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The Singularity Wars

52 JoshuaFox 14 February 2013 09:44AM

(This is a introduction, for  those not immersed in the Singularity world, into the history of and relationships between SU, SIAI [SI, MIRI], SS, LW, CSER, FHI, and CFAR. It also has some opinions, which are strictly my own.)

The good news is that there were no Singularity Wars. 

The Bay Area had a Singularity University and a Singularity Institute, each going in a very  different direction. You'd expect to see something like the People's Front of Judea and the Judean People's Front, burning each other's grain supplies as the Romans moved in. 

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Evaluating the feasibility of SI's plan

25 JoshuaFox 10 January 2013 08:17AM

(With Kaj Sotala)

SI's current R&D plan seems to go as follows: 

1. Develop the perfect theory.
2. Implement this as a safe, working, Artificial General Intelligence -- and do so before anyone else builds an AGI.

The Singularity Institute is almost the only group working on friendliness theory (although with very few researchers). So, they have the lead on Friendliness. But there is no reason to think that they will be ahead of anyone else on the implementation.

The few AGI designs we can look at today, like OpenCog, are big, messy systems which intentionally attempt to exploit various cognitive dynamics that might combine in unexpected and unanticipated ways, and which have various human-like drives rather than the sort of supergoal-driven, utility-maximizing goal hierarchies that Eliezer talks about, or which a mathematical abstraction like AIXI employs.

A team which is ready to adopt a variety of imperfect heuristic techniques will have a decisive lead on approaches based on pure theory. Without the constraint of safety, one of them will beat SI in the race to AGI. SI cannot ignore this. Real-world, imperfect, safety measures for real-world, imperfect AGIs are needed.  These may involve mechanisms for ensuring that we can avoid undesirable dynamics in heuristic systems,  or AI-boxing toolkits usable in the pre-explosion stage, or something else entirely. 

SI’s hoped-for theory will include a reflexively consistent decision theory, something like a greatly refined Timeless Decision Theory.  It will also describe human value as formally as possible, or at least describe a way to pin it down precisely, something like an improved Coherent Extrapolated Volition.

The hoped-for theory is intended to  provide not only safety features, but also a description of the implementation, as some sort of ideal Bayesian mechanism, a theoretically perfect intelligence.

SIers have said to me that SI's design will have a decisive implementation advantage. The idea is that because strap-on safety can’t work, Friendliness research necessarily involves more fundamental architectural design decisions, which also happen to be general AGI design decisions that some other AGI builder could grab and save themselves a lot of effort. The assumption seems to be that all other designs are based on hopelessly misguided design principles. SI-ers, the idea seems to go, are so smart that they'll  build AGI far before anyone else. Others will succeed only when hardware capabilities allow crude near-brute-force methods to work.

Yet even if the Friendliness theory provides the basis for intelligence, the nitty-gritty of SI’s implementation will still be far away, and will involve real-world heuristics and other compromises.

We can compare SI’s future AI design to AIXI, another mathematically perfect AI formalism (though it has some critical reflexivity issues). Schmidhuber, Hutter, and colleagues think that their AXI can be scaled down into a feasible implementation, and have implemented some toy systems. Similarly, any actual AGI based on SI's future theories will have to stray far from its mathematically perfected origins.

Moreover, SI's future friendliness proof may simply be wrong. Eliezer writes a lot about logical uncertainty, the idea that you must treat even purely mathematical ideas with same probabilistic techniques as any ordinary uncertain belief. He pursues this mostly so that his AI can reason about itself, but the same principle applies to Friendliness proofs as well.

Perhaps Eliezer thinks that a heuristic AGI is absolutely doomed to failure; that a hard takeoff  immediately soon after the creation of the first AGI is so overwhelmingly likely that a mathematically designed AGI is the only one that could stay Friendly. In that case, we have to work on a pure-theory approach, even if it has a low chance of being finished first. Otherwise we'll be dead anyway. If an embryonic AGI will necessarily undergo an intelligence explosion, we have no choice but to "shut up and do the impossible."

I am all in favor of gung-ho knife-between-the teeth projects. But when you think that your strategy is impossible, then you should also look for a strategy which is possible, if only as a fallback. Thinking about safety theory until drops of blood appear on your forehead (as Eliezer puts it, quoting Gene Fowler), is all well and good. But if there is only a 10% chance of achieving 100% safety (not that there really is any such thing), then I'd rather go for a strategy that provides only a 40% promise of safety, but with a 40% chance of achieving it. OpenCog and the like are going to be developed regardless, and probably before SI's own provably friendly AGI. So, even an imperfect safety measure is better than nothing.

