You can't not think in terms of stories, that is simply how our minds work. All you can do is to try to keep that (in the form of "intuition") from preventing the adequate weighing of statistics, probabilities, and explicit evidence that can't easily be fit into narratives.
Added: Even when thinking with images or kinesthetically, a person can only use the images or feelings as isolated "facts" or as part of a consistent sequence which has all the same problems as verbal stories.
I wonder how many people here besides me lost their appetite for consuming monomyth-structured stories after their naturalistic awakening?
After my naturalistic awakening, I went on a journey, overcame an almost insuperable obstacle and then returned, having achieved a worthy reward.
Seriously, though - what makes you think you've lost your appetite for consuming monomyth-structured stories?
Some things come to mind: Nassim Taleb in his books criticizes this habit of story telling all the time. From the field of biases: scenario thinking(which is a way of mental storytelling). A reason for the planning fallacy is because a plan is essentially a good story we tell ourselves and others but we neglect all the details that mess it up.
As a counterpoint, see Dennett's idea of "The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity" - narrative as an integral part of consciousness.
Consider the normative models against which we evaluate "biased" vs "unbiased" decisions, for instance expected utility. To even begin to apply such a model you'll need to have identified some set of decisions among which you are to choose - should I or shouldn't I eat this ice cream, drink this whiskey, turn down this job, whatever - and relevant consequences which vary in their utility: fit vs...
It's the people who realize they don't know anything at all that end up doing pretty well.
Sounds like a story to me...
I know, tis pretty old, but some remark: How about the upsides of stories. I mean... a) we apparently are in a way programmed to find/make up stories, because they help us make sense of the world. Isn't it good, to break complicated stuff down into simpler stories, then tell those stories and make the audience want to hear more (or find out more themselves)? b) they stick. If I want to remember something I make it into a story or try to find it's internal story (or I stupidly repeat it over and over again if I really don't get it).
Don't get me wrong - I a...
I got as far as "some things actually are good versus evil, we all know this, right?" at 4:00, and lost all respect for the man. I didn't watch the rest.
Other than how we treat them, what's the difference between a story and a theory or hypothesis?
Edit: I'm guessing from the downvote that I may've been misunderstood. The above question is not rhetorical; it's intended to spark conversation.
Interesting idea. I'm not sure I completely understand it, though. Could you give an example?
Here's a made-up example. I chose this example for simplicity, not because it really represents the kind of insight that makes it worthwhile to listen to someone.
Prior to Darwin, many philosophers believed that the most fundamental explanations were teleological. To understand a thing, they held, you had to understand its purpose. Material causes were dependent upon teleological ones. (For example, a thing's purpose would determine what material causes it was subjected to in the first place). These philosophers would then proceed to use teleology as the basis of their reasoning about living organisms. For example, on seeing a turtle for the first time, they might have reasoned as follows:
Premise 1: This turtle has a hard shell.
Premise 2: The purpose of a hard shell is to deflect sharp objects.
Conclusion: Therefore, this turtle comes from an environment containing predators that attack with sharp objects (e.g., teeth).
But, of course, there is something deeply wrong with such an explanation. Insofar as a thing has a purpose, that purpose is something that the thing will do in the future. Teleology amounts to saying that the future somehow reached back in time and caused the thing to acquire properties in the past. Teleology is backwards causation.
After Darwin, we know that the turtle has a hard shell because hard shells are heritable and helped the turtle's ancestors to reproduce. The teleological explanation doesn't just violate causality---it also ignores the real reason that the turtle has a shell: natural selection. So the whole argument above might seem irredeemably wrong.
But now suppose that we introduce the following scheme for translating from the language of teleology to Darwinian language:
"The purpose of this organism's having property X is to perform action Y."
becomes
"The use of property X by this organism's ancestors to perform action Y caused this organism to have property X.
Applying this scheme to the argument above produces a valid and correct chain of reasoning. Moreover, once I figure out the scheme, I can apply it to many (but not all) chains of inferences made by the teleologist to produce what I regard to be correct and interesting inferences. In the example above, I only applied the translation scheme to a premise, but sometimes I'll get interesting results when I apply the scheme to a conclusion, too.
Of course, not all inferences by the teleologist will be salvageable. Many will be inextricably intertwined with false premises. It takes work to separate the wheat from the chaff. But, in my experience, it often turns out to be worth the effort.
Good thing I asked; that wasn't what I originally thought you meant. It's similar enough to translating conversational shorthand that I probably already do that occasionally without even realizing it, but it'd be good to keep in in mind as a tool to use purposely. Thanks. :)
Tyler Cowen argues in a TED talk (~15 min) that stories pervade our mental lives. He thinks they are a major source of cognitive biases and, on the margin, we should be more suspicious of them - especially simple stories. Here's an interesting quote about the meta-level: