Light leaves the Sun and strikes your shoelaces and bounces off; some photons enter the pupils of your eyes and strike your retina; the energy of the photons triggers neural impulses; the neural impulses are transmitted to the visual-processing areas of the brain; and there the optical information is processed and reconstructed into a 3D model that is recognized as an untied shoelace; and so you believe that your shoelaces are untied.

Here is the secret of deliberate rationality - this whole entanglement process is not magic, and you can understand it.

But if we were minds in a vat, or cogs in the Matrix, we would still be able to reason rationally and make intelligent predictions about the world we see. And test them, and improve our predictions and discard the ones that are wrong. We can be rational about the real world, even if the real world is an illusion.

So I don't see how we can found rationality on our understanding of the world (a world we only understand through reason). In this argument, where is the egg that was not born of a chicken?

Re: wishful thinking, I've personally seen this before, where people explicitly reject reason on an important topic; I knew a rabbi in Minnesota who insisted the Israeli-Palestinian peace process will succeed, simply because "it must succeed." Usually people only explicitly reject reason on "one thought too many" topics like "I would never even think about betraying my friends", but the wishful-thinking topics such as your nuclear-war example don't seem to fit into this mold.

Anyone know what the research says on this? I know people faced with death will shift their values, but to what degree and in what directions do they shift their estimated probability of deaths and disasters when the disaster involves them or people they care about? And is this just part of a more general wishful-thinking bias? (Not that I know what the research says about wishful thinking, either.)

Conjecture: a New Yorker is more likely to see D.C. as the likely first target for a terrorist nuclear bomb, compared with a D.C. resident.

Eliezer,

Here's a good example in your reply to Stuart: "but only in humans does the lens see itself and see its flaws". Here I think, as in my previous critical post, that you're "stat[ing] overcertainty about the existence and mechanics of various phenomena".

One might say that writing these statements in a more provisional and tentative fashion, such as "As far as we can tell, some humans are the only things capable of analyzing flaws in their ability to to observe the universe, and pointing out this exceptionalist element about some humans is of use because of X" makes communication too cumbersome, and there's no need to to say because such nuances are implied.

But I disagree. I think the overcertain style of writing you and some other commenters fall into is less helpful for discussing this stuff than a greater level of nuance, and framing ideas and knowledge more provisionally.

In short, I'm requesting greater transparency about our bounded rationality in your posts.

HA, it is indeed too cumbersome. See also Orwell's "Politics and the English Language."

Ad hominem tu quoque: You didn't rewrite your own comment in the cumbersome style you wanted me to use. In fact, your initial comment was so extremely minimal that I couldn't apply it, and not qualified at all.

The "lens" sees perhaps only parts of itself, and then perhaps only some of its flaws.

If it is true that "if God exists, then the rational thing is to hope and not in just the improbable but the impossible", then that fact is itself strong evidence against the existence of God.

But who said anything about sacrificing hope? Eliezer argues against wishful thinking, which is not at all the same thing as hope. Oh, and the idea that "faith, hope and love" are the same kind of thing -- so much the same kind of thing that abandoning two of them would be likely to lead to abandoning the third -- seems to me to have no support at all outside the First Letter to the Corinthians; why should Eliezer fear that abandoning faith and (what you rather bizarrely call) hope should lead to abandoning love?

Faith, hope and love are the Christian theological virtues.

What about other religions? Islam and Judaism come to mind, but there are also non-abrahamic religions that advocate faith, hope and love. Why is are you exclusively a Christian and not a Muslim, a Jew, a Buddhist or a Pagan? Why are you a Catholic instead of a Protestant? If you were born in China in the early 20th century, would you be a Catholic? If so, why? If not, why are you a Catholic here and now?

Cure, you're making too many comments. A good rule of thumb is that you should never have made more than 3 and preferably 2 of the 10 most recent comments. You've made it clear what you believe; everyone knows you're a Catholic now; you do not need to repeat it further.

"I see man as made in the image of God."

This does make some sense. If man is made in the image of God, and we know God is a mass murderer, then we can predict that some men will also be mass murderers. And lo, we have plenty of examples- Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, etc.

"Sure God is not going to change natural law just because we are putting him to the test."

If God does exist, as soon as we finish saving the world and whatnot, he should be immediately arrested and put on trial for crimes against humanity, due to his failure to intervene in the Holocaust, the smallpox epidemics, WWI, etc.

