Similar to a game of The Sims the characters actions are chosen in advance.

A string of actions were your last action effects the next one and were actions are cancelled out and changed. 

Your next action is to prepare a meal. You walk to the kitchen to start preparing the meal when you open the fridge and notice you don't have any food. The action is now cancelled and replaced with "Go to the store to buy food". 

After I posted my great idea that "Determinism Is Just A Special Case Of Randomness" because "if not I don't see how there could be free will in a deterministic universe" I was positively guided by the LW community to read the Free Will Sequence so I am learning more about our biases and how we build illusions like free will and randomness in our minds.

But I don't see a list on LW or Wikipedia of a list of cognitive illusions and I think it would be great to have one of those just as it is useful for many people to visit the List Of Cognitive Biases page as a study reference or even to use in day to day life.

I think these are some cognitive illusions that are normally discussed as such:

- Free will

- Randomness/probability

- Time

- Money

There must be many more, but I don't find a list with summaries and that would great (to help me avoid writing posts like my "great idea" above!).

EDIT: The majority of comments below are about questioning if they are illusions or not and if they should be called cognitive illusions.

I guess there is no list of cognitive illusions because there is no academic agreement about these issues like in cognitive biases which are generally accepted as such!

Thx for the comments!

I was trying to reconcile the fact that in a deterministic universe there could be life with free will, but I am going full circle now and am starting to think that everything is really random, if not I don't see how there could be free will in a deterministic universe.

If mathematicians measure randomness with probability, then there must be some things that have a 100% occurrence probability (in the current universe above atomic levels I presume), which now I see as special cases of randomness rather than opposites to randomness, and these lead us to think that there is determinism.

I think we may have this cognitive bias (deterministic views of reality) because it is extremely helpful to use these 100% probability occurrence things to model the universe rationally, learn, and to predict the future, but it is not the whole story or at least a complete description of reality.

What do you think?

EDIT 1: Thank you all for the comments below. I recognize I am naive in this topic.

Although I am not convinced yet, I think my possible argumentative error is:

P1: I observe free will in the behavior of living things.

P2: Deterministic physical mechanical processes don't permit free will.

C: Therefore physics must include random processes.

I think I only see a solution of free will in randomness, but maybe there are other solutions ( I will read the Free Will Sequence here on LW!)

EDIT 2: After reading some articles of the Free Will Sequence I realize the problem of investing energy around free will questions if free will is just a mistake in our thinking process.

It is something like why ask about time travel if time doesn't exist? or, why explore the mechanics of randomness vs determinism if randomness doesn't exist and thus the dichotomy "randomness vs determinism" doesn't exist in the first place? 

This is intended to eventually be a Main post and part of sequences on free will and religion.  It will be part of the Free Will sequence.

Please comment if you do or do not think this post is ready for Main.  I intend to move it there eventually.  As with any post at LessWrong, I'm completely open to criticism, but I hope it's directed at improving the quality of the thinking here rather than kneejerk opposition to my ideas.

------------------------------------------------------

The main point of this post is that I intend to convince every rationalist here, and every causal reader, to commit to allowing others to have free will.

First a bit of background.  I'm a conservative christian.  Growing up I considered myself a rationalist.  Now that I've known about Less Wrong for several years and have read the sequences, I no longer think I can classify myself that way <grin>.  Nowdays I usually consider myself a pragmatist.  "Being a rationalist" now carries with it a significant weight in my mind of formal Bayes Theorem and such that I've never had time to fully follow through and practice.  I also have a little fear that completely committing to be Bayesian would eventually put a huge conflict between my faith and Bayesian reasoning - just a little fear.  I've been reading Less Wrong for years now, they've all been resolve to my satisfaction.  I also haven't simply because looking at the math that gets thrown around here in Bayes Theorem discussion seems like it would take too much time for me to understand, and I'm already very busy (and, being an engineer and not a math major, a bit intimidating).

