prase comments on Thoughts on moral intuitions - LessWrong

39 Post author: Kaj_Sotala 30 June 2012 06:01AM

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Comment author: buybuydandavis 14 July 2012 11:18:49PM *  1 point [-]

For example, it seems that you assume that the post was arguing in favour of the most primitive moral relativism of "all preferences are equal" sort.

No, you've misread me. As I said, while the author accepts the presuppositions of moral relativism, he was busy climbing out of the relativist swamp to be able to assert his own values. He attempts to resolve the unease of the liberal moral relativist at the apparent contradiction between their avowed moral relativism and the assertion of liberal values.

It's a backhanded "tu quoque". Basically, yeah, we're forcing our values on people, but everybody does it. It's much like Doug Wilson's "tu quoque" defense of faith - rationality isn't self justifying, so reason is just "another faith". Everybody's doing it.

Both of these tu quoques operate by destroying the distinctions made by the concepts in question, faith and force. Just as no one believes that having faith that quacking like a duck will start your car is "the same" as relying on reason and evidence to use your key, no one believes that my desire to murder you is "the same" as your desire not to be murdered.

In his argument, he pits a conservative straw man and a vegan straw man against his relatively favorably portrayed liberal moral relativist. It's peculiar that you accuse me of straw manning Kaj, when his whole argument is based in contrasts to straw men he disagrees with, which is part of what allows him to blithely assert liberal values despite his admission that "we're no different than the conservatives".

Notice who's missing in his political universe? Libertarians - those who assert the difference between my desire to murder you and your desire not to be murdered. Yet another straw man aspect to his argument - those who would most strenuously object to his thesis don't even exist.

Comment author: prase 15 July 2012 06:51:06PM 2 points [-]

Still I think you are misinterpreting (not strawmanning) Kaj when you assume that he was trying to assert, defend or justify his (liberal) ideological position. I read the post as doing something very different: pointing out reasons why many political arguments naturally fail when both parties have insufficiently compatible base values.

I believe Kaj does not think that there is no difference between the statements "killing people without a very good reason should be illegal" and "homosexual partnerships should be illegal". But he probably thinks that the important difference is a matter of value judgement. Even if I justify the distinct moral status of murder and homosexuality by a more general principle, e.g. that an act is immoral if and only if it causes harm, the justification relies on my fundamental values and is no good in a debate where my interlocutor doesn't share these values.

(I think this should be pretty uncontroversial and politically neutral. Kaj has perhaps made a mistake using the labels "conservative" and "liberal" and expressing where his own sympathies are, which may have created an impression that the article was defending liberal ideas.)

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 15 July 2012 10:47:04PM 2 points [-]

Yes, this. My worst mistake was probably straying into normative wording, given that the post was meant to be mainly/purely descriptive.