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The Semiotic Fallacy

18 Stabilizer 21 February 2017 04:50AM

Acknowledgement: This idea is essentially the same as something mentioned in a podcast where Julia Galef interviews Jason Brennan.

You are in a prison. You don't really know how to fight and you don't have very many allies yet. A prison bully comes up to you and threatens you. You have two options: (1) Stand up to the bully and fight. If you do this, you will get hurt, but you will save face. (2) You can try and run away. You might get hurt less badly, but you will lose face.

What should you do?

From reading accounts of former prisoners and also from watching realistic movies and TV shows, it seems like (1) is the better option. The reason is that the semiotics—or the symbolic meaning—of running away has bad consequences down the road. If you run away, you will be seen as weak, and therefore you will be picked on more often and causing more damage down the road.

This is a case where focusing the semiotics on the action is the right decision, because it is underwritten by future consequences.

But consider now a different situation. Suppose a country, call it Macholand, controls some tiny island far away from its mainland. Macholand has a hard time governing the island and the people on the island don't quite like being ruled by Macholand. Suppose, one fine day, the people of the island declare independence from Macholand. Macholand has two options: (1) Send the military over and put down the rebellion; or (2) Allow the island to take its own course.

From a semiotic standpoint, (1) is probably better. It signals that Macholand is strong and powerful country. But from a consequential standpoint, it is at least plausible (2) is a better option. Macholand saves money and manpower by not having to govern that tiny island; the people on the island are happier by being self-governing; and maybe the international community doesn't really care what Macholand does here.

This is a case where focusing on the semiotics can lead to suboptimal outcomes. 

Call this kind of reasoning the semiotic fallacy: Thinking about the semiotics of possible actions without estimating the consequences of the semiotics.

I think the semiotic fallacy is widespread in human reasoning. Here are a few examples:

  1. People argue that democracy is good because it symbolizes egalitarianism. (This is example used in the podcast interview)
  2. People argue that we should build large particle accelerators because it symbolizes human achievement.
  3. People argue that we shouldn't build a wall on the southern border because it symbolizes division.
  4. People argue that we should build a wall on the southern border because it symbolizes national integrity. 

Two comments are in order:

  1. The semiotic fallacy is a special case of errors in reasoning and judgement caused from signaling behaviors (à la Robin Hanson). The distinctive feature of the semiotic fallacy is that the semiotics are explicitly stated during reasoning. Signaling type errors are often subconscious: e.g., if we spend a lot of money on our parents' medical care, we might be doing it for symbolic purposes (i.e., signaling) but we wouldn't say explicitly that that's why we are doing it. In the semiotic fallacy on the other hand, we do explicitly acknowledge the reason we do something is because of its symbolism.
  2. Just like all fallacies, the existence of the fallacy doesn't necessarily mean the final conclusion is wrong. It could be that the semiotics are underwritten by the consequences. Or the conclusion could be true because of completely orthogonal reasons. The fallacy occurs when we ignore, in our reasoning during choice, the need for the consequential undergirding of symbolic acts.

[Link] David Chalmers on LessWrong and the rationalist community (from his reddit AMA)

11 ignoranceprior 22 February 2017 07:07PM

A semi-technical question about prediction markets and private info

6 CronoDAS 20 February 2017 02:20AM

There exists a 6-sided die that is weighted such that one of the 6 numbers has a 50% chance to come up and all the other numbers have a 1 in 10 chance. Nobody knows for certain which number the die is biased in favor of, but some people have had a chance to roll the die and see the result.

You get a chance to roll the die exactly once, with nobody else watching. It comes up 6. Running a quick Bayes's Theorem calculation, you now think there's a 50% chance that the die is biased in favor of 6 and a 10% chance for the numbers 1 through 5.

You then discover that there's a prediction market about the die. The prediction market says there's a 50% chance that "3" is the number the die is biased in favor of, and each other number is given 10% probability. 

How do you update based on what you've learned? Do you make any bets?

I think I know the answer for this toy problem, but I'm not sure if I'm right or how it generalizes to real life...

 

Nearest unblocked strategy versus learning patches

4 Stuart_Armstrong 23 February 2017 12:42PM

Crossposted at Intelligent Agents Forum.

The nearest unblocked strategy problem (NUS) is the idea that if you program a restriction or a patch into an AI, then the AI will often be motivated to pick a strategy that is as close as possible to the banned strategy, very similar in form, and maybe just as dangerous.

For instance, if the AI is maximising a reward R, and does some behaviour Bi that we don't like, we can patch the AI's algorithm with patch Pi ('maximise R0 subject to these constraints...'), or modify R to Ri so that Bi doesn't come up. I'll focus more on the patching example, but the modified reward one is similar.

continue reading »

Levers, Emotions, and Lazy Evaluators:

4 lifelonglearner 20 February 2017 11:00PM

Levers, Emotions, and Lazy Evaluators: Post-CFAR 2

[This is a trio of topics following from the first post that all use the idea of ontologies in the mental sense as a bouncing off point. I examine why naming concepts can be helpful, listening to your emotions, and humans as lazy evaluators. I think this post may also be of interest to people here. Posts 3 and 4 are less so, so I'll probably skip those, unless someone expresses interest. Lastly, the below expressed views are my own and don’t reflect CFAR’s in any way.]


Levers:

When I was at the CFAR workshop, someone mentioned that something like 90% of the curriculum was just making up fancy new names for things they already sort of did. This got some laughs, but I think it’s worth exploring why even just naming things can be powerful.


Our minds do lots of things; they carry many thoughts, and we can recall many memories. Some of these phenomena may be more helpful for our goals, and we may want to name them.


When we name a phenomenon, like focusing, we’re essentially drawing a boundary around the thing, highlighting attention on it. We’ve made it conceptually discrete. This transformation, in turn, allows us to more concretely identify which things among the sea of our mental activity correspond to Focusing.


Focusing can then become a concept that floats in our understanding of things our minds can do. We’ve taken a mental action and packaged it into a “thing”. This can be especially helpful if we’ve identified a phenomena that consists of several steps which usually aren’t found together.


By drawing certain patterns around a thing with a name, we can hopefully help others recognize them and perhaps do the same for other mental motions, which seems to be one more way that we find new rationality techniques.


This then means that we’ve created a new action that is explicitly available to our ontology. This notion of “actions I can take” is what I think forms the idea of levers in our mind. When CFAR teaches a rationality technique, the technique itself seems to be pointing at a sequence of things that happen in our brain. Last post, I mentioned that I think CFAR techniques upgrade people’s mindsets by changing their sense of what is possible.


I think that levers are a core part of this because they give us the feeling of, “Oh wow! That thing I sometimes do has a name! Now I can refer to it and think about it in a much nicer way. I can call it ‘focusing’, rather than ‘that thing I sometimes do when I try to figure out why I’m feeling sad that involves looking into myself’.”


For example, once you understand that a large part of habituation is simply "if-then" loops (ala TAPs, aka Trigger Action Plans), you’ve now not only understood what it means to learn something as a habit, but you’ve internalized the very concept of habituation itself. You’ve gone one meta-level up, and you can now reason about this abstract mental process in a far more explicit way.


Names haves power in the same way that abstraction barriers have power in a programming language—they change how you think about the phenomena itself, and this in turn can affect your behavior.  

 

Emotions:

CFAR teaches a class called “Understanding Shoulds”, which is about seeing your “shoulds”, the parts of yourself that feel like obligations, as data about things you might care about. This is a little different from Nate Soares’s Replacing Guilt series, which tries to move past guilt-based motivation.


In further conversations with staff, I’ve seen the even deeper view that all emotions should be considered information.


The basic premise seems to be based off the understanding that different parts of us may need different things to function. Our conscious understanding of our own needs may sometimes be limited. Thus, our implicit emotions (and other S1 processes) can serve as a way to inform ourselves about what we’re missing.


In this way, all emotions seem channels where information can be passed on from implicit parts of you to the forefront of “meta-you”. This idea of “emotions as a data trove” is yet another ontology that produces different rationality techniques, as it’s operating on, once again, a mental model that is built out of a different type of abstraction.


Many of the skills based on this ontology focus on communication between different pieces of the self.


I’m very sympathetic to this viewpoint, as it form the basis of the Internal Double Crux (IDC) technique, one of my favorite CFAR skills. In short, IDC assumes that akrasia-esque problems are caused by a disagreement between different parts of you, some of which might be in the implicit parts of your brain.


By “disagreement”, I mean that some part of you endorses an action for some well-meaning reasons, but some other part of you is against the action and also has justifications. To resolve the problem, IDC has us “dialogue” between the conflicting parts of ourselves, treating both sides as valid. If done right, without “rigging” the dialogue to bias one side, IDC can be a powerful way to source internal motivation for our tasks.


While I do seem to do some communication between my emotions, I haven’t fully integrated them as internal advisors in the IFS sense. I’m not ready to adopt a worldview that might potentially hand over executive control to all the parts of me. Meta-me still deems some of my implicit desires as “foolish”, like the part of me that craves video games, for example. In order to avoid slippery slopes, I have a blanket precommitment on certain things in life.


For the meantime, I’m fine sticking with these precommitments. The modern world is filled with superstimuli, from milkshakes to insight porn (and the normal kind) to mobile games, that can hijack our well-meaning reward systems.


Lastly, I believe that without certain mental prerequisites, some ontologies can be actively harmful. Nate’s Resolving Guilt series can leave people without additional motivation for their actions; guilt can be a useful motivator. Similarly, Nihilism is another example of an ontology that can be crippling unless paired with ideas like humanism.

