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The Emulation argument for human-level AI argues that since whole brain emulation seems feasible then human-level AI must also be feasible. There are many underlying assumptions in the argument, most of them are explored by Chalmers (2010)1. Perhaps the most debated premise is holding that a brain emulation could have a consciousness mind or that consciousness isn’t fundamental to human intelligence. Chalmers 2 formalized the argument as follows:”
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An emulated-brain populated world could hold severe negative consequences, such as:
An emulated-brain populated world could hold severe negative consequences, such as:Inherent inability to have consciousness, if some philosophers are right3456.Elimination of culture in general, due to an extremely increasing penalty for inefficiency in the form of flamboyant displays7Near zero costs for reproduction, pushing most ofemulations to live in a subsistence state.8LUCAS, John. (1961) Minds, machines, and Gödel, Philosophy, 36, pp. 112–127↩DREYFUS, H. (1972) What Computers Can’t Do, New York: Harper & Row.↩PENROSE, Roger (1994) Shadows of the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.↩BLOCK, Ned (1981) Psychologism and behaviorism, Philosophical Review, 90, pp. 5–43.↩BOSTROM, Nick.(2004) "The future of human evolution". Death and Anti‐Death: Two Hundred Years After Kant, Fifty Years After Turing, ed. Charles Tandy (Ria University Press: Palo Alto, California, 2004): pp. 339‐371. Available at:http://www.nickbostrom.com/fut/evolution.pdf↩HANSON, Robin. (1994) "If uploads come first: The crack of a future dawn" Extropy, 6(2). Available at:http://hanson.gmu.edu/uploads.html↩