The main reason I come here is because this community thinks about thinking, which so few people around me do.  I crave that introspection that happens here, and so I'm drawn back to it.  Not always often, but enough to generally stay abreast of what's going on.  (I also have to admit to myself that I come back because you people are very smart, and I want you to think of me as smart too, and have your approval, but I try to keep that in check <grin>)

Now that I've been here (online only - no meetups yet) and learned with you over the years, another reason I stay here is because of the clear success of Evolutionary Psychology in predicting human behavior.  The clearest example I've ever had is this:

My children and I love to chase each other around the house.  It drives my wife crazy, especially when it happens right at bedtime.  At some point after I read about evolutionary psychology, this chain of logic dawned on me: The natural genetic behavior that's successful gets reinforced over generations -> Things you love to do naturally are joyful to you -> You pass those things on to your children through play the way lions play hunt with cubs ->  Human parents and children get true joy from chasing each other because their ancestors loved the hunt and were successful at it!

Now THAT was an eye opener!  It was the answer to a question I'd never known I had, which was this.  Why do children love to chase, and why do I love to chase them?  Because their ancestors survived that way and it was passed to them genetically.  I even like to playfully almost-catch-them-and-let-them-escape.  I even playfully let them catch me, too.  And we love it.

Religion has no answer to this question.  Religion doesn't even know how to ask this question.  But it flowed naturally out of Evolutionary Psychology just by my knowing that the concept existed!  Powerful!  Now, this post isn't really about religion so I won't go into why that doesn't break my faith.  I'll handle that it other posts.  The reason why I'm talking about it now is to get you to recognize that you are a tribal hunter by ancestry, even more fundamentally than you are the descendant of conquerors.  And knowing that Politics Is The Mind Killer, you'll listen to this next part, and take it seriously.

Less Wrong rationalists are growing, and being recognized by the religious community.  As militant Atheists.  It's reported that this is a new thing among atheists, this new desire to spread atheist philosophies as strongly as any religion spreads it's beliefs.  I've seen it in a couple places now, in about the last year.

I have a huge, scary concern for the future of our world.  It's not atheism.  And it's not religion.  I fear future wars.  As a military history enthusiast and a veteran I've learned a lot about war.  A lot.  And the principle is true that those who don't learn from history are doomed to repeat it.  Knowing that we are tribal animals I see aetheists as one tribe and religionists as another.  Now that I see the of growth and success of LW I see a future pattern emerging in the United States:

Few atheists among overwhelming Christians -> shrinking Christianity, growing Atheism -> atheism tribalness growing well connected and strong -> Natural tribal impulse to not tolerate different voices -> war between atheists and Christians.

Don't try to say this won't happen, and that Rationalists will always allow other people to believe differently.  Coherent Extrapolated Volition, Politics is the Mind Killer, and Eliezar' success in creating the LW and rationalist movement say otherwise.  Now, today, the commitment to altruism seems like a solution, but it isn't.  You all here are so very intelligent and you seriously look down on those of faith.  I see it all over the place.  It's a real blind spot that you can't see because it's inside your mental algorithms.  Altruism is very easily perverted into forcing other people because you know what is best for them.  It's not enough by itself.  It needs something else attached.

Someday there will come a time when new leaders will come up trough the rationalist movement who don't have Eliezar's  commitment to freedom.  And power corrupts even good, compassionate people.  So now I come to my request.

This principle needs to the rationalist movement.  A guarantee of free will for others that disagree with you, EVEN IF THEY ARE WRONG.  

I know religions have not always had this either.  Be better than the religions you despise.  Recognize that they also are tribal animals trying to become civilized tribal animals.  

I ask you personally to commit to making free will for all a part of your personal philosophy.  And I ask you to formalize that as part of Less Wrong, the Rationalist community, and your evangelical aetheism.  Plant the seed now so that is has time to grow. It is my fear that if you don't your children's children, and my childrens' children, will know a brutal war of philosophies unlike any we have ever seen.

