Consequentialists see morality through consequence-colored lenses.  I attempt to prise apart the two concepts to help consequentialists understand what deontologists are talking about.

Consequentialism¹ is built around a group of variations on the following basic assumption:

• The rightness of something depends on what happens subsequently.

It's a very diverse family of theories; see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article.  "Classic utilitarianism" could go by the longer, more descriptive name "actual direct maximizing aggregative total universal equal-consideration agent-neutral hedonic act² consequentialism".  I could even mention less frequently contested features, like the fact that this type of consequentialism doesn't have a temporal priority feature or side constraints.  All of this is is a very complicated bag of tricks for a theory whose proponents sometimes claim to like it because it's sleek and pretty and "simple".  But the bottom line is, to get a consequentialist theory, something that happens after the act you judge is the basis of your judgment.

To understand deontology as anything but a twisted, inexplicable mockery of consequentialism, you must discard this assumption.

Deontology relies on things that do not happen after the act judged to judge the act.  This leaves facts about times prior to and the time during the act to determine whether the act is right or wrong.  This may include, but is not limited to:

• The agent's epistemic state, either actual or ideal (e.g. thinking that some act would have a certain result, or being in a position such that it would be reasonable to think that the act would have that result)
• The reference class of the act (e.g. it being an act of murder, theft, lying, etc.)
• Historical facts (e.g. having made a promise, sworn a vow)
• Counterfactuals (e.g. what would happen if others performed similar acts more frequently than they actually do)
• Features of the people affected by the act (e.g. moral rights, preferences, relationship to the agent)
• The agent's intentions (e.g. meaning well or maliciously, or acting deliberately or accidentally)

It is a general and primary principle of rationality, that we should not believe that which there is insufficient reason to believe; likewise, a principle of social morality that we should not enforce upon our fellows a law which there is insufficient justification to enforce.

Nonetheless, I've always felt a bit nervous about demanding that people be able to explain things in words, because, while I happen to be pretty good at that, most people aren't.

"I remember this paper I wrote on existentialism. My teacher gave it back with an F. She’d underlined true and truth wherever it appeared in the essay, probably about twenty times, with a question mark beside each. She wanted to know what I meant by truth." —Danielle Egan (journalist)

This experience permanently traumatized Ms. Egan, by the way.  Because years later, at a WTA conference, one of the speakers said that something was true, and Ms. Egan said "What do you mean, 'true'?", and the speaker gave some incorrect answer or other; and afterward I quickly walked over to Ms. Egan and explained the correspondence theory of truth:  "The sentence 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white"; if you're using a bucket of pebbles to count sheep then an empty bucket is true if and only if the pastures are empty.  I don't know if this cured her; I suspect that it didn't.  But up until that point, at any rate, it seems Ms. Egan had been so traumatized by this childhood experience that she believed there was no such thing as truth - that because her teacher had demanded a definition in words, and she hadn't been able to give a good definition in words, that no good definition existed.

Of which I usually say:  "There was a time when no one could define gravity in exquisitely rigorous detail, but if you walked off a cliff, you would fall."

On the other hand - it is a general and primary principle of rationality that when you have no justification, it is very important that there be some way of saying "Oops", losing hope, and just giving up already.  (I really should post, at some point, on how the ability to just give up already is one of the primary distinguishing abilities of a rationalist.)  So, really, if you find yourself totally unable to justify something in words, one possibility is that there is no justification.  To ignore this and just casually stroll along, would not be a good thing.

And with moral questions, this problem is doubled and squared. 

Everything I am, is surely my brain; but I don't accept everything my brain does, as "me".

Though I don't like the fact, it does seem in my case to be true, that reflecting upon a passion can diminish it.  It does seem that in taking a step back from myself to look at what my brain is doing, that this introduces a greater emotional distance from the world, than when I am not reflecting.  Though I am extremely cautious when it comes to the moral issue of how to modify human nature, this is one thing that I would change, I think.

The point at which you start thinking that not everything that goes on your brain is to be identified with "you", is something of a Rubicon, I fear.  And those who prize the intensity of a simple passionate existence, above success in life or a complex layered personality, should not cross that Rubicon.

(Though in this case you should accept advice from rationalists about practical policies for guarding yourself, because this is a dangerous world in which to be unreflective.  For example: if you don't follow the link to the rest of this post, then sign the #$!@ up for cryonics regardless of what your simple passions say on the subject.)

Followup to:  Anthropomorphic Optimism

Aristotle distinguished between four senses of the Greek word aition, which in English is translated as "cause", though Wikipedia suggests that a better translation is "maker".  Aristotle's theory of the Four Causes, then, might be better translated as the Four Makers.  These were his four senses of aitia:  The material aition, the formal aition, the efficient aition, and the final aition.

The material aition of a bronze statue is the substance it is made from, bronze.  The formal aition is the substance's form, its statue-shaped-ness.  The efficient aition best translates as the English word "cause"; we would think of the artisan carving the statue, though Aristotle referred to the art of bronze-casting the statue, and regarded the individual artisan as a mere instantiation.