If heuristic approaches have a 99% chance of an immediate unfriendly explosion, then that might be wrong. But SI, better than anyone, should know that any intuition-based probability estimate of “99%” really means “70%”. Even if other approaches are long-shots, we should not put all our eggs in one basket. Theoretical perfection and stopgap safety measures can be developed in parallel.

Given what we know about human overconfidence and the general reliability of predictions, the actual outcome will to a large extent be something that none of us ever expected or could have predicted. No matter what happens, progress on safety mechanisms for heuristic AGI will improve our chances if something entirely unexpected happens.

What impossible thing should SI be shutting up and doing? For Eliezer, it’s Friendliness theory. To him, safety for heuristic AGI is impossible, and we shouldn't direct our efforts in that direction. But why shouldn't safety for heuristic AGI be another impossible thing to do?

(Two impossible things before breakfast … and maybe a few more? Eliezer seems to be rebuilding logic, set theory, ontology, epistemology, axiology, decision theory, and more, mostly from scratch. That's a lot of impossibles.)

And even if safety for heuristic AGIs is really impossible for us to figure out now, there is some chance of an extended soft takeoff that will allow for the possibility of us developing heuristic AGIs which will help in figuring out AGI safety, whether because we can use them for our tests, or because they can by applying their embryonic general intelligence to the problem. Goertzel and Pitt have urged this approach.

Yet resources are limited. Perhaps the folks who are actually building their own heuristic AGIs are in a better position than SI to develop safety mechanisms for them, while SI is the only organization which is really working on a formal theory on Friendliness, and so should concentrate on that. It could be better to focus SI's resources on areas in which it has a relative advantage, or which have a greater expected impact.

Even if so, SI should evangelize AGI safety to other researchers, not only as a general principle, but also by offering theoretical insights that may help them as they work on their own safety mechanisms.

In summary:

1. AGI development which is unconstrained by a friendliness requirement is likely to beat a provably-friendly design in a race to implementation, and some effort should be expended on dealing with this scenario.

2. Pursuing a provably-friendly AGI, even if very unlikely to succeed, could still be the right thing to do if it was certain that we’ll have a hard takeoff very soon after the creation of the first AGIs. However, we do not know whether or not this is true.

3. Even the provably friendly design will face real-world compromises and errors in its  implementation, so the implementation will not itself be provably friendly. Thus, safety protections of the sort needed for heuristic design are needed even for a theoretically Friendly design.

[Proposed Paper] Predicting Machine Super Intelligence

3 JaySwartz 20 November 2012 07:15AM

Note from Malo
The Singularity Institute is always on the lookout for interested and passionate individuals to contribute to our research. As Luke frequently reminds everyone, we've got 2–3 years of papers waiting to be written (see “Forthcoming and Desired Articles on AI Risk”). If you are interested in contributing, I want to hear from you! Get in touch with me at malo@intelligence.org

We wish we could work with everyone who expresses an interest in contributing, but that isn't feasible. To provide a path to becoming a contributor we encouraging individuals to read up on the field, identify an article they think they could work on, and post a ~1000 word outline/preview to the LW community for feedback. If the community reacts positively (based on karma and comments) we'll support the potential contributors' effort to complete the paper and—if all goes well—move forward with an official research relationship (e.g.,Visiting Fellow, Research Fellow or Research Associate).


Hello,

This is my first posting here, so please forgive me if I make any missteps.

The outline draft below draws heavily on Intelligence Explosion: Evidence and Import (Muehlhauser and Salamon 2011?). I will review Stuart Armstrong’s How We're Predicting AI... or Failing to, (Armstrong 2012) for additional content and research areas.

I'm not familiar with the tone and tenor of this community, so I want to be clear about feedback. This is an early draft and as such, nearly all of the content may or may not survive future edits. All constructive feedback is welcome. Subjective opinion is interesting, but unlikely to have an impact unless it opens lines of thought not previously considered.

I'm looking forward to a potentially lively exchange.

Jay

Predicting Machine Super Intelligence

Jacque Swartz

Most Certainly Not Affiliated with Singularity Institute

jaywswartz@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper examines the disciplines, domains, and dimensional aspects of Machine Super Intelligence (MSI) and considers multiple techniques that have the potential to predict the appearance of MSI. Factors that can impact the speed of discovery are reviewed. Then, potential prediction techniques are considered. The concept of MSI is dissected into the currently comprehended components. Then those components are evaluated to indicate their respective state of maturation and the additional behaviors required for MSI. Based on the evaluation of each component, a gap analysis is conducted. The analyses are then assembled in an approximate order of difficulty, based on our current understanding of the complexity of each component. Using this ordering, a collection of indicators is constructed to identify an approximate progression of discoveries that ultimately yield MSI. Finally, a model is constructed that can be updated over time to constantly increase the accuracy of the predicted events, followed by conclusions.

