Rationality Quotes December 2013
Rationality quotes time!
The usual rules:
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- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
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"Finally, a study that backs up everything I've always said about confirmation bias." -Kslane, Twitter
Link
Not really relevant, but this seems like an overstatement. Paratroopers and bombing I can see, but strafing doesn't seem to be mentioned, and I'm not aware that using airborne grapples to overturn ships has ever happened (my understanding is that the weight ratios wouldn't cooperate).
He also seems to be predicting that only one side in any given conflict will have airships, and assuming that everyone else will just keep doing what they were doing before instead of developing strategies and technologies to defend against this new threat.
As to your last paragraph: yes, Lana could have imagined the future "one step further" by considering what would have happened when both sides of a war acquire these flying ships. In this respect, his "error" in considering only one of the two sides seems similar to one of Sun Tzu which goes something like:
What happens when both you and your enemy "know the enemy and know yourself". How can neither of you not fear the result of a hundred battles?
However, consider also The Bomber Will Always Get Through, some 300 years later, as a counterpoint to "develop new strategies to defend against this new threat".
Two interpretations jump to mind: the first is that 'fear' is interpreted as uncertainty, the second is that mutually fully informed agents could do enough damage to each other that war between them is senseless, and thus there are no battles.
Alternately, I interpreted it as saying that war between two such agents will always be a stalemate, with both sides gingerly risking pawns and trading minor victories which, while never leading to substantial success, do not lead to crushing defeat, either.
Of course, your second interpretation is much more applicable in the general case of two sides which are not evenly matched, in which case the weaker one will accept their defeat (either by surrendering or deciding to go out in a defiant but hopeless battle), in which case your first interpretation comes into play.
I note that people on the ground did develop new strategies to defend against planes. Radar and antiaircraft guns and those balloon things to take them down, bomb shelters to make them less lethal. I wonder how many WWII bombers would it take to land a single bomb on DC?
The bombers also evolved, of course (I guess now it would be "the missile will always get through"), and my understanding is that defense hasn't kept up with offense. But a race with a clear victor isn't the same thing as no race at all.
— Donald Rumsfeld
I don't like a lot of things he did, but that's the second very good advice I've heard from Rumsfeld. Maybe I need to start respecting his competence more.
The "known knowns" quote got made fun of a lot, but I think it's really good out of context:
"There are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; that is to say, there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know we don't know."
Also, every time I think of that I try to picture the elusive category of "unknown knowns" but I can't ever think of an example.
I guess "unknown knowns" are the counterpoint to "unknown unknowns" -- things it never occurred to you to consider, but didn't. Eg. "We completely failed to consider the possibility that the economy would mutate into a continent-sized piano-devouring shrimp, and it turned out we were right to ignore that."
That's a survivor bias.
Things that we know that we don't know we know? I run into these all the time... last night, for example, I realized that I knew the English word for the little plastic cylinders at the end of a shoelace. (I discovered this when someone asked me what an 'aglet' was.) I'd had no idea.
An aglet... beautiful. I probably have a larger vocabulary in English than in Finnish by now. Lots of unknown knowns there I bet.
I figure "unknown knowns" covers a huge category of its own: willful ignorance. All those things that are pretty obvious (e.g. the absence of the Dragon in the garage) but that many people, including Rumsfeld apparently, choose to ignore or "unknow".
Its much easier to generate good advice than to follow it.
I'm also fond of
Rumsfeld quotes
He's oversimplifying-- was it necessary to go to war then?-- but it's still worth thinking about whether a criticism is based on what's actually possible.
-The Economist
-- 1634: The Baltic War, by Eric Flint and David Weber
"A problem well put, is half solved." - John Dewey
From a commenter called "ThisIsMyRealName" over at Slate
See also Pretending to Be Wise.
I don't think that's quite right. Assigning blame isn't about being correct. It's about figuring out how to prevent the problem from being repeated. Once you know who is at fault and how, you know what to warn them not to do in order to keep it from being repeated.
Even still, saying everyone is equally to blame doesn't actually figure out how to prevent the problem from being repeated.
It's also about counter-factually preventing the problem, UDT-style.
http://phenomena.nationalgeographic.com/2013/11/26/welcome-to-the-era-of-big-replication/
When he studied which psychological studies were replicatable, and had to choose whether to disbelieve some he'd previously based a lot of work on, Brian Nosek said:
(via ciphergoth on twitter)
Which one is the red pill again?
From The Matrix Original Script (the wording is slightly different in the movie).
As a side note, never take pills from strange people in empty werehouses who found you on the internet.
That depends, how were their reviews on Silk Road? :P
Especially not in werehouses, no.
I'm wary of being in werehouses at all. They could turn back to people at any time!
