Less Wrong is a community blog devoted to refining the art of human rationality. Please visit our About page for more information.

An Introduction to Löb's Theorem in MIRI Research

16 orthonormal 23 March 2015 10:22PM

Would you like to see a primer on several MIRI research topics (assuming only the background of having taken a course with proofs in math or computer science)? Or are you curious why MIRI does so much with mathematical logic, and why people on Less Wrong keep referring to Löb's Theorem?

If you answered yes to either question, you may be interested in my lecture notes, An Introduction to Löb's Theorem in MIRI Research! These came out of an introductory talk that I gave at a MIRIx workshop.

Since I've got some space here, I'll just copy and paste the table of contents and the introduction section...

continue reading »

New forum for MIRI research: Intelligent Agent Foundations Forum

36 orthonormal 20 March 2015 12:35AM

Today, the Machine Intelligence Research Institute is launching a new forum for research discussion: the Intelligent Agent Foundations Forum! It's already been seeded with a bunch of new work on MIRI topics from the last few months.

We've covered most of the (what, why, how) subjects on the forum's new welcome post and the How to Contribute page, but this post is an easy place to comment if you have further questions (or if, maths forbid, there are technical issues with the forum instead of on it).

But before that, go ahead and check it out!

(Major thanks to Benja Fallenstein, Alice Monday, and Elliott Jin for their work on the forum code, and to all the contributors so far!)

EDIT 3/22: Jessica Taylor, Benja Fallenstein, and I wrote forum digest posts summarizing and linking to recent work (on the IAFF and elsewhere) on reflective oracle machines, on corrigibility, utility indifference, and related control ideas, and on updateless decision theory and the logic of provability, respectively! These are pretty excellent resources for reading up on those topics, in my biased opinion.

"Solving" selfishness for UDT

18 Stuart_Armstrong 27 October 2014 05:51PM

With many thanks to Beluga and lackofcheese.

When trying to decide between SIA and SSA, two anthropic probability theories, I concluded that the question of anthropic probability is badly posed and that it depends entirely on the values of the agents. When debating the issue of personal identity, I concluded that the question of personal identity is badly posed and depends entirely on the values of the agents. When the issue of selfishness in UDT came up recently, I concluded that the question of selfishness is...

But let's not get ahead of ourselves.

continue reading »

Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma

69 orthonormal 07 June 2013 08:30AM

I'm proud to announce the preprint of Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic, a joint paper with Mihaly Barasz, Paul Christiano, Benja Fallenstein, Marcello Herreshoff, Patrick LaVictoire (me), and Eliezer Yudkowsky.

This paper was one of three projects to come out of the 2nd MIRI Workshop on Probability and Reflection in April 2013, and had its genesis in ideas about formalizations of decision theory that have appeared on LessWrong. (At the end of this post, I'll include links for further reading.)

Below, I'll briefly outline the problem we considered, the results we proved, and the (many) open questions that remain. Thanks in advance for your thoughts and suggestions!

Background: Writing programs to play the PD with source code swap

(If you're not familiar with the Prisoner's Dilemma, see here.)

The paper concerns the following setup, which has come up in academic research on game theory: say that you have the chance to write a computer program X, which takes in one input and returns either Cooperate or Defect. This program will face off against some other computer program Y, but with a twist: X will receive the source code of Y as input, and Y will receive the source code of X as input. And you will be given your program's winnings, so you should think carefully about what sort of program you'd write!

Of course, you could simply write a program that defects regardless of its input; we call this program DefectBot, and call the program that cooperates on all inputs CooperateBot. But with the wealth of information afforded by the setup, you might wonder if there's some program that might be able to achieve mutual cooperation in situations where DefectBot achieves mutual defection, without thereby risking a sucker's payoff. (Douglas Hofstadter would call this a perfect opportunity for superrationality...)

