AI workers in the 1960s should have read Wittgenstein's discussion of games to understand a key problem with building symbolic logic systems that have an atomic symbol correspond to each dictionary word.
Can you elaborate on this? It sounds fascinating. I confess I can't make heads or tails of Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein, in his discussion of games (specifically, his idea that concepts are delineated by fuzzy "family resemblance", rather than necessary and sufficient membership criteria) basically makes the same points as Eliezer does in these posts.
Representative quotes:
...Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? -- Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' "-but look and see whe
Another month has passed and here is a new rationality quotes thread. The usual rules are: