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JoshuaZ comments on To signal effectively, use a non-human, non-stoppable enforcer - LessWrong
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But that's easy to solve. If you've already seen evidence that the mugger is someone who strongly keeps promises then you've now have enough reason to believe them to put the direction in favor of the mugger releasing the the AI. One doesn't necessarily even need that because humans more often tell the truth than lie, and more often keep their promises than break them. Once the probability of the mugger doing what they threaten is a tiny bit over 1/2, Pascal's mugging still is a threat.
Maybe not. Game theoretically, making yourself visibly vulnerable to Pascal's Muggings may guarantee that they will occur, making them cease to constitute evidence.
I've actually just expanded on this idea in the original Pascal's Mugging article. If the Mugger's claims are in no way associated with you or similar muggings, then conceivably you should take the probability at face value. But if that's not the case, then the probability of a direct manipulation attempt should also be taken into consideration, negating the increase in claimed utility.
I think that solves it.