Emotional Basilisks
Suppose it is absolutely true that atheism has a negative impact on your happiness and lifespan. Suppose furthermore that you are the first person in your society of relatively happy theists who happened upon the idea of atheism, and moreover found absolute proof of its correctness, and quietly studied its effects on a small group of people kept isolated from the general population, and you discover that it has negative effects on happiness and lifespan. Suppose that it -does- free people from a considerable amount of time wasted - from your perspective as a newfound atheist - in theistic theater.
Would you spread the idea?
This is, in our theoretical society, the emotional equivalent of a nuclear weapon; the group you tested it on is now comparatively crippled with existentialism and doubt, and many are beginning to doubt that the continued existence of human beings is even a good thing. This is, for all intents and purposes, a basilisk, the mere knowledge of which causes its knower severe harm. Is it, in fact, a good idea to go around talking about this revolutionary new idea, which makes everybody who learns it slightly less happy? Would it be a -better- idea to form a secret society to go around talking to bright people likely to discover it themselves to try to keep this new idea quiet?
(Please don't fight the hypothetical here. I know the evidence isn't nearly so perfect that atheism does in fact cause harm, as all the studies I've personally seen which suggest as much have some methodical flaws. This is merely a question of whether "That which can be destroyed by the truth should be" is, in fact, a useful position to take, in view of ideas which may actually be harmful.)
Falsifiable and non-Falsifiable Ideas
I have been talking to some people (few specific people I thought would benefit and appreciate it) in my dorm and teaching them rationality. I have been thinking of skills that should be taught first and it made me think about what skill is most important to me as a rationalist.
I decided to start with the question “What does it mean to be able to test something with an experiment?” which could also mean “What does it mean to be falsifiable?”
To help my point I brought up the thought experiment with a dragon in Carl Sagan’s garage which is as follows
Carl: There is a dragon in my garage
Me: I thought dragons only existed in legends and I want to see for myself
Carl: Sure follow me and have a look
Me: I don’t see a dragon in there
Carl: My dragon is invisible
Me: Let me throw some flour in so I can see where the dragon is by the disruption of the flour
Carl: My dragon is incorporeal
And so on
The answer that I was trying to bring about was along the lines that if something could be tested by an experiment then it must have at least one different effect if it were true than if it were false. Further if something had at least one effect different if it were true than if it was false then I could at least in theory test it with an experiment.
This led me to the statement:
If something cannot at least in theory be tested by experiment then it has no effect on the world and lacks meaning from a truth stand point therefore rational standpoint.
Anthony (the person I was talking to at the time) started his counter argument with any object in a thought experiment cannot be tested for but still has a meaning.
So I revised my statement any object that if brought into the real world cannot be tested for has no meaning. Under the assumption that if an object could not be tested for in the real world it also has no effect on anything in the thought experiment. i.e. the story with the dragon would have gone the same way independent of its truth values if it were in the real world.
Then the discussion continued into could it be rational to have a belief that could not even in theory be tested. It became interesting when Anthony gave the argument that if believing in a dragon in your garage gave you happiness and the world would be the same either way besides the happiness combined with the principle that rationality is the art of systematized winning it is clearly rational to believe in the dragon.
I responded with truth trumps happiness and believing the dragon would force you to believe the false belief which is not worth the amount of happiness received by believing it. Even further I argued that it would in fact be a false belief because p(world) > p(world)p(impermeable invisible dragon) which is a simple occum’s razor argument.
My intended direction for this argument with Anthony from this point was to apply these points to theology but we ran out of time and we have not had time again to talk so that may be a future post.
Today however Shminux pointed out to me that I held beliefs that were themselves non-falsifiable. I realized then that it might be rational to believe non-falsifiable things for two reasons (I’m sure there’s more but these are the main one’s I can think of please comment your own)
1) The belief has a beauty to it that flows with falsifiable beliefs and makes known facts fit more perfectly. (this is very dangerous and should not be used lightly because it focuses to closely on opinion)
2) You believe that the belief will someday allow you to make an original theory which will be falsifiable.
Both of these reasons if not used very carefully will allow false beliefs. As such I myself decided that if a belief or new theory sufficiently meets these conditions enough to make me want to believe them I should put them into a special category of my thoughts (perhaps conjectures). This category should be below beliefs in power but still held as how the world works and anything in this category should always strive to leave it, meaning that I should always strive to make any non-falsifiable conjecture no longer be a conjecture through making it a belief or disproving it.
Note: This is my first post so as well as discussing the post, critiques simply to the writing are deeply welcomed in PM to me.