Highlights from "50 Unfortunate Truths About Investing" by Morgan Housel.
More of the people reading this comment are likely to hire a financial advisor than try to become an investor.
With that in mind I'd like to hear more about why financial advisors don't have our best interests at heart. I took a personal finance course in college that was 95% telling us how to create and execute financial plans and 5% telling us that in practice you should just hire a financial advisor. The former is to ensure that you know if your financial advisor knows what he's talking about. Is this actually bad advice?
In my experience, quite a few money managers generate a lot more fees then they strictly need to. Even some index funds will churn/rebalance more than necessary in order to generate a fee. When you consider the oft-cited statistic that very few managers outperform the market, and add in the fact that many they do eat the entire much of the surplus with fees, it becomes optimal to buy a good index rather than hire a financial adviser.
The problem with hiring advisers of all kinds is that you are hiring someone because they know more than you- which means you run the risk of them using their knowledge to rip you off.
I'd be interested in some guesstimations on how much luck it would take to be Warren Buffett, for example. Survivorship bias in finance is often employed as a just so story.
Less than you think given that he was able to cheaply borrow money through his insurance company.
[Via] (http://www.nytimes.com/books/00/12/24/reviews/001224.24spurlit.html)
Impressive, but it does have a pretty dramatic possible failure state where Tyson's response is "I suggest we settle this by punching each other." (In deed if not in word.)
I think the cleverness is in the violation of Tyson's expectations about how the encounter will go. Ayer went off script and that seems to have nonplussed Tyson.
And so philosophyboxing was born.
Relevant for LW: Could superhumanly strong AI box its way out of the box?
How good would a boxing AI be at Newcomb's Problem?
Example of professing a belief - here, belief is a fashion statement, or something fun to whip out at parties, not a thing that actually constrains anticipation.
I wonder what the story would sound like if told from the perspective of the literary theorist. Perhaps a story about how philosophers like to go on and on about truth and rationality, but when pressed by a relatively intelligent interlocutor, can't even supply you with something as basic as a theory of knowledge?
"So what's it all about then, Bertie?"
I'm not sure why a literary theorist would expect a theory of knowledge to be particularly basic, if they did they'd probably feel equipped to come up with one themself.
Basic to the field of philosophy (it is supposed to be in their domain after all, like criticism is supposed to be the domain of literary theorists), not basic as in trivial for non-experts.
If one were to fault a philosopher for not being able to generate something basic in that sense, I'd think one would also have to fault physicists for not yet having generated a Theory of Everything. A generalized theory of knowledge would be fundamental within philosophy, but that doesn't equate to being easy to generate, or impossible to work without (if it were, after all, nobody else ought to be able to get any work done without it either.)
I think an epistemology is something a literary theorist in particular has special need of. One thing you can do with an epistemology is recognize meaningless or unknowable claims.
I mean, I don't know much about literary theory. But I expect my belief that literary theorists need to know epistemology is common here. I mean, one of the (older) posts uses a literature professor as an example of someone trapped by a meaningless claim (No Logical Positivist, I).
As for "an" epistemology, yes, there are a plurality of them. Of which one (or more?) is Bayesian epistemology. Imagine if Dennet taught the literary theorist that, don't you think he'd do better literary theory? Don't you think he'd avoid traps that other theorists fall into, of arguing the meaningless or unknowable?
You seem to miss Dennett's point: the guy wasn't there because he cared about having a good epistemology, an accurate theory of the world - it's merely what everyone else is doing at the minute, and so he's doing it too.
He was there because at the time, you needed an epistemology to be taken seriously as a literary theorist. Good. Literary theorists probably need epistemologies.
What I'm saying is maybe this fashion, as Dennett calls it, is functional. Maybe it's popular for a very good reason. The way falsifiability is popular in science, for example.. Can't it be a good thing that the theorist is responding to a pressure in his field?
... not really... if he's not actually motivated by the additional rightness you can get with a theory of knowledge, then, why would he choose a good theory of knowledge instead of a cool one? I think I see what you're saying now.
Yes, that's what this line is about:
Also, saying that literary theorists need good epistemologies because it's crucial to their job is... Something you should offer a fair bit of evidence for. I don't see the relationship at all - other than the general use of believing true over false things.
... I completely missed that line when I read the quote. This is embarrassing.
And I don't have a fair bit of evidence for it, all I have is
literary theorists are pretty smart and apparently they thought it was necessary
an epistemology is good for recognizing meaningless or unknowable claims, and from the little I've seen of literary theory a lot of the claims looked like that on the surface
that was enough to make me think it was possible that Daniel Dannett was just being a jerk. Because I missed the part of the quote about how the literary theorist didn't care about getting the right epistemology. I thought he was just making fun of the literary theorist for responding to pressure within his field, because it looked to him like following a fashion. Again. Not something I still believe. It's because I missed that part of the quote.
