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Esar comments on Philosophy Needs to Trust Your Rationality Even Though It Shouldn't - LessWrong
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That's fine, but it doesn't address the problem I described in the great great grandparent of this reply. Either you mean the brain activity of a healthy person, or the brain activity common to healthy and brain-damaged people. Even if philosophers intend to be discussing brain processes (which, in almost every case, they do not) then you've assumed an answer, not given one.
But in any case, this way of tabooing 'moral judgement' makes it very clear that the question the psychologist is discussing is not the question the philosopher is discussing.
In that case I don't understand the question the philosopher is discussing. Can you explain it to me without using the phrase "moral judgment"?
Well, this isn't something I'm an expert in. Most of my knowledge of the topic comes from this SEP article, which I would in any case just be summarizing if I tried to explain the debate. The article is much clearer than I'm likely to be. So you're probably just better off reading that, especially the intro and section 3: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/
That article uses the phrase 'moral judgement' of course, but anyway I think tabooing the term (rather than explaining and then using it) is probably counterproductive.
I'd of course be happy to discuss the article.