gwern comments on Who Wants To Start An Important Startup? - LessWrong
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To sound a note of caution... I spent a number of years acquiring various kinds of non-monetary capital that are useful for startups. Looking back with my current state of theoretical knowledge and memories, I suspect I may come to see this period as involving too little caution. The key concept acquired between then and now is Kelly Betting.
I still haven't worked through the applications of this concept to startups in a way that I feel is "settled", but depending on the precise nature of the risks and rewards and the bankroll of the typical person accepting startup equity in place of cash, the Kelly Criterion may indicate that startups should usually not be more than hobbies for "normal" (non-rich, non-certainly-immortal, declining-utility-in-dollars) humans. Note that if startups are roughly as risky as a simple Kelly calculation says they should be, this might still be cause for concern because most people who raise theory/practice issues with Kelly say that it over invests in risks.
I'm still exploring ways that the theory might line up with reality, but even my limited state of knowledge has caused me to scale back my startup enthusiasm in the last year or so. The math might come out more positive if you value the knowledge capital gained through startup work in the correct way, for example, but that's particularly tricky to calculate. If anyone else has thoughts on this subject I would love to read or hear them.
For reference, Robin already wrote about Kelly betting to claim that the present era is visibly unstable because most investment firms, and the economy in general, seems not to be engaged in a Kelly strategy at the present time. In some sense, Robin claimed, a financial system not dominated by Kelly-following-financial-entities would probably be a system that has no significantly old Kelly-following-financial-entities, because in the long run they "win" at finance.
Another source on Kelly betting that is directly applicable to startups flows with the "invest in the team, not the idea" dictum. The post "Optimal startup burn rate and the Kelly criterion" is no longer available in the wild but is retained on archive.org and discussed the optimal team size and experimental product cycle given a starting bankroll. (The blog is LaserLike and is not itself down.)
For what its worth, I'm not totally bearish on startups, and sort of have one cooking... I'm just trying to pursue startup stuff with an eye on keeping a bird or 6 in the hand while pursuing startup stuff in parallel. In this vein, if anyone is or knows a solid hardware hacker with RFID experience/interest, especially if they are ethical, planful, world-savey, "rational", and/or live in (southern?) California, I'd appreciate hearing from you. No particular startup interest or equity tolerance is important -- just hardware skills, character, and an interest in educational conversation :-)
I'm not too clear how we would apply KC to startups (as opposed to specific contracts in prediction markets).
Let's see... Somewhere Paul Graham says that >90% of startups will fail, so our Kelly odds are 9:1. What's the return on a won bet? Well, the recent Kaufmann Foundation report on VC funds puts the single best VC funds at an overall return of ~8x but that's not enough because that implies that we may not even break even if we lost ~9 investments for every 1 investment returning 8! (receiving 8 back on a 9:1 bet)
If startups are negative expected value, the KC is not useful: it presumes bets are positive expected value and the question is what fraction to bet at any time to avoid ruin. I suppose that treating them as lottery tickets and assuming you are risk-seeking might make it useful, but I don't know how to do that.
Maybe time-value will help. Thinking of a LWer I know, he received the rough equivalent of a year's salary when the startup 'won'. But the startup itself took years and naturally wasn't paying the salary a big competitor might, so it's not obvious that he was better off in the end, which brings us back to the expected value question.
Yeah, I dunno.
I don't understand your calculation. Even the best VC funds probably make some losing investments, so to achieve an overall return of 8x, the winning startups must yield more than that.
I did say it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me.
KC does apply to negative EV bets. The formula emits a negative allocation (ie "take the other side").
Yeah, but I don't think that really applies to startups! (What is 'the other side'? Are there people who offer shorts on arbitrary startups for less than millions?)
On the contrary, in some sense, that's when the KC is most useful. The correct amount of money to gamble on losing propositions is 0!
My estimation of startups in general is that startups are a good way for exceptional individuals to capture much of the value they create. The problem is that it's difficult to tell who is exceptional beforehand, especially if one can only measure sparkle and not grit, and also especially if one has not determined their own level yet.
In that vein, I am cautious about finding cofounders in ways like this.
The major value-add of professional VCs is that they are (should be) better at picking startups than most people. It's very much possible for 90% of startups to fail while VCs still make money. (For one, successful startups can use much more capital; and the rest of the money is supplied by unsophisticated founders.)
I was under the impression that VCs often had significant industry contacts that the fledgling company would then have access to, and that advice for founders is to not sign a deal with someone who is only offering money. (Of course, that advice given by a connected investor is self-serving, and should be taken with a grain of salt.)