I don't know whether an epistemology can be true or false.
A literature professor might ask: What happens when you see Hamlet in terms of Dennett"s epistemology as opposed to the epistemology of Aristotele?
If you want to ask that question it doesn't matter whether the epistemologies are true. It makes sense that the professor focuses on understanding the epistemology of Daniel Dennett instead of trying to understand which epistemology is true.
An literature professor doesn't try to understand the epistemology of God, the one true epistemology. He tries to understand the epistemology of authors. Daniel Dennett happens to be an important author and his epistemology seems worthy of analysis.
That's because "true" or "false" are aspects of maps, and epistemologies aren't maps - they're mapmaking tools.
You don't judge tools based on their truth or falsehood; you judge them based on their usefulness towards a certain purpose.
In humans' case, I think that an epistemology's job is to act as a bridge between our naive map-making and the world - that is, an epistemology's usefulness is measured by how well humans can use it to generate maps of their territory, and how well the maps it generates conform to their territory when read by humans. (Where "territory" can mean something as bare and ephemeral as raw qualia, barring any deeper assertion of the epistemology in question).
Most of the Headlines from a Mathematically Literate World. An example:
Mathematically and Economically Literate World: Rapid economic growth in India and China create record sales for low marginal cost information goods that achieve cross-cultural appeal by, for example, playing to base pleasures by displaying explosions and beautiful actors.
More of these gems, for the lazy:
In case anyone's curious, here are the highest-grossing films, adjusted for inflation.
Notice the number of political digs among the clear ones.
Looks to me like around 4, with one of them being of no particular partisan orientation.
Okay, what's special about that number, that I should notice it? Seems about what one would expect for a list of that length. A bit low, frankly.
The number doesn't seem as important as the habit of noticing political digs, regardless of whether or not you agree with them.
Okay. I was just wondering why you said 'number' there.
Scott R. Bakker, The White-Luck Warrior
- G. T. W. Patrick
We see things not as they are, but as they make us be.
Scott R. Bakker, The White-Luck Warrior
Another good fictional epigraph from the same book:
--Socrates in Gorgias (Paragraph break mine, to make it slightly less of a wall of text. This has shown up before, in a somewhat different form.)
Scott Aaronson after looking into the JFK assassination conspiracy evidence:
Huh, I didn't know Bertrand Russell, Carl Sagan & John Kerry were JFK truthers (for want of a more precise term). That's kind of interesting. (I don't mean to imply that's particularly good evidence for a JFK assassination conspiracy. Scientists, philosophers & politicians are about as good as the rest of us at getting things outside their speciality wrong. I really do just mean that it's mildly interesting.)
That post nicely demonstrates some useful heuristics. Point 11 = "Hug the Query". Point 12 = "Proving Too Much". Point 14 = "Burdensome Details". Point 18 = "cock-up before conspiracy". Point 20 uses a rule of thumb I recognize but haven't seen named anywhere yet: beware of rejecting a reasonably complete, orthodox theory in favour of a contrarian theory merely because contrarians claim to have piled up an assortment of anomalous "details that don’t add up in the official account".
Working with a top secret clearance has made me much more aware of how different hardball power reality is than it is presented. Just as one might consider a predilection towards conspiracies a bias, I think I came in to that job with a bias AGAINST conspiracies. I liked believing the world is a fair place where all sorts of tricky evil secret stuff "just wouldn't be done."
I now think (> 50% probability) that the bulk of society is coddled in a belief that things are fair and the world works in a warmish fuzzish way, but that the interactions especially between states and non-state power organizations (terrorists in common usage) is essentially without rules. If you can concieve of a way to get an advantage, it will be R&D'd and if it is workable it will be used.
I figure with just above 50% probability JFK was lone-assasinated purely on the basis that in 50 years with so much attention something would have broken, probably, if there was more to break. It would not matter to me much if it turned out to be a conspiracy of some sort, even if it was covered up, it would be par for the course in my current world view, either way.
Meaning I would be careful imputing too much superiority to myself over Russel, Sagan and/or Kerry purely on the basis of thinking JFK was lone-assasinated.
Both Sagan and Russell were despite their general bastions of rationality, both heavily influenced by their left-wing political environments. I find it surprising still despite that, but not very surprising.
Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try Again. Fail again. Fail better. -Samuel Beckett
A classic illustration of how to use (and how to not use) conditional probabilities:
--Edgar Allan Poe, "The Mystery of Marie Roget"
Hard to tell out of context, but is this claiming that each successive flower is independent evidence? In general, it feels like the reasoner is missing some dependency relationships between bits of evidence here.
Scott R. Bakker, The White-Luck Warrior
This is a good take, but I think I like the Feynman better (which I have to assume has appeared months and months ago):
"The first principle is that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool."
From a different angle, there's also the Heinlein: "Your enemy is never a villain in his own eyes. Keep this in mind; it may offer a way to make him your friend. If not, you can kill him without hate — and quickly."
I guess we could just add most of the "Prince of Nothing" and the "The Aspect-Emperor" Series by Scott R. Bakker to the LessWrong quotes ;-) By the way, is there a reading list that we can add them to?
"Knowing others is intelligence; knowing yourself is true wisdom. Mastering others is strength, mastering yourself is true power."
-Lao Tzu (c.604 - 531 B.C.)
-- R. Preston McAfee, Introduction to Economic Analysis
A 100 page comic book cost me $0.25 US in 1970 or so, it is a few US$ now. A 12 oz soft drink cold in a deli was about $0.10, it is more usually $1.00 now. A gallon of gasoline $0.29, now about $4.50. Not a single one of these is of notably better quality now than it was then, I'd say they are directly comparable and are quite different enough in nominal price so that there can be no doubt.
Sorry not to go all the way back to 1913, but I was 13 years old in 1970 so it was easier to use what I could remember.
A few dollars? 100 page comic books in the U.S. these days usually sell for upwards of $20. But comics are really another case where the product itself isn't directly comparable between time periods.The market has shrunk tremendously, so they try to make up the difference in volume by selling high quality "glossies" rather than the old low quality "pulps," for a larger profit margin per sale. In terms of physical quality of materials, it absolutely is better than what you'd buy in the 1970's, although arguably the quality of the materials doesn't have much to do with how entertaining the contents are. The writing is also completely different, since comics today target a very different age demographic than they did a few decades ago.
Nitpick: well the gasoline no longer has lead in it.
counter-nitpick because of government regulations about mixing with ethanol the current gallon has fewer watt-hours in it.
Marvin Minsky here
“It’s easy to put your head down and just work on what you think needs to be done. It’s a lot harder to pull your head up and ask why.” - Rework
Glenn Reynolds
Said the engineer to the engineers.
Well, Glenn Reynolds is a law professor.
Fair enough, heh. But I wouldn't want to idealize the epistemic purity of engineering. Amusingly in this context, often engineering decisions are based more on precedent than science (has somebody else done things this way?), and it sometimes happens that there is a "bottom line" for which evidence is post hoc deduced (e.g., by relaxing the stringency of assumptions in a model in order to get the "right" answer).
Granted, such rationalizations usually affect risks only at the margin, but still...
I guess the bottom line is that engineering is not just science but also aesthetics, economics, and group coordination. To the extent that those things involve cognitive biases et cetera, engineering does too.
I disagree. Unless we are talking about sofware engineering then it seems to me that what you select is based on previous projects but the choices themselves are based on tested scientific models with predictive power.
Precedent is evidence that "doing things this way" works. This is generally a better basis then new, and hence speculative, science. Especially when the price of getting it wrong is frequently high.
As I was saying to Remontoire, I wholly agree. But (a) precendent is not "Science", unless you want to be very semantically generous, and (b) precedent is one primary method by which the law does its "rationalization", which the OP was attacking.
--Fred Clark
That's a great way to make them lose their trust in medical professionals indefinitely. It's probably not a good idea to reinforce their delusions, either.
Fair point, and I don't mean to endorse the quote as psychiatric advice (nor do I believe the quote was intended as such). I took is as an amusing expression of a general principle, that people with deluded beliefs may be quite rational in following the consequences of those beliefs, which should be taken into account when dealing with them.
I didn't think you endorsed it, but if an analogy is problematic, then the principle it's trying to express might be too.
— Wilson and Shea, Illuminatus!
Doesn't this only allow 'patients' who correctly think they have superpowers to escape? How is this a net improvement in holding only patients who are actually insane?
A patient who believes they are Samson inaccurately believes they have a weakness: their hair being cut. By cutting their hair, you trigger their imaginary weakness, which decreases the amount that they resist, and thus you do not have to pin them down with orderlies.
Think of PCP-driven berserkers flipping cars with their mere, ordinary human strength, fully unleashed without regard to injury or death, and you've got some notion of the problem posed by a delusional man who thinks he's Samson.
Do you have evidence that car flipping really happens?
Presumably in the same spirit, when treating mental patients who think they're Superman, expose them to glowing yellow rocks. That said, does this sort of thing actually work in real life?
Reinforcing their beliefs might work for making them even more insane.
Honestly, it would surprise me if either of those strategies worked (or failed) as one might naively expect, since I mostly expect pathological delusions to involve some seriously atypical connections between observations and conclusions. But I bet there's people on LW with experience in the field, or at least who have read up on case studies.
I used to have a wrestling coach that used the very un-PC term "retard strength" to refer to the ability of an opponent to apply lots of force from angles you wouldn't think they could a priori (as a compliment, not a slur).
--Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 8.50
If you get one bitter cucumber, asking for its cause may be a waste of time. But if you get a lot of bitter cucumbers, spending some time on changing that might give net positive utility.
Why not? It can be useful to know whether they were placed there by a benevolent god or a blind idiot god.
Nick Szabo
Why the focus on advertisers and salespeople? I mean, if you're just talking about extending 'useful' social interactions, policemen do that too. So do company managers and military officers. There are lots of lines of work where people interact with a large number of people on a daily basis. Drug dealers would be another example. Yet such professions need not act in a way that is psychopathic (except maybe drug dealers, but they, too, often build friendships and trust with their clients).
Interestingly, advertiser, lawyers, and financial traders all have in common that they are agents who play zero-sum or almost zero-sum games on behalf of someone. People who represent big interests in these games are compensated well, because of the logic of the game: so much is at stake that you want to have the best person representing you, so these people's services are bid up. But there is still the feeling that the game is wasteful, though perhaps unavoidably so.
Also, problematically for first sentence, I don't think many people would necessarily come up with the four professions named, especially "advertiser" and "salesperson", if asked to name the most important professions in the modern world, and some important professions, like "scientist", are widely valorized, while others, like "engineer", are at the least not reviled.
Not nearly as much as you think, the game is in a sense locally zero sum, but it greatly benefits the wider system if the right person wins. Hint: consider what would happen if court cases or the resource allocation problems implicit in stock trading were decided by coin flips.
Also contrast with warriors, they really do engage in almost zero-sum games on behalf of someone else, and their game is much less optimized to increase the odds of the right side wining, and yet they're generally considered valiant heroes. The reason being that they were necessary even in the tribal period, so our instincts have evolved to take them into account.
One shouldn't compare apples to oranges. But it's fair to say both are food.
--Scott Adams
Your link is to the site, not to the blog post http://dilbert.com/blog/entry/the_mythical_49/
I'm not sure I get this - If you're not allowed to compare apples to oranges, how do you decide which to eat? Is that the point this quote is trying to make?
It's a common English expression that has nothing to do with food.
Expressed in pictures rather than words, but a great example of how to respond to humanity-threatening calamities:
http://www.kiwisbybeat.com/minus37.html?Bonjour
Sidenote: Almost every Minus comic is wonderful, and there aren't that many of them (you can read the whole series in an hour).
I printed this up and hung it on my wall for a while. Before anyone gets worried about what that indicates, the girl in the comic is a reality warper and could get away with it.
Never found a good enough image of Akemi Homura changing her eyes, though.
It's probably because I'm not familiar with Minus, but I don't understand what the girl did that is admirable. If she's normal, Mestroyer's comment addresses why it isn't admirable. If she has superpowers, destroying the meteor is completely effortless for her, making her action simply a decision of saving humanity over letting it die, which mostly anyone would make.
Slightly ruined by the fact that, well, given minus, I'm really more worried about the meteor...
Are you saying that you should respond by being omnipotent?
Cool comic, though a repeat http://lesswrong.com/lw/2o3/rationality_quotes_september_2010/2juu
The girl with the bat is trying to try. It's symbolic defiance, not a proper response to a humanity-threatening calamity. Granted defiance is a better attitude than the attitudes of the people shivering in fear, praying, smiling and holding up "Welcome to Earth!" signs, looting and pillaging, sitting around mellow-ly and talking and doing nothing, and standing in lines and holding hands. But that girl is still going to die and so will the rest of humanity.
Maybe you can argue that she doesn't know it won't work, but there are kinds of virtue a rationalist should not aspire to, and that includes the kind that you can only have by being ignorant of things.
The girl with the bat, in the context of the comic, is actually basically omnipotent.
Not only is she entirely capable of destroying the asteroid and eliminating whatever threat it represents using a baseball bat, given the content of the other comics, I think there's actually a reasonable chance that she consciously or subconsciously created the asteroid in the first place to give herself something to do.
Actually now that you mention it, I remember hearing that in a previous discussion of the comic. And what you say makes her despicable, instead of courageous but irrational. Am I strategically forgetting things to make better stories? (shudder).
Minus is about as despicable as any ordinary child of seven or so would be if they were also omnipotent.
Which is to say she's kind of horrifying, but not with any sort of deliberation involved.
Not to mention the applicable Riddle of Kyon.
I'm thankful this TV tropes page helpfully provided a synopsis of your fanfic for context. I wouldn't have understood you without it.
