survey introduction said the following:

This survey is intended to gauge Wikipedia use habits. This survey has 3 pages with 5 questions total (3 on the first page, 1 on the second page, 1 on the third page). Please try your best to answer all of the questions, and make a guess if you’re not sure.

And the actual questions:

  1. How many distinct Wikipedia pages do you read per week on average?

    • less than 1
    • 1 to 10
    • 11 to 25
    • 26 or more
  2. On a search engine (e.g. Google) results page, do you explicitly seek Wikipedia pages, or do you passively click on Wikipedia pages only if they show up at the top of the results?

    • I explicitly seek Wikipedia pages
    • I have a slight preference for Wikipedia pages
    • I just click on what is at the top of the results
  3. Do you usually read a particular section of a page or the whole article?

    • Particular section
    • Whole page
  4. How often do you do the following? (Choices: Several times per week, About once per week, About once per month, About once per several months, Never/almost never.)

    • Use the search functionality on Wikipedia
    • Be surprised that there is no Wikipedia page on a topic
  5. For what fraction of pages you read do you do the following? (Choices: For every page, For most pages, For some pages, For very few pages, Never. These were displayed in a random order for each respondent, but displayed in alphabetical order here.)

    • Check (click or hover over) at least one citation to see where the information comes from on a page you are reading
    • Check how many pageviews a page is getting (on an external site or through the Pageview API)
    • Click through/look for at least one cited source to verify the information on a page you are reading
    • Edit a page you are reading because of grammatical/typographical errors on the page
    • Edit a page you are reading to add new information
    • Look at the “See also” section for additional articles to read
    • Look at the editing history of a page you are reading
    • Look at the editing history solely to see if a particular user wrote the page
    • Look at the talk page of a page you are reading
    • Read a page mostly for the “Criticisms” or “Reception” (or similar) section, to understand different views on the subject
    • Share the page with a friend/acquaintance/coworker

For the SurveyMonkey audience, there were also some demographic questions (age, gender, household income, US region, and device type).

Survey questions for the second survey

For reference, here are the survey questions for the second survey. A dummy/mock-up version of the survey can be found here: https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/28BW78V.

The survey introduction said the following:

This survey is intended to gauge Wikipedia use habits. Please try your best to answer all of the questions, and make a guess if you’re not sure.

This survey has 4 questions across 3 pages.

In this survey, “Wikipedia page” refers to a Wikipedia page in any language (not just the English Wikipedia).

And the actual questions:

  1. How many distinct Wikipedia pages do you read (at least one sentence of) per week on average?

    • Fewer than 1
    • 1 to 10
    • 11 to 25
    • 26 or more
  2. Which of these articles have you read (at least one sentence of) on Wikipedia (select all that apply)?

    • Adele
    • Barack Obama
    • Bernie Sanders
    • China
    • Donald Trump
    • Google
    • Hillary Clinton
    • India
    • Japan
    • Justin Bieber
    • Justin Trudeau
    • Katy Perry
    • Taylor Swift
    • The Beatles
    • United States
    • World War II
    • None of the above
  3. What are some of the Wikipedia articles you have most recently read (at least one sentence of)? Feel free to consult your browser’s history.

  4. Recall a time when you were surprised that a topic did not have a Wikipedia page. What were some of these topics?

Results

In this section we present the highlights from each of the survey questions. If you prefer to dig into the data yourself, there are also some exported PDFs below provided by SurveyMonkey. Most of the inferences can be made using these PDFs, but there are some cases where additional filters are needed to deduce certain percentages.

We use the notation “SnQm” to mean “survey n question m”.

S1Q1: number of Wikipedia pages read per week

Here is a table that summarizes the data for Q1:

How many distinct Wikipedia pages do you read per week on average? SM = SurveyMonkey audience, V = Vipul Naik’s timeline, SSC = Slate Star Codex audience, AM = Wikipedia Analytics mailing list.
Response SM V SSC AM
less than 1 42% 1% 1% 0%
1 to 10 45% 40% 37% 29%
11 to 25 13% 43% 36% 14%
26 or more 0% 16% 27% 57%

Here are some highlights from the first question that aren’t apparent from the table:

  • Of the people who read fewer than 1 distinct Wikipedia page per week (26 people), 68% were female even though females were only 48% of the respondents. (Note that gender data is only available for the SurveyMonkey audience.)

  • Filtering for high household income ($150k or more; 11 people) in the SurveyMonkey audience, only 2 read fewer than 1 page per week, although most (7) of the responses still fall in the “1 to 10” category.

The comments indicated that this question was flawed in several ways: we didn’t specify which language Wikipedias count nor what it meant to “read” an article (the whole page, a section, or just a sentence?). One comment questioned the “low” ceiling of 26; in fact, I had initially made the cutoffs 1, 10, 100, 500, and 1000, but Vipul suggested the final cutoffs because he argued they would make it easier for people to answer (without having to look it up in their browser history). It turned out this modification was reasonable because the “26 or more” group was a minority.

S1Q2: affinity for Wikipedia in search results

We asked Q2, “On a search engine (e.g. Google) results page, do you explicitly seek Wikipedia pages, or do you passively click on Wikipedia pages only if they show up at the top of the results?”, to see to what extent people preferred Wikipedia in search results. The main implication to this for people who do content creation on Wikipedia is that if people do explicitly seek Wikipedia pages (for whatever reason), it makes sense to give them more of what they want. On the other hand, if people don’t prefer Wikipedia, it makes sense to update in favor of diversifying one’s content creation efforts while still keeping in mind that raw pageviews indicate that content will be read more if placed on Wikipedia (see for instance Brian Tomasik’s experience, which is similar to my own, or gwern’s page comparing Wikipedia with other wikis).

The following table summarizes our results.

On a search engine (e.g. Google) results page, do you explicitly seek Wikipedia pages, or do you passively click on Wikipedia pages only if they show up at the top of the results? SM = SurveyMonkey audience, V = Vipul Naik’s timeline, SSC = Slate Star Codex audience, AM = Wikipedia Analytics mailing list, H = heavy users (26 or more articles per week) of Wikipedia.
Response SM V SSC AM H
Explicitly seek Wikipedia 19% 60% 63% 57% 79%
Slight preference for Wikipedia 29% 39% 34% 43% 20%
Just click on top results 52% 1% 3% 0% 1%

One error on my part was that I didn’t include an option for people who avoided Wikipedia or did something else. This became apparent from the comments. For this reason, the “Just click on top results” options might be inflated. In addition, some comments indicated a mixed strategy of preferring Wikipedia for general overviews while avoiding it for specific inquiries, so allowing multiple selections might have been better for this question.

S1Q3: section vs whole page

This question is relevant for Vipul and me because the work Vipul funds is mainly whole-page creation. If people are mostly reading the introduction or a particular section like the “Criticisms” or “Reception” section (see S1Q5), then that forces us to consider spending more time on those sections, or to strengthen those sections on weak existing pages.

Responses to this question were fairly consistent across different audiences, as can be see in the following table.

Do you usually read a particular section of a page or the whole article? SM = SurveyMonkey audience, V = Vipul Naik’s timeline, SSC = Slate Star Codex audience, AM = Wikipedia Analytics mailing list.
Response SM V SSC AM
Section 73% 80% 74% 86%
Whole 34% 23% 33% 29%

Note that people were allowed to select more than one option for this question. The comments indicate that several people do a combination, where they read the introductory portion of an article, then narrow down to the section of their interest.

S1Q4: search functionality on Wikipedia and surprise at lack of Wikipedia pages

We asked about whether people use the search functionality on Wikipedia because we wanted to know more about people’s article discovery methods. The data is summarized in the following table.

How often do you use the search functionality on Wikipedia? SM = SurveyMonkey audience, V = Vipul Naik’s timeline, SSC = Slate Star Codex audience, AM = Wikipedia Analytics mailing list, H = heavy users (26 or more articles per week) of Wikipedia.
Response SM V SSC AM H
Several times per week 8% 14% 32% 57% 55%
About once per week 19% 17% 21% 14% 15%
About once per month 15% 13% 14% 0% 3%
About once per several months 13% 12% 9% 14% 5%
Never/almost never 45% 43% 24% 14% 23%

Many people noted here that rather than using Wikipedia’s search functionality, they use Google with “wiki” attached to their query, DuckDuckGo’s “!w” expression, or some browser configuration to allow a quick search on Wikipedia.

To be more thorough about discovering people’s content discovery methods, we should have asked about other methods as well. We did ask about the “See also” section in S1Q5.

Next, we asked how often people are surprised that there is no Wikipedia page on a topic to gauge to what extent people notice a “gap” between how Wikipedia exists today and how it could exist. We were curious about what articles people specifically found missing, so we followed up with S2Q4.

How often are you surprised that there is no Wikipedia page on a topic? SM = SurveyMonkey audience, V = Vipul Naik’s timeline, SSC = Slate Star Codex audience, AM = Wikipedia Analytics mailing list, H = heavy users (26 or more articles per week) of Wikipedia.
Response SM V SSC AM H
Several times per week 2% 0% 2% 29% 6%
About once per week 8% 22% 18% 14% 34%
About once per month 18% 36% 34% 29% 31%
About once per several months 21% 22% 27% 0% 19%
Never/almost never 52% 20% 19% 29% 10%

Two comments on this question (out of 59) – both from the SSC group – specifically bemoaned deletionism, with one comment calling deletionism “a cancer killing Wikipedia”.

S1Q5: behavior on pages

This question was intended to gauge how often people perform an action for a specific page; as such, the frequencies are expressed in page-relative terms.

The following table presents the scores for each response, which are weighted by the number of responses. The scores range from 1 (for every page) to 5 (never); in other words, the lower the number, the more frequently one does the thing.

For what fraction of pages you read do you do the following? Note that the responses have been shortened here; see the “Survey questions” section for the wording used in the survey. Responses are sorted by the values in the SSC column. SM = SurveyMonkey audience, V = Vipul Naik’s timeline, SSC = Slate Star Codex audience, AM = Wikipedia Analytics mailing list, H = heavy users (26 or more articles per week) of Wikipedia.
Response SM V SSC AM H
Check ≥1 citation 3.57 2.80 2.91 2.67 2.69
Look at “See also” 3.65 2.93 2.92 2.67 2.76
Read mostly for “Criticisms” or “Reception” 4.35 3.12 3.34 3.83 3.14
Click through ≥1 source to verify information 3.80 3.07 3.47 3.17 3.36
Share the page 4.11 3.72 3.86 3.67 3.79
Look at the talk page 4.31 4.28 4.03 3.00 3.86
Look at the editing history 4.35 4.32 4.12 3.33 3.92
Edit a page for grammatical/typographical errors 4.50 4.41 4.22 3.67 4.02
Edit a page to add new information 4.61 4.55 4.49 3.83 4.34
Look at editing history to verify author 4.50 4.65 4.48 3.67 4.73
Check how many pageviews a page is getting 4.63 4.88 4.96 3.17 4.92

The table above provides a good ranking of how often people perform these actions on pages, but not the distribution information (which would require three dimensions to present fully). In general, the more common actions (scores of 2.5–4) had responses that clustered among “For some pages”, “For very few pages”, and “Never”, while the less common actions (scores above 4) had responses that clustered mainly in “Never”.