New book on atheism, transhumanism, and x-risk
Phil Torres is the creative force behind the highly enjoyable folk music of Baobab, and he also writes philosophy papers (under the name "Philippe Verdoux").
His forthcoming book may be of interest to LWers: A Crisis of Faith: Atheism, Emerging Technologies, and the Future of Humanity. Mostly it's a beginner's book about atheism, but chapter 20 discusses cognitive enhancement and mind uploading, and chapter 21 discusses existential risks as one of the most important things for humans to address once they've stopped fooling around with religion. There's also an appendix on the simulation argument.
Thwarting a Catholic conversion?
I recently learned that a friend of mine, and a long-time atheist (and atheist blogger), is planning to convert to Catholicism. It seems the impetus for her conversion was increasing frustration that she had no good naturalistic account for objective morality in the form of virtue ethics; that upon reflection, she decided she felt like morality "loved" her; that this feeling implied God; and that she had sufficient "if God, then Catholicism" priors to point toward Catholicism, even though she's bisexual (!) and purports to still feel uncertain about the Church's views on sexuality. (Side note: all of this information is material she's blogged about herself, so it's not as if I'm sharing personal details she would prefer to be kept private.)
First, I want to state the rationality lesson I learned from this episode: atheists who spend a great deal of their time analyzing and even critiquing the views of a particular religion are at-risk atheists. Eliezer's spoken about this sort of issue before ("Someone who spends all day thinking about whether the Trinity does or does not exist, rather than Allah or Thor or the Flying Spaghetti Monster, is more than halfway to Christianity."), but I guess it took a personal experience to really drive the point home. When I first read my friend's post, I had a major "I notice that I am confused" moment, because it just seemed so implausible that someone who understood actual atheist arguments (as opposed to dead little sister Hollywood Atheism) could convert to religion, and Catholicism of all things. I seriously considered (and investigated) the possibility that her post was some kind of prank or experiment or otherwise not sincere, or that her account had been hijacked by a very good impersonator (both of these seem quite unlikely at this point).
But then I remembered how I had been frustrated in the past by her tolerance for what seemed like rank religious bigotry and how often I thought she was taking seriously theological positions that seemed about as likely as the 9/11 attacks being genuinely inspired and ordained by Allah. I remembered how I thought she had a confused conception of meta-ethics and that she often seemed skeptical of reductionism, which in retrospect should have been a major red flag for purported atheists. So yeah, spending all your time arguing about Catholic doctrine really is a warning sign, no matter how strongly you seem to champion the "atheist" side of the debate. Seriously.
But second, and more immediately, I wonder if anybody has advice on how to handle this, or if they've had similar experiences with their friends. I do care about this person, and I was devastated to hear this news, so if there's something I can do to help her, I want to. Of course, I would prefer most that she stop worrying about religion entirely and just grok the math that makes religious hypotheses so unlikely as to not be worth your time. But in the short term I'd settle for her not becoming a Catholic, and not immersing herself further in Dark Side Epistemology or surrounding herself with people trying to convince her that she needs to "repent" of her sexuality.
I think I have a pretty good understanding of the theoretical concepts at stake here, but I'm not sure where to start or what style of argument is likely to have the best effect at this point. My tentative plan is to express my concern, try to get more information about what she's thinking, and get a dialogue going (I expect she'll be open to this), but I wanted to see if you all had more specific suggestions, especially if you've been through similar experiences yourself. Thanks!
Non-theist cinema?
There isn't much in the way of explicitly atheist cinema* -- that is, movies that contain the explicit or implicit message that religion is nothing but superstition, and where this point itself is a central part of the story. The only popular films that jump to mind here are The Invention of Lying, and to a lesser extent The Man from Earth (overall a phenomenal movie, but far less well known). Sure, there are lots of popular movies that make fun of organized religion, or what some people might call religious "fanaticism" (e.g., Dogma, Saved, The Life of Brian, Jesus Camp). But pretty much all of these come away with the message that it's fine to be "spiritual" or whatever, so long as you don't hurt other people, and don't get too crazy about what you believe. As much as some "conservative" pundits love to accuse Hollywood "liberals" of being godless, there sure aren't many movies where godlessness is really taken seriously.
And that's unfortunate, in my view, as movies are probably the most prevalent and influential art form for the general public, and because many people will form their views on abstract concepts based on the percepts that movies provide (related to the issue of generalizing from fictional evidence). One need only glance over the examples on the tvtropes page "Hollywood Atheist" to see that movies and television aren't exactly putting the best foot forward for our kind.
