Eugine_Nier comments on When None Dare Urge Restraint, pt. 2 - LessWrong
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And this is why Baysians always loose to barbarians.
I suspect that if a nation of rationalists who all think "It is just too dangerous for there to be any target in the world about whom saying positive things trumps saying accurate things" were invaded by barbarians, they would, after short reflection, decide that designating those among them who took the role of soldier to repel the invasion as heroes, that this would be an accurate thing as well as positive.
The point of Bayesians vs. Barbarians is not that the Bayesians lose, but that true rationalists win against the barbarians where merely "clever" wannabes lose, and that we aspiring rationalists know enough about how they do it to win as well.
That only happens if rationalists actually implement advise like that contained in the post, instead of simply patting themselves on the back over that fact that "true rationalists" would win while still acting like "merely 'clever' wannabes".
I believe the only way to be left alone by barbarians is to have a credible deadman-switch doomsday device.
That could be an effective strategy, but how much effort did you put into thinking of others before you decided that there are none?
It's an issue I've read and written about for a few years. How much concerted thought? Not sure, probably not enough. Constructing human institutions in which the cost for violent action increases sharply in all circumstances is non-trivial.
Is it that non-trivial? Humans have managed to make societies as a whole have less violence over the last few thousand years, and much of that impact seems to have been accidental.
That only works when the barbarians are rational enough so that they a). believe that you do in fact have such a device, and b). care whether you have it or not. If, instead, the barbarians are committed to invading you even at the cost of their own lives, or believe that their gods/manifest destiny/force of will/whatever will protect them against any retaliation by you, then your doomsday device is useless.
Doesn't that presume barbarians who will reliably act in their own best interest?
If I assume that, then being able to offer barbarians a service they value in exchange for something they value less is sufficient to protect myself from barbarians, as long as I ensure I won't provide that service once attacked. But it's quite an assumption.
no, you use the threat against people who are rational to provide you with conventional air superiority. This protects you from stupid people.
Ah, I see.
So what protects them?
The stupid people? Their overwhelming numbers! ;)
How does air superiority protect you? Is that the question? It reliably does, the fact that modern empires are too chickenshit/stupid to use it correctly doesn't mean it doesn't work.
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Air_Power/vietnam/AP40.htm
I am now confused.
It sounds like you are saying:
a) conventional air superiority is a reliable way of being left alone by barbarians, and
b) a credible deadman-switch doomsday device is the only way to be left alone by barbarians
I also believe:
c) conventional air superiority is not a credible deadman-switch doomsday device,
It seems that at least one of those statements must be false.
there are two types of barbarians, the kind that take a nuke seriously (current nation states) and the kind that are just insane. You use conventional means against the latter. you get supplied with conventional means by the former.