mavant comments on An overview of the mental model theory - LessWrong
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Comments (26)
No.
Asking a trick question and then insisting on a particular reading does not constitute evidence of a logical fallacy being committed by the answerer.
It's not a trick question. It's pretty much the same as the example used in the literature and then I have a few other examples that are straight from the literature. The literature on mental models is mainly on deductive reasoning. That is why the question is in the format it is.I have rephrased it to try to make it more clear that it is not about which algorithm is correct.
Can you please let me know if you think this helps. Also, did you have the same problem with the second problem.
The thing is that the problem requires a particular reading because a different reading makes it a totally different problem. Under your reading the question really is:
The dealt hand will contain cards from only one of the following sets of cards:
Obviously, that's a totally different problem. If you have any suggestions on how to improve the question, let me know.
The fact that it's the same phrasing used in the literature is really concerning, because it means the interpretation the literature gives is wrong: Many subjects may in fact be generating a mental model (based on deductive reasoning, no less!) which is entirely compatible with the problem-as-stated and yet which produces a different answer than the one the researchers expected.
One could certainly write '(Ace is present OR King is present) XOR (Queen is present OR Ace is present)' which trivially reduces to '(King is present OR Queen is present) AND (Ace is not present)', but that gives the game away a bit - as perhaps it should! The fact that phrasing the knowledge formally rather than in ad-hoc English makes the correct answer so much more obvious is a strong indicator that this is a deficiency in the original researchers' grasp of idiomatic English, not in their research subjects' grasp of logic.
It's difficult for me to look at the problem with fresh eyes, so I can't be entirely certain whether the added 'black box' note helps. It doesn't look helpful.
What would be really useful would be a physical situation in which the propositional-logic reading of the statements is the only correct interpretation. There is luckily a common silly-logic-puzzle trope which evokes this:
Those two statements are not mutually exclusive.