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The Cold War divided Science

21 Douglas_Knight 05 April 2014 11:10PM

What can we learn about science from the divide during the Cold War?

I have one example in mind: America held that coal and oil were fossil fuels, the stored energy of the sun, while the Soviets held that they were the result of geologic forces applied to primordial methane.

At least one side is thoroughly wrong. This isn't a politically charged topic like sociology, or even biology, but a physical science where people are supposed to agree on the answers. This isn't a matter of research priorities, where one side doesn't care enough to figure things out, but a topic that both sides saw to be of great importance, and where they both claimed to apply their theories. On the other hand, Lysenkoism seems to have resulted from the practical importance of crop breeding.

First of all, this example supports the claim that there really was a divide, that science was disconnected into two poorly communicating camps. It suggests that when the two sides reached the same results on other topics, they did so independently. Even if we cannot learn from this example, it suggests that we may be able to learn from other consequences of dividing the scientific community.

My understanding is that although some Russian language research papers were available in America, they were completely ignored and the scientists failed to even acknowledge that there was a community with divergent opinions. I don't know about the other direction.

Some questions:

  • Are there other topics, ideally in physical science, on which such a substantial disagreement persisted for decades? not necessarily between these two parties?
  • Did the Soviet scientists know that their American counterpoints disagreed?
  • Did Warsaw Pact (eg, Polish) scientists generally agree with the Soviets about the origin of coal and oil? Were they aware of the American position? Did other Western countries agree with America? How about other countries, such as China and Japan?
  • What are the current Russian beliefs about coal and oil? I tried running Russian Wikipedia through google translate and it seemed to support the biogenic theory. (right?) Has there been a reversal among Russian scientists? When? Or does Wikipedia represent foreign opinion? If a divide remains, does it follow the Iron Curtain, or some new line?
  • Have I missed some detail that would make me not classify this as an honest disagreement between two scientific establishments?
  • Finally, the original question: what can we learn about the institution of science?

Terrorist baby down the well: a look at institutional forces

14 Stuart_Armstrong 18 March 2014 02:30PM

Two facts "everyone knows", an intriguing contrast, and a note of caution.

"Everyone knows" that people are much more willing to invest into cures than preventions. When a disaster hits, then money is no object; but trying to raise money for prevention ahead of time is difficult, hamstrung by penny-pinchers and short-termism. It's hard to get people to take hypothetical risks seriously. There are strong institutional reasons for this, connected with deep human biases and bureaucratic self-interest.

"Everyone knows" that governments overreact to the threat of terrorism. The amount spent on terrorism dwarfs other comparable risks (such as slipping and falling in your bath). There's a huge amount of security theatre, but also a lot of actual security, and pre-emptive invasions of privacy. We'd probably be better just coping with incidents as they emerge, but instead we cause great annoyance and cost across the world to deal with a relatively minor problem. There are strong institutional reasons for this, connected with deep human biases and bureaucratic self-interest.

And both these facts are true. But... they contradict each other. One is about a lack of prevention, the other about an excess of prevention. And there are more examples of excessive prevention: the war on drugs, for instance. In each case we can come up with good explanations as to why there is not enough/too much prevention, and these explanations often point to fundamental institutional forces or human biases. This means that the situation could essentially never have been otherwise. But the tension above hints that these situations may be a lot more contingent than that, more dependent on history and particular details of our institutions and political setup. Maybe if the biases were reversed, we'd have equally compelling stories going the other way. So when predicting the course of future institutional biases, or attempting to change them, take into account that they may not be nearly as solid or inevitable as they feel today.

[Link] Distance from Harvard

6 GLaDOS 16 October 2013 08:43PM

Related: Loss of local knowledge affecting intellectual trends, The Hyborian Age

This post is from Gregory Cochran's and Henry Harpending's excellent blog West Hunter.

Barry Marshall once said that if he had gone to Harvard, he would have known that stomach ulcers were caused by stress, and wouldn’t even have considered the possibility that they might be caused by a bacterium.  There are a number of other important innovators that sure look as if they benefited from living as far as possible from  the sources of establishment opinion.  Back when continental drift was officially nonsense,  quite a few geologists in South Africa and Australia thought it must be correct – partly because there are local geological facts that are hard to explain any other way (like ancient glacial moraines in Australia whose rocks originated in South Africa) but also because physical distance translates into mental distance.

Of course this does not always work – distance is useful, but not sufficient..  Indonesia is pretty far from Harvard, but is a vast wasteland, intellectually.  Ideally, you want a country full of people drawn from the  populations that actually produce creative thinkers (Europeans, mostly) instead of the populations that ought to but don’t.  And it should be really, really far away.