Previously known: CliqueBot and FairBot

And indeed, there's a way to do this that's been known since at least the 1980s. You can write a computer program that knows its own source code, compares it to the input, and returns C if and only if the two are identical (and D otherwise). Thus it achieves mutual cooperation in one important case where it intuitively ought to: when playing against itself! We call this program CliqueBot, since it cooperates only with the "clique" of agents identical to itself.

There's one particularly irksome issue with CliqueBot, and that's the fragility of its cooperation. If two people write functionally analogous but syntactically different versions of it, those programs will defect against one another! This problem can be patched somewhat, but not fully fixed. Moreover, mutual cooperation might be the best strategy against some agents that are not even functionally identical, and extending this approach requires you to explicitly delineate the list of programs that you're willing to cooperate with. Is there a more flexible and robust kind of program you could write instead?

As it turns out, there is: in a 2010 post on LessWrong, cousin_it introduced an algorithm that we now call FairBot. Given the source code of Y, FairBot searches for a proof (of less than some large fixed length) that Y returns C when given the source code of FairBot, and then returns C if and only if it discovers such a proof (otherwise it returns D). Clearly, if our proof system is consistent, FairBot only cooperates when that cooperation will be mutual. But the really fascinating thing is what happens when you play two versions of FairBot against each other. Intuitively, it seems that either mutual cooperation or mutual defection would be stable outcomes, but it turns out that if their limits on proof lengths are sufficiently high, they will achieve mutual cooperation!

The proof that they mutually cooperate follows from a bounded version of Löb's Theorem from mathematical logic. (If you're not familiar with this result, you might enjoy Eliezer's Cartoon Guide to Löb's Theorem, which is a correct formal proof written in much more intuitive notation.) Essentially, the asymmetry comes from the fact that both programs are searching for the same outcome, so that a short proof that one of them cooperates leads to a short proof that the other cooperates, and vice versa. (The opposite is not true, because the formal system can't know it won't find a contradiction. This is a subtle but essential feature of mathematical logic!)

Generalization: Modal Agents

Unfortunately, FairBot isn't what I'd consider an ideal program to write: it happily cooperates with CooperateBot, when it could do better by defecting. This is problematic because in real life, the world isn't separated into agents and non-agents, and any natural phenomenon that doesn't predict your actions can be thought of as a CooperateBot (or a DefectBot). You don't want your agent to be making concessions to rocks that happened not to fall on them. (There's an important caveat: some things have utility functions that you care about, but don't have sufficient ability to predicate their actions on yours. In that case, though, it wouldn't be a true Prisoner's Dilemma if your values actually prefer the outcome (C,C) to (D,C).)

However, FairBot belongs to a promising class of algorithms: those that decide on their action by looking for short proofs of logical statements that concern their opponent's actions. In fact, there's a really convenient mathematical structure that's analogous to the class of such algorithms: the modal logic of provability (known as GL, for Gödel-Löb).

So that's the subject of this preprint: what can we achieve in decision theory by considering agents defined by formulas of provability logic?

continue reading »

Problematic Problems for TDT

36 drnickbone 29 May 2012 03:41PM

A key goal of Less Wrong's "advanced" decision theories (like TDT, UDT and ADT) is that they should out-perform standard decision theories (such as CDT) in contexts where another agent has access to the decider's code, or can otherwise predict the decider's behaviour. In particular, agents who run these theories will one-box on Newcomb's problem, and so generally make more money than agents which two-box. Slightly surprisingly, they may well continue to one-box even if the boxes are transparent, and even if the predictor Omega makes occasional errors (a problem due to Gary Drescher, which Eliezer has described as equivalent to "counterfactual mugging"). More generally, these agents behave like a CDT agent will wish it had pre-committed itself to behaving before being faced with the problem.

However, I've recently thought of a class of Omega problems where TDT (and related theories) appears to under-perform compared to CDT. Importantly, these are problems which are "fair" - at least as fair as the original Newcomb problem - because the reward is a function of the agent's actual choices in the problem (namely which box or boxes get picked) and independent of the method that the agent uses to choose, or of its choices on any other problems. This contrasts with clearly "unfair" problems like the following:

Discrimination: Omega presents the usual two boxes. Box A always contains $1000. Box B contains nothing if Omega detects that the agent is running TDT; otherwise it contains $1 million.

 

So what are some fair "problematic problems"?

Problem 1: Omega (who experience has shown is always truthful) presents the usual two boxes A and B and announces the following. "Before you entered the room, I ran a simulation of this problem as presented to an agent running TDT. I won't tell you what the agent decided, but I will tell you that if the agent two-boxed then I put nothing in Box B, whereas if the agent one-boxed then I put $1 million in Box B. Regardless of how the simulated agent decided, I put $1000 in Box A. Now please choose your box or boxes."

Analysis: Any agent who is themselves running TDT will reason as in the standard Newcomb problem. They'll prove that their decision is linked to the simulated agent's, so that if they two-box they'll only win $1000, whereas if they one-box they will win $1 million. So the agent will choose to one-box and win $1 million.

However, any CDT agent can just take both boxes and win $1001000. In fact, any other agent who is not running TDT (e.g. an EDT agent) will be able to re-construct the chain of logic and reason that the simulation one-boxed and so box B contains the $1 million. So any other agent can safely two-box as well. 

Note that we can modify the contents of Box A so that it contains anything up to $1 million; the CDT agent (or EDT agent) can in principle win up to twice as much as the TDT agent.

 

Problem 2: Our ever-reliable Omega now presents ten boxes, numbered from 1 to 10, and announces the following. "Exactly one of these boxes contains $1 million; the others contain nothing. You must take exactly one box to win the money; if you try to take more than one, then you won't be allowed to keep any winnings. Before you entered the room, I ran multiple simulations of this problem as presented to an agent running TDT, and determined the box which the agent was least likely to take. If there were several such boxes tied for equal-lowest probability, then I just selected one of them, the one labelled with the smallest number. I then placed $1 million in the selected box. Please choose your box."

Analysis: A TDT agent will reason that whatever it does, it cannot have more than 10% chance of winning the $1 million. In fact, the TDT agent's best reply is to pick each box with equal probability; after Omega calculates this, it will place the $1 million under box number 1 and the TDT agent has exactly 10% chance of winning it.
 
But any non-TDT agent (e.g. CDT or EDT) can reason this through as well, and just pick box number 1, so winning $1 million. By increasing the number of boxes, we can ensure that TDT has arbitrarily low chance of winning, compared to CDT which always wins.


Some questions:

1. Have these or similar problems already been discovered by TDT (or UDT) theorists, and if so, is there a known solution? I had a search on Less Wrong but couldn't find anything obviously like them.

2. Is the analysis correct, or is there some subtle reason why a TDT (or UDT) agent would choose differently from described?

3. If a TDT agent believed (or had reason to believe) that Omega was going to present it with such problems, then wouldn't it want to self-modify to CDT? But this seems paradoxical, since the whole idea of a TDT agent is that it doesn't have to self-modify.

4. Might such problems show that there cannot be a single TDT algorithm (or family of provably-linked TDT algorithms) so that when Omega says it is simulating a TDT agent, it is quite ambiguous what it is doing? (This objection would go away if Omega revealed the source-code of its simulated agent, and the source-code of the choosing agent; each particular version of TDT would then be out-performed on a specific matching problem.)

5. Are these really "fair" problems? Is there some intelligible sense in which they are not fair, but Newcomb's problem is fair? It certainly looks like Omega may be "rewarding irrationality" (i.e. giving greater gains to someone who runs an inferior decision theory), but that's exactly the argument that CDT theorists use about Newcomb.

6. Finally, is it more likely that Omegas - or things like them - will present agents with Newcomb and Prisoner's Dilemma problems (on which TDT succeeds) rather than problematic problems (on which it fails)?