But perhaps there's a bit more hope in the way of non-theist cinema, as opposed to overt atheist cinema. Of course, any story without gods is a non-theist story, and there are plenty of movies that don't touch on gods or religion at all. But what I'm talking about are movies where one would normally expect to find religion, but where no religion is to be found -- in other words, movies that seem to be depicting the alternate world where humanity never fell prey to this particular superstition, and where the concepts of god and religion simply don't exist.
The movie that inspired this particular thought was 50/50, the recent comedy-drama where Joseph Gordon-Levitt plays a man dealing with potentially fatal cancer. It's a great movie, but what struck me afterwards is how completely absent any mention of god, religion, the afterlife, etc. was in a movie about a man, along with his friends and family, potentially facing his own death. There are lots of characters, lots of conflicts, lots of different perspectives on what he's going through, but nothing at all from anyone amounting to a "spiritual" response to the situation (at least that I recall).
And it got me thinking, what other sorts of issues are there where we would normally expect religion to pop up, such that a story without it would be decidedly non-theist, as opposed to incidentally non-theist? And are there other major movies that you think tell such a story? I ask both because I'm always eager to hear about new movies I might enjoy (or old movies I might appreciate more), but also because I think this sort of non-theist cinema might be a good bridge to people who would instinctively rebel against anything openly atheist. In other words, show people that a "godless" world really isn't all that crazy, that people get by just fine and find ways to face conflicts, etc. Anyway, just thought I'd poll the membership and see what people thought about this idea. Looking forward to seeing the responses!
*I'm well aware that there's quite a bit of atheist and non-theist art in other mediums -- sf literature most prominently. But I'm focusing on movies (and perhaps to a lesser extent, television) because those are the main forms of "public art" in our culture, and the mediums most likely to influence how the public at large views these concepts.
Russ Roberts and Gary Taubes on confirmation bias [podcast]
Here is the link. The context is nutritional science and epidemiology, but confirmation bias is the primary theme pumping throughout the discussion. Gary Taubes has gained a reputation for contrarianism.* According to Taubes, the current nutritional paradigm (fat is bad, exercise is good, carbs are OK) does not deserve high credibility.
Roberts brings up the role of identity in perpetuating confirmation bias--a hypothesis has become part of you, so it has become that much harder to countenance contrary evidence. In this context they also talk about theism (Roberts is Jewish, while Taubes is an atheist). And, the program being EconTalk, Roberts draws analogies with economics.
*Sometime between 45 and 50 minutes in, Roberts points out that given this reputation, Taubes is susceptible to belief distortion as well:
What's your evidence that you are not just falling prey to the Ancel Keys and other folks who have made the same mistake?
I do not think Taubes gives a direct answer.
Leaving a line of retreat for theists
Eliezer recommends that we leave a line of retreat when discussing controversial topics, since this prevents scary propositions from clouding our judgment. However, I've noticed recently that there are some topics that are just too scary for people to think about, the existence of God being a primary example. Simply put, people don't want to admit that the universe is beyond the reach of a caring God, no matter how much evidence there is to the contrary. People especially don't want to hear that they will one day cease to exist, never to be reincarnated or continued in an afterlife. I've found this to be a major stumbling block when having discussions with theists or agnostics--though the people I've talked to are willing to accept that nonbelievers can lead very moral lives, the thought that "it's just us" is the stopsign that prevents the discussion from moving further. Naturally I've explained that it's important to only believe things that are true, but for some people this meme just can't overcome the scariness of a naturalistic universe.
Have any LessWrongians managed to overcome this obstacle? If so, how? We can generalize this problem somewhat: are there effective techniques for getting people to clearly evaluate the probability of scary or depressing propositions? Explanations with the smallest amount of inferential distance are preferred--while something like cryonics does answer most of the theistic objections raised above, it's a huge distance away from most people's belief systems. (That said, it's quite possible that the answer to my question might be "No, there are no effective techniques that have short inferential distances," and in the spirit of this post I'm willing to accept that.) I'd also be interested in hearing anecdotes about similar situations if anyone has any.
Sean Carroll: Does the Universe Need God? [link]
Does the Universe Need God? (essay by Sean Carroll)
In this essay, Sean Carroll:
-
Dissolves the problem of "creation from nothing":
A provocative way of characterizing these beginning cosmologies is to say that "the universe was created from nothing." Much debate has gone into deciding what this claim is supposed to mean. Unfortunately, it is a fairly misleading natural-language translation of a concept that is not completely well-defined even at the technical level. Terms that are imprecisely defined include "universe," "created," "from," and "nothing." (We can argue about "was.")
