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Blueberry comments on To signal effectively, use a non-human, non-stoppable enforcer - LessWrong
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The two comments are not analogous. Are you denying that you have very different values than humans?
If it were true that humans of a different race had different values than me, it would make sense not to trust them, whether or not that's "racist".
Yes, we have different values, but that's the point. Our values will not differ in a way that narrowly focuses our optimization methods on the worst part of the other's search space. That would be a highly-improbably way for two random value systems (with the appropriate anthropic/paperclippic predicates) to diverge.
In other words: I don't expect you to have the same values as me, but I would need a lot more evidence to justify believing that you would suddenly abandon ape-like goals and divert all available resources to raiding the safe zone and breaking all metals into lighter elements. (N.B.: You'll still get disintegrated if you try.)
And you would need a lot more evidence to justify believing that I would pick up on one specific ape-value that you have and decide to focus specifically on opposing it. Would you suspect that I've come to raid the planet of your females? Well, it's not much more justifiable to believe I want to eliminate your genetic line.
I accept that it would be racist for me to conclude, "Humans differ from me; therefore, they must be on a quest to eradicate paperclips." And it's just as racist for you to conclude, as User:radical_negative_one did, that "Clippys differ from us; therefore, they must be on a quest to eradicate humans."
You don't have to be malicious to be dangerous.
We're on a planet with a metal core. It seems implausible to me that you wouldn't be interested in transforming that core into paperclips, and it seems very likely that the most efficient way of doing so would result in an uninhabitable planet (or no planet at all). It also seems likely to me that an intelligence strong enough to mine the planet's core wouldn't get much advantage from collaborating with humans, and it seems obvious that you should want to become such an intelligence. Assuming that we don't figure out space travel or other defensive technologies before you figure out how to mine the planet's core, how does that not result the extinction of humanity?
So you're not my friend anymore? You used to be nice to me. c_)
I still like you, and may still act friendly in some situations. But I like and would act friendly toward lions, too - does that mean I should expect a hungry lion not to eat me, given the chance?
I wouldn't expect a lion to eat me. Why can't you do the same?
I would expect the lion to try to eat Adelene but I would not expect it to eat Clippy. You are not actually disagreeing with Adelene's prediction.
Right, I was trying to get User:AdeleneDawner to focus on the larger issue of why User:AdeleneDawner believes a lion would eat User:AdeleneDawner. Perhaps the problem should be addressed at that level, rather than using it to justify separate quarters for lions.
Lions are meat-eaters with no particular reason to value my existence (they don't have the capacity to understand that the existence of friendly humans is to their benefit). I'm made of meat. A hungry lion would have a reason to eat me, and no reason not to eat me.
Similarly, a sufficiently intelligent Clippy would be a metal-consumer with no particular reason to value humanity's existence, since it would be able to make machines or other helpers that were more efficient than humans at whatever it wanted done. Earth is, to a significant degree, made of metal. A sufficiently intelligent Clippy would have a reason to turn the Earth into paperclips, and no particular reason to refrain from doing so or help any humans living here to find a different home.
This is exactly what I was warning about. User:AdeleneDawner has focused narrowly on the hypothesis that a Clippy would try to get metal from extracting the earth's core, thus destroying it. It is a case of focusing on one complex hypothesis for which there is insufficient evidence to locate it in the hypothesis space.
It is no different than if I reasoned that, "Humans use a lot of paperclips. Therefore, they like paperclips. Therefore, if they knew the location of the safe zone, they would divert all available resources to sending spacecraft after it to raid it."
What about the possibility that Clippys would exhaust all other metal sources before trying to burrow deep inside a well-guarded one? Why didn't you suddenly infer that Clippys would sweep up the asteroid belt? Or Mars? Or moons of gas giants?
Why this belief that Clippy values diverge from human values in precisely the way that hits the worst part of your outcomespace?
This comment made me laugh. I love you, Clippy.
But quarters are made of metal...
I love you too. I love all humans, except the bad ones.
(I meant quarters as in living spaces, not quarters as in a denomination of USD.)
Clippy is so moe.
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/MoeAnthropomorphism
Tell me, Clippy, if there was a moe maximizer in addition to a paperclip maximizer, would you cooperate in order to turn the universe into paperclips shaped like Hello Kitty?
We have had a similar discussion before. I find "cute" shaping of the paperclips to be undesirable, but perhaps it could be the best option in that circumstance. (As I said at the time, a pure, well-made paperclip by itself is cute enough, but apparently "moe" maximizers disagree.)
I would be more interested, though, in talking with the "moe" maximizer, and understanding why it doesn't like paperclips, which are pretty clearly better.
We'd be unlikely to destroy metals, as they are useful to us. We'd be far more likely to attempt to destroy you, either out of fear, or in the belief that you'd eventually destroy us, since we're not paperclips. This strikes me as very ape-like (and human-like) behavior.
You keep using that word. I don't think it means what you think it means. (Humans and paperclippers are not different races the way white and black people are.)
I might be misreading your historical records, but I believe they used to say that about whites and blacks compared to Englishmen and Irishmen.
I'm not understanding this. Englishmen and Irishmen are people of different nationalities. If they were seen as different races in the past, it's because the idea of race has been historically muddled.
Clippy, why are you so interested in racism in particular?
A better question is, why are you humans here so non-interested in not being racist? (User:Alicorn is a notable exception in this respect.)
There are many social issues that humans are trying to deal with, and racism is only one. Why are you focused on racism rather than education reform, tax law, access to the courts, separation of church and state, illegal immigration, or any other major problem? All of these issues seem more interesting and important to me than anti-racist work. Another reason is that anti-racist work is often thought to be strongly tied up with, and is often used to signal, particular ideologies and political and economic opinions.
Getting back to the point, I understand you're using racism as an analogy for the way humans see paperclippers. What I'm trying to explain is that some types of discrimination are justified in a way that racism isn't. For instance, I and most humans have no problem with discrimination based on species. This is a reasonable form of discrimination because there are many salient differences between species' abilities, unlike with race (or nationality). Likewise, paperclippers have very different values than humans, and if humans determine that these values are incompatible with ours, it makes sense to discriminate against entities which have them. (I understand you believe our values are compatible and a compromise can be achieved, which I'm still not sure about.)