peter_hurford comments on Why Eat Less Meat? - LessWrong

48 Post author: peter_hurford 23 July 2013 09:30PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (513)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: blacktrance 07 January 2014 12:36:08AM *  1 point [-]

if one cares about suffering, one should also care about nonhuman animals

This assumes that if I care about suffering, my utility function places some negative weight on suffering much in the same way it places a positive weight on me eating food I like, but this need not be the case. If I care about suffering, it means I want less of it, but it doesn't mean that I'm willing to give up much to reduce the amount. Ceteris paribus, I want less suffering in the world, but that doesn't mean I care enough about it to not eat delicious hamburgers, or even to pay more for a burger. I care about not getting dust specks in my eye too, but if I got one dust speck in my eye per month, and I could get rid of it by never eating burgers, I'd keep eating burgers. It doesn't mean that I don't care, though.

Comment author: peter_hurford 07 January 2014 01:34:33AM *  1 point [-]

That's technically true, yeah. It means you don't care very much (or care very very much about eating burgers)...

Comment author: SaidAchmiz 12 January 2014 05:02:37AM 0 points [-]

Or it means that the formalism of a utility function does not fully describe your preferences.

That is, asking "how much do you care about X", and getting some real number as the answer to that question for any value of X, will not describe the preferences and choices of the agent in question. (This is one way to interpret my previously offered "chickens vs. grandmother" conundrum.)

A more apt formalism might be some sort of multi-tier system, perhaps. I haven't settled on an answer, myself.