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Ultimatums in the Territory

12 malcolmocean 28 September 2015 10:01PM

When you think of "ultimatums", what comes to mind?

Manipulativeness, maybe? Ultimatums are typically considered a negotiation tactic, and not a very pleasant one.

But there's a different thing that can happen, where an ultimatum is made, but where articulating it isn't a speech act but rather an observation. As in, the ultimatum wasn't created by the act of stating it, but rather, it already existed in some sense.

Some concrete examples: negotiating relationships

I had a tense relationship conversation a few years ago. We'd planned to spend the day together in the park, and I was clearly angsty, so my partner asked me what was going on. I didn't have a good handle on it, but I tried to explain what was uncomfortable for me about the relationship, and how I was confused about what I wanted. After maybe 10 minutes of this, she said, "Look, we've had this conversation before. I don't want to have it again. If we're going to do this relationship, I need you to promise we won't have this conversation again."

I thought about it. I spent a few moments simulating the next months of our relationship. I realized that I totally expected this to come up again, and again. Earlier on, when we'd had the conversation the first time, I hadn't been sure. But it was now pretty clear that I'd have to suppress important parts of myself if I was to keep from having this conversation.

"...yeah, I can't promise that," I said.

"I guess that's it then."

"I guess so."

I think a more self-aware version of me could have recognized, without her prompting, that my discomfort represented an unreconcilable part of the relationship, and that I basically already wanted to break up.

The rest of the day was a bit weird, but it was at least nice that we had resolved this. We'd realized that it was a fact about the world that there wasn't a serious relationship that we could have that we both wanted.

I sensed that when she posed the ultimatum, she wasn't doing it to manipulate me. She was just stating what kind of relationship she was interested in. It's like if you go to a restaurant and try to order a pad thai, and the waiter responds, "We don't have rice noodles or peanut sauce. You either eat somewhere else, or you eat something other than a pad thai."

An even simpler example would be that at the start of one of my relationships, my partner wanted to be monogamous and I wanted to be polyamorous (i.e. I wanted us both to be able to see other people and have other partners). This felt a bit tug-of-war-like, but eventually I realized that actually I would prefer to be single than be in a monogamous relationship.

I expressed this.

It was an ultimatum! "Either you date me polyamorously or not at all." But it wasn't me "just trying to get my way".

I guess the thing about ultimatums in the territory is that there's no bluff to call.

It happened in this case that my partner turned out to be really well-suited for polyamory, and so this worked out really well. We'd decided that if she got uncomfortable with anything, we'd talk about it, and see what made sense. For the most part, there weren't issues, and when there were, the openness of our relationship ended up just being a place where other discomforts were felt, not a generator of disconnection.

Normal ultimatums vs ultimatums in the territory

I use "in the territory" to indicate that this ultimatum isn't just a thing that's said but a thing that is true independently of anything being said. It's a bit of a poetic reference to the map-territory distinction.

No bluffing: preferences are clear

The key distinguishing piece with UITTs is, as I mentioned above, that there's no bluff to call: the ultimatum-maker isn't secretly really really hoping that the other person will choose one option or the other. These are the two best options as far as they can tell. They might have a preference: in the second story above, I preferred a polyamorous relationship to no relationship. But I preferred both of those to a monogamous relationship, and the ultimatum in the territory was me realizing and stating that.

This can actually be expressed formally, using what's called a preference vector. This comes from Keith Hipel at University of Waterloo. If the tables in this next bit doesn't make sense, don't worry about it: all important conclusions are expressed in the text.

First, we'll note that since each of us have two options, a table can be constructed which shows four possible states (numbered 0-3 in the boxes).

    My options
  options insist poly don't insist
Partner
options
offer relationship 3: poly relationship 1: mono relationship
don't offer 2: no relationship 0: (??) no relationship

This representation is sometimes referred to as matrix form or normal form, and has the advantage of making it really clear who controls which state transitions (movements between boxes). Here, my decision controls which column we're in, and my partner's decision controls which row we're in.

Next, we can consider: of these four possible states, which are most and least preferred, by each person? Here's my preferences, ordered from most to least preferred, left to right. The 1s in the boxes mean that the statement on the left is true.

state 3 2 1 0
I insist on polyamory 1 1 0 0
partner offers relationship 1 0 1 0
My preference vector (← preferred)

The order of the states represents my preferences (as I understand them) regardless of what my potential partner's preferences are. I only control movement in the top row (do I insist on polyamory or not). It's possible that they prefer no relationship to a poly relationship, in which case we'll end up in state 2. But I still prefer this state over state 1 (mono relationship) and state 0 (in which I don't ask for polyamory and my partner decides not to date me anyway). So whatever my partners preferences are, I've definitely made a good choice for me, by insisting on polyamory.

This wouldn't be true if I were bluffing (if I preferred state 1 to state 2 but insisted on polyamory anyway). If I preferred 1 to 2, but I bluffed by insisting on polyamory, I would basically be betting on my partner preferring polyamory to no relationship, but this might backfire and get me a no relationship, when both of us (in this hypothetical) would have preferred a monogamous relationship to that. I think this phenomenon is one reason people dislike bluffy ultimatums.

My partner's preferences turned out to be...

state 1 3 2 0
I insist on polyamory 0 1 1 0
partner offers relationship 1 1 0 0
Partner's preference vector (← preferred)

You'll note that they preferred a poly relationship to no relationship, so that's what we got! Although as I said, we didn't assume that everything would go smoothly. We agreed that if this became uncomfortable for my partner, then they would tell me and we'd figure out what to do. Another way to think about this is that after some amount of relating, my partner's preference vector might actually shift such that they preferred no relationship to our polyamorous one. In which case it would no longer make sense for us to be together.

UITTs release tension, rather than creating it

In writing this post, I skimmed a wikihow article about how to give an ultimatum, in which they say:

"Expect a negative reaction. Hardly anyone likes being given an ultimatum. Sometimes it may be just what the listener needs but that doesn't make it any easier to hear."

I don't know how accurate the above is in general. I think they're talking about ultimatums like "either you quit smoking or we break up". I can say that expect that these properties of an ultimatum contribute to the negative reaction:

  • stated angrily or otherwise demandingly
  • more extreme than your actual preferences, because you're bluffing
  • refers to what they need to do, versus your own preferences

So this already sounds like UITTs would have less of a negative reaction.

But I think the biggest reason is that they represent a really clear articulation of what one party wants, which makes it much simpler for the other party to decide what they want to do. Ultimatums in the territory tend to also be more of a realization that you then share, versus a deliberate strategy. And this realization causes a noticeable release of tension in the realizer too.

Let's contrast:

"Either you quit smoking or we break up!"

versus

"I'm realizing that as much as I like our relationship, it's really not working for me to be dating a smoker, so I've decided I'm not going to. Of course, my preferred outcome is that you stop smoking, not that we break up, but I realize that might not make sense for you at this point."

Of course, what's said here doesn't necessarily correspond to the preference vectors shown above. Someone could say the demanding first thing when they actually do have a UITT preference-wise, and someone who's trying to be really NVCy or something might say the sceond thing even though they're actually bluffing and would prefer to . But I think that in general they'll correlate pretty well.

The "realizing" seems similar to what happened to me 2 years ago on my own, when I realized that the territory was issuing me an ultimatum: either you change your habits or you fail at your goals. This is how the world works: your current habits will get you X, and you're declaring you want Y. On one level, it was sad to realize this, because I wanted to both eat lots of chocolate and to have a sixpack. Now this ultimatum is really in the territory.

Another example could be realizing that not only is your job not really working for you, but that it's already not-working to the extent that you aren't even really able to be fully productive. So you don't even have the option of just working a bit longer, because things are only going to get worse at this point. Once you realize that, it can be something of a relief, because you know that even if it's hard, you're going to find something better than your current situation.

Loose ends

More thoughts on the break-up story

One exercise I have left to the reader is creating the preference vectors for the break-up in the first story. HINT: (rot13'd) Vg'f fvzvyne gb gur cersrerapr irpgbef V qvq fubj, jvgu gjb qrpvfvbaf: fur pbhyq vafvfg ba ab shgher fhpu natfgl pbairefngvbaf be abg, naq V pbhyq pbagvahr gur eryngvbafuvc be abg.

An interesting note is that to some extent in that case I wasn't even expressing a preference but merely a prediction that my future self would continue to have this angst if it showed up in the relationship. So this is even more in the territory, in some senses. In my model of the territory, of course, but yeah. You can also think of this sort of as an unconscious ultimatum issued by the part of me that already knew I wanted to break up. It said "it's preferable for me to express angst in this relationship than to have it be angst free. I'd rather have that angst and have it cause a breakup than not have the angst."

Revealing preferences

I think that ultimatums in the territory are also connected to what I've called Reveal Culture (closely related to Tell Culture, but framed differently). Reveal cultures have the assumption that in some fundamental sense we're on the same side, which makes negotiations a very different thing... more of a collaborative design process. So it's very compatible with the idea that you might just clearly articulate your preferences.

Note that there doesn't always exist a UITT to express. In the polyamory example above, if I'd preferred a mono relationship to no relationship, then I would have had no UITT (though I could have bluffed). In this case, it would be much harder for me to express my preferences, because if I leave them unclear then there can be kind of implicit bluffing. And even once articulated, there's still no obvious choice. I prefer this, you prefer that. We need to compromise or something. It does seem clear that, with these preferences, if we don't end up with some relationship at the end, we messed up... but deciding how to resolve it is outside the scope of this post.

Knowing your own preferences is hard

Another topic this post will point at but not explore is: how do you actually figure out what you want? I think this is a mix of skill and process. You can get better at the general skill by practising trying to figure it out (and expressing it / acting on it when you do, and seeing if that works out well). One process I can think of that would be helpful is Gendlin's Focusing. Nate Soares has written about how introspection is hard and to some extent you don't ever actually know what you want: You don't get to know what you're fighting for. But, he notes,

"There are facts about what we care about, but they aren't facts about the stars. They are facts about us."

And they're hard to figure out. But to the extent that we can do so and then act on what we learn, we can get more of what we want, in relationships, in our personal lives, in our careers, and in the world.

(This article crossposted from my personal blog.)

Indifferent vs false-friendly AIs

9 Stuart_Armstrong 24 March 2015 12:13PM

A putative new idea for AI control; index here.

For anyone but an extreme total utilitarian, there is a great difference between AIs that would eliminate everyone as a side effect of focusing on their own goals (indifferent AIs) and AIs that would effectively eliminate everyone through a bad instantiation of human-friendly values (false-friendly AIs). Examples of indifferent AIs are things like paperclip maximisers, examples of false-friendly AIs are "keep humans safe" AIs who entomb everyone in bunkers, lobotomised and on medical drips.

The difference is apparent when you consider multiple AIs and negotiations between them. Imagine you have a large class of AIs, and that they are all indifferent (IAIs), except for one (which you can't identify) which is friendly (FAI). And you now let them negotiate a compromise between themselves. Then, for many possible compromises, we will end up with most of the universe getting optimised for whatever goals the AIs set themselves, while a small portion (maybe just a single galaxy's resources) would get dedicated to making human lives incredibly happy and meaningful.

But if there is a false-friendly AI (FFAI) in the mix, things can go very wrong. That is because those happy and meaningful lives are a net negative to the FFAI. These humans are running dangers - possibly physical, possibly psychological - that lobotomisation and bunkers (or their digital equivalents) could protect against. Unlike the IAIs, which would only complain about the loss of resources to the FAI, the FFAI finds the FAI's actions positively harmful (and possibly vice versa), making compromises much harder to reach.