I. Introduction

Predicting the emergence of MSI could potentially be the most important pursuit of humanity. The distinct possibility of an MSI emerging that could harm or exterminate the human race (citation) demands that we create an early warning system. This will give us the opportunity to ensure that the MSI that emerges continues to advance human civilization (citation).

We currently appear to be at some temporal distance from witnessing the creation of MSI (multiple citations). Many factors, such as a rapidly increasing number of research efforts (citation) and motivations for economic gain (citation), clearly indicate that there is a possibility that MSI could appear unexpectedly or even unintentionally (citation).

Some of the indicators that could be used to provide an early warning tool are defined in this paper. The model described at the end of the paper is a potentially viable framework for instrumentation. It should be refined and regularly updated until a more effective tool is created or the appearance of MSI.

This paper draws heavily upon Intelligence Explosion: Evidence and Import (Muehlhauser and Salamon 2011?) and Stuart Armstrong’s How We're Predicting AI... or Failing to, (2012).

This paper presupposes that MSI is generally understood to be equivalent to Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) that has developed the ability to function at levels substantially beyond current human abilities. The latter term will be used throughout the remainder of this paper.

II. Overview

In addition to the fundamental challenge of creating AGI, there are a multitude of theories as to the composition and functionality of a viable AGI. Section three explores the factors that can impact the speed of discovery in general. Individual indicators are explored for unique factors to consider. The factors identified in this section can radically change the pace of discovery.

The fourth section considers potential prediction techniques. Data points and other indicators are identified for each prediction model. The efficacy of the models is examined and developments that increase a model’s accuracy are discussed.

The high degree of complexity of AGI indicates the need to subdivide AGI into its component parts. In the fifth section the core components and functionality required for a potential AGI are established. Each of the components is then examined to determine its current state of development. Then an estimate of the functionality required for an AGI is created as well as recording of any identifiable dependencies. A gap analysis is then performed on the findings to quantify the discoveries required to fill the gap.

This approach does increase the likelihood of prediction error due to the conjunction fallacy, exemplified by research such as the dice selection study (Tversky and Kahneman 1983) and covered in greater detail by Eliezer Yudkowski’s bias research (Yudkowski 2008). Fortunately, the exposure to this bias diminishes as each component matures to its respective usability point and reduces the number of unknown factors.

The sixth section examines the output of the gap analyses for additional dependencies. Then the outputs are assembled in an approximate order of difficulty, based on our current understanding of the complexity of each output. Using this ordering, combined with the dependencies, a collection of indicators with weighting factors is constructed to identify an approximate progression of discoveries that ultimately yield AGI.

Comprehending the indicators, dependencies and rate factors in a model as variables provides a means, however crude, to reflect their impact when they do occur.

In the seventh section, a model is constructed to use the indicators and other inputs to estimate the occurrence of AGI. It is examined for strengths and weaknesses that can be explored to improve the model. Additional enhancements to the model are suggested for exploration.

The eighth and final section includes conclusions and considerations for future research.

III. Rate Modifiers

This section explores the factors that can impact the speed of discovery. Individual indicators are explored for unique factors to consider. While the factors identified in this section can radically change the pace of discovery, comprehending them in the model as variables provides a means to reflect their impact when they do occur.

Decelerators

    Discovery Difficulty

    Disinclination

    Lower Probability Events

       Societal Collapse
       Fraud

    ++

Accelerators

    Improved Hardware

    Better Algorithms

    Massive Datasets

    Progress in Psychology and Neuroscience

    Accelerated Science

    Collaboration

    Crossover

    Economic Pressure

    Final Sprint

    Outliers

    Existing Candidate Maturation

    ++

IV. Prediction Techniques

This section considers potential prediction techniques. Some techniques do not require the indicators above. Most will benefit by considering some or all of the indicators. It is very important to not loose sight of the fact that mankind is inclined to inaccurate probability estimates and overconfidence (Lichtenstein et al. 1992; Yates et al. 2002)

Factors Impacting Accurate Prediction

Prediction Models

    Wisdom of Crowds

    Hardware Extrapolation

    Breakthrough Curve

    Evolutionary Extrapolation

    Machine Intelligence Improvement Curve

    ++

V. Potential AGI Componentry

This section establishes a set of core components and functionality required for a potential AGI. Each of the components is then examined to determine its current state of development as well as any identifiable dependencies. Then an estimate of the functionality required for a AGI is created followed by a gap analysis to quantify the discoveries required to fill the gap.