One comment (out of 43) – from the SSC group, but a different individual from the two in S1Q4 – bemoaned deletionism.

S2Q1: number of Wikipedia pages read per week

Note the wording changes on this question for the second survey: “less” was changed to “fewer”, the clarification “at least one sentence of” was added, and we explicitly allowed any language. We have also presented the survey 1 results for the SurveyMonkey audience in the corresponding rows, but note that because of the change in wording, the correspondence isn’t exact.

How many distinct Wikipedia pages do you read (at least one sentence of) per week on average? SM = SurveyMonkey audience with no demographic filters, CEYP = College-educated young people of SurveyMonkey, S1SM = SurveyMonkey audience with no demographic filters from the first survey.
Response SM CEYP S1SM
Fewer than 1 37% 32% 42%
1 to 10 48% 64% 45%
11 to 25 7% 2% 13%
26 or more 7% 2% 0%

Comparing SM with S1SM, we see that probably because of the wording, the percentages have drifted in the direction of more pages read. It might be surprising that the young educated audience seems to have a smaller fraction of heavy users than the general population. However note that each group only had ~50 responses, and that we have no education information for the SM group.

S2Q2: multiple-choice of articles read

Our intention with this question was to see if people’s stated or recalled article frequencies matched the actual, revealed popularity of the articles. Therefore we present the pageview data along with the percentage of people who said they had read an article.

Which of these articles have you read (at least one sentence of) on Wikipedia (select all that apply)? SM = SurveyMonkey audience with no demographic filters, CEYP = College-educated young people of SurveyMonkey. Columns “2016” and “2015” are desktop pageviews in millions. Note that the 2016 pageviews only include pageviews through the end of June. The rows are sorted by the values in the CEYP column followed by those in the SM column.
Response SM CEYP 2016 2015
None 37% 40%
World War II 17% 22% 2.6 6.5
Barack Obama 17% 20% 3.0 7.7
United States 17% 18% 4.3 9.6
Donald Trump 15% 18% 14.0 6.6
Taylor Swift 9% 18% 1.7 5.3
Bernie Sanders 17% 16% 4.3 3.8
Japan 11% 16% 1.6 3.7
Adele 6% 16% 2.0 4.0
Hillary Clinton 19% 14% 2.8 1.5
China 13% 14% 1.9 5.2
The Beatles 11% 14% 1.4 3.0
Katy Perry 9% 12% 0.8 2.4
Google 15% 10% 3.0 9.0
India 13% 10% 2.4 6.4
Justin Bieber 4% 8% 1.6 3.0
Justin Trudeau 9% 6% 1.1 3.0

Below are four plots of the data. Note that r_s denotes Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is used instead of Pearson’s r because the former is less affected by outliers. Note also that the percentage of respondents who viewed a page counts each respondent once, whereas the number of pageviews does not have this restriction (i.e. duplicate pageviews count), so we wouldn’t expect the relationship to be entirely linear even if the survey audiences were perfectly representative of the general population.

SM vs 2016 pageviews

SM vs 2016 pageviews

SM vs 2015 pageviews

SM vs 2015 pageviews

CEYP vs 2016 pageviews

CEYP vs 2016 pageviews

CEYP vs 2015 pageviews

CEYP vs 2015 pageviews

S2Q3: free response of articles read

The most common response was along the lines of “None”, “I don’t know”, “I don’t remember”, or similar. Among the more useful responses were:

S2Q4: free response of surprise at lack of Wikipedia pages

As with the previous question, the most common response was along the lines of “None”, “I don’t know”, “I don’t remember”, “Doesn’t happen”, or similar.

The most useful responses were classes of things: “particular words”, “French plays/books”, “Random people”, “obscure people”, “Specific list pages of movie genres”, “Foreign actors”, “various insect pages”, and so forth.

Summaries of responses (exported from SurveyMonkey)

SurveyMonkey allows exporting of response summaries. Here are the exports for each of the audiences.

Survey-making lessons

Not having any experience designing surveys, and wanting some rough results quickly, I decided not to look into survey-making best practices beyond the feedback from Vipul. As the first survey progressed, it became clear that there were several deficiencies in that survey:

  • Question 1 did not specify what counts as reading a page.
  • We did not specify which language Wikipedias we were considering (multiple people noted how they read other language Wikipedias other than the English Wikipedia).
  • Question 2 did not include an option for people who avoid Wikipedia or do something else entirely.
  • We did not include an option to allow people to release their survey results.

Further questions

The two surveys we’ve done so far provide some insight into how people use Wikipedia, but we are still far from understanding the value of Wikipedia pageviews. Some remaining questions:

  • Could it be possible that even on non-obscure topics, most of the views are by “elites” (i.e. those with outsized impact on the world)? This could mean pageviews are more valuable than previously thought.
  • On S2Q1, why did our data show that CEYP was less engaged with Wikipedia than SM? Is this a limitation of the small number of responses or of SurveyMonkey’s audiences?

Further reading

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Vipul Naik for collaboration on this project and feedback while writing this document, and thanks to Ethan Bashkansky for reviewing the document. All imperfections are my own.

The writing of this document was sponsored by Vipul Naik.

Document source and versions

The source files used to compile this document are available in a GitHub Gist. The Git repository of the Gist contains all versions of this document since its first publication.

This document is available in the following formats:

License

This document is released to the public domain.

Suggestion: jog instead of walk

2 [deleted] 13 July 2016 05:34PM

A bit of background: my manager literally runs around the office when she needs something so she can return to her desk asap. While watching her one day I thought about trying my own experiment of jogging from place to place.

I chose jogging instead of running as I figured the expenditure of energy and anaerobic respiration required for a full on run/sprint would take too much energy for the seconds saved and distance traveled, while jogging would feel a more natural transition of energy and still save some time.

So far, the only 'drawback' I've seen is the occasional confused look from a passerby (truthfully though, most people don't seem to care). Comparing this to the increase of overall energy and positive emotion I've felt, it's been well worth it. There also might be times and places where jogging would be inappropriate, so use discretion of course.

Also, you don't have to start out with jogging right away! I run daily anyway so that's why I transitioned right away. You could start with a brisker walk and work your way up.

If you do try it out, please feel free to let me know how it works out for you! :)

tDCS, Neuroscientists' Open Letter To DIY Brain Hackers

4 morganism 12 July 2016 07:37PM

"The evidence of harm would be the evidence that you can hurt some cognitive functions with the same stimulation protocols that help another cognitive function. But they're completely correct that we don't have any evidence saying you're definitely hurting yourself. We do have evidence that you're definitely changing your brain."

interview:

http://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2016/07/11/caution-brain-hacking

 

Paper:

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ana.24689/references

 

I was aware of the variability of responses to stim, but not the paper that leveraging one brain function could impair another. This was also written to give the docs some info to help inform their patients.

edit

I'll also tuck this in here, as i posted it to open thread.

Texting changes brain waves to new, previously unknown, pattern.

http://sciencebulletin.org/archives/2623.html

Makes me wonder if they were using spell check, or the new, shortend speak. By using constructed kernels, or images of words and concepts, it looks like machine learning retrieval or construction is already  being practiced here ?

Open thread, Jul. 11 - Jul. 17, 2016

4 MrMind 11 July 2016 07:09AM

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.


Notes for future OT posters:

1. Please add the 'open_thread' tag.

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one. (Immediately before; refresh the list-of-threads page before posting.)

3. Open Threads should be posted in Discussion, and not Main.

4. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.

A Very Concrete Model of Learning From Regrets

1 SquirrelInHell 09 July 2016 11:30AM

Warning 1: This post is written in the form of Java-like pseudocode.

If you have no knowledge of programming, you might have trouble understanding it.

(If you do, it still does not guarantee you will understand, but your chances are better.)

 

Warning 2: I have more than moderate, but less than high, confidence that this model is approximately correct.

It doesn't mean that my or anyone's brain works exactly in the way shown in the code, but rather that the flow of data in the brain is approximately as if it were using such an algorithm.

The word "approximately" includes stuff I don't (yet) know about, but also stuff I didn't include below to keep it simple.

I wrote this specifically for regrets, but processing of positive memories seems to have similar mechanics (with different constants).

 

Warning 3: There is little chance of finding any existing studies/data etc. that could directly validate or invalidate this model. (However if you know of any, I'm all ears.)

There might some stuff that is correlated, so if you know something mention it too.

 

class Brain
{
    ...
    
    // This represents a memory about a single event
    
    class Memory
    {
        ...
        
        float associatedEmotions; // positive or negative
    }
    
    // Your brain keeps track of this
    
    private Map<Memory, Float> memoriesRequireProcessing = new Map<>();
    
    // Add new stuff to the queue
    
    private void somethingHappened(Memory newMemory)
    {
        float affect = getAffectOfSituation(newMemory);
        
        newMemory.associatedEmotions = affect * 0.5;
    
        if (Math.abs(affect) > 0.1)
            memoriesRequireProcessing.add(newMemory, Math.abs(affect));
    }          // You have no control over how this works,     // but you can influence the confidence parameter     // (mostly indirectly, a little bit directly)          protected void learnedMyLesson(Memory m, float confidence)     {         float previousValue =             memoriesRequireProcessing.get(m);                  float nextValue = previousValue * (1.0 - confidence);                  if (nextValue > 0.1)             memoriesRequireProcessing.set(m, nextValue);         else             memoriesRequireProcessing.remove(m);     }          // You can consciously override this and do something else     //     // @return: judgement of success or failure          protected float ruminateOnMemory(Memory m)     {         // Depends on the situation, but the default is         // relatively low confidence                  learnedMyLesson(m, 0.1);                  // Substitute affect for judgement of success                  return getAffectOfSituation(m);     }          // This prompts some thoughts about a memory          private void rememberAbout(Memory m)     {         feelEmotion(m.associatedEmotions);              float judgement = ruminateOnMemory(m);                  m.associatedEmotions =             0.9 * m.associatedEmotions             + 0.2 * judgement;     }          // Your brain does this all the time          private void onIdle()     {         while (memoriesRequireProcessing.thereIsALotOfShit())         {             // Choose some memory paired with a high value                          Memory next = memoriesRequireProcessing.choose();                          rememberAbout(next);         }                  ...     }          ... }

New LW Meetup: Boise ID, Bay City MI

2 FrankAdamek 08 July 2016 03:25PM

This summary was posted to LW Main on July 8th. The following week's summary is here.