With the Internet and cell phones and all that,  psychological isolation is harder to find. Once even California had some thoughts of its own, but that day is long past. If we want to keep progress from stalling out, we need people that don’t get sucked into to the usual crap – because they can’t.

The only real solution is interstellar colonization: the speed of light is your friend.  A generation ship might do the job -  even if it never arrived. It would be out there for hundreds of years, years in which the inhabitants could go their own way.  Some of the ships would be boring, some of them would go crazy – but at least they’d be different.

 

HIKE: A Group Dynamics Case Study

9 iconreforged 16 July 2013 07:14PM

I belong to a group at my university that organizes a backpacking trip for incoming freshmen in the two weeks before orientation week. This organization, which I will refer to as HIKE (not the real name), is particularly interesting in terms of group design. Why? It is approximately 30 years old, is run entirely by current students, and brings together a very large group of people and knits them into a largish community. Pretty much everyone involved  agrees that HIKE works very well. During my involvement (I was a participating freshman, and I have since become staff) I have continually wondered, why is this group so much more fun than any other group I've been a part of?

It's also particularly effective. Leading ~80 incoming freshmen, who have no current friends, and who know no one, and who don't generally have any backpacking experience, into the woods for two weeks, is no easy task. HIKE manages its own logistics, staff training, and organization, entirely with student volunteers who staff the trip, with little to no university interaction. (We get them to advertise our trip, and they generally permit us to continue to exist.) It takes some dedication to keep this rolling, and I have seen other campus groups completely fail to find that kind of dedication from their membership.

While it's not a rationalist group, it seems to have stumbled upon a cocktail of instrumentally rational practices. 

HIKE uses an interesting process of network homogenization. When staff members (who have generally been on several trips before) are assigned crews, staff members fill out "Who Do You Know?" forms, on which you rank how well you know other staff on a scale from 1 to 5. The people in charge of making groups, usually Project Directors, then group staffers based on how well you don't know other staff. You usually staff a trip with people that you haven't gotten to know very well, and then get to know them. Because of this process of strengthening the weakest bonds, HIKE is able to function as a relatively large social group, even across graduation classes and around existing cliques.

As far as actual interaction, HIKE involves a lot of face time with your crew of 10 freshmen and your co-staffers. There aren't really any breaks (with the exception of solos, see below) and you are hiking, eating, and chatting together for approximately 225 hours (15 waking hours in a day * 15 days). I had 13 hours and 40 minutes of class a week the Spring 2013 semester. HIKE is approximately 7+ weeks of class at that rate.

One of the more beloved HIKE traditions is the solo, where the hiking leaders pick a spot with plenty of isolated spaces, and the participants can choosee to spend ~24 hours alone and, optionally, fasting. It's a novel experience, and people like the time to rest and reflect in the middle of a very social, very intensive hiking trip.

My suspicion for why this all works is that HIKE very closely simulates a hunter-gatherer lifestyle. You travel in ~10 member groups, on foot, carrying your food, on mountain trails. You spend your every waking hour with the crew. The 2-3 hiking leaders are there to facilitate only (read: perform first aid if necessary, guide conversation, teach outdoor skills if necessary, and nudge the group if they get off track), and all decisions are made by consensus (which isn't an all-purpose decision making process, but is very egalitarian, and helps the group gel).

Maybe I'm just praising my friend-group, but I feel like I stumbled into a particularly strong group of people. We all feel very well-connected and we feel a lot of commitment to the program. My experience with other college groups has been that members are pulled apart by other commitments and a lack of familiarity with other members, and HIKE seems to avoid that with a critical mass of consecutive face time. We manage to have continuity of social norms across the years, but a great deal of flexibility (no one remembers what happened 4 years ago, and some traditions disappear and others cement themselves as ancient and hallowed despite being only two years old).

I'm interested in hearing any thoughts on this, and any relevant experience with other groups, ideas for testing cross-application, requests for further elaboration, etc.


 

 

Notes on the Psychology of Power

34 gwern 27 July 2012 07:22PM

Luke/SI asked me to look into what the academic literature might have to say about people in positions of power. This is a summary of some of the recent psychology results.

The powerful or elite are: fast-planning abstract thinkers who take action (1) in order to pursue single/minimal objectives, are in favor of strict rules for their stereotyped out-group underlings (2) but are rationalizing (3) & hypocritical when it serves their interests (4), especially when they feel secure in their power. They break social norms (5, 6) or ignore context (1) which turns out to be worsened by disclosure of conflicts of interest (7), and lie fluently without mental or physiological stress (6).

What are powerful members good for? They can help in shifting among equilibria: solving coordination problems or inducing contributions towards public goods (8), and their abstracted Far perspective can be better than the concrete Near of the weak (9).

