Change in values of the future agents, however sudden of gradual, means that the Future (the whole freackin' Future!) won't be optimized according to our values, won't be anywhere as good as it could've been otherwise.
That really depends of what you mean by "our values":
1) The values of modern, western, educated humans? (as opposed to those of the ancient Greek, or of Confucius, or of medieval Islam), or
2) The "core" human values common to all human civilizations so far? ("stabbing someone who just saved your life is a bit of a dick move", "It would be a shame if humanity was exterminated in order to pave the universe with paperclips", etc.)
Both of those are quite fuzzy and I would find it hard to describe either of them precisely enough that even a computer could understand them.
When Eliezer talks of Friendly AI having human value, I think he's mostly talking about the second set (in The Psychological Unity of Mankind. But when Ben or Robin talk about how it isn't such a big deal if values change, because they've already changed in the past, they seem to be referring to the first kind of value.
I would agree with Ben and Robin that it isn't a big deal if our descendents (or Ems or AIs) have values that are at odds with our current, western, values (because they might be "wrong", some might be instrumental values we confuse for terminal values, etc.); but I wouldn't extend that to changes in "fundamental human values".
So I don't think "Ben and Robin are OK with a future without our values" is a good way of phrasing it. The question is more whether there is such a thing as fundamental human values (or is everything cultural?), whether it's easy to hit those in mind-space, etc.
Counterpoints: The Psychological Diversity of Mankind, Human values differ as much as values can differ.
Spelling notice (bold added):
When Eliezer talks of Friendly AI having human value, I think he's mostly talking about the second set (in The Psychological Unity of Manking.
Ben Goertzel:
Robin Hanson:
We all know the problem with deathism: a strong belief that death is almost impossible to avoid, clashing with undesirability of the outcome, leads people to rationalize either the illusory nature of death (afterlife memes), or desirability of death (deathism proper). But of course the claims are separate, and shouldn't influence each other.
Change in values of the future agents, however sudden of gradual, means that the Future (the whole freackin' Future!) won't be optimized according to our values, won't be anywhere as good as it could've been otherwise. It's easier to see a sudden change as morally relevant, and easier to rationalize gradual development as morally "business as usual", but if we look at the end result, the risks of value drift are the same. And it is difficult to make it so that the future is optimized: to stop uncontrolled "evolution" of value (value drift) or recover more of astronomical waste.
Regardless of difficulty of the challenge, it's NOT OK to lose the Future. The loss might prove impossible to avert, but still it's not OK, the value judgment cares not for feasibility of its desire. Let's not succumb to the deathist pattern and lose the battle before it's done. Have the courage and rationality to admit that the loss is real, even if it's too great for mere human emotions to express.