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[LINK] Article in the Guardian about CSER, mentions MIRI and paperclip AI

19 Sarokrae 30 August 2014 02:04PM

http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/30/saviours-universe-four-unlikely-men-save-world

The article is titled "The scientific A-Team saving the world from killer viruses, rogue AI and the paperclip apocalypse", and features interviews with Martin Rees, Huw Price, Jaan Tallinn and Partha Dasgupta. The author takes a rather positive tone about CSER and MIRI's endeavours, and mentions x-risks other than AI (bioengineered pandemic, global warming with human interference, distributed manufacturing).

I find it interesting that the inferential distance for the layman to the concept of paperclipping AI is much reduced by talking about paperclipping America, rather than the entire universe: though the author admits still struggling with the concept. Unusually for an journalist who starts off unfamiliar with these concepts, he writes in a tone that suggests that he takes the ideas seriously, without the sort of "this is very far-fetched and thus I will not lower myself to seriously considering it" countersignalling usually seen with x-risk coverage. There is currently the usual degree of incredulity in the comments section though.

For those unfamiliar with The Guardian, it is a British left-leaning newspaper with a heavy focus on social justice and left-wing political issues. 

Update on establishment of Cambridge’s Centre for Study of Existential Risk

40 Sean_o_h 12 August 2013 04:11PM
Cambridge’s high-profile launch of the Centre for Study of Existential Risk last November received a lot of attention on LessWrong, and a number of people have been enquiring as to what‘s happened since. This post is meant to give a little explanation and update of what’s been going on.

Motivated by a common concern over human activity-related risks to humanity, Lord Martin Rees, Professor Huw Price, and Jaan Tallinn founded the Centre for Study of Existential Risk last year.  However, this announcement was made before the establishment of a physical research centre or securement of long-term funding. The last 9 months have been focused on turning an important idea into a reality.

Following the announcement in November, Professor Price contacted us at the Future of Humanity Institute regarding the possibility of collaboration on joint academic funding opportunities; the aim being both to raise the funds for CSER’s research programmes and to support joint work by the FHI and CSER’s researchers on anthropogenic existential risk. We submitted our first grant application in January to the European Research Council – an ambitious project to create “A New Science of Existential Risk” that, if successful, would provide enough funding for CSER’s first research programme - a sizeable programme that will run for five years.
We’ve been successful in the first and second rounds, and we will hear a final round decision at the end of the year. It was also an opportunity for us to get some additional leading academics onto the project – Sir Partha Dasgupta, Professor of Economics at Cambridge and an expert in social choice theory, sustainability and intergenerational ethics, is a co-PI (along with Huw Price, Martin Rees and Nick Bostrom). In addition, a number of prominent academics concerned about technology-related risk – including Stephen Hawking, David Spiegelhalter, George Church and David Chalmers – have joined our advisory board.

The FHI regards establishment of CSER as of the highest priority for a number of reasons including:

1) The value of the research the Centre will engage in
2) The reputational boost to the field of Existential Risk gained by the establishment of high-profile research centre in Cambridge.
3) The impact on policy and public perception that academic heavy-hitters like Rees and Price can have

Therefore we’ve been working with CSER behind the scenes over the last 9 months. Progress has been a little slow until now – Huw, Martin and Jaan are fully committed to this project, but due to their other responsibilities aren’t in a position to work full-time on it yet. 

However, we’re now in a position to make CSER’s establishment official. Cambridge’s new Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities (CRASSH) will host CSER and provide logistical support. I’ll be acting manager of CSER’s activities over the coming 6-12 months, under the guidance of Huw, Martin and Jaan. A generous seed funding donation from Jaan Tallinn is funding CSER’s establishment and these activities – which will include a lecture series, workshops, public outreach, and staff time on grant-writing and fundraising. It’ll also provide a buyout of a fraction of my time from FHI (providing funds for us to hire part-time staff to offload some of the FHI workload and help with some of the CSER work).

At the moment and over the next couple of months we’re going to be focused on identifying and working on additional academic funding opportunities for additional programmes, as well as chasing some promising leads in industry, private and philanthropic funding. I’ll also be aiming to keep CSER’s public profile active. There will be newsletters every three months (sign up here), the website’s going to be fleshed out to contain more detail about our planned research and existing literature, and we’ll be arranging regular high-quality media engagement. While we’re unlikely to have time to answer every general query that comes in (though we’ll try whenever possible: email: admin@cser.org), we’ll aim to keep the existential risk community informed through the newsletters and posts such as these.

We’ve been lucky to get a lot of support from the academic and existential risk community for the CSER centre. In addition to CRASSH, Cambridge’s Centre for Science and Policy will provide support in making policy-relevant links, and may co-host and co-publicise events. Luke Muehlhauser, MIRI’s Executive Director, has been very supportive and has provided valuable advice, and has generously offered to direct some of MIRI’s volunteer support towards CSER tasks. We also expect to get valuable support from the growing community around FHI.

From where I’m sitting, CSER’s successful launch is looking very promising. The timeline on our research programmes, however, is still a little more uncertain. If we’re successful with the European Research Council, we can expect to be hiring a full research team next spring. If not, it may take a little longer, but we’re exploring a number of different opportunities in parallel and are feeling confident. The support of the existential risk community continues to be invaluable.

Thanks,

Seán Ó hÉigeartaigh
Academic Manager, Future of Humanity Institute 
Acting Academic Manager, Cambridge Centre for Study of Existential Risk.


SIA, conditional probability and Jaan Tallinn's simulation tree

10 Stuart_Armstrong 12 November 2012 05:24PM

If you're going to use anthropic probability, use the self indication assumption (SIA) - it's by far the most sensible way of doing things.

Now, I am of the strong belief that probabilities in anthropic problems (such as the Sleeping Beauty problem) are not meaningful - only your decisions matter. And you can have different probability theories but still always reach the decisions if you have different theories as to who bears the responsibility of the actions of your copies, or how much you value them - see anthropic decision theory (ADT).

But that's a minority position - most people still use anthropic probabilities, so it's worth taking a more through look at what SIA does and doesn't tell you about population sizes and conditional probability.

This post will aim to clarify some issues with SIA, especially concerning Jaan Tallinn's simulation-tree model which he presented in exquisite story format at the recent singularity summit. I'll be assuming basic familiarity with SIA, and will run away screaming from any questions concerning infinity. SIA fears infinity (in a shameless self plug, I'll mention that anthropic decision theory runs into far less problems with infinities; for instance a bounded utility function is a sufficient - but not necessary - condition to ensure that ADT give you sensible answers even with infinitely many copies).

But onwards and upwards with SIA! To not-quite-infinity and below!

 

SIA does not (directly) predict large populations

One error people often make with SIA is to assume that it predicts a large population. It doesn't - at least not directly. What SIA predicts is that there will be a large number of agents that are subjectively indistinguishable from you. You can call these subjectively indistinguishable agents the "minimal reference class" - it is a great advantage of SIA that it will continue to make sense for any reference class you choose (as long as it contains the minimal reference class).

The SIA's impact on the total population is indirect: if the size of the total population is correlated with that of the minimal reference class, SIA will predict a large population. A correlation is not implausible: for instance, if there are a lot of humans around, then the probability that one of them is you is much larger. If there are a lot of intelligent life forms around, then the chance that humans exist is higher, and so on.

In most cases, we don't run into problems with assuming that SIA predicts large populations. But we have to bear in mind that the effect is indirect, and the effect can and does break down in many cases. For instance imagine that you knew you had evolved on some planet, but for some odd reason, didn't know whether your planet had a ring system or not. You have managed to figure out that the evolution of life on planets with ring systems is independent of the evolution of life on planets without. Since you don't know which situation you're in, SIA instructs you to increase the probability of life on ringed and on non-ringed planets (so far, so good - SIA is predicting generally larger populations).

And then one day you look up at the sky and see:

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