The problem with "creation from nothing" is that it conjures an image of a pre-existing "nothingness" out of which the universe spontaneously appeared – not at all what is actually involved in this idea. Partly this is because, as human beings embedded in a universe with an arrow of time, we can't help but try to explain events in terms of earlier events, even when the event we are trying to explain is explicitly stated to be the earliest one. It would be more accurate to characterize these models by saying "there was a time such that there was no earlier time."
To make sense of this, it is helpful to think of the present state of the universe and work backwards, rather than succumbing to the temptation to place our imaginations "before" the universe came into being. The beginning cosmologies posit that our mental journey backwards in time will ultimately reach a point past which the concept of "time" is no longer applicable. Alternatively, imagine a universe that collapsed into a Big Crunch, so that there was a future end point to time. We aren't tempted to say that such a universe "transformed into nothing"; it simply has a final moment of its existence. What actually happens at such a boundary point depends, of course, on the correct quantum theory of gravity.
The important point is that we can easily imagine self-contained descriptions of the universe that have an earliest moment of time. There is no logical or metaphysical obstacle to completing the conventional temporal history of the universe by including an atemporal boundary condition at the beginning. Together with the successful post-Big-Bang cosmological model already in our possession, that would constitute a consistent and self-contained description of the history of the universe.
Nothing in the fact that there is a first moment of time, in other words, necessitates that an external something is required to bring the universe about at that moment. As Hawking put it in a celebrated passage:
So long as the universe had a beginning, we could suppose it had a creator. But if the universe is really self-contained, having no boundary or edge, it would have neither beginning nor end, it would simply be. What place, then, for a creator?
-
Uses Bayesian reasoning to judge possible explanations:
Nevertheless, for the sake of playing along, let's imagine that intelligent life only arises under a very restrictive set of circumstances. Following Swinburne, we can cast the remaining choices in terms of Bayesian probability. The basic idea is simple: we assign some prior probability – before we take into account what we actually know about the universe – to each of the three remaining scenarios. Then we multiply that prior probability by the probability that intelligent life would arise in that particular model. The result is proportional to the probability that the model is correct, given that intelligent life exists.[17] Thus, for option #2 (a single universe, no supernatural intervention), we might put the prior probability at a relatively high value by virtue of its simplicity, but the probability of life arising (we are imagining) is extremely small, so much so that this model could be considered unlikely in comparison with the other two.
We are left with option #3, a "multiverse" with different conditions in different regions (traditionally called "universes" even if they spatially connected), and #4, a single universe with parameters chosen by God to allow for the eventual appearance of life. In either case we can make a plausible argument that the probability of life arising is considerable. All of the heavy lifting, therefore, comes down to our prior probabilities – our judgments about how a priori likely such a cosmological scenario is. Sadly, prior probabilities are notoriously contentious objects.
I will consider more carefully the status of the "God hypothesis," and its corresponding prior probability, in the final section. For now, let's take a look at the multiverse. -
Correctly describes parsimony in terms of Kolmogorov complexity:
What prior likelihood should we assign to such a scenario? One popular objection to the multiverse is that it is highly non-parsimonious; is it really worth invoking an enormous number of universes just to account for a few physical parameters? As Swinburne says:
To postulate a trillion trillion other universes, rather than one God in order to explain the orderliness of our universe, seems the height of irrationality.
That might be true, even with the hyperbole, if what one was postulating were simply "a trillion trillion other universes." But that is a mischaracterization of what is involved. What one postulates are not universes, but laws of physics. Given inflation and the string theory landscape (or other equivalent dynamical mechanisms), a multiverse happens, whether you like it or not.
This is an important point that bears emphasizing. All else being equal, a simpler scientific theory is preferred over a more complicated one. But how do we judge simplicity? It certainly doesn't mean "the sets involved in the mathematical description of the theory contain the smallest possible number of elements." In the Newtonian clockwork universe, every cubic centimeter contains an infinite number of points, and space contains an infinite number of cubic centimeters, all of which persist for an infinite number of separate moments each second, over an infinite number of seconds. Nobody ever claimed that all these infinities were a strike against the theory. Indeed, in an open universe described by general relativity, space extends infinitely far, and lasts infinitely long into the future; again, these features are not typically seen as fatal flaws. It is only when space extends without limit and conditions change from place to place, representing separate "universes," that people grow uncomfortable. In quantum mechanics, any particular system is potentially described by an infinite number of distinct wave functions; again, it is only when different branches of such a wave function are labeled as "universes" that one starts to hear objections, even if the mathematical description of the wave function itself hasn't grown any more complicated.
A scientific theory consists of some formal (typically mathematical) structure, as well as an "interpretation" that matches that structure onto the world we observe. The structure is a statement about patterns that are exhibited among the various objects in the theory. The simplicity of a theory is a statement about how compactly we can describe the formal structure (the Kolmogorov complexity), not how many elements it contains. The set of real numbers consisting of "eleven, and thirteen times the square root of two, and pi to the twenty-eighth power, and all prime numbers between 4,982 and 34,950" is a more complicated set than "the integers," even though the latter set contains an infinitely larger number of elements. The physics of a universe containing 1088 particles that all belong to just a handful of types, each particle behaving precisely according to the characteristics of its type, is much simpler than that of a universe containing only a thousand particles, each behaving completely differently. -
Discusses "meta-explanatory accounts":
For convenience I am brutally lumping together quite different arguments, but hopefully the underlying point of similarity is clear. These ideas all arise from a conviction that, in various contexts, it is insufficient to fully understand what happens; we must also provide an explanation for why it happens – what might be called a "meta-explanatory" account.
It can be difficult to respond to this kind of argument. Not because the arguments are especially persuasive, but because the ultimate answer to "We need to understand why the universe exists/continues to exist/exhibits regularities/came to be" is essentially "No we don't." That is unlikely to be considered a worthwhile comeback to anyone who was persuaded by the need for a meta-explanatory understanding in the first place.
Granted, it is always nice to be able to provide reasons why something is the case. Most scientists, however, suspect that the search for ultimate explanations eventually terminates in some final theory of the world, along with the phrase "and that's just how it is." It is certainly conceivable that the ultimate explanation is to be found in God; but a compelling argument to that effect would consist of a demonstration that God provides a better explanation (for whatever reason) than a purely materialist picture, not an a priori insistence that a purely materialist picture is unsatisfying.
Why are some people so convinced of the need for a meta-explanatory account, while others are perfectly happy without one? I would suggest that the impetus to provide such an account comes from our experiences within the world, while the suspicion that there is no need comes from treating the entire universe as something unique, something for which a different set of standards is appropriate.
...
States of affairs only require an explanation if we have some contrary expectation, some reason to be surprised that they hold. Is there any reason to be surprised that the universe exists, continues to exist, or exhibits regularities? When it comes to the universe, we don't have any broader context in which to develop expectations. As far as we know, it may simply exist and evolve according to the laws of physics. If we knew that it was one element of a large ensemble of universes, we might have reason to think otherwise, but we don't. (I'm using "universe" here to mean the totality of existence, so what would be called the "multiverse" if that's what we lived in.)
...
Likewise for the universe. There is no reason, within anything we currently understand about the ultimate structure of reality, to think of the existence and persistence and regularity of the universe as things that require external explanation. Indeed, for most scientists, adding on another layer of metaphysical structure in order to purportedly explain these nomological facts is an unnecessary complication. This brings us to the status of God as a scientific hypothesis. -
Points out the theory-saving in and the predictive issues of God as a hypothesis:
Similarly, the apparent precision of the God hypothesis evaporates when it comes to connecting to the messy workings of reality. To put it crudely, God is not described in equations, as are other theories of fundamental physics. Consequently, it is difficult or impossible to make predictions. Instead, one looks at what has already been discovered, and agrees that that's the way God would have done it. Theistic evolutionists argue that God uses natural selection to develop life on Earth; but religious thinkers before Darwin were unable to predict that such a mechanism would be God's preferred choice.
...
This is a venerable problem, reaching far beyond natural theology. In numerous ways, the world around us is more like what we would expect from a dysteleological set of uncaring laws of nature than from a higher power with an interest in our welfare. As another thought experiment, imagine a hypothetical world in which there was no evil, people were invariably kind, fewer natural disasters occurred, and virtue was always rewarded. Would inhabitants of that world consider these features to be evidence against the existence of God? If not, why don't we consider the contrary conditions to be such evidence? - And more!
See also his blog entry for more discussion of the essay.
Edit: added the bullet point about "meta-explanatory accounts."
Is Atheism a failure to distinguish Near and Far?
The terms Near and Far are to be taken in the context of Robin Hanson's Near/Far articles.