 

Edit: I tweaked the explanation of Box A's contents in Problem 1, since this was causing some confusion. The idea is that, as in the usual Newcomb problem, Box A always contains $1000. Note that Box B depends on what the simulated agent chooses; it doesn't depend on Omega predicting what the actual deciding agent chooses (so Omega doesn't put less money in any box just because it sees that the actual decider is running TDT).

Decision Theories: A Less Wrong Primer

69 orthonormal 13 March 2012 11:31PM

Alpha-beta pruning (from Wikipedia)

Summary: If you've been wondering why people keep going on about decision theory on Less Wrong, I wrote you this post as an answer. I explain what decision theories are, show how Causal Decision Theory works and where it seems to give the wrong answers, introduce (very briefly) some candidates for a more advanced decision theory, and touch on the (possible) connection between decision theory and ethics.

continue reading »

Updateless anthropics

9 Stuart_Armstrong 20 February 2011 07:23PM

Three weeks ago, I set out to find a new theory of anthropics, to try and set decision theory on a firm footing with respect to copying, deleting copies, merging them, correlated decisions, and the presence or absence of extra observers. I've since come full circle, and realised that UDT already has a built-in anthropic theory, that resolves a lot of the problems that had been confusing me.

The theory is simple, and is essentially a rephrasing of UDT: if you are facing a decision X, and trying to figure out the utility of X=a for some action a, then calculate the full expected utility of X being a, given the objective probabilities of each world (including those in which you don't exist).

As usual, you have to consider the consequences of X=a for all agents who will make the same decision as you, whether they be exact copies, enemies, simulations or similar-minded people. However, your utility will have to do more work that is usually realised: notions such as selfishness or altruism with respect to your copies have to be encoded in the utility function, and will result in substantially different behaviour.

The rest of the post is a series of cases-studies illustrating this theory. Utility is assumed to be linear in cash for convenience.

Sleeping with the Presumptuous Philosopher 

The first test case is the Sleeping Beauty problem.


 In its simplest form, this involves a coin toss; if it comes out heads, one copy of Sleeping Beauty is created. If it comes out tails, two copies are created. Then the copies are asked at what odds they would be prepared to bet that the coin came out tails. You can assume either that the different copies care for each other in the manner I detailed here, or more simply that all winnings will be kept by a future merged copy (or an approved charity). Then the algorithm is simple: the two worlds have equal probability. Let X be the decision where sleeping beauty decides between a contract that pays out $1 if the coin is heads, versus one that pays out $1 if the coin is tails. If X="heads" (to use an obvious shorthand), then Sleeping Beauty will expect to make $1*0.5, as she is offered the contract once. If X="tails", then the total return of that decision is $1*2*0.5, as copies of her will be offered the contract twice, and they will all make the same decision. So Sleeping Beauty will follow the SIA 2:1 betting odds of tails over heads.

Variants such as "extreme Sleeping Beauty" (where thousands of copies are created on tails) will behave in the same way; if it feels counter-intuitive to bet at thousands-to-one odds that a fair coin landed tails, it's the fault of expected utility itself, as the rewards of being right dwarf the costs of being wrong.

But now let's turn to the Presumptuous Philosopher, a thought experiment that is often confused with Sleeping Beauty. Here we have exactly the same setup as "extreme Sleeping Beauty", but the agents (the Presumptuous philosophers) are mutually selfish. Here the return to X="heads" remains $1*0.5. However the return to X="tails" is also $1*0.5, since even if all the Presumptuous Philosophers in the "tails" universe bet on "tails", each one will still only get $1 in utility. So the Presumptuous Philosopher should only take even SSA betting 1:1 odds on the result of the coin flip.

