falenas108 comments on An attempt to dissolve subjective expectation and personal identity - LessWrong

35 Post author: Kaj_Sotala 22 February 2013 08:44PM

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Comment author: falenas108 23 February 2013 03:48:28PM -1 points [-]

I'm not entirely self-altruistic - I've currently got a pretty strong "don't create multiple redundant copies of sentient beings"utility component, or shall we say gut instinct.

Is this a thing you're saying for you personally, or people in general? Because if it's not for everyone, then you still have to deal with the problem mentioned here.

Comment author: someonewrongonthenet 24 February 2013 12:08:04AM *  2 points [-]

Alright, let's imagine that I was creating copies of myself for whatever reason:

In the present, I feel equal self-altruism towards all future identical copies of myself .

However, the moment a copy of myself is made, each copy will treat the other as a separate individual (with the regular old fashioned altruism one might have towards someone exactly like oneself, rather than future-self-altruism).