New meetups (or meetups with a hiatus of more than a year) are happening in:

Irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups are taking place in:

The remaining meetups take place in cities with regular scheduling, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berlin, Boston, Brussels, Buffalo, Canberra, Columbus, Denver, Kraków, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Moscow, New Hampshire, New York, Philadelphia, Research Triangle NC, San Francisco Bay Area, Seattle, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Toronto, Vienna, Washington DC, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers and a Slack channel for daily discussion and online meetups on Sunday night US time.

continue reading »

[LINK] Concrete problems in AI safety

15 Stuart_Armstrong 05 July 2016 09:33PM

From the Google Research blog:

We believe that AI technologies are likely to be overwhelmingly useful and beneficial for humanity. But part of being a responsible steward of any new technology is thinking through potential challenges and how best to address any associated risks. So today we’re publishing a technical paper, Concrete Problems in AI Safety, a collaboration among scientists at Google, OpenAI, Stanford and Berkeley.

While possible AI safety risks have received a lot of public attention, most previous discussion has been very hypothetical and speculative. We believe it’s essential to ground concerns in real machine learning research, and to start developing practical approaches for engineering AI systems that operate safely and reliably.

We’ve outlined five problems we think will be very important as we apply AI in more general circumstances. These are all forward thinking, long-term research questions -- minor issues today, but important to address for future systems:

  • Avoiding Negative Side Effects: How can we ensure that an AI system will not disturb its environment in negative ways while pursuing its goals, e.g. a cleaning robot knocking over a vase because it can clean faster by doing so?
  • Avoiding Reward Hacking: How can we avoid gaming of the reward function? For example, we don’t want this cleaning robot simply covering over messes with materials it can’t see through.
  • Scalable Oversight: How can we efficiently ensure that a given AI system respects aspects of the objective that are too expensive to be frequently evaluated during training? For example, if an AI system gets human feedback as it performs a task, it needs to use that feedback efficiently because asking too often would be annoying.
  • Safe Exploration: How do we ensure that an AI system doesn’t make exploratory moves with very negative repercussions? For example, maybe a cleaning robot should experiment with mopping strategies, but clearly it shouldn’t try putting a wet mop in an electrical outlet.
  • Robustness to Distributional Shift: How do we ensure that an AI system recognizes, and behaves robustly, when it’s in an environment very different from its training environment? For example, heuristics learned for a factory workfloor may not be safe enough for an office.

We go into more technical detail in the paper. The machine learning research community has already thought quite a bit about most of these problems and many related issues, but we think there’s a lot more work to be done.

We believe in rigorous, open, cross-institution work on how to build machine learning systems that work as intended. We’re eager to continue our collaborations with other research groups to make positive progress on AI.

Notes on Imagination and Suffering

5 SquirrelInHell 05 July 2016 02:28PM

Time: 22:56:47

I

This is going to be an exercise in speed writing a LW post.

Not writing posts at all seems to be worse than writing poorly edited posts.

It is currently hard for me to do anything that even resembles actual speed writing: even as I type this sentence, I have a very hard to resist urge to check it for grammar mistakes and make small corrections/improvements before I've even finished typing.

But to reduce the burden of writing, I predict it is going to be highly useful to develop the ability of actually writing a post as fast as I can type, without going back.

If this proves to have acceptable results, you can expect more regular posts from me in the future.

And possibly, if I develop the habit of writing regularly, I'll finally get to describing some of the topics on which I have (what I believe are) original and sizable clusters of knowledge, which is not easily available somewhere else.

But for now, just some thoughts on a very particular aspect of modelling how human brains think about a very particular thing.

This thing is immense suffering.

Time: 23:03:18

(Still slow!)

II

You might have heard this or similar from someone, possibly more than once in your life:

"you have no idea how I feel!"

or

"you can't even imagine how I feel!"

For me, this kind of phrase has always had the ring of a challenge. I have a potent imagination, and non-negligible experience in the affairs of humans. Therefore, I am certainly able to imagine how you feel, am I not?

Not so fast.

(Note added later: as Gram_Stone mentions, these kinds of statements tend to be used in epistemically unsound arguments, and as such can be presumed to be suspicious; however here, I am more concerned with the fact of the matter of how imagination works.)

Let's back up a little bit and recount some simple observations about imagining numbers.

You might be able to imagine and hold the image of five, six, nine, or even sixteen apples in your mind.

If I tell you to imagine something more complex, like pointed arrows arranged in a circle, you might be able to imagine four, or six, or maybe even eight of them.

If your brain is constructed differently from mine, you might easily go higher with the numbers.

But at some fairly small number, your mental machinery simply no longer has the capacity to imagine more shapes.

III

However, if I tell you that "you can't even imagine 35 apples!" it is obviously not an insult or a challenge, and what is more:

"imagining 35 apples" is NOT EQUAL to "comprehending in every detail what 35 apples are"

I.e. depending on how good your knowledge of natural numbers is, that is to say, if you passed the first class of primary school, you can analyse the situation of "35 apples" in every possible way, and imagine it partially - but not all of it at the same time.

Directly imagining apples is very similar to actually experiencing apples in your life, but it has a severe limitation.

You can experience 35 apples in your life, but you can't imagine all of them at once even if you saw them 3 seconds ago.

Meta: I think I'm getting better at not stopping when I write.

Time: 23:13:00

IV

But, you ask, what is the point of writing all this obvious stuff about apples?

Well, if you move to more emotionally charged topics, like someone's emotions, it is much harder to think about the situation in a clear way.

And if you have a clear model of how your brain processes this information, you might be able to respond in a more effective way.

In particular, you might be saved from feeling guilty or inadequate about not being able to imagine someone's feelings or suffering.

It is a simple fact about your brain that it has a limited capability to imagine emotion.

And especially with suffering, the amount of suffering you are able to experience IS OF A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ORDER OF MAGNITUDE than the amount you are able to imagine, even with the best intentions and knowledge.

However, can you comprehend it?

V

From this model, it is also immediately obvious that the same thing happens when you think about your own suffering in the past.

We know generally that humans can't remember their emotions very well, and their memories don't correlate very well with reported experience-in-the-moment.

Based on my personal experience, I'll tentatively make some bolder claims.

If you have suffered a tremendous amount, and then enough time has passed to "get over it", your brain is not only unable to imagine how much you have suffered in the past:

it is also unable to comprehend the amount of suffering.

Yes, even if it's your own suffering.

And what is more, I propose that the exact mechanism of "getting over something" is more or less EQUIVALENT to losing the ability to comprehend that suffering.

The same would (I expect) hold in case of getting better after severe PTSD etc.

VI

So in this sense, a person telling you "you cannot even imagine how I feel" is right also with a less literal interpretation of their statement.

If you are a mentally healthy individual, not suffering any major traumas etc., I suggest your brain literally has a defense mechanism (that protects your precious mental health) that makes it impossible for you to not only imagine, but also fully comprehend the amounts of suffering you are being told about.

Time: 23:28:04

Publish!

Open thread, Jul. 04 - Jul. 10, 2016

4 MrMind 04 July 2016 07:02AM

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.


Notes for future OT posters:

1. Please add the 'open_thread' tag.

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one. (Immediately before; refresh the list-of-threads page before posting.)

3. Open Threads should be posted in Discussion, and not Main.

4. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.

Link: Re-reading Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow

11 toomanymetas 04 July 2016 06:32AM

"A bit over four years ago I wrote a glowing review of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow. I described it as a “magnificent book” and “one of the best books I have read”. I praised the way Kahneman threaded his story around the System 1 / System 2 dichotomy, and the coherence provided  by prospect theory.

What a difference four years makes. I will still describe Thinking, Fast and Slow as an excellent book – possibly the best behavioural science book available. But during that time a combination of my learning path and additional research in the behavioural sciences has led me to see Thinking, Fast and Slow as a book with many flaws."

Continued here: https://jasoncollins.org/2016/06/29/re-reading-kahnemans-thinking-fast-and-slow/

The map of future models

5 turchin 03 July 2016 01:17PM

TL;DR: Many models of the future exist. Several are relevant. Hyperbolic model is strongest, but too strange.

Our need: correct model of the future
Different people: different models = no communication.

Assumptions:
Model of the future = main driving force of historical process + graphic of changes
Model of the future determines global risks

The map: lists all main future models.
Structure: from fast growth – to slow growth models.
Pfd: http://immortality-roadmap.com/futuremodelseng.pdf

 

 

 

 

Zombies Redacted

30 Eliezer_Yudkowsky 02 July 2016 08:16PM

I looked at my old post Zombies! Zombies? and it seemed to have some extraneous content.  This is a redacted and slightly rewritten version.

continue reading »

New LW Meetup: Dallas

1 FrankAdamek 01 July 2016 03:41PM

This summary was posted to LW Main on July 1st. The following week's summary is here.

New meetups (or meetups with a hiatus of more than a year) are happening in:

Irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups are taking place in:

The remaining meetups take place in cities with regular scheduling, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berlin, Boston, Brussels, Buffalo, Canberra, Columbus, Denver, Kraków, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Moscow, New Hampshire, New York, Philadelphia, Research Triangle NC, San Francisco Bay Area, Seattle, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Toronto, Vienna, Washington DC, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers and a Slack channel for daily discussion and online meetups on Sunday night US time.

continue reading »

Rationality Quotes July 2016

1 bbleeker 01 July 2016 09:02AM

Another month, another rationality quotes thread. The rules are:

  • Provide sufficient information (URL, title, date, page number, etc.) to enable a reader to find the place where you read the quote, or its original source if available. Do not quote with only a name.
  • Post all quotes separately, so that they can be upvoted or downvoted separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
  • Do not quote yourself.
  • Do not quote from Less Wrong itself, HPMoR, Eliezer Yudkowsky, or Robin Hanson. If you'd like to revive an old quote from one of those sources, please do so here.
  • No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.

July 2016 Media Thread

2 ArisKatsaris 01 July 2016 06:52AM

This is the monthly thread for posting media of various types that you've found that you enjoy. Post what you're reading, listening to, watching, and your opinion of it. Post recommendations to blogs. Post whatever media you feel like discussing! To see previous recommendations, check out the older threads.

Rules:

  • Please avoid downvoting recommendations just because you don't personally like the recommended material; remember that liking is a two-place word. If you can point out a specific flaw in a person's recommendation, consider posting a comment to that effect.
  • If you want to post something that (you know) has been recommended before, but have another recommendation to add, please link to the original, so that the reader has both recommendations.
  • Please post only under one of the already created subthreads, and never directly under the parent media thread.
  • Use the "Other Media" thread if you believe the piece of media you want to discuss doesn't fit under any of the established categories.
  • Use the "Meta" thread if you want to discuss about the monthly media thread itself (e.g. to propose adding/removing/splitting/merging subthreads, or to discuss the type of content properly belonging to each subthread) or for any other question or issue you may have about the thread or the rules.

Notes on the Safety in Artificial Intelligence conference

25 UmamiSalami 01 July 2016 12:36AM

These are my notes and observations after attending the Safety in Artificial Intelligence (SafArtInt) conference, which was co-hosted by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and Carnegie Mellon University on June 27 and 28. This isn't an organized summary of the content of the conference; rather, it's a selection of points which are relevant to the control problem. As a result, it suffers from selection bias: it looks like superintelligence and control-problem-relevant issues were discussed frequently, when in reality those issues were discussed less and I didn't write much about the more mundane parts.

SafArtInt has been the third out of a planned series of four conferences. The purpose of the conference series was twofold: the OSTP wanted to get other parts of the government moving on AI issues, and they also wanted to inform public opinion.

The other three conferences are about near term legal, social, and economic issues of AI. SafArtInt was about near term safety and reliability in AI systems. It was effectively the brainchild of Dr. Ed Felten, the deputy U.S. chief technology officer for the White House, who came up with the idea for it last year. CMU is a top computer science university and many of their own researchers attended, as well as some students. There were also researchers from other universities, some people from private sector AI including both Silicon Valley and government contracting, government researchers and policymakers from groups such as DARPA and NASA, a few people from the military/DoD, and a few control problem researchers. As far as I could tell, everyone except a few university researchers were from the U.S., although I did not meet many people. There were about 70-100 people watching the presentations at any given time, and I had conversations with about twelve of the people who were not affiliated with existential risk organizations, as well as of course all of those who were affiliated. The conference was split with a few presentations on the 27th and the majority of presentations on the 28th. Not everyone was there for both days.

Felten believes that neither "robot apocalypses" nor "mass unemployment" are likely. It soon became apparent that the majority of others present at the conference felt the same way with regard to superintelligence. The general intention among researchers and policymakers at the conference could be summarized as follows: we need to make sure that the AI systems we develop in the near future will not be responsible for any accidents, because if accidents do happen then they will spark public fears about AI, which would lead to a dearth of funding for AI research and an inability to realize the corresponding social and economic benefits. Of course, that doesn't change the fact that they strongly care about safety in its own right and have significant pragmatic needs for robust and reliable AI systems.

Most of the talks were about verification and reliability in modern day AI systems. So they were concerned with AI systems that would give poor results or be unreliable in the narrow domains where they are being applied in the near future. They mostly focused on "safety-critical" systems, where failure of an AI program would result in serious negative consequences: automated vehicles were a common topic of interest, as well as the use of AI in healthcare systems. A recurring theme was that we have to be more rigorous in demonstrating safety and do actual hazard analyses on AI systems, and another was that we need the AI safety field to succeed in ways that the cybersecurity field has failed. Another general belief was that long term AI safety, such as concerns about the ability of humans to control AIs, was not a serious issue.

On average, the presentations were moderately technical. They were mostly focused on machine learning systems, although there was significant discussion of cybersecurity techniques.

The first talk was given by Eric Horvitz of Microsoft. He discussed some approaches for pushing into new directions in AI safety. Instead of merely trying to reduce the errors spotted according to one model, we should look out for "unknown unknowns" by stacking models and looking at problems which appear on any of them, a theme which would be presented by other researchers as well in later presentations. He discussed optimization under uncertain parameters, sensitivity analysis to uncertain parameters, and 'wireheading' or short-circuiting of reinforcement learning systems (which he believes can be guarded against by using 'reflective analysis'). Finally, he brought up the concerns about superintelligence, which sparked amused reactions in the audience. He said that scientists should address concerns about superintelligence, which he aptly described as the 'elephant in the room', noting that it was the reason that some people were at the conference. He said that scientists will have to engage with public concerns, while also noting that there were experts who were worried about superintelligence and that there would have to be engagement with the experts' concerns. He did not comment on whether he believed that these concerns were reasonable or not.

An issue which came up in the Q&A afterwards was that we need to deal with mis-structured utility functions in AI, because it is often the case that the specific tradeoffs and utilities which humans claim to value often lead to results which the humans don't like. So we need to have structural uncertainty about our utility models. The difficulty of finding good objective functions for AIs would eventually be discussed in many other presentations as well.

The next talk was given by Andrew Moore of Carnegie Mellon University, who claimed that his talk represented the consensus of computer scientists at the school. He claimed that the stakes of AI safety were very high - namely, that AI has the capability to save many people's lives in the near future, but if there are any accidents involving AI then public fears could lead to freezes in AI research and development. He highlighted the public's irrational tendencies wherein a single accident could cause people to overlook and ignore hundreds of invisible lives saved. He specifically mentioned a 12-24 month timeframe for these issues.

Moore said that verification of AI system safety will be difficult due to the combinatorial explosion of AI behaviors. He talked about meta-machine-learning as a solution to this, something which is being investigated under the direction of Lawrence Schuette at the Office of Naval Research. Moore also said that military AI systems require high verification standards and that development timelines for these systems are long. He talked about two different approaches to AI safety, stochastic testing and theorem proving - the process of doing the latter often leads to the discovery of unsafe edge cases.

He also discussed AI ethics, giving an example 'trolley problem' where AI cars would have to choose whether to hit a deer in order to provide a slightly higher probability of survival for the human driver. He said that we would need hash-defined constants to tell vehicle AIs how many deer a human is worth. He also said that we would need to find compromises in death-pleasantry tradeoffs, for instance where the safety of self-driving cars depends on the speed and routes on which they are driven. He compared the issue to civil engineering where engineers have to operate with an assumption about how much money they would spend to save a human life.

He concluded by saying that we need policymakers, company executives, scientists, and startups to all be involved in AI safety. He said that the research community stands to gain or lose together, and that there is a shared responsibility among researchers and developers to avoid triggering another AI winter through unsafe AI designs.

The next presentation was by Richard Mallah of the Future of Life Institute, who was there to represent "Medium Term AI Safety". He pointed out the explicit/implicit distinction between different modeling techniques in AI systems, as well as the explicit/implicit distinction between different AI actuation techniques. He talked about the difficulty of value specification and the concept of instrumental subgoals as an important issue in the case of complex AIs which are beyond human understanding. He said that even a slight misalignment of AI values with regard to human values along one parameter could lead to a strongly negative outcome, because machine learning parameters don't strictly correspond to the things that humans care about.

Mallah stated that open-world discovery leads to self-discovery, which can lead to reward hacking or a loss of control. He underscored the importance of causal accounting, which is distinguishing causation from correlation in AI systems. He said that we should extend machine learning verification to self-modification. Finally, he talked about introducing non-self-centered ontology to AI systems and bounding their behavior.

The audience was generally quiet and respectful during Richard's talk. I sensed that at least a few of them labelled him as part of the 'superintelligence out-group' and dismissed him accordingly, but I did not learn what most people's thoughts or reactions were. In the next panel featuring three speakers, he wasn't the recipient of any questions regarding his presentation or ideas.

Tom Mitchell from CMU gave the next talk. He talked about both making AI systems safer, and using AI to make other systems safer. He said that risks to humanity from other kinds of issues besides AI were the "big deals of 2016" and that we should make sure that the potential of AIs to solve these problems is realized. He wanted to focus on the detection and remediation of all failures in AI systems. He said that it is a novel issue that learning systems defy standard pre-testing ("as Richard mentioned") and also brought up the purposeful use of AI for dangerous things.

Some interesting points were raised in the panel. Andrew did not have a direct response to the implications of AI ethics being determined by the predominantly white people of the US/UK where most AIs are being developed. He said that ethics in AIs will have to be decided by society, regulators, manufacturers, and human rights organizations in conjunction. He also said that our cost functions for AIs will have to get more and more complicated as AIs get better, and he said that he wants to separate unintended failures from superintelligence type scenarios. On trolley problems in self driving cars and similar issues, he said "it's got to be complicated and messy."

Dario Amodei of Google Deepbrain, who co-authored the paper on concrete problems in AI safety, gave the next talk. He said that the public focus is too much on AGI/ASI and wants more focus on concrete/empirical approaches. He discussed the same problems that pose issues in advanced general AI, including flawed objective functions and reward hacking. He said that he sees long term concerns about AGI/ASI as "extreme versions of accident risk" and that he thinks it's too early to work directly on them, but he believes that if you want to deal with them then the best way to do it is to start with safety in current systems. Mostly he summarized the Google paper in his talk.

In her presentation, Claire Le Goues of CMU said "before we talk about Skynet we should focus on problems that we already have." She mostly talked about analogies between software bugs and AI safety, the similarities and differences between the two and what we can learn from software debugging to help with AI safety.

Robert Rahmer of IARPA discussed CAUSE, a cyberintelligence forecasting program which promises to help predict cyber attacks. It is a program which is still being put together.

In the panel of the above three, autonomous weapons were discussed, but no clear policy stances were presented.

John Launchbury gave a talk on DARPA research and the big picture of AI development. He pointed out that DARPA work leads to commercial applications and that progress in AI comes from sustained government investment. He classified AI capabilities into "describing," "predicting," and "explaining" in order of increasing difficulty, and he pointed out that old fashioned "describing" still plays a large role in AI verification. He said that "explaining" AIs would need transparent decisionmaking and probabilistic programming (the latter would also be discussed by others at the conference).

The next talk came from Jason Gaverick Matheny, the director of IARPA. Matheny talked about four requirements in current and future AI systems: verification, validation, security, and control. He wanted "auditability" in AI systems as a weaker form of explainability. He talked about the importance of "corner cases" for national intelligence purposes, the low probability, high stakes situations where we have limited data - these are situations where we have significant need for analysis but where the traditional machine learning approach doesn't work because of its overwhelming focus on data. Another aspect of national defense is that it has a slower decision tempo, longer timelines, and longer-viewing optics about future events.

He said that assessing local progress in machine learning development would be important for global security and that we therefore need benchmarks to measure progress in AIs. He ended with a concrete invitation for research proposals from anyone (educated or not), for both large scale research and for smaller studies ("seedlings") that could take us "from disbelief to doubt".

The difference in timescales between different groups was something I noticed later on, after hearing someone from the DoD describe their agency as having a longer timeframe than the Homeland Security Agency, and someone from the White House describe their work as being crisis reactionary.

The next presentation was from Andrew Grotto, senior director of cybersecurity policy at the National Security Council. He drew a close parallel from the issue of genetically modified crops in Europe in the 1990's to modern day artificial intelligence. He pointed out that Europe utterly failed to achieve widespread cultivation of GMO crops as a result of public backlash. He said that the widespread economic and health benefits of GMO crops were ignored by the public, who instead focused on a few health incidents which undermined trust in the government and crop producers. He had three key points: that risk frameworks matter, that you should never assume that the benefits of new technology will be widely perceived by the public, and that we're all in this together with regard to funding, research progress and public perception.

In the Q&A between Launchbury, Matheny, and Grotto after Grotto's presentation, it was mentioned that the economic interests of farmers worried about displacement also played a role in populist rejection of GMOs, and that a similar dynamic could play out with regard to automation causing structural unemployment. Grotto was also asked what to do about bad publicity which seeks to sink progress in order to avoid risks. He said that meetings like SafArtInt and open public dialogue were good.

One person asked what Launchbury wanted to do about AI arms races with multiple countries trying to "get there" and whether he thinks we should go "slow and secure" or "fast and risky" in AI development, a question which provoked laughter in the audience. He said we should go "fast and secure" and wasn't concerned. He said that secure designs for the Internet once existed, but the one which took off was the one which was open and flexible.

