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benelliott comments on You're in Newcomb's Box - LessWrong
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In Newcomb's problem, we can make the statement that people one-boxing in Newcomb's problem reliably receive $1,000,000 while people two-boxing reliably receive only $1000 via Omega's infallible prediction, so we can conclude that one-boxing is a better solution, even if we don't know the low-level definition of the process by which the prediction occurs.
However, we have no evidence that choosing an option that Prometheus did not predict that you would choose will make you cease to exist. For all his foresight, Prometheus just didn't predict correctly what you would choose -- there's no threat looming over your head.
Of course, you may have some weird programming in your brain that physically prevents you from two-boxing here, but there is no evidence to suggest that trying would likely harm you.
I don't know about you, but I would still one-box on Newcomb's problem even if Omega is not entirely infallible, so the fact the Prometheus is capable of mistakes cannot be the problem. I would also one-box in transparent Newcomb's, since once again being the sort of person that does that seems to end well for me.
What is the difference between this and transparent Newcomb's with an Omega who is very occasionally wrong.
Ah, bugger. I've lost my link to Transparent Newcomb (TN).
From what I recall, Omega doesn't let you play the game if you would one-box on normal Newcomb but two-box on TN. As a result, having the strategy 'I will one-box on normal Newcomb but two-box on TN' will probably result in you getting no money because when Omega psychoanalyzes you, he'll almost always see this. So you lose, because you're not yet past the filter.
In this problem, you were filtered out prior to birth by a Prometheus who only chose embryos that he believed would one-box. The line 'I should one-box or I won't get to exist' doesn't work because embryos can't think. At the time at which you can first consciously consider this problem, you will be past the filter, and so are free to choose the most effective solution regardless of Prometheus's preferences. So you two-box and win, 'cause you already exist.
The problem changes, of course, if there is any way in which Prometheus could punish you for two-boxing, causing you to lose >100$ in utility.
Edit: Changed a couple of details to properly refer to TN when Omega has a slight possibility of being wrong.
What if we modify transparent Newcomb to say the Omega chose whether to fill the box before you were born?
Maybe Prometheus could predict your decision by running a simulation of you and putting "you" in that situation.
Bongo linked to it in response to my question about it.
Wrong rules. Correct rules are as follows (named "Newcomb’s Problem with a Dual Simulation" in Drescher's book):
Well for starters, existing people can be rewarded or punished. Non-existing people cannot. Any bet offered with a promise or punishment to a non-existing person, is a sucker's bait.
Btw, Transparent Newcomb also seems stupid to me. When Omega offers you the boxes you see what Omega has foreseen for you, and yet you're seemingly not allowed to update on the information, because being the sort of person who lets observed reality affect his decision-making means that Omega won't have chosen you in the first place. Or e.g. being the person who lets emotional outrage at Omega prejudging you affect his judgment.
I can precommit to honoring some known situations (Parfit's hitchhiker, Kavka's toxin), but I don't know how to self-modify to not self-modify at any situation. That looks like brain-damage to me, not rationality.
So you think that one-boxing is correct in the regular version of Newcomb's paradox but incorrect in the 'transparent boxes' version?
So then, if you had to play the "transparent boxes" version you might think to yourself beforehand "if only this was the regular Newcomb's problem I would almost certainly win $1m, but as things are I'm almost certainly only going to get $1k."
Help is available: Go into the room with a blanket or tea-cosy, and carefully shield your eyes until such time as you've located box B and thrown the blanket or tea-cosy over it. (Hopefully Omega will have anticipated such shenanigans from you, and filled the boxes accordingly.)
Not quite. Thinking it over, what I'm saying is that one-boxing in transparent Newcomb requires a level of committment that's different in kind to the level of commitment required by normal Newcomb. Here's why:
Our primary goal is to get a box filled with $1.000.000
In normal Newcomb, we can succeed in this by committing to taking the opaque box. Therefore we just have to trust Omega's predictive capabilities were good enough to predict us one-boxing, so that the opaque box IS the box with $1.000.000
In transparent Newcomb, we can succeed in getting a box filled with $1.000.000 only by committing to take an empty box instead if an empty box appears.Unless our senses are deluding us (e.g. simulation), this is a logical impossibility. So we must commit to a logical impossibility, which being a logical impossibility should never happen.
So normal Newcomb just requires a bit of trust in Omega's abilities, while transparent Newcomb requires committing to a logical impossibility (that the empty box is the filled box). Or perhaps altering your utility function so that you no longer want money-filled boxes.
But isn't it equally a "logical impossibility" in normal Newcomb that taking both boxes will give me less money than taking just one box?
I agree that with transparent boxes the "logical impossibility" feels more salient, especially if I don't think about the normal variant too carefully. So, sure, there's a difference. But I don't think the difference is what you are claiming here.
Note that this particular response to transparent Newcomb doesn't apply to the Prometheus variant, since you never see the empty box.
In the Prometheus variant we see we exist. I really can't take the Prometheus variant at all seriously, nor do I believe I should.
Transparent Newcomb is the same problem as Kavka's toxin. You should take one box for the same reason you should drink the toxin after the millionaire gives you the money. Your argument would prevent you from winning at Kavka's toxin: after you get the money, and you're faced with the toxin to drink, it's tempting to think that there's no reason to drink it.
You're not making the correct comparison. Drinking Kavka's toxin after you get the money is like one-boxing after seeing the box is full.
One-boxing whether the box is full or empty is however like drinking Kavka's toxin even if you do NOT get the money.
And since Transparent Newcomb demands the latter (one-boxing whether the box is full or empty), it's not the same problem as Kavka's toxin.