The final aition was the goal, or telos, or purpose of the statue, that for the sake of which the statue exists.

Though Aristotle considered knowledge of all four aitia as necessary, he regarded knowledge of the telos as the knowledge of highest order.  In this, Aristotle followed in the path of Plato, who had earlier written:

Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause from that without which the cause would not be able to act as a cause.  It is what the majority appear to do, like people groping in the dark; they call it a cause, thus giving it a name that does not belong to it.  That is why one man surrounds the earth with a vortex to make the heavens keep it in place, another makes the air support it like a wide lid.  As for their capacity of being in the best place they could possibly be put, this they do not look for, nor do they believe it to have any divine force...

Continuation of:  Changing Your Metaethics, Setting Up Metaethics
Followup to:  Does Your Morality Care What You Think?, The Moral Void, Probability is Subjectively Objective, Could Anything Be Right?, The Gift We Give To Tomorrow, Rebelling Within Nature, Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom, ...

(The culmination of a long series of Overcoming Bias posts; if you start here, I accept no responsibility for any resulting confusion, misunderstanding, or unnecessary angst.)

What is morality?  What does the word "should", mean?  The many pieces are in place:  This question I shall now dissolve.

The key—as it has always been, in my experience so far—is to understand how a certain cognitive algorithm feels from inside.  Standard procedure for righting a wrong question:  If you don't know what right-ness is, then take a step beneath and ask how your brain labels things "right".

It is not the same question—it has no moral aspects to it, being strictly a matter of fact and cognitive science.  But it is an illuminating question.  Once we know how our brain labels things "right", perhaps we shall find it easier, afterward, to ask what is really and truly right.

But with that said—the easiest way to begin investigating that question, will be to jump back up to the level of morality and ask what seems right.  And if that seems like too much recursion, get used to it—the other 90% of the work lies in handling recursion properly.

(Should you find your grasp on meaningfulness wavering, at any time following, check Changing Your Metaethics for the appropriate prophylactic.)

Followup to:  The Moral Void

A widespread excuse for avoiding rationality is the widespread belief that it is "rational" to believe life is meaningless, and thus suffer existential angst.  This is one of the secondary reasons why it is worth discussing the nature of morality.  But it's also worth attacking existential angst directly.

I suspect that most existential angst is not really existential.  I think that most of what is labeled "existential angst" comes from trying to solve the wrong problem.

Let's say you're trapped in an unsatisfying relationship, so you're unhappy.  You consider going on a skiing trip, or you actually go on a skiing trip, and you're still unhappy.  You eat some chocolate, but you're still unhappy.  You do some volunteer work at a charity (or better yet, work the same hours professionally and donate the money, thus applying the Law of Comparative Advantage) and you're still unhappy because you're in an unsatisfying relationship.

So you say something like:  "Skiing is meaningless, chocolate is meaningless, charity is meaningless, life is doomed to be an endless stream of woe."  And you blame this on the universe being a mere dance of atoms, empty of meaning.  Not necessarily because of some kind of subconsciously deliberate Freudian substitution to avoid acknowledging your real problem, but because you've stopped hoping that your real problem is solvable.  And so, as a sheer unexplained background fact, you observe that you're always unhappy.

Followup to:  The Moral Void

Three people, whom we'll call Xannon, Yancy and Zaire, are separately wandering through the forest; by chance, they happen upon a clearing, meeting each other.  Introductions are performed.  And then they discover, in the center of the clearing, a delicious blueberry pie.

Xannon:  "A pie!  What good fortune!  But which of us should get it?"

Yancy:  "Let us divide it fairly."

Zaire:  "I agree; let the pie be distributed fairly.  Who could argue against fairness?"

Xannon:  "So we are agreed, then.  But what is a fair division?"

Yancy:  "Eh?  Three equal parts, of course!"

Zaire:  "Nonsense!  A fair distribution is half for me, and a quarter apiece for the two of you."

Yancy:  "What?  How is that fair?"

Zaire:  "I'm hungry, therefore I should be fed; that is fair."

Xannon:  "Oh, dear.  It seems we have a dispute as to what is fair.  For myself, I want to divide the pie the same way as Yancy.  But let us resolve this dispute over the meaning of fairness, fairly: that is, giving equal weight to each of our desires.  Zaire desires the pie to be divided {1/4, 1/4, 1/2}, and Yancy and I desire the pie to be divided {1/3, 1/3, 1/3}.  So the fair compromise is {11/36, 11/36, 14/36}."

Followup to:  What Would You Do Without Morality?, Something to Protect

Once, discussing "horrible job interview questions" to ask candidates for a Friendly AI project, I suggested the following:

Would you kill babies if it was inherently the right thing to do?  Yes [] No []

If "no", under what circumstances would you not do the right thing to do?   ___________

If "yes", how inherently right would it have to be, for how many babies?     ___________