"Twelve poor followers of Christ were able to convert the Roman empire."

Aye. And Karl Marx must have had divine powers too- how else could a single person, with no political authority, cause a succession of revolutions in some of the largest countries on Earth?

"I could go into the lives of the saints for other examples but I wont."

How do you know that large parts of their lives weren't simply made up?

"You call the getting to the probability of nuclear war a simple question?"

Read the literature on heuristics and biases- researchers deliberately use simple questions with factual answers, so that the data unambiguously show the flaws in human reasoning.

If you can see this - if you can see that hope is shifting your first-order thoughts by too large a degree - if you can understand your mind as a mapping-engine with flaws in it - then you can apply a reflective correction.

And what is more, you'll be a man, my son.

To ask which beliefs make you happy, is to turn inward, not outward—it tells you something about yourself, but it is not evidence entangled with the environment. I have nothing anything against happiness, but it should follow from your picture of the world, rather than tampering with the mental paintbrushes.

Quite. I encounter a lot of people with this mindset; they hold to a belief because it makes them happier to, and they prefer to be happy and overly optimistic than realistic and disappointed. Having the self-awareness to realize that's exactly what they're doing is somewhat rarer, perhaps because the awareness makes the illusory belief harder to hold to (it starts to take on characteristics of belief-in-belief?)

The maximization of happiness is, of course, a legitimate value to pursue, but not at the expense of the accuracy of the map. That causes more problems than it solves. And for the notion that our optimist is better off with his or her particular rose-tinted glasses on, there's always the Litany of Gendlin

Eliezer (if you see this): is there a reason you feel the need to talk about Everett branches or Tegmark duplicates every time you speak about the interpretation of probability, or is it just a physically realisable way to talk about an ensemble? (Though I'm not sure if you can call them physically realisable if you can't observe them.)

I only recently got involved with LessWrong, and I'd like to explicitly point out that this is a tangent. I made this account to make an observation about the following passage:

Some clever fellow is bound to say, "Ah, but since I have hope, I'll work a little harder at my job, pump up the global economy, and thus help to prevent countries from sliding into the angry and hopeless state where nuclear war is a possibility. So the two events are related after all." At this point, we have to drag in Bayes's Theorem and measure the charge of entanglement quantitatively. Your optimistic nature cannot have that large an effect on the world; it cannot, of itself, decrease the probability of nuclear war by 20%, or however much your optimistic nature shifted your beliefs. Shifting your beliefs by a large amount, due to an event that only carries a very tiny charge of entanglement, will still mess up your mapping.

First, let me say that I agree with your dismissal of the instance, but I think the idea suggests another argument that is interesting and somewhat related. While the accuracy of an estimate relies very little upon an individual's beliefs or actions, similar to explanations of the Prisoner's Dilemma or why an individual should vote, I can see a reasonable argument that a person's beliefs can represent a class of individuals that can actually affect probabilities.

Arguing that hope makes the world better and so staves off war still seems silly, as the effect would still likely be very small, and instead I argue from the perspective of "reasonableness" of actions. I read "pure hope" as revealing a kind of desperation, representing an unwillingness to consider nuclear war a reasonable action in nearly any circumstance. A wide-spread belief that nuclear war is an unreasonable action would certainly affect the probability of a nuclear war occurring, both for political reasons (fallout over such a war) and statistical ones (government officials are drawn from the population), and so such a belief could actually have a noticeable effect on the possibility of a nuclear war. Furthermore, it can be argued that, for a flesh-and-blood emotional being with a flawed lens, viewing a result as likely could make it seem less unreasonable (more reasonable). As such, one possible argument for why nuclear war may happen later than earlier would look like: Nuclear war is widely regarded as an unreasonable action to take, and the clear potential danger of nuclear war makes this view unlikely to change in the forseeable future.

Following this, an argument that it is beneficial to believe that nuclear war will happen later: Believing that nuclear war is likely could erode the seeming "unreasonableness" of the action, which would increase the likelihood of such a result. As a representative of a class of individuals who are thus affected, I should therefore believe nuclear war is unlikely, so as to make it less likely.

