Peterdjones comments on Philosophy Needs to Trust Your Rationality Even Though It Shouldn't - LessWrong

27 Post author: lukeprog 29 November 2012 09:00PM

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Comment author: Peterdjones 30 November 2012 12:24:01AM 6 points [-]

On only the rarest occasions do philosophers suggest that some term ("good", "morality," "rationalism", "free will", "soul", "knowledge") might not possess a definition that is precise enough to do the work that we ask of it.

And they neve expend any effort in establishing clear meanings for such terms. Oh wait....they expend far too mcuh effort arguing about definitions...no, too little...no, too much.

OK: the problem with philosopher is that they are contradictory.

Comment author: khafra 30 November 2012 06:14:52PM 0 points [-]

And they never expend any effort in establishing clear meanings for such terms. Oh wait....they expend far too much effort arguing about definitions

If philosophers were strongly biased toward climbing the ladder of abstraction instead of descending it, they could expend a great deal of effort, flailing uselessly about definitions.

Comment author: Bruno_Coelho 02 December 2012 04:09:20PM -1 points [-]

What sort of people do you have in mind? The generalization apparently consider academic philosophers in the actual state, but not past people. Sure, someone without strong science background will miss the point, focusing on the words. But arguing "by definitions" is not something done exclusively by philosophers.