Mainstream status:

The distinction between epistemic and instrumental rationality is standard.

Postmodernists/relativists have emphasized use of the word 'true' as a mere emphasis, which I admit is a common use.

I haven't particularly seen anyone pioneering a rationalist technique of trying to eliminate the word 'true' to avoid use as a mere emphasis. The deflationary theory of truth says that all uses of "truth" are deflatable - which this sequence denies; but the idea of deflating "true" out of sentences is clearly precedented, as is the Tarski-inspired algorithm for doing so.

I haven't particularly seen anything which emphasizes that the residue of trying to eliminate the word "truth" is abstraction and generalization over the behavior of map-territory correspondences.

Similarly, I haven't previously seen anyone advocate, as a rationality technique, trying to eliminate the word 'rational'; or emphasizing that the non-eliminable residue will be about cognitive algorithms. I wouldn't particularly expect to see that; this is me trying to narrow the definition a particular way that I think is useful.