In a future post I'll cover how religions are the empirically determined solution to problems that prevented civilization from arising,  and how rationalism is the modern, more specifically planned version.  And why religion is not evil like you think it is.

Sincerely,

Troshen

**** DEAL OVER: As of 20120611.

Another free kindle I thought some might have interest in. I haven't read it, but the first review was glowing and looked relevant.

First Amazon Review:

> Five Star Final; Excellent; A "must read" for any "student" of brain-behavior relationships

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B005DKQQG4/

UPDATE: Still free at the US amazon at 2pm eastern time. Reports that it is not free at the UK site, which I verified. Since I can log in to the UK site from the US and see the price, I assume people in the UK could sign into the US site and buy it. If anyone gives that a try, let me know and I'll further update the top level.

UPDATE:  Free at amazon.fr. Can buy at the US site from the Netherlands. Can't buy from FR or US sites from UK.

I just came across this article that points out a Kindle Fire glitch: one that apparently lets you download books gratis if you cancel your purchase while the book is still downloading, and then quickly open it. The tablet downloads the book fully once it's been opened, letting you read it to your heart's content without actually having bought it.

This should be a great way for anyone wanting good(yet insanely expensive) Kindle books, provided this doesn't contradict your moral compunctions. Personally I neither own a Kindle Fire nor do I have a Kindle account, but just wanted to point this out for anyone interested here.

Of course, Amazon might have already fixed the glitch with a software update-but this has been strangely under-reported so maybe not.

This is a combination news-announcement and begging for someone with academic subscriptions to maybe jailbreak a PDF for us.

"Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the expertise defense" (emphasis added):

"Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate—as measured by a reliable and validated test of expert knowledge—does not eliminate the influence of one important extraneous feature (i.e., the heritable personality trait extraversion) on judgments concerning freedom and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important cases, the expertise defense fails. Implications for the practice of philosophy, experimental philosophy, and applied ethics are discussed."

Linked from http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/experimental_philosophy/2011/06/failure-of-the-expertise-defense-persistent-bias-in-expert-intuitions-.html which elaborates:

"For example, our research suggests that heritable personality traits predict bias in some fundamental philosophically relevant intuitions (Feltz & Cokely 2008, 2009; Cokely & Feltz, 2009; Feltz, Perez, & Harris, in press; Feltz, Harris, & Perez, 2010). In response to these findings, “philosophical expertise” has been used to shield some parts of standard philosophical practice from the worries presented by experimental philosophers (e.g., Ludwig, 2007; Kauppinen 2007; Horvarth, 2010; Sosa, 2010; Williamson, 2007, 2011). One important part of the “Expertise Defense” is that philosophers are assumed to be relevantly different from the folk (e.g., as a result of their years of training) and consequently philosophers' intuitions shouldn’t display the same (or similar) biases.

But more recently, there have been serious concerns raised by experimental philosophers about the Expertise Defense. Some have used indirect strategies suggesting that philosophical expertise is unlike expertise in areas known to result in the relevant differences (e.g., in chess) (Weinberg, Gonnerman, Buckner, & Alexander, 2010 see related discussion here). Others have opted for direct strategies showing that for many important everyday behaviors (e.g., voting, returning library books, showing common courtesy) philosophers often display the same (or similar) biases as the folk (Schwitzgebel 2009; Schwitzgebel & Rust, 2010, 2009; Schwitzgebel & Cushman, in press). In a new paper (Schulz, Cokely, & Feltz, in press), we also adopt the direct strategy and present the first evidence that personality predicts persistent bias in verifiable expert intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important fundamental philosophical debates, the Expertise Defense fails"

Nadia wanted to solve Alonzo. To reduce him to a canonical, analytic representation, sufficient to reconfigure him at will. If there was a potential Alonzo within potential-Alonzo-space, say, who was utterly devoted to Nadia, who would dote on her and die for her, an Alonzo-solution would make its generation trivial.

from True Names, by Cory Doctorow and Benjamin Rosenbaum

Warning: this post tends toward the character of mainstream philosophy, in that it relies on the author's intuitions to draw inferences about the nature of reality.

