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Rationality when Insulated from Evidence

3 JustinMElms 29 June 2016 04:03PM

Basically: How does one pursue the truth when direct engagement with evidence is infeasible?

I came to this question while discussing GMO labeling. In this case I am obviously not in a position to experiment for myself, but furthermore: I do not have the time to build up the bank of background understanding to engage vigorously with the study results themselves. I can look at them with a decent secondary education's understanding of experimental method, genetics, and biology, but that is the extent of it.

In this situation I usually find myself reduced to weighing the proclamations of authorities

 

  • I review aggregations of authority from one side and then the other--because finding a truly unbiased source for contentious issues is always a challenge, and usually says more about the biases of whoever is anointing the source "unbiased." 
  • Once I have reviewed the authorities, I do at least some due diligence on each authority so that I can modulate my confidence if a particular authority is often considered partisan on an issue. This too can present a bias spiral checking for bias in the source pillorying the authority as partisan ad infinitum.
  • Once I have some known degree of confidence in the authorities of both sides, I can form some level of confidence in a statement like: "I am ~x% confident that the scientific consensus is on Y's side" or "I am ~Z% confident that there is not scientific consensus on Y"
Once that establishes a baseline on an issue, I am able to do some argumentation analysis to see what arguments each side has that simply should not be included in the discussion. This is usually irrelevant appeals (e.g.: In the GMO labeling debate, "It must be better because it's more natural") or corollary citations that are screened off by evidence closer to the source (e.g.: In the GMO labeling debate, "X many countries require GMO labeling" should be screened off by looking at the evidence that led to that decision).

After that, I find myself with a rather unfulfilling meta-assessment of an issue. I fear that I am asking for a non-existent shortcut around the hard solution of: "If an answer is important to you, do the necessary learning to at least be able to engage directly with the evidence," but I will ask anyway: does anyone else have strategies for seeking the truth while insulated from direct evidence?

 

Reasons to believe

9 irrational 02 December 2013 05:44AM

I've been thinking recently that I believe in the Theory of Evolution on about the same level as in the Theory of Plate Tectonics. I have grown up being taught that both are true, and I am capable of doing research in either field, or at least reading the literature to examine them for myself. I have not done so in either case, to any reasonable extent.

I am not swayed by the fact that some people consider the former (and not so much the latter) to be controversial, primarily because those people aren't scientists. I tend to be self-congratulatory about this fact, but then I think that I am essentially not interested in examining the evidence, but I am essentially taking it on faith (which the creationists are quick to point out). I think I have good Bayesian reasons to take science on faith (rather than, say, mythology that is being offered in its stead), but do I therefore have good reasons to accept a particular well-established scientific theory on faith, or is it incumbent upon me to examine it, if I think its conclusions are important to my life?

In other words, is it epistemologically wrong to rely on an authority that has produced a number of correct statements (that I could and did verify) to be more or less correct in the future? If I think of this problem as a sort of belief network, with a parent node that has causal connections to hundreds of children, I think such a reliance is reasonable, once you establish that the authority is indeed accurate. On the other hand, appeal to authority is probably the most famous fallacy there is.

Any thoughts? If Eliezer or other people have written on this exact topic, a reference would be appreciated.