So SB is acts like she follows the self-indication assumption, (SIA), and while the PP is following the self-sampling assumption (SSA). This remains true if we change the setup so that one agent is given a betting opportunity in the tails universe. Then the objective probability of any one agent being asked is low, so both SB and PP model the "objective probability" of the tails world, given that they have been asked to bet, as being low. However, SB gains utility if any of her copies is asked to bet and receives a profit, so the strategy "if I'm offered $1 if I guess correctly whether the coin is heads or tails, I will say tails" gets her $1*0.5 utility whether or not she is the specific one who is asked. Betting heads nets her the same result, so SB will give SIA 1:1 odds in this case.

On the other hand, the PP will only gain utility in the very specific world where he himself is asked to bet. So his gain from the updateless "if I'm offered $1 if I guess correctly whether the coin is heads or tails, I will say tails" is tiny, as he's unlikely to be asked to bet. Hence he will offer the SSA odds that make heads a much more "likely" proposition.

The Doomsday argument

Now, using SSA odds brings us back into the realm of the classical Doomsday argument. How is it that Sleeping Beauty is immune to the Doomsday argument while the Presumptuous Philosopher is not? Which one is right; is the world really about to end?

Asking about probabilities independently of decisions is meaningless here; instead, we can ask what would agents decide in particular cases. It's not surprising that agents will reach different decisions on such questions as, for instance, existential risk mitigation, if they have different preferences.

Let's do a very simplified model, where there are two agents in the world, and that one of them is approached at random to see if they would pay $Y to add a third agent. Each agent derives a (non-indexical) utility of $1 for the presence of this third agent, and nothing else happens in the world to increase or decrease anyone's utility.

First, let's assume that each agent is selfish about their indexical utility (their cash in the hand). If the decision is to not add a third agent, all will get $0 utility. If the decision is to add a third agent, then there are three agents in the world, and one them will be approached to lose $Y. Hence the expected utility is $(1-Y/3).

Now let us assume the agents are altruistic towards each other's indexical utilities. Then the expected utility of not adding a third agent is still $0. If the decision is to add a third agent, then there are three agents in the world, and one of them will be approached to lose $Y - but all will value that lose at the same amount. Hence the expected utility is $(1-Y).

So if $Y=$2, for instance, the "selfish" agents will add the third agent, and the "altruistic" ones will not. So generalising this to more complicated models describing existential risk mitigations schemes, we would expect SB-type agents to behave differently to PP-types in most models. There is no sense in asking which one is "right" and which one gives the more accurate "probability of doom"; instead ask yourself which better corresponds to your own utility model, hence what your decision will be.

Psy-Kosh's non-anthropic problem

Cousin_it has a rephrasing of Psy-Kosh's non-anthropic problem to which updateless anthropics can be illustratively applied:

You are one of a group of 10 people who care about saving African kids. You will all be put in separate rooms, then I will flip a coin. If the coin comes up heads, a random one of you will be designated as the "decider". If it comes up tails, nine of you will be designated as "deciders". Next, I will tell everyone their status, without telling the status of others. Each decider will be asked to say "yea" or "nay". If the coin came up tails and all nine deciders say "yea", I donate $1000 to VillageReach. If the coin came up heads and the sole decider says "yea", I donate only $100. If all deciders say "nay", I donate $700 regardless of the result of the coin toss. If the deciders disagree, I don't donate anything.

We'll set aside the "deciders disagree" and assume that you will all reach the same decision. The point of the problem was to illustrate a supposed preference inversion: if you coordinate ahead of time, you should all agree to say "nay", but after you have been told you're a decider, you should update in the direction of the coin coming up tails, and say "yea".

From the updateless perspective, however, there is no mystery here: the strategy "if I were a decider, I would say nay" maximises utility both for the deciders and the non-deciders.

But what if the problem were rephrased in a more selfish way, with the non-deciders not getting any utility from the setup (maybe they don't get to see the photos of the grateful saved African kids), while the deciders got the same utility as before? Then the strategy "if I were a decider, I would say yea" maximises your expect utility, because non-deciders get nothing, thus reducing the expected utility gains and losses in the world where the coin came out tails. This is similar to SIA odds, again.