(Is the conditional probability that a given person had read all your fanfics, given that she visits LessWrong, high enough to overcome the low prior probability that a given person has read all your fanfics?)
She's a reality warper - thus, taking action that appears pointless to the uninformed observer (such as yourself), but is in fact an extremely effective method of saving the world.
Not sure if that's the intention in linking to it, but...
Everybody's a complex person. Everybody. Everybody's nuanced. -Jack Abramoff
A wave hitting a rock is complex, so is a vegetable on life support. What's the context?
Not sure, actually, dude was a corrupt lobbyist, so presumably he was emphasizing that he had his reasons for the stuff he got up to.
I like it as a reminder that everyone is their own story's protagonist. Its easy for me to view someone as the jerk who cut in front of the traffic, but presumably their own narrative includes a compelling reason for their seemingly antisocial behavior.
— Adam Cadre
"The bigger the problem, the bigger the opportunity." - Vinod Khosla
Seems like a just-world fallacy. The cost:benefit ratio of problems is not fixed.
I guess what matters in a problem is size * solvability. Solvability may be variable, but bigger problems do necessarily mean more room for improvement.
Even though it doesn't account for solvability, I still think it's a good quote. Most people become very accustomed to the way things are, even if they're bad, and never think to change them. This quote reverses that mindset, by getting you to think in terms of opportunity. Once you get over that hump, then you could think about solvability. The real point is that the hump is very important to get over, and this quote is pretty effective in getting you over it.
Nikolai Bukharin.
-- Karl Marx
-- Shimon the Digger
Or rather we change little by little. Remember that while every improvement is a change, not every change is an improvement.
Approximately 100 million deaths later, philosophers vowed to go back to just interpreting.
“What does a fish know about the water in which he swims?” - Albert Einstein
Sort of a well known quote, but it's not here, and it's amazing, so I figured I'd submit it.
Nassim Taleb
After years of reading econblogs, I now understand that the Federal Reserve is not creating enough money. I don't actually think that understanding is a bad thing.
I can see why inflation can be good for a smallish economy, but the US dollar is widely used as a reserve currency by foreigners, and if they no longer trusted it to stay hard they'd probably switch to gold or Swiss francs or bitcoins or whatnot and... I dunno what would happen, but I kinda doubt it would be nice. (I hardly know anything about macroeconomics, so I'm very likely missing something.)
Nice example of metacontrarianism, BTW: “why don't they just print more money” is something uneducated people often come up with, and most literate people realize there are problems with that, but that doesn't necessarily mean it's wrong.
I think the missing bits here are that (1) creating money needn't necessarily raise inflation, and (2) modest increases in US inflation are unlikely to trigger a mass flight from the US dollar.
Only if the Federal Reserve is in fact not creating enough money.
“Progressive” as in ‘gradual’ or as in ‘left-wing’?
If the former, how is that a danger? I mean, the same is true about general relativity or quantum field theory.
I will attempt to fix the quote:
The danger of reading quotes like this is the message that some field is wrong and crazy is delivered as an aside when it is an hypothesis worthy of a great amount of questioning that is almost certainly largely incorrect.
He means gradual. If you look to long at random distribution and listen to people who are in the narration business to frame the random distribution you will start seeing patterns that don't exist.
No, those things do in fact make sense. They simply aren't intuitive.
If you're good at something, never do it for free.
--The Joker
The Dark Knight (2008)
I'm good at blowing bubbles with bubble gum. I have yet to charge anyone for doing it.
I suppose you could say that as long as I gain pleasure from blowing bubbles I'm not doing it "for free" but that makes the statement very trivial. Under normal interpretations of "for free", the statement is wrong because there's no demand from anyone else that I blow bubbles.
I'd correct that statement to "if you're good at something, never do it under market value", which raises the possibility that I would still do for free things like blowing bubbles that have no market value.
Gum bubble fetish camming?
"I'm good at blowing bubbles with bubble gum. I have yet to charge anyone for doing it."
I think it's implied that this only applies when there is a demand for the service. Were you to find that there's a large audience for your displays, I bet you'd at least pass the hat around before doing another one.
The quote is a good one, and not because it's true.
Natalie Reed taking a very Bayesian approach to gender identity
Given that this quote essentially advises ignoring priors, I don't see what's so Bayesian about it.
I took it to be about using posteriors rather than priors (i.e., P(X is trans | X is wondering whether they're trans) != P(X is trans)), but I know I steelman writers on the Internet too much.
There's such a thing as too much steelmanning?
Yes. There is far too much idiocy in the world to spend time and effort on trying to make it look presentable.
OTOH the result of doing that is sometimes just plain awesome.
