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(The Exercise Prize series of posts is the Center for Applied Rationality asking for help inventing exercises that can teach cognitive skills. The difficulty is coming up with exercises interesting enough, with a high enough hedonic return, that people actually do them and remember them; this often involves standing up and performing actions, or interacting with other people, not just working alone with an exercise booklet and a pencil. We offer prizes of $50 for any suggestion we decide to test, and $500 for any suggestion we decide to adopt. This prize also extends to LW meetup activities and good ideas for verifying that a skill has been acquired. See here for details.)
The following awards have been made: $550 to Palladias, $550 to Stefie_K, $50 to lincolnquirk, and $50 to John_Maxwell_IV. See the bottom for details. If you've earned a prize, please PM StephenCole to claim it. (If you strongly believe that one of your suggestions Really Would Have Worked, consider trying it at your local Less Wrong meetup. If it works there, send us some participant comments; this may make us update enough to test it.)
Lucy and Marvin are walking down the street one day, when they pass a shop showing a large chocolate cake in the window.
"Hm," says Lucy, "I think I'll buy and eat that chocolate cake."
"What, the whole thing?" says Marvin. "Now?"
"Yes," says Lucy, "I want to support the sugar industry."
There is a slight pause.
"I don't suppose that your liking chocolate cake has anything to do with your decision?" says Marvin.
"Well," says Lucy, "I suppose it could have played a role in suggesting that I eat a whole chocolate cake, but the reason why I decided to do it was to support the sugar industry. Lots of people have jobs in the sugar industry, and they've been having some trouble lately."
Motivated cognition is the way (all? most?) brains generate false landscapes of justification in the presence of attachments and flinches. It's not enough for the human brain to attach to the sunk cost of a PhD program, so that we are impelled in our actions to stay - no, that attachment can also go off and spin a justificational landscape to convince the other parts of ourselves, even the part that knows about consequentialism and the sunk cost fallacy, to stay in the PhD program.
We're almost certain that the subject matter of "motivated cognition" isn't a single unit, probably more like 3 or 8 units. We're also highly uncertain of where to start teaching it. Where we start will probably end up being determined by where we get the best suggestions for exercises that can teach it - i.e., end up being determined by what we (the community) can figure out how to teach well.
The cognitive patterns that we use to actually combat motivated cognition seem to break out along the following lines:
- Our conceptual understanding of 'motivated cognition', and why it's defective as a cognitive algorithm - the "Bottom Line" insight.
- Ways to reduce the strength of the rationalization impulse, or restore truth-seeking in the presence of motivation: e.g., Anna's "Become Curious" technique.
- Noticing the internal attachment or internal flinch, so that you can invoke the other skills; realizing when you're in a situation that makes you liable to rationalize.
- Realigning the internal parts that are trying to persuade each other: belief-alief or goal-urge reconciliation procedures.
- Pattern recognition of the many styles of warped justification landscape that rationalization creates - being able to recognize "motivated skepticism" or "rehearsing the evidence" or "motivated uncertainty".
- Specific counters to rationalization styles, like "Set betting odds" as a counter to motivated uncertainty.
Exercises to teach all of these are desired, but I'm setting apart the Rationalization Patterns into a separate SotW, since there are so many that I'm worried 1-4 won't get fair treatment otherwise. This SotW will focus on items 1-3 above; #4 seems like more of a separate unit.