And the compromises reached might be bad ones. For instance, what if the FAI and FFAI agree on "half-lobotomised humans" or something like that? You might ask why the FAI would agree to that, but there's a great difference to an AI that would be friendly on its own, and one that would choose only friendly compromises with a powerful other AI with human-relevant preferences.

Some designs of FFAIs might not lead to these bad outcomes - just like IAIs, they might be content to rule over a galaxy of lobotomised humans, while the FAI has its own galaxy off on its own, where its humans take all these dangers. But generally, FFAIs would not come about by someone designing a FFAI, let alone someone designing a FFAI that can safely trade with a FAI. Instead, they would be designing a FAI, and failing. And the closer that design got to being FAI, the more dangerous the failure could potentially be.

So, when designing an FAI, make sure to get it right. And, though you absolutely positively need to get it absolutely right, make sure that if you do fail, the failure results in a FFAI that can safely be compromised with, if someone else gets out a true FAI in time.

Lying in negotiations: a maximally bad problem

13 Stuart_Armstrong 17 November 2014 03:17PM

In a previous post, I showed that the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (KSBS) and own my Mutual Worth Bargaining Solution (MWBS) were all maximally vulnerable to lying. Here I can present a more general result: all bargaining solutions are maximally vulnerable to lying.

Assume that players X and Y have settled on some bargaining solution (which only cares about the defection point and the utilities of X and Y). Assume further that player Y knows player X's utility function. Let player X look at the possible outcomes, and let her label any outcome O "admissible" if there is some possible bargaining partner YO with utility function uO such that O would be the outcome of the bargain between X and YO.

For instance, in the case of NBS and KSBS, the admissible outcomes would be the outcomes Pareto-better than the disagreement point. The MWBS has a slightly larger set of admissible outcomes, as it allows players to lose utility (up to the maximum they could possibly gain).

Then the general result is:

If player Y is able to lie about his utility function while knowing player X's true utility (and player X is honest), he can freely select his preferred outcome among the outcomes that are admissible.

The proof of this is also derisively brief: player Y need simply claim to have utility uO, in order to force outcome O.

Thus, if you've agreed on a bargaining solution, all that you've done is determined the set of outcomes among which your lying opponent will freely choose.

There may be a subtlety: your system could make use of an objective (or partially objective) disagreement point, which your opponent is powerless to change. This doesn't change the result much:

If player Y is able to lie about his utility function while knowing player X's true utility (and player X is honest), he can freely select his preferred outcome among the outcomes that are admissible given the disagreement point.

 

Exploitation and gains from trade

Note that the above result did not make any assumptions about the outcome being Pareto - giving up Pareto doesn't make you non-exploitable (or "strategyproof" as it is often called).

But note also that the result does not mean that the system is exploitable! In the random dictator setup, you randomly assign power to one player, who then makes all the decisions. In terms of expected utility, this is a pUX+(1-p)UY, where UX is the best outcome ("Utopia") for X and UY the best outcome for Y, and p the probability that X is the random dictator. The theorem still holds for this setup: player X knows that player Y will be able to select freely among the admissible outcomes, which is the set S={pUX+(1-p)O | O an outcome}. However, player X knows that player Y will select pUX+(1-p)UY as this maximises his expected utility. So a bargaining solution which has a particular selection of admissible outcomes can be strategyproof.

However, it seems that the only strategyproof bargaining solutions are variants of random dictators! These solutions do not allow much gain from trade. Conversely, the more you open your bargaining solution up to gains from trade, the more exploitable you become from lying. This can be seen in the examples above: my MWBS tried to allow greater gains (in expectation) by not restricting to strict Pareto improvements from the disagreement point. As a result, it makes itself more vulnerable to liars.

