KnaveOfAllTrades comments on Confused as to usefulness of 'consciousness' as a concept - LessWrong

35 Post author: KnaveOfAllTrades 13 July 2014 11:01AM

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Comment author: mwengler 11 July 2014 03:46:43PM 4 points [-]

So with consciousness, is it a useful concept? Well it certainly labels something without which I would simply not care about this conversation at all, as well as a bunch of other things. I personally believe p-zombies are impossible, that building a working human except without consciousness would be like building a working gasoline engine except without heat. I mention this for context, I think my believe about p-zombies is actually pretty common.

About the statement "I shouldn't eat chickens because they are conscious" You ask what is it about consciousness that makes it wrong to eat its possessor? You don't really try to answer the question, but I think there is an answer: we shouldn't eat things that don't want us to eat them. Probably more to the point, we shouldn't kill things that don't want us to kill them, and I would imagine the Chicken is much more concerned with our killing it than what happens after that. And with that idea, if we relabel consciousness as zxc, but zxc is still that thing that allows something to want other things, then it still works to say we shouldn't eat chickens because they are zxc and do not want us to kill them.

If I have somehow missed your point, I am sorry. I did hope it would be valuable to suggest that "we shouldn't eat chickens because they don't want us to kill them" was a more fundamental moral statement than appealing to the abstraction of their consciousness.

Comment author: KnaveOfAllTrades 11 July 2014 08:30:24PM 9 points [-]

Yes. If we change "We shouldn't eat chickens because they are conscious" to "We shouldn't eat chickens because they want to not be eaten," then this becomes another example where, once we cashed out what was meant, the term 'consciousness' could be circumvented entirely and be replaced with a less philosophically murky concept. In this particular case, how clear the concept of 'wanting' (as relating to chickens) is, might be disputed, but it seems like clearly a lesser mystery or lack of clarity than the monolith of 'consciousness'.