Another person asked how we could avoid discounting outliers in our models, referencing Matheny's point that we need to include corner cases. Matheny affirmed that data quality is a limiting factor to many of our machine learning capabilities. At IARPA, we generally try to include outliers until they are sure that they are erroneous, said Matheny.

Another presentation came from Tom Dietterich, president of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. He said that we have not focused enough on safety, reliability and robustness in AI and that this must change. Much like Eric Horvitz, he drew a distinction between robustness against errors within the scope of a model and robustness against unmodeled phenomena. On the latter issue, he talked about solutions such as expanding the scope of models, employing multiple parallel models, and doing creative searches for flaws - the latter doesn't enable verification that a system is safe, but it nevertheless helps discover many potential problems. He talked about knowledge-level redundancy as a method of avoiding misspecification - for instance, systems could identify objects by an "ownership facet" as well as by a "goal facet" to produce a combined concept with less likelihood of overlooking key features. He said that this would require wider experiences and more data.

There were many other speakers who brought up a similar set of issues: the user of cybersecurity techniques to verify machine learning systems, the failures of cybersecurity as a field, opportunities for probabilistic programming, and the need for better success in AI verification. Inverse reinforcement learning was extensively discussed as a way of assigning values. Jeanette Wing of Microsoft talked about the need for AIs to reason about the continuous and the discrete in parallel, as well as the need for them to reason about uncertainty (with potential meta levels all the way up). One point which was made by Sarah Loos of Google was that proving the safety of an AI system can be computationally very expensive, especially given the combinatorial explosion of AI behaviors.

In one of the panels, the idea of government actions to ensure AI safety was discussed. No one was willing to say that the government should regulate AI designs. Instead they stated that the government should be involved in softer ways, such as guiding and working with AI developers, and setting standards for certification.

Pictures: https://imgur.com/a/49eb7

In between these presentations I had time to speak to individuals and listen in on various conversations. A high ranking person from the Department of Defense stated that the real benefit of autonomous systems would be in terms of logistical systems rather than weaponized applications. A government AI contractor drew the connection between Mallah's presentation and the recent press revolving around superintelligence, and said he was glad that the government wasn't worried about it.

I talked to some insiders about the status of organizations such as MIRI, and found that the current crop of AI safety groups could use additional donations to become more established and expand their programs. There may be some issues with the organizations being sidelined; after all, the Google Deepbrain paper was essentially similar to a lot of work by MIRI, just expressed in somewhat different language, and was more widely received in mainstream AI circles.

In terms of careers, I found that there is significant opportunity for a wide range of people to contribute to improving government policy on this issue. Working at a group such as the Office of Science and Technology Policy does not necessarily require advanced technical education, as you can just as easily enter straight out of a liberal arts undergraduate program and build a successful career as long as you are technically literate. (At the same time, the level of skepticism about long term AI safety at the conference hinted to me that the signalling value of a PhD in computer science would be significant.) In addition, there are large government budgets in the seven or eight figure range available for qualifying research projects. I've come to believe that it would not be difficult to find or create AI research programs that are relevant to long term AI safety while also being practical and likely to be funded by skeptical policymakers and officials.

I also realized that there is a significant need for people who are interested in long term AI safety to have basic social and business skills. Since there is so much need for persuasion and compromise in government policy, there is a lot of value to be had in being communicative, engaging, approachable, appealing, socially savvy, and well-dressed. This is not to say that everyone involved in long term AI safety is missing those skills, of course.

I was surprised by the refusal of almost everyone at the conference to take long term AI safety seriously, as I had previously held the belief that it was more of a mixed debate given the existence of expert computer scientists who were involved in the issue. I sensed that the recent wave of popular press and public interest in dangerous AI has made researchers and policymakers substantially less likely to take the issue seriously. None of them seemed to be familiar with actual arguments or research on the control problem, so their opinions didn't significantly change my outlook on the technical issues. I strongly suspect that the majority of them had their first or possibly only exposure to the idea of the control problem after seeing badly written op-eds and news editorials featuring comments from the likes of Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking, which would naturally make them strongly predisposed to not take the issue seriously. In the run-up to the conference, websites and press releases didn't say anything about whether this conference would be about long or short term AI safety, and they didn't make any reference to the idea of superintelligence.

I sympathize with the concerns and strategy given by people such as Andrew Moore and Andrew Grotto, which make perfect sense if (and only if) you assume that worries about long term AI safety are completely unfounded. For the community that is interested in long term AI safety, I would recommend that we avoid competitive dynamics by (a) demonstrating that we are equally strong opponents of bad press, inaccurate news, and irrational public opinion which promotes generic uninformed fears over AI, (b) explaining that we are not interested in removing funding for AI research (even if you think that slowing down AI development is a good thing, restricting funding yields only limited benefits in terms of changing overall timelines, whereas those who are not concerned about long term AI safety would see a restriction of funding as a direct threat to their interests and projects, so it makes sense to cooperate here in exchange for other concessions), and (c) showing that we are scientifically literate and focused on the technical concerns. I do not believe that there is necessarily a need for the two "sides" on this to be competing against each other, so it was disappointing to see an implication of opposition at the conference.

Anyway, Ed Felten announced a request for information from the general public, seeking popular and scientific input on the government's policies and attitudes towards AI: https://www.whitehouse.gov/webform/rfi-preparing-future-artificial-intelligence

Overall, I learned quite a bit and benefited from the experience, and I hope the insight I've gained can be used to improve the attitudes and approaches of the long term AI safety community.

Link: The Economist on Paperclip Maximizers

5 Anders_H 30 June 2016 12:40PM

I certainly was not expecting the Economist to publish a special report on paperclip maximizers (!).

See http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21700762-techies-do-not-believe-artificial-intelligence-will-run-out-control-there-are?fsrc=scn/fb/te/pe/ed/frankensteinspaperclips

 

As the title suggests, they are downplaying the risks of unfriendly AI, but just the fact that the Economist published this is significant

The Ethics of AI and Its Effect On Us

-1 cameroncowan 30 June 2016 02:18AM

As many of you know, I've been pretty passionate about the melding to science through AI and philosophy. I've often asked questions on this forum in regards to thought, culture, and figuring out how to decide what an AI should do and how to keep and AI friendly. Fortunately, Slate.com has given me yet another opportunity to wax on the subject again (unpoetically). 

 

The article is here

One of the subjects of the article is an interesting case in what the future might hold for AI. 

Saqib Shaikh is a microsoft engineering working on one of their many AI projects. His claim to fame is his ability to use AI and machine learning to create smart glasses that he uses to compensate for his loss of sight when he was a child. Rather that improve his sight, the glasses give him sounds and he sees using the sound. From avoiding a skateboarder to finding his family, he gets about. It is an excellent example of how assistive technologies could become an important part of our lives. 

Ethical AI is a rather large topic and it is something that we will have to deal with sooner rather than later. The writer reminds us that we need greater collaboration on AI. This could be challenging thanks to nativism, Brexit, and overall national feelings that are sweeping the world. In the moment when we really need to come together on a technology that could solve a host of problems and help is make really great decisions, we're coming apart at every seam. But that's another story for another time.

We tend to have these pop culture notions about AI. As the article states we're somewhere between HAL and Siri in terms of our understanding and acceptance of AI in our lives. But the fact is that every items are getting smarter and getting infused with technology like never before giving these devices the chance to do even more for us than ever before.

Obviously, if we are creating something as smart and complex as we are we want some assurance that they will behave in a way that we find acceptable. In this way we refer to this boundary of behavior as an ethic and we hope for a friendly AI. The problem with ethics is that it is very subjective and requires judgement and discernment and is deeply cultural. What we think is right in the West might not be so true in parts of Asia where the civilization ethic is very different. How is AI going to respond to those nuances?

We can find some universal truths that most cultures can agree on:

We agree to not kill each other and punish those members who we catch doing it

We generally try to work cooperatively either directly or indirectly (directly in a hunting band, indirectly through economy of scale)

We aren't violent towards each other and we punish members who commit violence to another human or that humans items and home.

When it comes to social graces we won't have to worry about those with the AI we're likely to experience in our lifetimes. 

However, the ability to do "the right thing" will get complicated once we get past "perform this task, then that task, and then that task and report back to me." If an AI is doing legal discovery can they tell nuiance? Can they secure the data in such a way so as not to reveal any information to anyone else (computer or human) and in scenarios when certainly information cannot be used or used in certain contexts, is the AI smart enough to recognize those situations and act in an ethical manner of which we would approve? 

The article talks about trust and that we have to build trust into AI systems. This is where I think culture is vitally important. We humans are as much a product of our culture as anything else. How can we infuse human culture into AI?

 

To this the article says:

"A few people are taking the lead on this question. Cynthia Breazeal at the MIT Media Lab has devoted her life to exploring a more humanistic approach to artificial intelligence and robotics. She argues that technologists often ignore social and behavioral aspects of design. In a recent conversation, Cynthia said we are the most social and emotional of all the species, yet we spend little time thinking about empathy in the design of technology. She said, “After all, how we experience the world is through communications and collaboration. If we are interested in machines that work with us, then we can’t ignore the humanistic approach.”

 

The article has a few ideas about how to proceed with AI:

They include:

Transparency

Assistive

Efficient

Intelligent privacy

Accountability

Unbiased

 

I think this provides a helpful framework but as the article closes he brings up something that I think is vital and that is the transition from "labor saving and automated" to make and creation. Is it not better to keep 15 people employed with assistive AI than to displace those 15 workers with machines that simply do the job with minimal oversight? 

 

A few ideas:

Might creating meyers-briggs personalities for AI help with ethical decisions?

Might look at the Enneagram be helpful as well?

Can we control an AI by creating a system of motivations that causes it to generally work in an ethical way?

Can we remove excess desires so that the AI is motivated only to be helpful to humans and how do we create boundaries that stop and AI from causing harm of a violent or traumatizing nature? 

 

I hope this sparks interesting discussion! Let the discussion begin!

Market Failure: Sugar-free Tums

3 PhilGoetz 30 June 2016 12:12AM

In theory, the free market and democracy both work because suppliers are incentivized to provide products and services that people want.  Economists consider it a perverse situation when the market does not provide what people want, and look for explanations such as government regulation.

The funny thing is that sometimes the market doesn't work, and I look and look for the reason why, and all I can come up with is, People are stupid.

I've written before about the market's apparent failure to provide cup holders in cars.  I saw another example this week in the latest Wired magazine, a piece on page 42 about a start-up called Thinx to make re-usable women's underwear that absorbs menstrual fluid--all of it, so women don't have to slip out of the middle of meetings to change tampons.  The piece's angle was that venture capitalists rejected the idea because they were mostly men and so didn't "get it".

I'd guess they "got it".  It isn't a complicated idea.  The thing is, there are already 3 giant companies battling for that market.  The first thing a VC would say when you tell him you're going to make something better than a tampon is, "Why haven't Playtex, Kotex, or Tampax already done that?"