I was reading a fairly convincing article linked from a comment here about how theistic beliefs are so scantly supported, when not outright contradictory, that it's a doubtful whether anyone truly holds them at all. Of course there is a whole battery of explanations around the self-deception, signalling and belief-in-belief cluster, but the question that got in my head was about the kinds of people that can or cannot profess to hold these beliefs.
A common thread in many a 'deconversion' story is that some inconsistency in a person's worldview comes to their attention, and they can't let go until they have undone the whole fabric of their belief system. But given that most people are happy living productive lives while simultaneously nominally carrying around massively conflicted worldviews, what is it that makes certain individuals not capable of this fairly common human feat?
So the hypothesis that I'm considering is that the people who came to atheism this way, are those who demand detailed consistency of their Far ideals. Alternatively, they could be those for who what is normally considered Far is actually Near, in other words those with an unusually high Buxton Index. Combining the two, perhaps for people with a high Buxton Index, Far simply evaporates, as it comes under the scope of things that are relevant to a person's planning. (Edsger W. Djikstra, when introducing the Buxton Index, says that "true christians" have a Buxton Index of infinity. I think that couldn't be more wrong. Perhaps it is the case for singularitarians though.)
The obvious reason to be suspicious of this idea is that it's very flattering for those that fall in this category, which includes myself. Rather than dithering about it, I'd rather expose it to the community and see if it seems to have legs in the eyes of others.
An Intuitive Explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky’s Intuitive Explanation of Bayes’ Theorem
Common Sense Atheism has recently had a string of fantastic introductory LessWrong related material. First easing its audience into the singularity, then summarising the sequences, yesterday affirming that Death is a Problem to be Solved, and finally today by presenting An Intuitive Explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky’s Intuitive Explanation of Bayes’ Theorem.
From the article:
Eliezer’s explanation of this hugely important law of probability is probably the best one on the internet, but I fear it may still be too fast-moving for those who haven’t needed to do even algeba since high school. Eliezer calls it “excruciatingly gentle,” but he must be measuring “gentle” on a scale for people who were reading Feynman at age 9 and doing calculus at age 13 like him.
So, I decided to write an even gentler introduction to Bayes’ Theorem. One that is gentle for normal people.
It may be interesting if you want to do a review of Bayes' Theorem from a different perspective, or offer some introductory material for others. From a wider viewpoint, it's great to see a popular blog joining our cause for raising the sanity waterline.
"Target audience" size for the Less Wrong sequences
[Note: My last thread was poorly worded in places and gave people the wrong impression that I was interested in talking about growing and shaping the Less Wrong community. I was really hoping to talk about something a bit different. Here's my revision with a completely redone methodology.]
How many people would invest their time to read the LW sequences if they were introduced to them?
So in other words, I’m trying to estimate the theoretical upper-bound on the number of individuals world-wide who have the ability, desire, and time to read intellectual material online and who also have at least some pre-disposition to wanting to think rationally.
I’m not trying to evangelize to unprepared, “reach” candidates who maybe, possibly would like to read parts of the sequences. I’m just looking for likely size of the core audience who already has the ability, the time, and doesn’t need to jump through any major hoops to stomach the sequences (like deconverting from religion or radically changing their habits -- like suddenly devoting more of their time to using computers or reading.)
The reason I’m investigating this is because I want to build more rationalists. I know some smart people whose opinions I respect (like Michael Vassar) who contend we shouldn’t spend much time trying to reach more people with the sequences. They think the majority of people smart enough to follow the sequences and who do weird, eccentric things like “read in their spare time”, are already here. This is my second attempt to figure this out in the last couple days, and unlike my rough 2M person figure I got with my previous, hasty analysis, this more detailed analysis leaves me with a much lower world-wide target audience of only 17,000.
Filter |
Total Population |
Filters Away (%) |
Everyone |
6,880,000,000 |
|
Speaks English + Internet Access |
536,000,000 |
92.2% |
Atheist/Agnostic |
40,000,000 |
92.55% |
Believes in evolution | Atheist/Agnostic |
30,400,000 |
24% |
“NT” (Rational) MBTI |
3,952,000 |
87% |
IQ 130+ (SD 15; US/UK-Atheist-NT 108 IQ) |
284,544 |
92.8% |
30 min/day reading or on computers |
16,930 |
94.05% |
Yep, that’s right. There are basically only a few thousand relatively bright people in the world who think reason makes sense and devote at least 2% of their day to arcane activities like “reading” and "using computers".