The other way of reading the quote is that it's emphasizing the huge complexity penalty which should be assessed on "I’m just a cis person who has somehow managed to convince myself that I’m trans to the point that I’m having this kind of crisis" and nodding in the direction of the reversal test. And emphasizing that part of the argument makes it look pretty good.
Would you mind explicitly stating the prior that it's advising to ignore?
That said, it could also be taken as advising you not to double-count your priors by using them to discount the evidence. Imagine you've drawn a ball from an urn, and the ball looks blue to you — but your priors say that 99% of the balls in that urn are red. How much time do you want to spend questioning the validity of your color vision or the lighting before you consider that you drew a rare ball?
The prior probability for a person being cis is obviously much higher than the prior for trans; looking at it one way, this quote is advising ignoring that prior.
Of course, looked at another way, it's specifically noting that there should be a large complexity penalty for the hypothesis "I’m just a cis person who has somehow managed to convince myself that I’m trans to the point that I’m having this kind of crisis" relative to the hypothesis "I'm trans". And also implicitly using the reversal test.
Why? Also could we unpack the "I am trans" hypothesis? It seems to say "sometime during development something flipped the secondary sexual characteristics in my brain but not any of the ones outside it" given the type of spaghetti code evolution tends to produce, this seems rather unlikely. On the other hand, people convince themselves of weird beliefs and take them seriously enough to generate crises fairly regularly.
And yet...
Well, one obvious explanation for people thinking themselves trans is that maybe one of the secondary sexual characteristics flipped or maybe even something not related to sex at all. As a result they don't quite fit in, then they here about the transsexuality movement and convince themselves that they've found the problem.
Note that this is consistent with the twin studies. All the brain scan stuff strikes me as the "we picked it up on a brain scan therefore it must be biologically caused" fallacy.
Does it matter to you if it's biologically caused all else being equal?
Biologically caused is a problematic expression. Everything in the brain is biologically caused if we're generous enough. I assume you mean genetically caused or developmentally caused.
This is a potentially valid but minority interpretation of the statement "X is trans.", held by no trans people I have discussed the subject with (and it tends to come up, eventually, across a sample size of a dozen middling-to-close friends). The more common one, which all trans people I know hold, is "At some point during my development I gained a strong repulsion from the particular cultural bundle labeled with the gender which matches the dominant one for my sex." Generally this is also a strong attraction to the other major gender bundle, but sometimes the trans person finds that bundle equally off-putting and rejects both, and others exchange between the two regularly or hold themselves to be both.
Also, the poor coding practices which evolution uses make this more, not less, likely to occur. Most people who study trans issues, history, etc. agree that there were probably high rates of 'masked' trans people in the past, who kept their personal identification preferences secret.
But that's way too broad IMO.
I mean, I have an Y chromosome. I have male genitalia and no desire to ever change this. (I also happen to have quite a few traits that are way more common among males than among females, e.g. being about 1.88 m (6'2") tall, having a baritone vocal range, having quite a lot of terminal facial and body hair, and being sexually attracted to women.) I find calling myself male a quite reasonable way of summarizing that info.
But I find claims that all this means that my long hair/dislike of football/low aggressiveness/finding it easier to befriend women than men/etc.¹ are somehow suboptimal or make my maleness any less valid to be preposterous and/or offensive. ("So I guess your wooden leg makes you a table." -- Frank Zappa) IOW I do have “a strong repulsion from the particular cultural bundle labeled with the gender which matches the dominant one for my sex”. But I don't see any particular need to throw the baby away with the bath water and stop calling myself a man.
(As for neurological differences, I haven't got a brain scan in the couple few decades, but FWIW my girlfriend is a heterosexual female neurologist.)
And I think that once one knows all this about me, there's no question left to ask whether I actually am a man.
Like you, I have a Y chromosome and male genitalia and some traits that are more common among males than females, as well as some traits that are more common among females than males (such as being sexually attracted to men). And, sure, calling myself male is a fine way of summarizing that info, and nobody seems to object.
And I am entirely comfortable describing myself as male and being described that way. I'm comfortable playing a male social role, in other words. It sounds like you are, as well.
By contrast, I have friends who, like you and me, have a Y chromosome and male genitalia and etc. and etc. But they are not comfortable playing a male social role.
So there seems to be a difference between you and me, on the one hand, and my friends, on the other. Consequently, it seems useful to have language that lets us talk about that difference.
Some of those friends refer to themselves as "trans women". I see no reason not to use that language to refer to them.
This is why it's usually said that sex is biological, but gender is socio-cultural. Gender ideals and gender roles can change a lot from one culture to another. You might be a seemingly effeminate man in one place, and yet find that you're entirely normal in another place. It's complete delusion to think white North American cultural roles correspond to some Deep Time-driven neurological or evolutionary factor in some special way nobody else on the planet has access to.