 

Lazy Evaluators:

In In Defense of the Obvious, I gave a practical argument as to why obvious advice was very good. I brought this point up up several times during the workshop, and people seemed to like the point.


While that essay focused on listening to obvious advice, there appears to be a similar thing where merely asking someone, “Did you do all the obvious things?” will often uncover helpful solutions they have yet to do.

 

My current hypothesis for this (apart from “humans are programs that wrote themselves on computers made of meat”, which is a great workshop quote) is that people tend to be lazy evaluators. In programming, lazy evaluation is a way of solving for the value of expressions at the last minute, not until the answers are absolutely needed.


It seems like something similar happens in people’s heads, where we simply don’t ask ourselves questions like “What are multiple ways I could accomplish this?” or “Do actually I want to do this thing?” until we need to…Except that most of the time, we never need to—Life putters on, whether or not we’re winning at it.


I think this is part of what makes “pair debugging”, a CFAR activity where a group of people try to help one person with their “bugs”, effective. When we have someone else taking an outside view asking us these questions, it may even be the first time we see these questions ourselves.


Therefore, it looks like a helpful skill is to constantly ask ourselves questions and cultivate a sense of curiosity about how things are. Anna Salamon refers to this skill of “boggling”. I think boggling can help with both counteracting lazy evaluation and actually doing obvious actions.


Looking at why obvious advice is obvious, like “What the heck does ‘obvious’ even mean?” can help break the immediate dismissive veneer our brain puts on obvious information.


EX: “If I want to learn more about coding, it probably makes sense to ask some coder friends what good resources are.”


“Nah, that’s so obvious; I should instead just stick to this abstruse book that basically no one’s heard of—wait, I just rejected something that felt obvious.”


“Huh…I wonder why that thought felt obvious…what does it even mean for something to be dubbed ‘obvious’?”


“Well…obvious thoughts seem to have a generally ‘self-evident’ tag on them. If they aren’t outright tautological or circularly defined, then there’s a sense where the obvious things seems to be the shortest paths to the goal. Like, I could fold my clothes or I could build a Rube Goldberg machine to fold my clothes. But the first option seems so much more ‘obvious’…”


“Aside from that, there also seems to be a sense where if I search my brain for ‘obvious’ things, I’m using a ‘faster’ mode of thinking (ala System 1). Also, aside from favoring simpler solutions, also seems to be influenced by social norms (what do people ‘typically’ do). And my ‘obvious action generator’ seems to also be built off my understanding of the world, like, I’m thinking about things in terms of causal chains that actually exist in the world. As in, when I’m thinking about ‘obvious’ ways to get a job, for instance, I’m thinking about actions I could take in the real world that might plausibly actually get me there…”


“Whoa…that means that obvious advice is so much more than some sort of self-evident tag. There’s a huge amount of information that’s being compressed when I look at it from the surface…’Obvious’ really means something like ‘that which my brain quickly dismisses because it is simple, complies with social norms, and/or runs off my internal model of how the universe works.”


The goal is to reduce the sort of “acclimation” that happens with obvious advice by peering deeper into it. Ideally, if you’re boggling at your own actions, you can force yourself to evaluate earlier. Otherwise, it can hopefully at least make obvious advice more appealing.


I’ll end with a quote of mine from the workshop:


“You still yet fail to grasp the weight of the Obvious.”


Ontologies are Operating Systems

4 lifelonglearner 18 February 2017 05:00AM

Ontologies are Operating Systems: Post-CFAR 1

[I recently came back from volunteering at a CFAR workshop. I found the whole experience to be 100% enjoyable, and I’ll be doing an actual workshop review soon. I also learned some new things and updated my mind. This is the first in a four-part series on new thoughts that I’ve gotten as a result of the workshop. If LW seems to like this one, I'll post the rest too.]


I’ve been thinking more about the idea of how we even reason about our own thinking, our “ontology of mind”, and how our internal mental model of how our brain works.

 

(Roughly speaking, “ontology” means the framework you view reality through, and I’ll be using it here to refer specifically to how we view our minds.)


Before I continue, it might be helpful to ask yourself some of the below questions:

  • What is my brain like, perhaps in the form of a metaphor?

  • How do I model my thoughts?

  • What things can and can’t my brain do?

  • What does it feel like when I am thinking?

  • Do my thoughts often influence my actions?


<reminder to actually think a little before continuing>


I don’t know about you, but for me, my thoughts often feel like they float into my head. There’s a general sense of effortlessly having things stream in. If I’m especially aware (i.e. metacognitive), I can then reflect on my thoughts. But for the most part, I’m filled with thoughts about the task I’m doing.