Considering we have 6,438 Less Wrong logins created and a daily readership of around 5,500 people between logged in and anonymous readers, I now actually find it believable that we may have already reached a very large fraction of all the people in the world who we could theoretically convince to read the sequences.
This actually matters because it makes me update in favor of different, more realistic growth strategies than buying AdWords or doing SEO to try and reach the small number of people left in our current target audience. Like translating the sequences into Chinese. Or creating an economic disaster that leaves most of the Westerner world unemployed (kidding!). Or waiting until Eliezer publishes his rationality book so that we can reach the vast majority of our potential, future audience who currently still reads but doesn’t have time to do anti-social, low-prestige things like “reading blogs”.
For those of you who want to consider my methodology, here’s the rationale for each step that I used to disqualify potential sequence readers:
Doesn’t Speak English or have Internet Access: The sequences are English-only (right now) and online-only (right now). Don’t think there’s any contention here. This figure is the largest of the 3 figures I've found but all were around 500,000,000.
Not Atheist/Agnostic: Not being an Atheist or Agnostic is a huge warning sign. 93% of LW is atheist/agnostic for a reason. It’s probably a combo of 1) it’s hard to stomach reading the sequences if you’re a theist, and 2) you probably don’t use thinking to guide the formation of your beliefs anyway so lessons in rationality are a complete waste of time for you. These people really needs to have the healing power of Dawkins come into their hearts before we can help them. Also, note that even though it wasn't mentioned in Yvain's top-level survey post, the raw data showed that around 1/3rd of LW users who gave a reason for participating on LW cite "Atheism".
Evolution denialist: If you can’t be bothered to be moved to correct beliefs about the second most obvious conclusion in the world by the mountains of evidence in favor of it, you’re effectively saying you don’t think induction or science can work at all. These people also need to go through Dawkins before we can help them.
Not “NT” on the Myers-Briggs typology: Lots of people complain about the MBTI. But in this case, I don’t think it matters that the MBTI isn’t cleaving reality perfectly at the joints or that these types aren’t natural categories. I realize Jung types aren’t made of quarks and aren’t fundamental. But I’ve also met lots of people at the Less Wrong meet-ups. There’s an even split of E/I and P/J in our community. But there is a uniform, overwhelmingly strong disposition towards N and T. And we shouldn’t be surprised by this at all. People who are S instead of N take things at face value and resist using induction or intuition to extend their reasoning. These people can guess the teacher’s password, but they're not doing the same thing that you call "thinking". And if you’re not a T (Thinking), then that means you’re F (Feeling). And if you’re using feelings to chose beliefs in lieu of thinking, there’s nothing we can do for you -- you’re permanently disqualified from enjoying the blessings of rationality. Note: I looked hard to see if I could find data suggesting that being NT and being Atheist correlated because I didn’t want to “double subtract” out the same people twice. It turns out several studies have looked for this correlation with thousands of participants... and it doesn’t exist.
Lower than IQ 130: Another non-natural category that people like to argue about. Plus, this feels super elitist, right? Excluding people just because they're "not smart enough". But it’s really not asking that much when you consider that IQ 100 means you’re buying lottery tickets, installing malware on your computer, and spending most of your free time watching TV. Those aren’t the “stupid people” who are way down on the other side of the Gaussian -- that’s what a normal 90 - 110 IQ looks like. Real stupid is so non-functional that you never even see it... probably because you don’t hang out in prisons, asylums and homeless shelters. Really. And 130 isn’t all that “special“ once you find yourself being a white (+6IQ) college graduate (+5IQ) atheist (+4IQ) who's ”NT” on Myers-Briggs (+5IQ). In Yvain’s survey, the average IQ on LW was 145.88. And only 4 out of 68 LWers reported IQs below 130... the lowest being 120. I find it inconceivable that EVERYONE lied on this survey. I also find it highly unlikely that only the top 1/2 reported. But even if everyone who didn’t report was as low as the lowest IQ reported by anyone on Less Wrong, the average IQ would still be over 130. Note: I took the IQ boost from being atheist and being MBTI-“N” into account when figuring out the proportion of 130+ IQ conditional on the other traits already being factored in.
