= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
Eugine_Nier comments on Rationality: Appreciating Cognitive Algorithms - LessWrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (134)
Some are some aren't. Furthermore, it's impossible to say anything without using distinctions.
Not all moral distinctions are on-off buttons. Some (most?) are sliding scales.
I don't expect king-of-postmodernism-is-nonsense and mister-I-think-postmodernism-makes-good-points to come to agreement, but I'm interested in where exactly we disagree.
Do you think some agents could gain advantage by treating a sliding-scale moral quality as discrete?
Do you think some agents could gain advantage by treating a discrete moral quality as sliding-scale?
What sort of evidence is useful in deciding whether a particular moral quality is discrete or sliding scale?
First binary distinctions aren't just for moral systems.
If we restrict to moral distinctions, most moral distinctions are Schelling points.