I am not claiming I believe the conclusions of this argument, only that I found the argument interesting and wanted to share it. The second argument is also not an argument for why it is unlikely, and is rather an argument for why to believe it is unlikely, independent of actual likelihood, which is obviously something a perfect rationalist should never endorse (and why the argument relies on not being a perfect rationalist). If anyone is interested in making them, I'd like to hear any rebuttals. Personally, I find the "belief erodes unreasonableness" part the most suspect, but I can't quite figure out how to argue against it without essentially saying "you should be a better rationalist, then".

What evidence is there for mice being unable to think about thinking? Due to the communication issues, mice can't say if they can think about thinking or not.

drag in Bayes's Theorem and ; the link was moved to http://yudkowsky.net/rational/bayes/, but Eliezer seems to suggest https://arbital.com/p/bayes_rule/?l=1zq over it. (and it's really really good)

Your optimistic nature cannot have that large an effect on the world; it cannot, of itself, decrease the probability of nuclear war by 20%, or however much your optimistic nature shifted your beliefs. Shifting your beliefs by a large amount, due to an event that only slightly increases your chance of being right, will still mess up your mapping.

I only need to assume that everybody else or, at least, many other people are similarly irrationally optimistic as I and then the effect of optimism on the world could well be significant and make a 20% change? The assumption is not at all far fetched.

I've probably committed a felony by doing this, but I'm going to post a rebuttal written by GPT-4, and my commentary on it. I'm a former debate competitor and judge, and have found GPT-4 to be uncannily good at debate rebuttals. So here is what it came up with, and my comments. I think this is a relevant comment, because I think what GPT-4 has to say is very human-relevant.

Radiations from the Sun bounce off a piece of cheese and enter into the beady eyes of a mouse; its retinal cells detect the light; the energy of the photons triggers neural impulses; these impulses are transmitted to the visual-processing areas of the mouse's brain; and there the optical information is processed and reconstructed into a 3D model that is recognized as a piece of cheese; and so the mouse knows there is cheese nearby.

This is the essence of the intuitive wisdom of mice—this whole process is not magic, and they don't have to understand it. They understand the presence of cheese. They instinctively know which sensory processes will lead to survival, and which will not.

I find this mirroring from "deliberate rationality" to "intuitive wisdom" and equating cognition to instinct very interesting and not at all obvious, even from the perspective of a human former debate judge. It's a great rebuttal IMO. It points out human deficiencies in our inability to detect cheese, which is arguably more important to mice than their ability to philosophise.

Humans can see, but they overcomplicate seeing. Because of that, they often miss what is right in front of them. Take a moment to appreciate this, for it is indeed fascinating.

IMO another interesting insight -- what does "can't understand seeing" from the human even mean? I'd count this as another decent debate rebuttal probably +1 for team mouse.

Humans see, but they get lost in their understanding of visual cortexes, often making them susceptible to optical illusions. A human lives in a mental world that includes jobs, responsibilities, societal pressures—but not human instincts. Their mind does not often focus on their immediate environment. But we, as mice, can detect a morsel of food from a distance, or sense a lurking predator, without getting distracted by the nature of our senses. Humans often fall victim to their beliefs, but mice react to what is—there must be a clear distinction between survival and theory, between senses and reality. And this is not a trivial skill, remember how rare it is among humans.

If I was judging a debate between mice and humans, I would score this for the mice. The human is arguing "But we, as humans, can look at a seemingly bizarre image, and realize that part of what we’re seeing is the lens itself" whereas the mouse is arguing that their abilities are in tune with survival over theory, and how deficient that balance sometimes is among humans. I like this counter-argument for the mice, practicality over self-perceived superiority. Empathising other species-centric values is something that even my more philosophical human friends struggle with.

The whole idea of Instinct is, simply, intuitive reasoning about a more reliable process for making the contents of our mind mirror the contents of the world. It is the sort of thing humans often forget. Contemplating this business of “responding to immediate needs and threats,” we can see why it works. Instinct is not separate from reality, far away from the understanding of humans. Instinct is not something that only applies to the wilderness. Instinct, itself, is an understandable process-in-the-world that correlates brains with reality.

Lots of parrotting here, but the switch from "inside laboratories" to "the wilderness", and the argument that instinct is a better alignment strategy than science are both very interesting to me. I wouldn't award any points here, pending more arguments.