If you are dealing with an intelligence vastly more or less intelligent than yourself, there is no contest. One of you can play the other like tic-tac-toe. The stupid party's values are simply irrelevant to the final outcome.

If you are dealing with an intelligence extremely close to your own -- say, two humans within about five IQ points of each other -- then both parties' values will significantly affect the outcome.

If you are dealing with an intelligence moderately more or less intelligent than yourself, such as a world-class politician or an average eight-year-old child respectively, then the weaker intelligence might be able to slightly affect the outcome.

If we formalize free will as the fact that what we want to do has a causal effect on what we actually do, then perhaps we can characterize the sensation of free will -- the desire to loudly assert in political arguments that we have free will -- as a belief that our values will have a causal effect on the eventual outcome of reality.

This matches the sense that facing a terrifyingly powerful intelligence, one that can solve us completely, strips away our free will, which in turn probably explains the common misconception that free will is incompatible with reductionism -- knowing that an explanation exists feels like having the explanation be known by someone. We don't want to be understood.

It matches the sense that a person's free will can be denied by forcing them into a straitjacket and tossing them in a padded cell. It matches the assumption that not having free will would feel like sitting at the wheel of a vehicle that was running on autopilot and refusing manual commands.

In general, we can distinguish three successive stages at which free will can be cut off:

• The creature can be constructed non-heuristically to begin with; that is, it lacks a utility function.
• The creature can control insufficient resources to be in a winnable state; that is, it is physically helpless.
• The creature can be outsmarted; that is, it has a vastly superior opponent.

Probably the last two, and possibly all three, cannot remain cleanly separated under close scrutiny. But the model has such a deep psychological appeal that I think it must be useful somehow, if only as an intermediate step in easing lay folk into compatibilism, or in predicting and manipulating the vast majority of humans that believe or alieve it.

Novels

Blindsight, Peter Watts

Eighty years in the future, Earth becomes aware of an alien presence when thousands of micro-satellites surveil the Earth; through good luck, the incoming alien vessel is detected, and the ship Theseus, with its artificial intelligence captain and crew of five, are sent out to engage in first contact with the huge alien vessel called Rorschach. As they explore the vessel and attempt to analyze it and its inhabitants, the narrator considers his life and strives to understand himself and ponders the nature of intelligence and consciousness, their utility, and what an alien mind might be like. Eventually the crew realizes that they are greatly outmatched by the vessel and its unconscious but extremely capable inhabitants.

When the level of this threat becomes clear, Theseus runs a kamikaze mission using its antimatter as a payload, while Siri returns to Earth, which, as he grows nearer, it is apparent has been overrun by vampires. Non-sapient creatures are beginning to exterminate what may be the only bright spark on consciousness in the universe.

Ventus, Karl Schroeder

Ventus is well-written and fun, as well as having IME the most realistic treatment of nanotech I've yet encountered in SF. Schroeder is definitely an author to watch (this is his first novel). The setup is that some agents from the local galactic civilization have come to an off-limits world hunting a powerful cyborg who may be carrying the last copy of an extremely dangerous AI god. The tough part is that the world is off-limits because the nanotech on that world is controlled by AIs that destroy all technology not made by them, and aren't terribly human-friendly.

Crisis in Zefra, Karl Schroeder

In spring 2005, the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts of National Defense Canada (that is to say, the army) hired me to write a dramatized future military scenario.  The book-length work, Crisis in Zefra, was set in a mythical African city-state, about 20 years in the future, and concerned a group of Canadian peacekeepers who are trying to ready the city for its first democratic vote while fighting an insurgency.  The project ran to 27,000 words and was published by the army as a bound paperback book.