So, Thinx did a kickstarter and has now sold hundreds of thousands of thousands of absorbent underwear for about $30 each.

The failure in this case is not that VCs are sexist, but that Playtex, etc., never developed this product, although there evidently is a demand for it, and there is no evident reason it couldn't have been produced 20 years ago.  The belief that the market doesn't fail then almost led to a further failure, the failure to develop the product at the present time, because the belief that the market doesn't fail implied the product could not be profitable.

I just now came across an even clearer case of market failure: Sugar-free Tums.

continue reading »

Rationality when Insulated from Evidence

3 JustinMElms 29 June 2016 04:03PM

Basically: How does one pursue the truth when direct engagement with evidence is infeasible?

I came to this question while discussing GMO labeling. In this case I am obviously not in a position to experiment for myself, but furthermore: I do not have the time to build up the bank of background understanding to engage vigorously with the study results themselves. I can look at them with a decent secondary education's understanding of experimental method, genetics, and biology, but that is the extent of it.

In this situation I usually find myself reduced to weighing the proclamations of authorities

 

  • I review aggregations of authority from one side and then the other--because finding a truly unbiased source for contentious issues is always a challenge, and usually says more about the biases of whoever is anointing the source "unbiased." 
  • Once I have reviewed the authorities, I do at least some due diligence on each authority so that I can modulate my confidence if a particular authority is often considered partisan on an issue. This too can present a bias spiral checking for bias in the source pillorying the authority as partisan ad infinitum.
  • Once I have some known degree of confidence in the authorities of both sides, I can form some level of confidence in a statement like: "I am ~x% confident that the scientific consensus is on Y's side" or "I am ~Z% confident that there is not scientific consensus on Y"
Once that establishes a baseline on an issue, I am able to do some argumentation analysis to see what arguments each side has that simply should not be included in the discussion. This is usually irrelevant appeals (e.g.: In the GMO labeling debate, "It must be better because it's more natural") or corollary citations that are screened off by evidence closer to the source (e.g.: In the GMO labeling debate, "X many countries require GMO labeling" should be screened off by looking at the evidence that led to that decision).

After that, I find myself with a rather unfulfilling meta-assessment of an issue. I fear that I am asking for a non-existent shortcut around the hard solution of: "If an answer is important to you, do the necessary learning to at least be able to engage directly with the evidence," but I will ask anyway: does anyone else have strategies for seeking the truth while insulated from direct evidence?

 

Meme: Valuable Vulnerability

3 scarcegreengrass 27 June 2016 11:54PM
There's an idea i've encountered in a couple essays and posts (not on LW) that being emotionally vulnerable is, counterintuitively, a desirable trait. I think this is usually defined as being in a state where what you observe is liable to create negative emotions in you (or in some definitions, a variety of emotions). I've heard several people recommend this meme but i'm still trying to wrap my head around it. Personally i usually aim for more manageable emotional states, and i rarely cultivate this kind of state. On the other hand, its popularity suggests, in my opinion, that it has at least some usefulness. 

What do LWers think about this concept? What do you think is the main rationale for this idea, and do you think it is a good policy?

Open thread, June 27 - July 3, 2016

3 Clarity 27 June 2016 01:46AM

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.


Notes for future OT posters:

1. Please add the 'open_thread' tag.

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one. (Immediately before; refresh the list-of-threads page before posting.)

3. Open Threads should be posted in Discussion, and not Main.

4. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.

2016 LessWrong Diaspora Survey Analysis: Part Three (Mental Health, Basilisk, Blogs and Media)

15 ingres 25 June 2016 03:40AM

2016 LessWrong Diaspora Survey Analysis

Overview


Mental Health

We decided to move the Mental Health section up closer in the survey this year so that the data could inform accessibility decisions.

LessWrong Mental Health As Compared To Base Rates In The General Population
Condition Base Rate LessWrong Rate LessWrong Self dx Rate Combined LW Rate Base/LW Rate Spread Relative Risk
Depression 17% 25.37% 27.04% 52.41% +8.37 1.492
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 2.3% 2.7% 5.6% 8.3% +0.4 1.173
Autism Spectrum Disorder 1.47% 8.2% 12.9% 21.1% +6.73 5.578
Attention Deficit Disorder 5% 13.6% 10.4% 24% +8.6 2.719
Bipolar Disorder 3% 2.2% 2.8% 5% -0.8 0.733
Anxiety Disorder(s) 29% 13.7% 17.4% 31.1% -15.3 0.472
Borderline Personality Disorder 5.9% 0.6% 1.2% 1.8% -5.3 0.101
Schizophrenia 1.1% 0.8% 0.4% 1.2% -0.3 0.727
Substance Use Disorder 10.6% 1.3% 3.6% 4.9% -9.3 0.122

Base rates are taken from Wikipedia, US rates were favored over global rates where immediately available.

Accessibility Suggestions

So of the conditions we asked about, LessWrongers are at significant extra risk for three of them: Autism, ADHD, Depression.

LessWrong probably doesn't need to concern itself with being more accessible to those with autism as it likely already is. Depression is a complicated disorder with no clear interventions that can be easily implemented as site or community policy. It might be helpful to encourage looking more at positive trends in addition to negative ones, but the community already seems to do a fairly good job of this. (We could definitely use some more of it though.)

Attention Deficit Disorder - Public Service Announcement

That leaves ADHD, which we might be able to do something about, starting with this:

A lot of LessWrong stuff ends up falling into the same genre as productivity advice or 'self help'. If you have trouble with getting yourself to work, find yourself reading these things and completely unable to implement them, it's entirely possible that you have a mental health condition which impacts your executive function.

The best overview I've been able to find on ADD is this talk from Russell Barkely.

30 Essential Ideas For Parents

Ironically enough, this is a long talk, over four hours in total. Barkely is an entertaining speaker and the talk is absolutely fascinating. If you're even mildly interested in the subject I wholeheartedly recommend it. Many people who have ADHD just assume that they're lazy, or not trying hard enough, or just haven't found the 'magic bullet' yet. It never even occurs to them that they might have it because they assume that adult ADHD looks like childhood ADHD, or that ADHD is a thing that psychiatrists made up so they can give children powerful stimulants.

ADD is real, if you're in the demographic that takes this survey there's a decent enough chance you have it.

Attention Deficit Disorder - Accessibility

So with that in mind, is there anything else we can do?

Yes, write better.

Scott Alexander has written a blog post with writing advice for non-fiction, and the interesting thing about it is just how much of the advice is what I would tell you to do if your audience has ADD.

  • Reward the reader quickly and often. If your prose isn't rewarding to read it won't be read.

  • Make sure the overall article has good sectioning and indexing, people might be only looking for a particular thing and they won't want to wade through everything else to get it. Sectioning also gives the impression of progress and reduces eye strain.

  • Use good data visualization to compress information, take away mental effort where possible. Take for example the condition table above. It saves space and provides additional context. Instead of a long vertical wall of text with sections for each condition, it removes:

    • The extraneous information of how many people said they did not have a condition.

    • The space that would be used by creating a section for each condition. In fact the specific improvement of the table is that it takes extra advantage of space in the horizontal plane as well as the vertical plane.

    And instead of just presenting the raw data, it also adds:

    • The normal rate of incidence for each condition, so that the reader understands the extent to which rates are abnormal or unexpected.

    • Easy comparison between the clinically diagnosed, self diagnosed, and combined rates of the condition in the LW demographic. This preserves the value of the original raw data presentation while also easing the mental arithmetic of how many people claim to have a condition.

    • Percentage spread between the clinically diagnosed and the base rate, which saves the effort of figuring out the difference between the two values.

    • Relative risk between the clinically diagnosed and the base rate, which saves the effort of figuring out how much more or less likely a LessWronger is to have a given condition.

    Add all that together and you've created a compelling presentation that significantly improves on the 'naive' raw data presentation.

  • Use visuals in general, they help draw and maintain interest.

None of these are solely for the benefit of people with ADD. ADD is an exaggerated profile of normal human behavior. Following this kind of advice makes your article more accessible to everybody, which should be more than enough incentive if you intend to have an audience.1

Roko's Basilisk

This year we finally added a Basilisk question! In fact, it kind of turned into a whole Basilisk section. A fairly common question about this years survey is why the Basilisk section is so large. The basic reason is that asking only one or two questions about it would leave the results open to rampant speculation in one direction or another. By making the section comprehensive and covering every base, we've pretty much gotten about as complete of data as we'd want on the Basilisk phenomena.

Basilisk Knowledge
Do you know what Roko's Basilisk thought experiment is?

Yes: 1521 73.2%
No but I've heard of it: 158 7.6%
No: 398 19.2%

Basilisk Etiology
Where did you read Roko's argument for the Basilisk?

Roko's post on LessWrong: 323 20.2%
Reddit: 171 10.7%
XKCD: 61 3.8%
LessWrong Wiki: 234 14.6%
A news article: 71 4.4%
Word of mouth: 222 13.9%
RationalWiki: 314 19.6%
Other: 194 12.1%

Basilisk Correctness
Do you think Roko's argument for the Basilisk is correct?

Yes: 75 5.1%
Yes but I don't think it's logical conclusions apply for other reasons: 339 23.1%
No: 1055 71.8%

Basilisks And Lizardmen

One of the biggest mistakes I made with this years survey was not including "Do you believe Barack Obama is a hippopotamus?" as a control question in this section.2 Five percent is just outside of the infamous lizardman constant. This was the biggest survey surprise for me. I thought there was no way that 'yes' could go above a couple of percentage points. As far as I can tell this result is not caused by brigading but I've by no means investigated the matter so thoroughly that I would rule it out.

Higher?

Of course, we also shouldn't forget to investigate the hypothesis that the number might be higher than 5%. After all, somebody who thinks the Basilisk is correct could skip the questions entirely so they don't face potential stigma. So how many people skipped the questions but filled out the rest of the survey?

Eight people refused to answer whether they'd heard of Roko's Basilisk but went on to answer the depression question immediately after the Basilisk section. This gives us a decent proxy for how many people skipped the section and took the rest of the survey. So if we're pessimistic the number is a little higher, but it pays to keep in mind that there are other reasons to want to skip this section. (It is also possible that people took the survey up until they got to the Basilisk section and then quit so they didn't have to answer it, but this seems unlikely.)

Of course this assumes people are being strictly truthful with their survey answers. It's also plausible that people who think the Basilisk is correct said they'd never heard of it and then went on with the rest of the survey. So the number could in theory be quite large. My hunch is that it's not. I personally know quite a few LessWrongers and I'm fairly sure none of them would tell me that the Basilisk is 'correct'. (In fact I'm fairly sure they'd all be offended at me even asking the question.) Since 5% is one in twenty I'd think I'd know at least one or two people who thought the Basilisk was correct by now.

Lower?

One partial explanation for the surprisingly high rate here is that ten percent of the people who said yes by their own admission didn't know what they were saying yes to. Eight people said they've heard of the Basilisk but don't know what it is, and that it's correct. The lizardman constant also plausibly explains a significant portion of the yes responses, but that explanation relies on you already having a prior belief that the rate should be low.