 

What to do

What can be done about this? There seem to be several possibilities:

  1. Restrict to bargaining solutions difficult to exploit. This is the counsel of despair: give up most of the gains from trade, to protect yourself from lying. But there may be a system where the tradeoff between exploitability and potential gains is in some sense optimal.
  2. Figure out your opponent's true utility function. The other obvious solution: prevent lying by figuring out what your opponent really values, by inspecting their code, their history, their reactions, etc... This could be combined with refusing to trade with those who don't make their true utility easy to discover (or only using non-exploitable trades with those).
  3. Hide your own true utility. The above approach only works because the liar knows their opponent, and their opponent doesn't know them. If both utilities are hidden, it's not clear how exploitable the system really is.
  4. Play only multi-player. If there are many different trades with many different people, it becomes harder to construct a false utility that exploits them all. This is in a sense a variant of "hiding your own true utility": in that situation, the player has to lie given their probability distribution of your possible possible utilities; in this this situation, they have to lie, given the known distribution of multiple true utilities.

So there does not seem to be a principled way of getting rid of liars. But the multi-player (or hidden utility function) may point to a single "best" bargaining solution: the one that minimises the returns to lying and maximises the gains to trade, given ignorance of the other's utility function.

[Link] Cognitive biases about violence as a negotiating tactic

3 chaosmage 25 October 2013 11:43AM

Max Abrahms, "The Credibility Paradox: Violence as a Double-Edged Sword in International Politics," International Studies Quarterly 2013.

Abstract: Implicit in the rationalist literature on bargaining over the last half-century is the political utility of violence. Given our anarchical international system populated with egoistic actors, violence is thought to promote concessions by lending credibility to their threats. From the vantage of bargaining theory, then, empirical research on terrorism poses a puzzle. For non-state actors, terrorism signals a credible threat in comparison to less extreme tactical alternatives. In recent years, however, a spate of studies across disciplines and methodologies has nonetheless found that neither escalating to terrorism nor with terrorism encourages government concessions. In fact, perpetrating terrorist acts reportedly lowers the likelihood of government compliance, particularly as the civilian casualties rise. The apparent tendency for this extreme form of violence to impede concessions challenges the external validity of bargaining theory, as traditionally understood. In this study, I propose and test an important psychological refinement to the standard rationalist narrative. Via an experiment on a national sample of adults, I find evidence of a newfound cognitive heuristic undermining the coercive logic of escalation enshrined in bargaining theory. Due to this oversight, mainstream bargaining theory overestimates the political utility of violence, particularly as an instrument of coercion.

I found this via Bruce Schneier's blog, which frequently features very valuable analysis clustered around societal and computer security.

Cooperating with agents with different ideas of fairness, while resisting exploitation

38 Eliezer_Yudkowsky 16 September 2013 08:27AM

There's an idea from the latest MIRI workshop which I haven't seen in informal theories of negotiation, and I want to know if this is a known idea.

(Old well-known ideas:)

Suppose a standard Prisoner's Dilemma matrix where (3, 3) is the payoff for mutual cooperation, (2, 2) is the payoff for mutual defection, and (0, 5) is the payoff if you cooperate and they defect.

Suppose we're going to play a PD iterated for four rounds.  We have common knowledge of each other's source code so we can apply modal cooperation or similar means of reaching a binding 'agreement' without other enforcement methods.

If we mutually defect on every round, our net mutual payoff is (8, 8).  This is a 'Nash equilibrium' because neither agent can unilaterally change its action and thereby do better, if the opponents' actions stay fixed.  If we mutually cooperate on every round, the result is (12, 12) and this result is on the 'Pareto boundary' because neither agent can do better unless the other agent does worse.  It would seem a desirable principle for rational agents (with common knowledge of each other's source code / common knowledge of rationality) to find an outcome on the Pareto boundary, since otherwise they are leaving value on the table.

But (12, 12) isn't the only possible result on the Pareto boundary.  Suppose that running the opponent's source code, you find that they're willing to cooperate on three rounds and defect on one round, if you cooperate on every round, for a payoff of (9, 14) slanted their way.  If they use their knowledge of your code to predict you refusing to accept that bargain, they will defect on every round for the mutual payoff of (8, 8).