Though I don’t often go meta, I’m aware of the fact that I’m able to. In specific situations, knowing this helps me debug my thinking processes. For example, say my internal dialogue looks like this:


“Okay, so I’ve sent to forms to Steve, and now I’ve just got to do—oh wait what about my physics test—ARGH PAIN NO—now I’ve just got to do the write-up for—wait, I just thought about physics and felt some pain. Huh… I wonder why…Move past the pain, what’s bugging me about physics? It looks like I don’t want to do it because…  because I don’t think it’ll be useful?”


Because my ontology of how my thoughts operate includes the understanding that metacognition is possible, this is a “lever” I can pull on in my own mind.


I suspect that people who don’t engage in thinking about their thinking (via recursion, talking to themselves, or other things to this effect) may have a less developed internal picture of how their minds work. Things inside their head might seem to just pop in, with less explanation.


I posit that having a model of your brain that is less fleshed out affects our perception of what our brains can and can’t do.


We can imagine a hypothetical person who is self-aware and generally a fine human, except that their internal picture of their mind feels very much like a black box. They might have a sense of fatalism about some things in their mind or just feel a little confused about how their thoughts originate.


Then they come to a CFAR workshop.


What I think a lot of the CFAR rationality techniques gives these people is an upgraded internal picture of their mind with many additional levers. By “lever”, I mean a thing we can do in our brain, like metacognition or focusing (I’ll write more about levers next post). The upgraded internal picture of their mind draws attention to these levers and empowers people to have greater awareness and control in their heads by “pulling” on them.


But it’s not exactly these new levers that are the point. CFAR has mentioned that the point of teaching rationality techniques is to not only give people shiny new tools, but also improve their mindset. I agree with this view—there does seem to be something like an “optimizing mindset” that embodies rationality.


I posit that CFAR’s rationality techniques upgrade people’s ontologies of mind by changing their sense of what is possible. This, I think, is the core of an improved mindset—an increased corrigibility of mind.

 

Consider: Our hypothetical human goes to a rationality workshop and leaves with a lot of skills, but the general lesson is bigger than that. They’ve just seen that their thoughts can be accessed and even changed! It’s as if a huge blind spot in their thinking has been removed, and they’re now looking at entirely new classes of actions they can take!


When we talk about levers and internal models of our thinking, it’s important to remember that we’re really just talking about analogies or metaphors that exist in the mind. We don’t actually have access to our direct brain activity, so we need to make do with intermediaries that exist as concepts, which are made up of concepts, which are made up of concepts, etc etc.


Your ontology, the way that you think about how your thoughts work, is really just an abstract framework that makes it easier for “meta-you” (the part of your brain that seems like “you”) to more easily interface with your real brain.

 

Kind of like an operating system.


In other words, we can’t directly deal with all those neurons; our ontology, which contains thoughts, memories, internal advisors, and everything else is a conceptual interface that allows us to better manipulate information stored in our brain.


However, the operating system you acquire by interacting with CFAR-esque rationality techniques isn’t the only way type of upgraded ontology you can acquire. There exist other models which may also be just as valid. Different ontologies may draw boundaries around other mental things and empower your mind in different ways.


Leverage Research, for example, seems to be building its view of rationality from a perspective deeply grounded in introspection. I don’t know too much about them, but in a few conversations, they’ve acknowledged that their view of the mind is much more based off beliefs and internal views of things. This seems like they’d have a different sense of what is and isn’t possible.


My own personal view of rationality often views humans as merely a collection of TAPs (basically glorified if-then loops) for the most part. This ontology leads me to often think about shaping the environment, precommitment, priming/conditioning, and other ways to modify my habit structure. Within this framework of “humans as TAPs”, I search for ways to improve.


This is contrast with another view I hold of myself as an “agenty” human that has free will in a meaningful sense. Under this ontology, I’m focusing on metacognition and executive function. Of course, this assertion of my ability to choose and pick my actions seems to be at odds with my first view of myself as a habit-stuffed zombie.


It seems plausible then, that rationality techniques which often seem at odds with one another, like the above examples, occur because they’re operating on fundamentally different assumptions of how to interface with the human mind.


In some way, it seems like I’m stating that every ontology of mind is correct. But what about mindsets that model the brain as a giant hamburger? That seems obviously wrong. My response here is to appeal to practicality. In reality, all these mental models are wrong, but some of them can be useful. No ontology accurately depicts what’s happening in our brains, but the helpful ones can allows us to think better and make better choices.

 

The biggest takeaway for me after realizing all this was that even my mental framework, the foundation from which I built up my understanding of instrumental rationality, is itself based on certain assumptions of my ontology. And these assumptions, though perhaps reasonable, are still just a helpful abstraction that makes it easier for me to deal with my brain.

 

Open Thread, Feb. 20 - Feb 26, 2017

3 Elo 20 February 2017 04:51AM

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post, then it goes here.


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