Basilisk-Like Danger
Do you think Basilisk-like thought experiments are dangerous?

Yes, I think they're dangerous for decision theory reasons: 63 4.2%
Yes I think they're dangerous for social reasons (eg. A cult might use them): 194 12.8%
Yes I think they're dangerous for decision theory and social reasons: 136 9%
Yes I think they're socially dangerous because they make everybody involved look foolish: 253 16.7%
Yes I think they're dangerous for other reasons: 54 3.6%
No: 809 53.4%

Most people don't think Basilisk-Like thought experiments are dangerous at all. Of those that think they are, most of them think they're socially dangerous as opposed to a raw decision theory threat. The 4.2% number for pure decision theory threat is interesting because it lines up with the 5% number in the previous question for Basilisk Correctness.

P(Decision Theory Danger | Basilisk Belief) = 26.6%
P(Decision Theory And Social Danger | Basilisk Belief) = 21.3%

So of the people who say the Basilisk is correct, only half of them believe it is a decision theory based danger at all. (In theory this could be because they believe the Basilisk is a good thing and therefore not dangerous, but I refuse to lose that much faith in humanity.3)

Basilisk Anxiety
Have you ever felt any sort of anxiety about the Basilisk?

Yes: 142 8.8%
Yes but only because I worry about everything: 189 11.8%
No: 1275 79.4%

20.6% of respondents have felt some kind of Basilisk Anxiety. It should be noted that the exact wording of the question permits any anxiety, even for a second. And as we'll see in the next question that nuance is very important.

Degree Of Basilisk Worry
What is the longest span of time you've spent worrying about the Basilisk?

I haven't: 714 47%
A few seconds: 237 15.6%
A minute: 298 19.6%
An hour: 176 11.6%
A day: 40 2.6%
Two days: 16 1.05%
Three days: 12 0.79%
A week: 12 0.79%
A month: 5 0.32%
One to three months: 2 0.13%
Three to six months: 0 0.0%
Six to nine months: 0 0.0%
Nine months to a year: 1 0.06%
Over a year: 1 0.06%
Years: 4 0.26%

These numbers provide some pretty sobering context for the previous ones. Of all the people who worried about the Basilisk, 93.8% didn't worry about it for more than an hour. The next 3.65% didn't worry about it for more than a day or two. The next 1.9% didn't worry about it for more than a month and the last .7% or so have worried about it for longer.

Current Basilisk Worry
Are you currently worrying about the Basilisk?

Yes: 29 1.8%
Yes but only because I worry about everything: 60 3.7%
No: 1522 94.5%

Also encouraging. We should expect a small number of people to be worried at this question just because the section is basically the word "Basilisk" and "worry" repeated over and over so it's probably a bit scary to some people. But these numbers are much lower than the "Have you ever worried" ones and back up the previous inference that Basilisk anxiety is mostly a transitory phenomena.

One article on the Basilisk asked the question of whether or not it was just a "referendum on autism". It's a good question and now I have an answer for you, as per the table below:

Mental Health Conditions Versus Basilisk Worry
Condition Worried Worried But They Worry About Everything Combined Worry
Baseline (in the respondent population) 8.8% 11.8% 20.6%
ASD 7.3% 17.3% 24.7%
OCD 10.0% 32.5% 42.5%
AnxietyDisorder 6.9% 20.3% 27.3%
Schizophrenia 0.0% 16.7% 16.7%

 

The short answer: Autism raises your chances of Basilisk anxiety, but anxiety disorders and OCD especially raise them much more. Interestingly enough, schizophrenia seems to bring the chances down. This might just be an effect of small sample size, but my expectation was the opposite. (People who are really obsessed with Roko's Basilisk seem to present with schizophrenic symptoms at any rate.)

Before we move on, there's one last elephant in the room to contend with. The philosophical theory underlying the Basilisk is the CEV conception of friendly AI primarily espoused by Eliezer Yudkowsky. Which has led many critics to speculate on all kinds of relationships between Eliezer Yudkowsky and the Basilisk. Which of course obviously would extend to Eliezer Yudkowsky's Machine Intelligence Research Institute, a project to develop 'Friendly Artificial Intelligence' which does not implement a naive goal function that eats everything else humans actually care about once it's given sufficient optimization power.

The general thrust of these accusations is that MIRI, intentionally or not, profits from belief in the Basilisk. I think MIRI gets picked on enough, so I'm not thrilled about adding another log to the hefty pile of criticism they deal with. However this is a serious accusation which is plausible enough to be in the public interest for me to look at.

 

Percentage Of People Who Donate To MIRI Versus Basilisk Belief
Belief Percentage
Believe It's Incorrect 5.2%
Believe It's Structurally Correct 5.6%
Believe It's Correct 12.0%

Basilisk belief does appear to make you twice as likely to donate to MIRI. It's important to note from the perspective of earlier investigation that thinking it is "structurally correct" appears to make you about as likely as if you don't think it's correct, implying that both of these options mean about the same thing.

 

Sum Money Donated To MIRI Versus Basilisk Belief
Belief Mean Median Mode Stdev Total Donated
Believe It's Incorrect 1365.590 100.0 100.0 4825.293 75107.5
Believe It's Structurally Correct 2644.736 110.0 20.0 9147.299 50250.0
Believe It's Correct 740.555 300.0 300.0 1152.541 6665.0

Take these numbers with a grain of salt, it only takes one troll to plausibly lie about their income to ruin it for everybody else.

Interestingly enough, if you sum all three total donated counts and divide by a hundred, you find that five percent of the sum is about what was donated by the Basilisk group. ($6601 to be exact) So even though the modal and median donations of Basilisk believers are higher, they donate about as much as would be naively expected by assuming donations among groups are equal.4

 

Percentage Of People Who Donate To MIRI Versus Basilisk Worry
Anxiety Percentage
Never Worried 4.3%
Worried But They Worry About Everything 11.1%
Worried 11.3%

In contrast to the correctness question, merely having worried about the Basilisk at any point in time doubles your chances of donating to MIRI. My suspicion is that these people are not, as a general rule, donating because of the Basilisk per se. If you're the sort of person who is even capable of worrying about the Basilisk in principle, you're probably the kind of person who is likely to worry about AI risk in general and donate to MIRI on that basis. This hypothesis is probably unfalsifiable with the survey information I have, because Basilisk-risk is a subset of AI risk. This means that anytime somebody indicates on the survey that they're worried about AI risk this could be because they're worried about the Basilisk or because they're worried about more general AI risk.

 

Sum Money Donated To MIRI Versus Basilisk Worry
Anxiety Mean Median Mode Stdev Total Donated
Never Worried 1033.936 100.0 100.0 3493.373 56866.5
Worried But They Worry About Everything 227.047 75.0 300.0 438.861 4768.0
Worried 4539.25 90.0 10.0 11442.675 72628.0
Combined Worry         77396.0

Take these numbers with a grain of salt, it only takes one troll to plausibly lie about their income to ruin it for everybody else.

This particular analysis is probably the strongest evidence in the set for the hypothesis that MIRI profits (though not necessarily through any involvement on their part) from the Basilisk. People who worried from an unendorsed perspective donate less on average than everybody else. The modal donation among people who've worried about the Basilisk is ten dollars, which seems like a surefire way to torture if we're going with the hypothesis that these are people who believe the Basilisk is a real thing and they're concerned about it. So this implies that they don't, which supports my earlier hypothesis that people who are capable of feeling anxiety about the Basilisk are the core demographic to donate to MIRI anyway.

Of course, donors don't need to believe in the Basilisk for MIRI to profit from it. If exposing people to the concept of the Basilisk makes them twice as likely to donate but they don't end up actually believing the argument that would arguably be the ideal outcome for MIRI from an Evil Plot perspective. (Since after all, pursuing a strategy which involves Basilisk belief would actually incentivize torture from the perspective of the acausal game theories MIRI bases its FAI on, which would be bad.)

But frankly this is veering into very speculative territory. I don't think there's an evil plot, nor am I convinced that MIRI is profiting from Basilisk belief in a way that outweighs the resulting lost donations and damage to their cause.5 If anybody would like to assert otherwise I invite them to 'put up or shut up' with hard evidence. The world has enough criticism based on idle speculation and you're peeing in the pool.

Blogs and Media

Since this was the LessWrong diaspora survey, I felt it would be in order to reach out a bit to ask not just where the community is at but what it's reading. I went around to various people I knew and asked them about blogs for this section. However the picks were largely based on my mental 'map' of the blogs that are commonly read/linked in the community with a handful of suggestions thrown in. The same method was used for stories.

Blogs Read

LessWrong
Regular Reader: 239 13.4%
Sometimes: 642 36.1%
Rarely: 537 30.2%
Almost Never: 272 15.3%
Never: 70 3.9%
Never Heard Of It: 14 0.7%

SlateStarCodex (Scott Alexander)
Regular Reader: 1137 63.7%
Sometimes: 264 14.7%
Rarely: 90 5%
Almost Never: 61 3.4%
Never: 51 2.8%
Never Heard Of It: 181 10.1%

[These two results together pretty much confirm the results I talked about in part two of the survey analysis. A supermajority of respondents are 'regular readers' of SlateStarCodex. By contrast LessWrong itself doesn't even have a quarter of SlateStarCodexes readership.]

Overcoming Bias (Robin Hanson)
Regular Reader: 206 11.751%
Sometimes: 365 20.821%
Rarely: 391 22.305%
Almost Never: 385 21.962%
Never: 239 13.634%
Never Heard Of It: 167 9.527%

Minding Our Way (Nate Soares)
Regular Reader: 151 8.718%
Sometimes: 134 7.737%
Rarely: 139 8.025%
Almost Never: 175 10.104%
Never: 214 12.356%
Never Heard Of It: 919 53.06%

Agenty Duck (Brienne Yudkowsky)
Regular Reader: 55 3.181%
Sometimes: 132 7.634%
Rarely: 144 8.329%
Almost Never: 213 12.319%
Never: 254 14.691%
Never Heard Of It: 931 53.846%

Eliezer Yudkowsky's Facebook Page
Regular Reader: 325 18.561%
Sometimes: 316 18.047%
Rarely: 231 13.192%
Almost Never: 267 15.248%
Never: 361 20.617%
Never Heard Of It: 251 14.335%

Luke Muehlhauser (Eponymous)
Regular Reader: 59 3.426%
Sometimes: 106 6.156%
Rarely: 179 10.395%
Almost Never: 231 13.415%
Never: 312 18.118%
Never Heard Of It: 835 48.49%

Gwern.net (Gwern Branwen)
Regular Reader: 118 6.782%
Sometimes: 281 16.149%
Rarely: 292 16.782%
Almost Never: 224 12.874%
Never: 230 13.218%
Never Heard Of It: 595 34.195%

Siderea (Sibylla Bostoniensis)
Regular Reader: 29 1.682%
Sometimes: 49 2.842%
Rarely: 59 3.422%
Almost Never: 104 6.032%
Never: 183 10.615%
Never Heard Of It: 1300 75.406%

Ribbon Farm (Venkatesh Rao)
Regular Reader: 64 3.734%
Sometimes: 123 7.176%
Rarely: 111 6.476%
Almost Never: 150 8.751%
Never: 150 8.751%
Never Heard Of It: 1116 65.111%

Bayesed And Confused (Michael Rupert)
Regular Reader: 2 0.117%
Sometimes: 10 0.587%
Rarely: 24 1.408%
Almost Never: 68 3.988%
Never: 167 9.795%
Never Heard Of It: 1434 84.106%

[This was the 'troll' answer to catch out people who claim to read everything.]