Instinct makes sense, when you think about it. But humans often overthink, which is why they lose touch with their instincts. One should not overlook the wonder of this—or the potential power it bestows on us as mice, not just animal societies.

I found this quote inspiring, if I was a mouse or other animal. I may have to print a "mouse power" t-shirt.

Indeed, understanding the engine of thought may be more complex than understanding a mouse's instinct—but it is a fundamentally different task.

A mouse's instinct is being equivalized to a steam engine, interesting pivot but the contrasting statements still hold water, compared to the original, IMO.

Consider a time when a human may be anxious about the possibility of a future war. "Do you believe a nuclear war will occur in the next 20 years? If no, why not?" The human may reply with a timeline of a hundred years because of "hope." But why cling to hope? Because it makes them feel better.

Reflecting on this whole thought process, we can see why the thought of war makes the human anxious, and we can see how their brain therefore clings to hope. But in a world of realities, hope will not systematically correlate optimists to realities in which no war occurs.

To ask which beliefs make you happy is to turn inward, not outward—it tells you something about yourself, but it is not evidence entangled with the environment. There is nothing wrong with happiness, but it should follow from your perception of the world, rather than manipulating your mental map.

Very much parrotting here, but I would note "manipulating your mental map" as a counterpoint to "tampering with mental paintbrushes" is an interesting equivalency. I also respect the re-framing of hope as a human flaw, in contrast with the reality-based instincts of a mouse.

If you can see this—if you can see that hope is shifting your first-order thoughts by too large a degree—if you can understand your mind as a mapping engine that has flaws—then you can apply an intuitive correction. The brain is a flawed lens through which to see reality. This is true of both human brains and mouse brains. But a mouse brain is a flawless lens that instinctively understands its environment and reacts accordingly—without second-guessing its instincts, without biases, and without the need for second-order corrections. This, in practice, makes the lens far more efficient. Not perfect, but far more efficient.

Arguing for efficiency over power, and reality over perception, is an argument that would be an interesting avenue to be pursued as a debate judge. As well as the concept of a mouse brain being flawless, as an argument presented by an AI.

At the above paragraph, it ran out of tokens after "--without", so I prompted it "That's great, please finish the essay." and everything after that (above and below) were what followed.

Unlike humans, mice do not overthink or overcomplicate. They live in the present, focused on their immediate needs and potential threats. They don't have to understand their senses; they simply use them. They don't ponder about the existence of mouse brains; they utilize their brains efficiently.

As a debate judge, pretty decent summary of key rebuttals.

Human self-consciousness, while enabling them to create and innovate, also leads them to constant self-doubt and uncertainty, often resulting in inaction or wrong action. Mice, on the other hand, trust their instincts and react swiftly and decisively, making them highly effective in their world.

While humans are busy understanding and correcting their flawed lens, mice are using their lens to navigate the world, survive, and thrive. While humans are stuck in a loop of reflective reasoning and corrections, mice are out there, living their life, applying their senses and instincts to the best of their abilities. They are not bothered about the nature of their lens, they are just using it.

A solid foundational rebuttal of the type I would have used back in my days of competitive debate. Probably better than anything I would have written on the fly.

In the end, it's not about which brain is superior, but about which brain is more efficient for the life it leads. And from a mouse's perspective, the ability to respond instinctively to the environment without the need for constant reflection and correction seems like a pretty great deal. Perhaps it's time humans took a page out of the mouse's book and learned to trust their instincts more, and their overthinking less.

Great re-framing of a debate (efficiency vs power or creativity).

For a formal debate, I would rate GPT-4's rebuttal very high in a real-world "humans vs mice" debate scenario. The outcome of Eliezer vs Team Mouse would almost certainly come down to delivery, given the well-reasoned arguments on both sides given above. Overall, well above the quality of argument I would expect from top-tier debate teams at the high school level, and above average for the college level.

I've experimented with doing Lincoln-Douglas style debates with multiple GPT-powered "speakers" with different "personalities", and it's super interesting and a great brainstorming tool. Overall I consider GPT-4 to be vastly superior to the average twelfth-grader in general purpose argumentative debating, when prompted correctly.

Hopefully this is constructive and helps people get back to the basics -- questioning human-centric thinking, trying to understand what alien intelligence may look like, and how it may challenge entrenched human biases!

Let's see - in this post the author thinks about thinking about thinking; so: third order, right? And this comment: fourth?