There are various existing AI implementations as well as AGI concepts currently being investigated. Each one brings in unique elements. The common elements across most include; decision processing, expert systems, pattern recognition and speech/writing recognition. Each of these would include discipline-specific machine learning and search/pre-processing functionality. There also needs to be a general learning function for addition of new disciplines.

Within each discipline there are collections of utility functions. They are the component technologies required to make the higher order discipline efficient and useful. Each of the elements mentioned are areas of specialized study being pursued around the world. They draw from an even larger set of specializations. Due to complexity, in most cases there are second-order, and more, specializations.

Alternative Componentry

There are areas of research that have high potential for inserting new components or substantially modifying the comprehension of the components described.

Specialized Componentry

Robotics and other elements.

Current State

    Decision Processing

    Expert Systems

    Pattern Recognition

    Speech/Writing Recognition

    Machine Learning

        Decision Processing
       Expert Systems
       Pattern Recognition
       Speech/Writing Recognition

    Search/Pre-Processing

       Decision Processing
       Expert Systems
       Pattern Recognition
       Speech/Writing Recognition

Target State

The behaviors required for an AGI to function with acceptable speed and accuracy are not precise. The results of this section are based on a survey of definitions from available research.

    Decision Processing

    Expert Systems

    Pattern Recognition

    Speech/Writing Recognition

    Machine Learning

        Decision Processing
       Expert Systems
       Pattern Recognition
       Speech/Writing Recognition

    Search/Pre-Processing

       Decision Processing
       Expert Systems
       Pattern Recognition
       Speech/Writing Recognition

Dependencies

Gap Analysis

VI. Indicators

The second section examines the output of the gap analyses for additional dependencies. Then the outputs are assembled in an approximate order of difficulty, based on our current understanding of the complexity of each output. Using this ordering, combined with the dependencies, a collection of indicators is constructed to identify an approximate progression of discoveries that ultimately yield an AGI.

Additional Dependencies

Complexity Ranking

Itemized Indicators

VII. Predictive Model

In this section, a model is constructed using the indicators and other inputs to estimate the occurrence of AGI. It is examined for strengths and weaknesses that can be explored to improve the model. Additional enhancements to the model are suggested for exploration.

The Model

Strengths & Weaknesses

Enhancements

VIII. Conclusions

Based on the data and model created above the estimated time frame for the appearance of AGI is from x to y. As noted throughout this paper, the complex nature of AGI and the large number of discoveries and events that need to be quantified using imperfect methodologies, a precise prediction of when AGI will appear is currently impossible.

The model developed in this paper does establish a quantifiable starting point for the creation of an increasingly accurate tool that can be used to continually narrow the margin of error. It also provides a starting set of indicators that can serve as early warning of AGI when discoveries and events are made.

CFAR and SI MOOCs: a Great Opportunity

13 Wrongnesslessness 13 November 2012 10:30AM

Massive open online courses seem to be marching towards total world domination like some kind of educational singularity (at least in the case of Coursera). At the same time, there are still relatively few courses available, and each new added course is a small happening in the growing MOOC community.

Needless to say, this seems like a perfect opportunity for SI and CFAR to advance their goals via this new education medium. Some people seem to have already seen the potential and taken advantage of it:

One interesting trend that can be seen is companies offering MOOCs to increase the adoption of their tools/technologies. We have seem this with 10gen offering Mongo courses and to a lesser extent with Coursera’s ‘Functional Programming in Scala’ taught by Martin Odersky

(from the above link to the Class Central Blog)

 

So the question is, are there any online courses already planned by CFAR and/or SI? And if not, when will it happen?

 

Edit: This is not a "yes or no" question, albeit formulated as one. I've searched the archives and did not find any mention of MOOCs as a potentially crucial device for spreading our views. If any such courses are already being developed or at least planned, I'll be happy to move this post to the open thread, as some have requested, or delete it entirely. If not, please view this as a request for discussion and brainstorming.

P.S.: Sorry, I don't have the time to write a good article on this topic.