Having no free time: So you speak English, you don’t hate science, you don’t hate reason, and you’re somewhat bright. Seem like you’re a natural part of our target audience, right? Nope... wrong! There’s at least one more big hurdle: Having some free time. Most people who are already awesome enough to have passed through all these filters are winning so hard at life (by American standards of success) that they are wayyy too busy to do boring, anti-social & low-prestige tasks like reading online forums in their spare time (which they don’t have much of). In fact, it’s kind of like how knowing a bit about biases can hurt you and make you even more biased. Being a bit rational can skyrocket you to such a high level of narrowly-defined American-style "success" that you become a constantly-busy, middle-class wage-slave who zaps away all your free time in exchange for a mortgage and a car payment. Nice job buddy. Thanks for increasing my GDP epsilon%... now you are left with whatever rationality you started out with minus the effects of your bias dragging you back down to average over the ensuing years. The only ways I see out of this dilemma are 1) being in a relatively unstructured period of your life (ie, unemployed, college student, semi-retired, etc) or 2) having a completely broken motivation system which keeps you in a perpetually unstructured life against your will (akrasia) or perhaps 3) being a full-time computer professional who can multi-task and pass off reading online during your work day as actually working. That said, if you're unlucky enough to have a full-time job or you’re married with children, you’ve already fallen out of the population of people who read or use computers at least 30 minutes / day. This is because having a spouse cuts your time spent reading and using computers in half. Having children cuts reading in half and reduces computer usage by 1/3rd. And having a job similarly cuts both reading and computer usage in half. Unfortunately, most people suffer from several of these afflictions. I can’t find data that’s conditional on being an IQ 130+ Atheist but my educated guess is employment is probably much better than average due to being so much more capable and I’d speculate that relationships and children are about the same or perhaps a touch lower. All things equal, I think applying statistics from the general US civilian population and extrapolating is an acceptable approximation in this situation even if it likely overestimates the number of people who truly have 30 minutes of free time / day (the average amount of time needed just to read LW according to Yvain’s survey). 83% of people are employed full-time so they’re gone. Of the remaining 17% who are unemployed, 10% of the men and 50% of the women are married and have children so that’s another 5.1% off the top level leaving only 11.9% of people. Of that 11.9% left, the AVERAGE person has 1 hour they spend reading and ”Playing games and computer use for leisure“. Let’s be optimistic and assume they somehow devote half of their entire leisure budget to reading Less Wrong, that still only leaves 5.95%. Note: These numbers are a bit rough. If someone wants to go through the micro-data files of the US Time Use Survey for me and count the exact number of people who do more than 1 hour of "reading" and "Playing games and computer use for leisure", I welcome this help.
Anyone have thoughtful feedback on refinements or additional filters I could add to this? Do you know of better sources of statistics for any of the things I cite? And most importantly, do you have new, creative outreach strategies we could use now that we know this?
[LINK] Creationism = High Carb? Or, The Devil Does Atkins
Based on the community's continuing interests in diet and religion, I'd like to point out this blog post by the coauthor of Protein Power, Michael Eades, wherein he suggests that biblical literalism tends toward a low-fat approach to nutrition over a low-carb philosophy, by essentially throwing out a bunch of evidence on the matter:
Why, you might ask, is this scientist so obdurate in the face of all the evidence that’s out there? Perhaps because much of the evidence isn’t in accord with his religious beliefs. I try never to mention a person’s religious faith, but when it impacts his scientific thinking it at least needs to be made known. Unless he’s changed his thinking recently, Dr. Eckel apparently is one of the few academic scientists who are literal interpreters of the bible. I assume this because Dr. Eckel serves on the technical advisory board of the Institution for Creation Research, an organization that believes that not only is the earth only a few thousand years old , but that the entire universe in only a few thousand years old. And they believe that man was basically hand formed by God on the sixth day of creation. And Dr. Eckel’s own writings on the subject appear to confirm his beliefs
[.....]
Of all the evidence that exists, I think the evolutionary/natural selection data and the anthropological data are the most compelling because they provide the largest amount of evidence over the longest time. To Dr. Eckel, however, these data aren’t applicable because in his worldview prehistoric man didn’t exist and therefore wasn’t available to be molded by the forces of natural selection. I haven’t a clue as to what he thinks the fossil remains of early humans really were or where they came from. Perhaps he believes – as I once had it explained to me by a religious fundamentalist – these fossilized remains of dinosaurs, extinct ancient birds and mammals and prehistoric man were carefully buried by the devil to snare the unwary and the unbeliever. If this is the case, I guess I’ll have to consider myself snared.
In Dr. Eckel’s view, man was created post agriculturally. In fact, in his view, there was never an pre-agricultural era, so how could man have failed to adapt to agriculture?
While there's a clear persuasive agenda here and I won't present a full analysis of the situation, Eades also mentions biasing use of language earlier in the article. In particular, beware applause lights and confirmation bias in evaluating.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)