The only context in which the notion of consciousness seems inextricable from the statement is in ethical statements like, "We shouldn't eat chickens because they're conscious." In such statements, it feels like a particular sense of 'conscious' is being used, one which is defined (or at least characterised) as 'the thing that gives moral worth to creatures, such that we shouldn't eat them'.

Many people think that consciousness in the sense of having the capability to experience suffering or pleasure makes an entity morally relevant, because happiness/pleasure is held to be a good thing and suffering a bad one, as terminal values. (That of course doesn't mean that you couldn't eat chickens, for as long as you killed them painlessly. )

I don't mind shooting my opponents in a computer game because I know that they won't actually experience the suffering from being hit by a bullet, but I sure would mind if I knew that they did experience such pain.