Imagine being told that 90% of the planet's men are less masculine than the median! Does that make the statistician in you perk up his ears and start screaming bloody murder, or what!?
“I have thought for a long time now that if, some day, the increasing efficiency for the technique of destruction finally causes our species to disappear from the earth, it will not be cruelty that will be responsible for our extinction and still less, of course, the indignation that cruelty awakens and the reprisals and vengeance that it brings upon itself…but the docility, the lack of responsibility of the modern man, his base subservient acceptance of every common decree. The horrors that we have seen, the still greater horrors we shall presently see, are not signs that rebels, insubordinate, untamable men are increasing in number throughout the world, but rather that there is a constant increase in the number of obedient, docile men.”
—George Bernanos
I think this quote is sentimentally motivated inaccuracy. It relies upon the romantic notion that if the docile masses were to arise that they would be morally superior to those that do already choose to lead men. I think this thought of Bernanos does not arise from any sort of evidence at all, and that if there is any evidence about what happens when previously docile men rise to power it is that they behave very much like men in power have always behaved in the past, that there is no particularly great wisdom they bring with them on rising. I am thinking in particular of the rise of the communists in Russia and China and more recently the governments that have arisen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Egypt.
Arkady and Boris Strugatsky, Hard to be a God
This quote betrays a limited imagination. God could, for instance, make it so that people just automatically become full every day if they don't eat, or he could make it so that anyone who tried to steal would instantly faint.
Furthermore, the fact remains that in the real world, some people do have adequate food and shelter, are not powerful, and yet don't have it taken from them. If God were to magically give everyone food and shelter, even if he did not stop theft, there may be corrupt third world countries where there would be rampant theft and people still ended up starving, but there'd be a lot fewer homeless in first world countries (especially if he eliminated all mental illness at the same time).
As for the argument is that providing people with things would eliminate man's motive to do work, there's a big gap between "food and shelter" and "able to live comfortably on your salary".
Also, there's a difference between changing mankind's psychology (which I agree would pose problems) and merely physically changing mankind. A world where, say, all drunk people who tried to drive home were teleported home would contain less suffering with little downside. Likewise for a world that doesn't contain birth defects or cancer.
This is a rationality quote?
Not quite, it makes much more sense within the context of the novel from which it's taken. In particular...
In the novel, there is no God. The plot is similar to one of Iain Banks' Culture novels, Inversions (though it was written much earlier than Banks) -- there is an advanced starfaring civilization which has agents/helpers/guides on a medieval-tech planet and they are trying to improve things on that planet. Rumata is one of those agents and while his capabilities are magical and awesome from the point of view of the locals, he is very much not a god.
Indeed. To expand on that a bit more:
The titular phrase is a line in the book, something that Rumata thinks to himself while attempting to explain, for the twentieth, futile, time, to one of the natives (a populist revolutionary leader of sorts) that he is not a god; and that, though he does possess great and awesome powers (i.e. advanced weaponry), he refuses to provide them to the natives. The constraints here are not just practical, but moral:
--1635 The Eastern Front
Even if all Rumata has are a few history books and overwhelming weaponery, he should be able to make some solid improvements in the social organization. And if he has the full backing of a spacefaring civilization, he should be able to do a lot.
I haven't read Hard to be a God (it does sound interesting), but my proposal:
Basically plagiarize shamelessly from the nicer parts of history and keep your eyes open for how to use what you have.
I do recommend the book. It's not at all about sociotechnical difficulties of uplifting a medieval society...
Proceed to become horrified by the actions of the demagogues voted into office.
WARNING: MINOR SPOILERS below !
I should point out that, in this novel, humans from the distant future are attempting to uplift the culture of a relatively backward planet to somewhere closer to their own level. The locals do not really understand what is happening, but they know that some power beyound their understanding is messing with their world, and they try to exploit or resist it as best they can.
The novel has a sequel. In it, one of the uplift agents returns to Earth, only to find out that there may be someone or something out there, which is beyound human understanding, acting upon the humans in order to further some inscrutable goal. In secret, the humans mount a desperate attempt to resist this influence, by any means necessary, as best they can...
The sequel is followed by the final book of the trilogy. Whether what happens in it is wonderful or catastrophic depends on how you interpret the previous two books, I think, but it's at least a little sad all the same.
Your comment makes me wonder whether you are perhaps confusing Hard to Be a God with Inhabited Island (called Prisoners of Power in English, I believe).
You both need to go read the Fun Theory sequence.
Bloody small-minded humans, always mucking things up with their incrementalism and obsessive compulsions towards toil.
(potential spoilers removed, so if this dialogue doesn't make sense, be assured that it makes sense in context)
Scott R. Bakker, The White-Luck Warrior
-- Fine Structure