Nisan comments on Conflicts Between Mental Subagents: Expanding Wei Dai's Master-Slave Model - LessWrong

46 Post author: Yvain 04 August 2010 09:16AM

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Comment author: Nisan 05 August 2010 10:37:41PM 0 points [-]

Regarding your second two points, the idea of signalling games is that as long as C has some influence on your behavior, others can deduce from your apparent trustworthiness, altruism, etc., that you are at least somewhat trustworthy, etc. If you did away with C and simply made your U more trustworthy, you would seem less trustworthy than someone with a C, and other agents in the signalling game would assume that you have a C, but your U is unusually untrustworthy. So there's an incentive to be partially hypocritical.