I would consider it obvious that a rational agent should refuse this unfair bargain.  Otherwise agents with knowledge of your source code will offer you only this bargain, instead of the (12, 12) of mutual cooperation on every round; they will exploit your willingness to accept a result on the Pareto boundary in which almost all of the gains from trade go to them.

(Newer ideas:)

Generalizing:  Once you have a notion of a 'fair' result - in this case (12, 12) - then an agent which accepts any outcome in which it does worse than the fair result, while the opponent does better, is 'exploitable' relative to this fair bargain.  Like the Nash equilibrium, the only way you should do worse than 'fair' is if the opponent also does worse.

So we wrote down on the whiteboard an attempted definition of unexploitability in cooperative games as follows:

"Suppose we have a [magical] definition N of a fair outcome.  A rational agent should only do worse than N if its opponent does worse than N, or else [if bargaining fails] should only do worse than the Nash equilibrium if its opponent does worse than the Nash equilibrium."  (Note that this definition precludes giving in to a threat of blackmail.)

(Key possible-innovation:)

It then occurred to me that this definition opened the possibility for other, intermediate bargains between the 'fair' solution on the Pareto boundary, and the Nash equilibrium.

Suppose the other agent has a slightly different definition of fairness and they think that what you consider to be a payoff of (12, 12) favors you too much; they think that you're the one making an unfair demand.  They'll refuse (12, 12) with the same feeling of indignation that you would apply to (9, 14).

Well, if you give in to an arrangement with an expected payoff of, say, (11, 13) as you evaluate payoffs, then you're giving other agents an incentive to skew their definitions of fairness.

But it does not create poor incentives (AFAICT) to accept instead a bargain with an expected payoff of, say, (10, 11) which the other agent thinks is 'fair'.  Though they're sad that you refused the truly fair outcome of (as you count utilons) 11, 13 and that you couldn't reach the Pareto boundary together, still, this is better than the Nash equilibrium of (8, 8).  And though you think the bargain is unfair, you are not creating incentives to exploit you.  By insisting on this definition of fairness, the other agent has done worse for themselves than other (12, 12).  The other agent probably thinks that (10, 11) is 'unfair' slanted your way, but they likewise accept that this does not create bad incentives, since you did worse than the 'fair' outcome of (11, 13).

There could be many acceptable negotiating equilibria between what you think is the 'fair' point on the Pareto boundary, and the Nash equilibrium.  So long as each step down in what you think is 'fairness' reduces the total payoff to the other agent, even if it reduces your own payoff even more.  This resists exploitation and avoids creating an incentive for claiming that you have a different definition of fairness, while still holding open the possibility of some degree of cooperation with agents who honestly disagree with you about what's fair and are trying to avoid exploitation themselves.

This translates into an informal principle of negotiations:  Be willing to accept unfair bargains, but only if (you make it clear) both sides are doing worse than what you consider to be a fair bargain.

I haven't seen this advocated before even as an informal principle of negotiations.  Is it in the literature anywhere?  Someone suggested Schelling might have said it, but didn't provide a chapter number.

ADDED:

Clarification 1:  Yes, utilities are invariant up to a positive affine transformation so there's no canonical way to split utilities evenly.  Hence the part about "Assume a magical solution N which gives us the fair division."  If we knew the exact properties of how to implement this magical solution, taking it at first for magical, that might give us some idea of what N should be, too.

Clarification 2:  The way this might work is that you pick a series of increasingly unfair-to-you, increasingly worse-for-the-other-player outcomes whose first element is what you deem the fair Pareto outcome:  (100, 100), (98, 99), (96, 98).  Perhaps stop well short of Nash if the skew becomes too extreme.  Drop to Nash as the last resort.  The other agent does the same, starting with their own ideal of fairness on the Pareto boundary.  Unless one of you has a completely skewed idea of fairness, you should be able to meet somewhere in the middle.  Both of you will do worse against a fixed opponent's strategy by unilaterally adopting more self-favoring ideas of fairness.  Both of you will do worse in expectation against potentially exploitive opponents by unilaterally adopting looser ideas of fairness.  This gives everyone an incentive to obey the Galactic Schelling Point and be fair about it.  You should not be picking the descending sequence in an agent-dependent way that incentivizes, at cost to you, skewed claims about fairness.

Clarification 3:  You must take into account the other agent's costs and other opportunities when ensuring that the net outcome, in terms of final utilities, is worse for them than the reward offered for 'fair' cooperation.  Offering them the chance to buy half as many paperclips at a lower, less fair price, does no good if they can go next door, get the same offer again, and buy the same number of paperclips at a lower total price.

Countess and Baron attempt to define blackmail, fail

11 Stuart_Armstrong 15 July 2013 10:07AM

For a more concise version of this argument, see here.

We meet our heroes, the Countess of Rectitude and Baron Chastity, as they continue to investigate the mysteries of blackmail by sleeping together and betraying each other.

The Baron had a pile of steamy letters between him and the Countess: it would be embarrassing to both of them if these letters got out. Yet the Baron confided the letters to a trusted Acolyte, with strict instructions. The Acolyte was to publish these letters, unless the Countess agreed to give the Baron her priceless Ping Vase.

This seems a perfect example of blackmail:

  • The Baron is taking a course of action that is intrinsically negative for him. This behaviour only makes sense if it forces the Countess to take a specific action which benefits him. The Countess would very much like it if the Baron couldn't do such things.

As it turns out, a servant broke the Ping Vase while chasing the Countess's griffon. The servant was swiftly executed, but the Acolyte had to publish the letters as instructed, to great embarrassment all around (sometimes precommitments aren't what they're cracked up to be). After six days of exile in the Countess's doghouse (a luxurious, twenty-room affair) and eleven days of make-up sex, the Baron was back to planning against his lover.

continue reading »

Intrapersonal negotiation

30 datadataeverywhere 23 January 2011 11:02PM

Related to: Akrasia as a collective action problem and Self-empathy as a source of "willpower".

The Less Wrong community has discussed negotiating with one's conflicting sub-agents as a method to defeat akrasia and other forms of dynamic inconsistency, with some mix of reactions about how possible or effective that strategy can be. This article presents a successful example in my life, though it is probably an extreme outlier for a number of reasons.

I have been diagnosed with bipolar II disorder. It is one of the most significant challenges in my life, and certainly the one with the most dire implications. I can be fairly well modeled as three major sub-agents1:

  • Neutral: asymptomatic. Attempting to control mood swings has resulted in me spending the vast majority of my time as "neutral".
  • Hypomanic: anxious and energetic. I have some trouble focusing, but can be extremely productive. I often exercise several hours a day and sleep an average of two hours a night (often six hours every three days). I've written a 70 page paper in three days, and a 12 KLOC compiler in five days.
  • Depressed: listless, and suicidal. I have serious insomnia, but stay in bed all day. I can't stand other people and would really sincerely prefer not to exist. Ironically, I can credit my inability to motivate myself to do anything with not having killed myself in this state. Sometimes I'm very emotional (crying, etc.), sometimes I'm emotionally dead.
Of course, everything I know is perceived by all three agents, but it is interpreted in vastly different ways. None is rational, but all are biased in different ways. Each agent feels that it is less biased than the others, which is key to successful negotiation, since each thinks that it's getting the better end of the bargain.
Here are desires, both conflicting and otherwise:
  1. Hypomanic loves being who he is and doing what he wants. The main difficulty of transitioning back to Neutral is unwillingness, rather than inability.
  2. Hypomanic despises Depressed, and thinks that Neutral is boring. He recognizes that staying Hypomanic for too long will likely result in a crash followed by Depressed taking over, but still wants "one more day".
  3. Depressed loathes all of us. He doesn't like the others more than himself, but is usually willing to trade knowledge and pain for ignorance and happiness. However, he's unmotivated to bother taking the steps to make that happen. Again, the difficulty in forcing a transition is not really about inability, although difficulty and self-discipline are an issue.
  4. Depressed doesn't really want to kill himself, but he's very desirous of nonexistence. 
  5. Neutral is scared of and pained by Depressed. He is wary of Hypomanic but recognizes his usefulness. He spends much more time thinking of the other two than they think of him, and actively prevents transitions to the other two, which are fairly easy to accidentally trigger otherwise.
  6. Neutral is somewhat careful for his own sake, but all are motivated by other's concern for him. The latter is the only other significant reason Depressed hasn't gone through with a suicide attempt.
Without further ado, a compromise brokered by Neutral: Depressed will not take his life, on the condition that Neutral will free Hypomanic to do more things that might kill him.
This probably sounds like it's a terrible compromise, but it's the most we could agree to. Depressed would really like us to die, but would prefer it look like an accident for the sake of our family and friends. This is actually very unlikely, but becomes most likely when Hypomanic is doing something stupid and dangerous. Neutral thinks that Depressed is overly pessimistic, and is greatly exaggerating how dangerous Hypomanic's activities are2. Hypomanic is rather fearless, and dismisses the possibility of dying on accident. Also, although this is something I'm not supposed to say, my own life isn't that important to any of my agents. An accidental death in the near future is not that bothersome to any of us, even if it's not particularly desirable to Neutral or Hypomanic3. The prospect of causing grief for those around me weighs much more heavily in my mind, and while any death will cause this, I think a suicide will have a much longer lasting impact and make a lot of people feel guilt for something that isn't their fault.
I *don't* have faith that Depressed is sincere in his agreement (he's really not), but I *do* have faith and weak evidence that the existence of this compromise is one more excuse that reduces his motivation, and will still reduce the net likelihood that I will die in the near future. Likewise, Neutral doesn't constrain Hypomanic's activities very well to begin with, but the existence of this compromise ironically makes Hypomanic more likely to have second thoughts about the dangerous things he's about to do.

Neutral feels it necessary to let Hypomanic take control more often to ensure that the compromise has weight to Depressed, but has started using Hypomanic to accomplish goals that are otherwise too exhausting to attain (a several-day code crunch or a need to meet and make a good impression on dozens of people). Meanwhile, Hypomanic has been more responsible lately in relinquishing control within days rather than weeks, partially because of these negotiations, but mostly because of other people in my life who have been conscripted to help monitor and rein me in.

I do not have a great deal of proven success with this strategy. I started doing this less than a year ago, and have not dealt with a full-blown major depressive episode since then. During that time I have also been more successful than ever at preventing myself from slipping into depression in the first place and treating early depression aggressively. In the end, that makes a much more significant difference, but on the two occasions when I became depressed enough to start feeling suicidal I was positively influenced by this agreement.

It seems unlikely that this approach will help many people with anything, but I feel like it is interesting in the debate about dynamic inconsistency, and I encourage others to find mutually-beneficial agreements they can make with themselves if they also feel like they deal with mutually incompatible agents from time to time. Also, this is my first post that is more than a link, so please be constructive.

 

Notes

I've never used names to refer to myself in different states, and don't think of my major sub-agents as individuals, but I felt that it was useful for didactic purposes to refer to myself in different states as different proper nouns.

2 I don't race cars, do drugs, or get in fights (except at the dojo). I do push my physical limits farther than I should (do parkour that I'm not be ready for, run 20km when I usually run 5, etc.), and I have injured myself this way, but just pulled muscles, sprains and once a broken finger.

3 I haven't heard this argument before, but this is the reason I haven't signed up for cryonics.

 

If it's not obvious, I was in a neutral state when I wrote this. It would have been impossible for me to do while depressed, and unlikely for me to try while hypomanic. I tried to de-bias myself, but no matter what state I'm in, I prefer my own viewpoint, and speak less highly of the others that diverge.