Web of Trust lists Singularity.org as having a bad reputation

19 RobertLumley 23 June 2012 04:28PM

I'm not too sure who is familiar with Web of Trust, so I'll start with a brief description. It's basically a browser app that inserts a circle next to text links in websites. The color of the circle indicates whether or not it's average rating by users rates it as having a "good reputation" (green) or a "bad reputation" (red). There are four criteria: Trustworthiness, Vendor Reliability, Privacy, and Child Safety.

Singularity.org's printout is here. As you may have guessed from the title, Web of Trust lists Singularity.org as "poor" in trustworthiness, vendor reliability, and privacy. There's a comment that, when translated (via Google translate) says "Mass mailing of non-thematic Forums". It's also commented under the category "malicious content/viruses".

I'm not entirely sure how these ratings are generated, (How Ratings Work, related) but I've used it for several years, and this is only the second time I've disagreed with a rating. I've always found WOT to be very reliable, and a decent way of warning me if a site is unsafe so I don't have to think about it. So I was fairly alarmed when I saw the red circle there, since I'd imagine it's turning away people that don't know any better. If LW had a red circle, I never would have come here. I'm not sure what SI or LW can do about it, but there's a "click here if you are the owner of this site" button, although I don't know what that does. I've left my own rating on there, but it didn't seem to change the overall rankings.

 

Edit: When I made this post, the scorecard read Trustworthiness 30, Vendor Reliability 31, Privacy 31, Child Safety 100.

Help me make SI's arguments clear

14 crazy88 20 June 2012 10:54PM

One of the biggest problems with evaluating the plausibility of SI's arguments is that the arguments involve a large number of premises (as any complex argument will) and often these arguments are either not written down or are written down in disparate locations, making it very hard to piece together these claims. SI is aware of this and one of their major aims is to state their argument very clearly. I'm hoping to help with this aim.

My specific plan is as follows: I want to map out the broad structure of SI's arguments in "standard form" - that is, as a list of premises that support a conclusion. I then want to write this up into a more readable summary and discussion of SI's views.

The first step to achieving this is making sure that I understand what SI is arguing. Obviously, SI is arguing for a number of different things but I take their principle argument to be the following:

P1. Superintelligent AI (SAI) is highly likely to be developed in the near future (say, next 100 years and probably sooner)
P2. Without explicit FAI research, superintelligent AI is likely to pose a global catastrophic risk for humanity.
P3. FAI research has a reasonable chance of making it so that superintelligent AI will not pose a global catastrophic risk for humanity.
Therefore
C1. FAI research has a high expected value for humanity.
P4. We currently fund FAI research at a level below that supported by its expected value.
Therefore
C2. Humanity should expend more effort on FAI research.

Note that P1 in this argument can be weakened to simply say that SAI is a non-trivial possibility but, in response, a stronger version of P2 and P3 are required if the conclusion is still to be viable (that is, if SAI is less likely, it needs to be more dangerous or FAI research needs to be more effective in order for FAI research to have the same expected value). However, if P2 and P3 already seem strong to you, then the argument can be made more forceful by weakening P1. One further note, however, doing so might also make the move from C1 and P4 to C2 more open to criticism - that is, some people think that we shouldn't make decisions based on expected value calculations when we are talking about low probability/high value events.

So I'm asking for a few things from anyone willing to comment:

1.) A sense of whether this is a useful project (I'm very busy and would like to know whether this is a suitable use of my scarce spare time) - I will take upvotes/downvotes as representing votes for or against the idea (so feel free to downvote me if you think this idea isn't worth pursuing even if you wouldn't normally downvote this post).
2.) A sense of whether I have the broad structure of SI's basic argument right.

In terms of my commitment to this project: as I said before, I'm very busy so I don't promise to finish this project. However, I will commit to notifying Less Wrong if I give in on it and engaging in handover discussions with anyone that wants to take the project over.

Questions on SI Research

7 MichaelAnissimov 01 June 2012 03:00PM

Hello LessWrong,

As one of my assignments at the Singularity Institute (SI), I am writing a research FAQ answering the most frequently asked questions regarding the Singularity Institute's research program. 

For a short summary of what SI is about, see our concise summary

Here are some examples of questions I'm currently planning to include:

1) who conducts research at SI?

2) what are the specific research topics being investigated?

3) what is the history of SI's research program?

4) where does SI see its research program in 5, 10, and 20 years?

5) what other organizations conduct research similar to SI?

Please submit other questions that come to mind below. Unfortunately, due to limited time, we cannot answer every question posed to us. However, I hope to answer some of the questions that receive the most upvotes. Thank you for your participation!