The Unit Of Caring (Anonymous)
Regular Reader: 281 16.452%
Sometimes: 132 7.728%
Rarely: 126 7.377%
Almost Never: 178 10.422%
Never: 216 12.646%
Never Heard Of It: 775 45.375%

GiveWell Blog (Multiple Authors)
Regular Reader: 75 4.438%
Sometimes: 197 11.657%
Rarely: 243 14.379%
Almost Never: 280 16.568%
Never: 412 24.379%
Never Heard Of It: 482 28.521%

Thing Of Things (Ozy Frantz)
Regular Reader: 363 21.166%
Sometimes: 201 11.72%
Rarely: 143 8.338%
Almost Never: 171 9.971%
Never: 176 10.262%
Never Heard Of It: 661 38.542%

The Last Psychiatrist (Anonymous)
Regular Reader: 103 6.023%
Sometimes: 94 5.497%
Rarely: 164 9.591%
Almost Never: 221 12.924%
Never: 302 17.661%
Never Heard Of It: 826 48.304%

Hotel Concierge (Anonymous)
Regular Reader: 29 1.711%
Sometimes: 35 2.065%
Rarely: 49 2.891%
Almost Never: 88 5.192%
Never: 179 10.56%
Never Heard Of It: 1315 77.581%

The View From Hell (Sister Y)
Regular Reader: 34 1.998%
Sometimes: 39 2.291%
Rarely: 75 4.407%
Almost Never: 137 8.049%
Never: 250 14.689%
Never Heard Of It: 1167 68.566%

Xenosystems (Nick Land)
Regular Reader: 51 3.012%
Sometimes: 32 1.89%
Rarely: 64 3.78%
Almost Never: 175 10.337%
Never: 364 21.5%
Never Heard Of It: 1007 59.48%

I tried my best to have representation from multiple sections of the diaspora, if you look at the different blogs you can probably guess which blogs represent which section.

Stories Read

Harry Potter And The Methods Of Rationality (Eliezer Yudkowsky)
Whole Thing: 1103 61.931%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 145 8.141%
Partially And Abandoned: 231 12.97%
Never: 221 12.409%
Never Heard Of It: 81 4.548%

Significant Digits (Alexander D)
Whole Thing: 123 7.114%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 105 6.073%
Partially And Abandoned: 91 5.263%
Never: 333 19.26%
Never Heard Of It: 1077 62.29%

Three Worlds Collide (Eliezer Yudkowsky)
Whole Thing: 889 51.239%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 35 2.017%
Partially And Abandoned: 36 2.075%
Never: 286 16.484%
Never Heard Of It: 489 28.184%

The Fable of the Dragon-Tyrant (Nick Bostrom)
Whole Thing: 728 41.935%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 31 1.786%
Partially And Abandoned: 15 0.864%
Never: 205 11.809%
Never Heard Of It: 757 43.606%

The World of Null-A (A. E. van Vogt)
Whole Thing: 92 5.34%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 18 1.045%
Partially And Abandoned: 25 1.451%
Never: 429 24.898%
Never Heard Of It: 1159 67.266%

[Wow, I never would have expected this many people to have read this. I mostly included it on a lark because of its historical significance.]

Synthesis (Sharon Mitchell)
Whole Thing: 6 0.353%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 2 0.118%
Partially And Abandoned: 8 0.47%
Never: 217 12.75%
Never Heard Of It: 1469 86.31%

[This was the 'troll' option to catch people who just say they've read everything.]

Worm (Wildbow)
Whole Thing: 501 28.843%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 168 9.672%
Partially And Abandoned: 184 10.593%
Never: 430 24.755%
Never Heard Of It: 454 26.137%

Pact (Wildbow)
Whole Thing: 138 7.991%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 59 3.416%
Partially And Abandoned: 148 8.57%
Never: 501 29.01%
Never Heard Of It: 881 51.013%

Twig (Wildbow)
Whole Thing: 55 3.192%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 132 7.661%
Partially And Abandoned: 65 3.772%
Never: 560 32.501%
Never Heard Of It: 911 52.873%

Ra (Sam Hughes)
Whole Thing: 269 15.558%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 80 4.627%
Partially And Abandoned: 95 5.495%
Never: 314 18.161%
Never Heard Of It: 971 56.16%

My Little Pony: Friendship Is Optimal (Iceman)
Whole Thing: 424 24.495%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 16 0.924%
Partially And Abandoned: 65 3.755%
Never: 559 32.293%
Never Heard Of It: 667 38.533%

Friendship Is Optimal: Caelum Est Conterrens (Chatoyance)
Whole Thing: 217 12.705%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 16 0.937%
Partially And Abandoned: 24 1.405%
Never: 411 24.063%
Never Heard Of It: 1040 60.89%

Ender's Game (Orson Scott Card)
Whole Thing: 1177 67.219%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 22 1.256%
Partially And Abandoned: 43 2.456%
Never: 395 22.559%
Never Heard Of It: 114 6.511%

[This is the most read story according to survey respondents, beating HPMOR by 5%.]

The Diamond Age (Neal Stephenson)
Whole Thing: 440 25.346%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 37 2.131%
Partially And Abandoned: 55 3.168%
Never: 577 33.237%
Never Heard Of It: 627 36.118%

Consider Phlebas (Iain Banks)
Whole Thing: 302 17.507%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 52 3.014%
Partially And Abandoned: 47 2.725%
Never: 439 25.449%
Never Heard Of It: 885 51.304%

The Metamorphosis Of Prime Intellect (Roger Williams)
Whole Thing: 226 13.232%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 10 0.585%
Partially And Abandoned: 24 1.405%
Never: 322 18.852%
Never Heard Of It: 1126 65.925%

Accelerando (Charles Stross)
Whole Thing: 293 17.045%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 46 2.676%
Partially And Abandoned: 66 3.839%
Never: 425 24.724%
Never Heard Of It: 889 51.716%

A Fire Upon The Deep (Vernor Vinge)
Whole Thing: 343 19.769%
Partially And Intend To Finish: 31 1.787%
Partially And Abandoned: 41 2.363%
Never: 508 29.28%
Never Heard Of It: 812 46.801%

I also did a k-means cluster analysis of the data to try and determine demographics and the ultimate conclusion I drew from it is that I need to do more analysis. Which I would do, except that the initial analysis was a whole bunch of work and jumping further down the rabbit hole in the hopes I reach an oasis probably isn't in the best interests of myself or my readers.

Footnotes


  1. This is a general trend I notice with accessibility. Not always, but very often measures taken to help a specific group end up having positive effects for others as well. Many of the accessibility suggestions of the W3C are things you wish every website did.

  2. I hadn't read this particular SSC post at the time I compiled the survey, but I was already familiar with the concept of a lizardman constant and should have accounted for it.

  3. I've been informed by a member of the freenode #lesswrong IRC channel that this is in fact Roko's opinion, because you can 'timelessly trade with the future superintelligence for rewards, not just punishment' according to a conversation they had with him last summer. Remember kids: Don't do drugs, including Max Tegmark.

  4. You might think that this conflicts with the hypothesis that the true rate of Basilisk belief is lower than 5%. It does a bit, but you also need to remember that these people are in the LessWrong demographic, which means regardless of what the Basilisk belief question means we should naively expect them to donate five percent of the MIRI donation pot.

  5. That is to say, it does seem plausible that MIRI 'profits' from Basilisk belief based on this data, but I'm fairly sure any profit is outweighed by the significant opportunity cost associated with it. I should also take this moment to remind the reader that the original Basilisk argument was supposed to prove that CEV is a flawed concept from the perspective of not having deleterious outcomes for people, so MIRI using it as a way to justify donating to them would be weird.

Powering Through vs Working Around

1 lifelonglearner 24 June 2016 07:42PM

Lately, I’ve been musing on the nature of self-improvement in general.  When I notice that something I’ve been doing-- be it mental or physical, the next immediate chain of thought is “Okay, how do I improve my life now, knowing this phenomena exists?”  In doing so, I’ve recently realized that this is missing a crucial distinction that can lead to more confusion later down the road.

 

This important divide is the question of optimizing around, or powering through.  So before figuring out what actions I should be taking, it seems important to ask myself, “What am I trying to optimize for?” If the negative biases and habits I manage to identify are rocks, then the question is whether or not the best plan of action is to plan around these rocks, or crush them entirely.  This is far from a clear-cut division, however. It appears that breaking bad habits--powering through is going to be more costly in terms of resources spent.  Additionally, a successful plan for overcoming these errors will probably have a mix of these, especially if ridding oneself of the tendency entirely is the goal.

 

For an example of how these two are often blurred, take the planning fallacy:

 

One strategy may be to overestimate times when planning, pushing through the “it feels wrong” feeling to develop a better sense of how long things take.  To augment this, there are also planning techniques, like Murphyjitsu designed to get you considering “hidden factors”.  It’s far from clear how much actions that compensate for biases by countering their effects actually reduce the bias entirely, especially if the helpful action also becomes second nature.


But overall, I think this is an important distinction to keep in mind, because I’ll often be stuck asking myself “Should I work around X, or should I actively try to defeat X?”  

   Does anyone have experience trying to go specifically in one way or the other to counter their biases?

New LW Meetup: Bay City, MI

1 FrankAdamek 24 June 2016 03:58PM

This summary was posted to LW Main on June 24th. The following week's summary is here.

New meetups (or meetups with a hiatus of more than a year) are happening in:

Irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups are taking place in:

The remaining meetups take place in cities with regular scheduling, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berlin, Boston, Brussels, Buffalo, Canberra, Columbus, Denver, Kraków, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Moscow, New Hampshire, New York, Philadelphia, Research Triangle NC, San Francisco Bay Area, Seattle, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Toronto, Vienna, Washington DC, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers and a Slack channel for daily discussion and online meetups on Sunday night US time.

continue reading »

Diaspora roundup thread, 23rd June 2016

5 philh 23 June 2016 02:03PM

Guidelines: Top-level comments here should be links to things written by members of the rationalist community, preferably that have some particular interest to this community. Self-promotion is totally fine. Including a brief summary or excerpt is great, but not required. Generally stick to one link per top-level comment, so they can be voted on individually. Recent links are preferred.

Rule: Do not link to anyone who does not want to be linked to. In particular, Scott Alexander has asked people to get his permission, before linking to specific posts on his tumblr or in other out-of-the-way places.

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