Accelerando, Charles Stross

The first three stories follow the character of "venture altruist" Manfred Macx starting in the early 21st century, the second three stories follow his daughter Amber, and the final three focus largely on her son Sirhan in the completely transformed world at the end of the century.

In Accelerando, the planets of the solar system are dismantled to form a Matrioshka brain, a vast computational device inhabited by minds inconceivably more complex than naturally evolved intelligences such as human beings. This proves to be a normal stage in the life cycle of an inhabited solar system; the galaxies are filled with Matrioshka brains. Intelligent consciousnesses outside of Matrioshka brains may communicate via wormhole networks.

The notion that the universe is dominated by a communications network of superintelligences bears comparison with Olaf Stapledon's early science-fiction novel Star Maker (1937), although Stapledon's advanced civilizations communicate psychically rather than informatically.

The Lifecycle of Software Objects, Ted Chiang

A triumphant combination of the rigorous extrapolation of artificial intelligence and artificial life, two of the high concepts of contemporary SF, with an exploration of its consequences for the ordinary people whose lives it derails. Ana Alvarado is a former zookeeper turned software tester. When Blue Gamma offers her a job as animal trainer for their digients--digital entities, spawned by genetic algorithms to provide pets for players in the future virtual reality of Data Earth--she discovers an unexpected affinity for her charges. So does Derek Brooks, an animator who designs digient body parts. The market for digients develops and expands, cools and declines after the pattern of the software industry. Meanwhile Ana, Derek, and their friends become increasingly attached to their cute and talkative charges, who are neither pets nor children but something wholly new. But as Blue Gamma goes bust and Data Earth itself fades into obsolescence, Ana and the remaining digient keepers face a series of increasingly unpleasant dilemmas, their worries sharpened by their charges' growing awareness of the world beyond their pocket universe, and the steady unwinding of their own lives and relationships into middle-aged regrets for lost opportunities. Keeping to the constraints of a novella while working on a scale of years is a harsh challenge. Chiang's prose is sparse and austere throughout, relying on hints and nudges to provide context. At times, the narrative teeters on the edge of arid didacticism; there are enough ideas to fill a lesser author's trilogy, but much of the background is present only by implication, forcing the reader to work to fill in the blanks. (Indeed, this story may be impenetrable to readers who aren't at least passingly familiar with computers, the Internet, and virtual worlds such as Second Life.)

Short Stories

The Island, Peter Watts

"The Island" is a standalone novelette. It is also one episode in a projected series of connected tales (a lá Stross's Accellerando or Bradbury's The Martian Chronicles) that start about a hundred years from now and extends unto the very end of time. And in some parallel universe where I not only get a foothold into the gaming industry but actually keep one, it is a mission level for what would be, in my opinion, an extremely kick-ass computer game.

The Things, Peter Watts

Short Stories by Peter Watts

Divided by Infinity, Robert Charles Wilson

In the year after Lorraine's death I contemplated suicide six times. Contemplated it seriously, I mean: six times sat with the fat bottle of Clonazepam within reaching distance, six times failed to reach for it, betrayed by some instinct for life or disgusted by my own weakness.

I can't say I wish I had succeeded, because in all likelihood I did succeed, on each and every occasion. Six deaths. No, not just six. An infinite number.

Times six.

There are greater and lesser infinities.

But I didn't know that then.

Crystal Nights, Greg Egan

Short Stories by Greg Egan

The Finale of the Ultimate Meta Mega Crossover 

Vernor Vinge x Greg Egan crackfic.

Concepts contained in this story may cause SAN Checking in any mind not inherently stable at the third level of stress. Story may cause extreme existential confusion. Story is insane. The author recommends that anyone reading this story sign up with Alcor or the Cryonics Institute to have their brain preserved after death for later revival under controlled conditions. Readers not already familiar with this author should be warned that he is not bluffing.

Three Worlds Collide

A story to illustrate some points on naturalistic metaethics and diverse other issues of rational conduct.

Features Baby-Eating Aliens.