  1. Galinsky et al 2003; Guinote, 2007; Lammers et al 2008; Smith & Bargh, 2008
  2. Eyal & Liberman
  3. Rustichini & Villeval 2012
  4. Lammers et al 2010
  5. Kleef et al 2011
  6. Carney et al 2010
  7. Cain et al 2005; Cain et al 2011
  8. Eckel et al 2010
  9. Slabu et al; Smith & Trope 2006; Smith et al 2008

continue reading »

Beyond Reasonable Doubt? - Richard Dawkins [link]

24 Dreaded_Anomaly 10 February 2012 02:28AM

A new article looking at the jury system rationally and scientifically.

Excerpt:

Courtroom dramas accurately portray the suspense that hangs in the air when the jury returns and delivers its verdict. All, including the lawyers on both sides and the judge, are on tenterhooks and hold their breath while they wait to hear the foreman of the jury pronounce the words, “Guilty” or “Not guilty”. However, if the phrase “beyond reasonable doubt” means what it says, there should be no doubt of the outcome in the mind of anybody who has sat through the same trial as the jury. That includes the judge who, as soon as the jury has delivered its verdict, is prepared to give the order for execution — or release the prisoner without a stain on his character.

And yet, before the jury returned, there was enough “reasonable doubt” in that same judge’s mind to keep him on tenterhooks waiting for the verdict.

You cannot have it both ways. Either the verdict is beyond reasonable doubt, in which case there should be no suspense while the jury is out. Or there is real, nail-biting suspense, in which case you cannot claim that the case has been proved “beyond reasonable doubt”.

This really struck me as something that could have been on LW's front page.

The Goal of the Bayesian Conspiracy

-9 Arandur 16 August 2011 06:40PM

Suppose that there were to exist such an entity as the Bayesian Conspiracy.

I speak not of the social group of that name, the banner under which rationalists meet at various conventions – though I do not intend to disparage that group! Indeed, it is my fervent hope that they may in due time grow into the entity which I am setting out to describe. No, I speak of something more like the “shadowy group of scientists” which Yudkowsky describes, tongue (one might assume) firmly in cheek. I speak of such an organization which has been described in Yudkowsky's various fictional works, the secret and sacred cabal of mathematicians and empiricists who seek unwaveringly for truth... but set in the modern-day world, perhaps merely the seed of such a school, an organization which can survive and thrive in the midst of, yet isolated from, our worldwide sociopolitical mess. I ask you, if such an organization existed, right now, what would – indeed, what should – be its primary mid-term (say, 50-100 yrs.) goal?

I submit that the primary mid-term goal of the Bayesian Conspiracy, at this stage of its existence, is and/or ought to be nothing less than world domination.

Before the rotten fruit begins to fly, let me make a brief clarification.

The term “world domination” is, unfortunately, rather socially charged, bringing to mind an image of the archetypal mad scientist with marching robot armies. That's not what I'm talking about. My usage of the phrase is intended to evoke something slightly less dramatic, and far less sinister. “World domination”, to me, actually describes rather a loosely packed set of possible world-states. One example would be the one I term “One World Government”, wherein the Conspiracy (either openly or in secret) is in charge of all nations via an explicit central meta-government. Another would be a simple infiltration of the world's extant political systems, followed by policy-making and cooperation which would ensure the general welfare of the world's entire population – control de facto, but without changing too much outwardly. The common thread is simply that the Conspiracy becomes the only major influence in world politics.

(Forgive my less-than-rigorous definition, but a thorough examination of the exact definition of the word “influence” is far, far outside the scope of this article.)

So there is my claim. Let me tell you why I believe this is the morally correct course of action.

Let us examine, for a moment, the numerous major good works which are currently being openly done by rationalists, or with those who may not self-identify as rationalists, but whose dogmas and goals accord with ours. We have the Singularity Institute, which is concerned with ensuring that our technological, transhumanistic advent happens smoothly and with a minimum of carnage. We have various institutions worldwide advocating and practicing cryonics, which offers a non-zero probability of recovery from death. We have various institutions also who are working on life extension technologies and procedures, which offer to one day remove the threat of death entirely from our world.

All good things, I say. I also say: too slow!

Imagine what more could be accomplished if the United States, for example, granted to the Life Extension Foundation or to Alcor the amount of money and social prominence currently reserved for military purposes. Imagine what would happen if every scientist around the world were perhaps able to contribute under a unified institution, working on this vitally important problem of overcoming death, with all the money and time the world's governments could offer at their disposal.

