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ChristianKl comments on LW Women- Minimizing the Inferential Distance - LessWrong
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Her father had the goal of her learning how to cook. Cooking is a valuable skill and it makes sense for parents to want their children to learn valuable skills.
He could have simply said: "You need to learn how to cook".
If you want to persuade someone it's better to say "You need to learn how to cook, because it helps you to achieve important goal X" than to just say "You need to learn how to cook". A dad that thinks that getting married is one of the goals of his daughter will use the example.
If you tell a guy to learn cooking it sense to frame the reason differently.
Take Tim Ferriss in his new book "The 4-Hour Chef" with targets geeks:
There no sexism inherent in giving a girl different reasons than a boy.
There most definitely is. The sexism is not generated by giving a girl different reasons than a boy, but it is absolutely inherent in the entire process that causes one to give a girl different reasons than a boy.
True: There is no sexism inherent in giving child A different reasons from child B.
Possibly true: There is no sexism inherent in giving particular-girl-Alice different reasons from particular-boy-Bob.
False: There is no sexism inherent in giving girls-in-general different reasons from boys-in-general.
The problem is that your statement has definitional ambiguity. Reframing to make it clear which specific case you're talking about will help cool down this debate.
Sexism has the same problem, as a word, that racism has. Is it believing in a contextually significant difference between groups OR is is believing that one group is universally superior to another OR is it actively working to support or harm an individual based on group affiliation? Examples of the latter are used to make the word have revulsion which is then used to discredit those who hold the former.
Those may be correllated, but are not identical positions.
Absolutely not. But this is why I keep using terms like "poisoning the discourse". Questions about contextually significant differences between groups are valid and important directions of inquiry, but people have deliberately decided (for political reasons) to so conflate them with actively supporting or harming individuals based on group affiliation that it's impossible to have a scientific discussion without feeding a bunch of people who aren't qualified to interpret the data.
Because we don't have anything like HPMOR's "Bayesian Conspiracy", we need to be sensitive to the fact that certain factual conjectures cause damage when released into the wild. And because I don't know how rational you(collective) are, I need to make sure that you(collective) understand the social weight of certain conjectures before I'm willing to bandy them about. And unfortunately, responding with "but it seems factually true to me!" seems to be missing the point of the communication, which is "you are tugging on the end of a fact-string that is connected to a really nasty bit of primate pack-behavior, can we please tug more gently on it?". (I acknowledge that many people have responded with "but look how gently I'm already tugging"; I've attempted to respond with "seriously dudes, you need to tug even more gently than that.")
This is a seriously recursive process, so almost all of the facts have to be evaluated in terms of the correlative matrix they operate within, instead of their mere correspondence-with-personally-available-evidence. All of these facts shape the process by which we gather evidence about them.
But the whole point of the process is to force anyone with an unpopular opinion to tug more and more gently, until finally they cease to tug at all. Then the PC hive mind can move the goalposts forward a bit, and start silencing a more moderate group of critics, and then another, and another, until ultimately the keepers of the received wisdom can say or do anything they like and no one dares to question them.
So no, I'll continue on with my ironclad opposition to such transparent ploys. Anyone who whines about how their delicate sensibilities can't stand an open, honest discussion of the facts of an issue has given up the right to have anyone care what they think.
That is emphatically not the "point" of the process. That may be a consequence of the process, but it is not the point of it - and if it does happen to be a consequence of the process, it's clear that you can be relied on to say so and we'll negotiate a new equilibrium.
That... doesn't appear to be what actually happens. Are there "PC hive minds"? definitely. But right now, they most assuredly don't have the level of power that the old-guard conservatives do. Once they become the dominant force against rationality, if they don't evolve into milder strains in response to evolutionary pressure on their own, then it makes sense to start fighting them too. But right now, I have a seriously hard time seeing them as worse than what they're fighting.
(Who knows - maybe that makes me part of the PC hive mind myself? It would be good to get a solid argument for that, if it were the case; I'd rather not fall into a loyalty trap if I can avoid it).
I don't want to death-spiral into a discussion of politics, so I'll refrain from naming specific groups. But in most Western nations there are large, well-funded political activist groups that have consciously, explicitly adopting the tactic of aggressively claiming offense in order to silence their political opponents. While the members of such groups might be honestly dedicated to advancing some social cause, the leaders who encourage this behavior are professional politicians who are more likely to be motivated by issues of personal power and prestige.
So I'll certainly concede that many individuals may feel genuinely offended in various cases, but I stand by my claim that most of the political organizations they belong to encourage constant claims of offense as a cynical power play.
If you don't believe the ratcheting effect actually happens, I invite you to compare any random selection of political tracts from the 1950s, 1970s and 1990s. You'll find that on many issues the terms of the debate have shifted to the point where opinions that were seriously discussed in the 1950s are now considered not just wrong but criminal offenses. This may seem like a good thing if you happen to agree with the opinion that's currently be ascendant, but in most cases the change was not a result of one side marshaling superior evidence for their beliefs. Instead it's all emotion and political gamesmanship, supplemented by naked censorship whenever one side manages to get a large enough majority.
You know, it sounds like you're claiming that the fact that certain behaviors - generally accepted to be harmful - are no longer considered acceptable as proof of a conspiracy cynically piggybacking on this change to impose (self?)censorship , furthering some unspecified agenda. This feels like a strawman of your actual beliefs; could you explain what you meant?
I don't see a good reason to believe that's true - or at least, whether "conservatives" hold power is strongly function of what place you're talking about, and of what you mean by "power". Remember, not everybody here lives in the US like I assume you do (I live in France, as a first approximation it looks like you're all crazy over there).
The impression I get is that both liberals and conservatives enjoy whining about how they are oppressed by their all-powerful opponents, and if you add the right caveats (what kind of oppression and where), they might both be right.
In this thread, I've seen some distasteful justifications of "lying for the Greater Good" (or even just to defend "people in my coalition"), and in one (heavily downvoted) case, someone claiming they'd rather see the world destroyed rather than seeing it continue to exist with the current value systems ... all of that under the flag of feminism or LGBT advocacy. That has done very little to convince me that the biggest threats are from "old guard conservatives". It may be the case in some crapholes in Alabama, but probably not among the bright and educated.
You might be interested in a book called Racial Paranoia. It argues that since overt racism is publicly unacceptable in the US, people are focusing on tinier and tinier clues about who they can trust, resulting in a paranoid style which is actually a rational response to weird conditions.
That sounds like a stretch. While public racism is unacceptable, acting in ways consistent with racial prejudice usually goes without comment as long as plausible deniability exists.
I think such paranoia is in play in politics and sometimes online, where most or all of what you know about someone is what they say.
I don't disagree with the substance of your comment, but I'm not sure that public racism is as widely unacceptable as you'd like to think:
http://i.imgur.com/vcYuy.png
That's a plausible hypothesis - I do get the impression that overt racism is slightly more acceptable in France, and definitely more acceptable in China.
I also noticed that Americans tend to have a perspective on Arab Immigrants in France that seems weird and could be explained by the fact that they suppose "French"-Arab relationships are like the White-Black relationship in the US (or at least, that was one hypothesis I had at the time after some weird conversations).
That's because, for the most part, we are. It's hard to be sane and rational when all the processes you rely on for data-collection have been co-opted.
The interesting question isn't just who has the worst fringe (let alone who has the worst fringe that's shown up here), it's who's likely to get enough political power to do significant damage.
You mean political power here, or in general?
If it's here, I'm not very concerned about that; I'm more concerned about evaporative cooling, or outrage and indignation becoming acceptable modes of communication, or contemporary political issues becoming more prevalant than outlandish scenarios.
If it's in general, eh, I must admit I don't care that much, I don't have very strong opinions on who of "the left" or "the right" does the most damage when they're elected; I don't expect high value of information from looking at that, the whole field is polluted with partisan politics. I find figuring out what people agree and disagree on much more interesting.
"Point"?
Or what? Are you worried that disagreeing with these "keepers of the received wisdom" will be criminalized? Bearing in mind that Fred Phelps is a real person and his actions are, as yet, legal.
Transparent. Right. Because anyone who disagrees with you simply must have an ulterior motive.
Indeed. Those toddlers are just trying to hide away from the truth about where babies come from.
"people have deliberately decided (for political reasons) to so conflate them with actively supporting or harming individuals based on group affiliation that it's impossible to have a scientific discussion without feeding a bunch of people who aren't qualified to interpret the data."
The opposite is done too, though--for instance, when one assumes there is no differences between boys and girls, then dressing girls up in pink or giving them baby dolls is seen as abetting a (sometimes emergent) conspiracy which deserves great efforts to combat
Perhaps; I think part of the issue there is that there is a political debate and a sociological engineering project, and they keep shitting all over each other.
"I think if we raise boys and girls in gender-neutral environments, their inherent gender biases will be far less noticeable" is part of the sociological engineering project.
"No! You're turning them into lesbo feminazis and fairy faggots!" is the political-debate response.
"Fuck you! I'm dressing everyone unisex and attacking everyone who doesn't!" is the political-debate counter-response.
Note that while the counter-response is crazy, it's a predictable emotional response to the prior crazy, and shouldn't be blamed on its own. My assertion is that attacking people who say "I'm dressing everyone unisex and attacking everyon who doesn't!" isn't nearly as effective as attacking the people who set them off in the first place, and hoping that they'll calm down once they're not under severe stress from people who are crazier than they do and attack them without provocation.
Does that make sense?
(I haven't read everyone elses responses, and I will shortly, but first my initial reaction): There are political debate responses and political debate responses; one can discuss policy politely and even, theoretically, rationally. Given that, I think a political debate is absolutely essential before any sociological experiment is undertaken, save for the small scale model of what you are doing to your own children, which others may comment on as noble or foolish but we should have a high bar for interference of. But if you are trying to, say, create a pressure group which coerces toy-makers to have only boys hold the dolls in their catalogues (heard about that in sweeden yesterday) I would prefer the political debate prior to a quixotic quest to rewrite human nature.
In other words, I think the social engineers are more worrisome than the "crazy" people debating them.
Modulo your deliberate use of slurs, why is that not a valid objection. In other words, are you sure you understand the full implications of this "sociological engineering project" and why should the child be one of its test subjects?
I have to support and emphasize your response here.
The attempt to make those that disagree appear to be bigoted just isn't reasonable. Even those who endorse without judgement the lifestyle of being---and overtly displaying---what some people may call a "fairy faggot" have good reason to be wary of artificially forcing particular gender identities on test subjects. In fact, it is those who have or have in the past had their gender relevant identity features crushed who are in the best position to understand the risk of this kind of intervention.
Actively changing the environment and---explicitly or implicitly---enforcing expectations about how people should behave has significant consequences, not always good. And "gender neutral" isn't a neutral intervention but instead an artificial intervention towards someone else's arbitrary ideal. Even the described intent of the project hints at this: "their inherent gender biases will be far less noticeable" is very similar to "the gender identity they are instinctively drawn to will be crushed out of them".
If "sociological engineering projects" are to be done around this area I endorse only those that engineer towards freedom to choose one's own gender role and actively crushing prejudice, judgement and presumptive influence of any party over the expression of another. Whether or not said party happens to be an authority with a conformity agenda.
It seems that there's a qualitative difference between "crushing" gender roles (David Reimer?) and simply being gender neutral (e.g. giving the same kids both dolls and space shuttle model, not just the one judged gender appropriate).
Chesterton's fence and similar Burkean arguments are generally a reasonable position. But in this case, we know:
1) There are people who desire to do things that are not acceptable within their gender roles (i.e. cross-dressing)
2) Internalizing gender narratives makes those people miserable
3) Those people (as a group) are not more likely to engage in unacceptable behaviors (i.e. molest children)
4) Prior changes to gender and other social norms have occurred without society falling apart
5) Plausible arguments exist that those changes were net benefits for society (preventing Condoleezza Rice or Hilary Clinton from being Secretary of State is wasting talent)
In short, there is obvious and significant suffering that these changes could plausibly alleviate. Comparing these changes to similar changes suggests the downside risks are low. Even Burke acknowledged that change was sometimes necessary - otherwise Burkean conservatism becomes a fully general counter-argument.
In response to 1&2, I'd point out that 2 things: there are many gender norms,which may range from frivolous or harmful cultural baggage to valuable or vital biological or sociological adaptations. And, establishing a norm can be done with a range of incentives, and we should be open to optimizing them to minimize the misery while still promoting the norms that lead to a more harmonious society.
I don't believe #3 is the main argument for establishing gender roles.
For 4, there's a lot of apart in a society to fall. Some trends that worry me I do find plausible links to prior changes to gender norms. While I'm not sure I'm prepared to argue that here, I don't think the converse is firmly established, either.
5-Probably (there are probably arguments, I mean) but I don't find simply listing two names of women in high office to be one of them.
Fine. How do we tell the difference? Also, how do we tell the difference between norms-masquerading-as-facts and facts?
And one of the factors affecting this how much they desire these things is how they were brought up.
This argument would have more force if you had specific examples of different things parents do that affect the existence of the desire to violate gender norms.
For example, J. Edgar Hoover was born in 1895 (and was a cross-dresser). There's no plausible argument that second-wave feminism (circa 1960s) or third-wave feminism (circa 1990s) had any effect on his upbringing.
If society could affect the frequency of the desire, reducing the frequency might be a viable solution. But I've yet to hear a vaguely plausible story about what parents can choose to do that would have any effect.
This could be anthropic fallacy.
We could control for that by looking through the records of past civilizations and trying to get an idea of whether changes to gender or social norms were reliably associated with collapse.
That seems reasonable if there are no endogenous incentives rewarding crazy, but that seems like a questionable assumption for any ideology once it's gotten used to having crazy in its internal ecosystem.
I'd rather deal with that after the primary and initial source of crazy has been removed. Otherwise, it's too easy to accidentally mistake one for the other.
Rationalization being what it is, I suspect it'd be easy to mistake one for the other from the inside anyway.
Very true. So then the question becomes, given that:
is there, in fact, any way to prevent this process from occuring? or do we just have to cast our lots and hope for the best?