p4wnc6 comments on The Substitution Principle - LessWrong
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I'm claiming that the substitution principle isn't so much a model as a (non-information-adding) rephrasing of the existence of heuristics, so there isn't much of a "mistake" to be made - the rephrasing isn't actually wrong, just unhelpful.
Unless of course you actually think the new question is explicitly represented in the brain in a similar way that a question read or heard would be, in which case I think you've made that mistake in every single one of your examples, unless you have data to back up that assumption.
Being possible to easily misapply an explanation does make it bad, because that means it's not anticipation-constraining.
This is exactly what I'd expect the moment after learning of the existence of natural heuristics. If the brain is answering a question in less time than I'd expect it to take to calculate/retrieve the answer, obviously it's doing something else. What this post seems to be trying to add is that "doing something else" can be refined to "answering a different question" - but since the brain is providing output of type Answer, any output will be "answering a different question", so it's not actually a refinement.
It's possible you just wanted to explicitly state a principle that happened to be implicitly obvious to me, in which case we have no disagreement. But the length of the post and the fact that you bothered to cite Kahneman seem to me to indicate that you're trying to say something more substantial, in which case I've missed it.
I disagree that it fails to be a model. It predicts what types of information will be used by the agent (i.e. answers to simpler questions). Though Kahneman's book presents all this is in a glossed-over, readable way, his actual research papers do combine this with anchoring effects to specifically control and test that certain answers to anchor questions are being substituted for answers to more difficult questions. It's actually quite powerful as a model.
What definition does Kahneman use for "simpler"?
I'm no expert on this, but one main thing he uses as a proxy is pupil dilation. In arithmetical tasks, there is a strong correlation between pupil dilation, reported mental effort required to finish the task, and time taken to finish the task. So, the same person, when asked to do an unnatural modular arithmetic problem, will express more dilated pupils, report having a harder time, and take longer, than to solve a similar but more familiar numerical problem like adding large numbers. Kahneman applied similar approaches to moral and ethical questions.
I don't dispute that his findings are difficult to interpret and that many people (including Kahneman) probably overstretch to make them fit a compelling story (Kahneman even admits as much when discussing the narrative bias). But the overall model that when your System 1 hits a cognitive wall it demands that System 2 give it a compelling story about why this is so seems to be well confirmed. If you're willing to accept that things like pupil dilation are a proxy for how difficult a question feels to the answerer, then the anchoring-controlled experiments show that System 2 is lazy and wants the cheapest, quickest answer for a hard problem and it will often substitute an answer for a question it was already thinking about, or a question of considerably less cognitive strain (as measured by pupil dilation, etc.)