Imagine, also, how many lives are lost every day due to governmental negligence, and war, and poverty, and hunger. What does it profit the world, if we offer to freeze the heads of those who can afford it, while all around us there are people who can't even afford their bread and water?

I have what is, perhaps, to some who are particularly invested, an appalling and frightening proposition: for the moment, we should devote fewer of our resources to cryonics and life extension, and focus on saving the lives of those to whom these technologies are currently beyond even a fevered dream. This means holding the reins of the world, that we might fix the problems inherent in our society. Only when significant steps have been taken in the direction of saving life can we turn our focus toward extending life.

What should the Bayesian Conspiracy do, once it comes to power? It should stop war. It should usurp murderous despots, and feed the hungry and wretched who suffered under them. Again: before we work on extending the lives of the healthy and affluent beyond what we've so far achieved, we should, for example, bring the average life expectancy in Africa above the 50-year mark, where it currently sits (according to a 2006 study in the BMJ). This is what will bring about the maximum level of happiness in the world; not cryonics for those who can afford it.

Does this mean that we should stop researching these anti-death technologies? No! Of course not! Consider: even if cryonics drops to, say, priority 3 or 4 under this system, once the Conspiracy comes to power, that will still be far more support than it's currently receiving from world governments. The work will end up progressing at a far faster rate than it currently does.

Some of you may have qualms about this plan of action. You may ask, what about individual choice? What about the peoples' right to choose who leads them? Well, for those of us who live in the United States, at least, this is already a bit of a naïve question: due to color politics, you already do not have much of a choice in who leads you. But that's a matter for another time. Even if you think that dictatorship – even benevolent, rationalist dictatorship – would be inherently morally worse than even the flawed democratic system we enjoy here – a notion that may not even necessarily be the case!  do not worry: there's no reason why world domination need entail dictatorships. In countries where there are democratic systems in place, we will work within the system, placing Conspirators into positions where they can convince the people, via legitimate means, to give them public office. Once we have attained a sufficient level of power over this democratic system, we will effect change, and thence the work will go forth until this victory of rationalist dogma covers all the earth. When there are dictators, they will be removed and replaced with democratic systems... under the initial control of Conspirators, of course, and ideally under their continued control as time passes – but legitimately obtained control.

It is demonstrable that one's level of strength as a rationalist has a direct correlation to the probability that the one will make correct decisions. Therefore, the people who make decisions that affect large numbers of people ought to be those who have the highest level of rationality. In this way we can seek to avoid the many, many, many pitfalls of politics, including the inefficiency which Yudkowsky has again and again railed against. If all the politicians are on the same side, who's to argue?

In fact, even if two rationalists disagree on a particular point (which they shouldn't, but hey, even the best rationalists aren't perfect yet), they'll be able to operate more efficiently than two non-rationalists in the same position. Is the disagreement able to be settled by experiment? If it's important, throw funds at a lab to conduct such an experiment! After all, we're in charge of the money and the scientists. Is it not? Find a compromise that has the maximum expected utility for the constituents. We can do that with a high degree of accuracy; we have access to the pollsters and sociologists, and know about reliable versus unreliable polling methods!

What about non-rationalist aspiring politicians? Well, under an ideal Conspiracy takeover, there would be no such thing. Lessons on politics would include rationality as a basis; graduation from law school would entail induction into the Conspiracy, and access to the truths had therein.

I suppose the biggest question is, is all this realistic? Or is just an idealist's dream? Well, there's a non-zero probability that the Conspiracy already exists, in which case, I hope that they will consider my proposal... or, even better, I hope that I've correctly deduced and adequately explained the master plan. If the Conspiracy does not currently exist, then if my position is correct, we have a moral obligation to work our hardest on this project.

“But I don't want to be a politician,” you exclaim! “I have no skill with people, and I'd much rather tinker with the Collatz Conjecture at my desk for a few years!” I'm inclined to say that that's just too bad; sacrifices must be made for the common good, and after all, it's often said that anyone who actually wants a political office is by the fact unfit for the position. But in all realism, I'm quite sure that there will be enough room in the Conspiracy for non-politicians. We're all scientists and mathematicians at heart, anyway.

So! Here is our order of business. We must draw up a charter for the Bayesian Conspiracy. We must invent a testing system able to keep a distinction between those who are and are not ready for the Truths the Conspiracy will hold. We must find our strongest Rationalists – via a testing procedure we have not yet come up with – and put them in charge, and subordinate ourselves to them (not blindly, of course! The strength of community, even rationalist community, is in debate!). We must establish schools and structured lesson plans for the purpose of training fresh students; we must also take advantage of those systems which are already in place, and utilize them for (or turn them to) our purposes. I expect to have the infrastructure set up in no more than five years.

At that point, our real work will begin.