That second model is similar to the way I argued for SIA with agents getting created and destroyed. That post has been superseded by this one, which pointed out the flaw in the argument which was (roughly speaking) not considering setups like Psy-Kosh's original model. So once again, whether utility is broadly shared or not affects the outcome of the decision.

The Anthropic Trilemma

Eliezer's anthropic trilemma was an interesting puzzle involving probabilities, copying, and subjective anticipation. It inspired me to come up with a way of spreading utility across multiple copies which was essentially a Sleeping Beauty copy-altruistic model. The decision process going with it is then the same as the updateless decision process outlined here. Though initially it was phrased in terms of SIA probabilities and individual impact, the isomorphism between the two can be seen here.

Counterfactual Calculation and Observational Knowledge

11 Vladimir_Nesov 31 January 2011 04:28PM

Consider the following thought experiment ("Counterfactual Calculation"):

You are taking a test, which includes a question: "Is Q an even number?", where Q is a complicated formula that resolves to some natural number. There is no a priori reason for you to expect that Q is more likely even or odd, and the formula is too complicated to compute the number (or its parity) on your own. Fortunately, you have an old calculator, which you can use to type in the formula and observe the parity of the result on display. This calculator is not very reliable, and is only correct 99% of the time, furthermore its errors are stochastic (or even involve quantum randomness), so for any given problem statement, it's probably correct but has a chance of making an error. You type in the formula and observe the result (it's "even"). You're now 99% sure that the answer is "even", so naturally you write that down on the test sheet.

Then, unsurprisingly, Omega (a trustworthy all-powerful device) appears and presents you with the following decision. Consider the counterfactual where the calculator displayed "odd" instead of "even", after you've just typed in the (same) formula Q, on the same occasion (i.e. all possible worlds that fit this description). The counterfactual diverges only in the calculator showing a different result (and what follows). You are to determine what is to be written (by Omega, at your command) as the final answer to the same question on the test sheet in that counterfactual (the actions of your counterfactual self who takes the test in the counterfactual are ignored).

continue reading »

Another attempt to explain UDT

35 cousin_it 14 November 2010 04:52PM

(Attention conservation notice: this post contains no new results, and will be obvious and redundant to many.)

Not everyone on LW understands Wei Dai's updateless decision theory. I didn't understand it completely until two days ago. Now that I had the final flash of realization, I'll try to explain it to the community and hope my attempt fares better than previous attempts.

It's probably best to avoid talking about "decision theory" at the start, because the term is hopelessly muddled. A better way to approach the idea is by examining what we mean by "truth" and "probability" in the first place. For example, is it meaningful for Sleeping Beauty to ask whether it's Monday or Tuesday? Phrased like this, the question sounds stupid. Of course there's a fact of the matter as to what day of the week it is! Likewise, in all problems involving simulations, there seems to be a fact of the matter whether you're the "real you" or the simulation, which leads us to talk about probabilities and "indexical uncertainty" as to which one is you.

At the core, Wei Dai's idea is to boldly proclaim that, counterintuitively, you can act as if there were no fact of the matter whether it's Monday or Tuesday when you wake up. Until you learn which it is, you think it's both. You're all your copies at once.

continue reading »

What is Wei Dai's Updateless Decision Theory?

37 AlephNeil 19 May 2010 10:16AM

As a newcomer to LessWrong, I quite often see references to 'UDT' or 'updateless decision theory'. The very name is like crack - I'm irresistably compelled to find out what the fuss is about.

Wei Dai's post is certainly interesting, but it seemed to me (as a naive observer) that a fairly small 'mathematical signal' was in danger of being lost in a lot of AI-noise. Or to put it less confrontationally: I saw a simple 'lesson' on how to attack many of the problems that frequently get discussed here, which can easily be detached from the rest of the theory. Hence this short note, the purpose of which is to present and motivate UDT in the context of 'naive decision theory' (NDT), and to pre-empt what I think is a possible misunderstanding.

continue reading »

View more: Next