Is CFAR going to market themselves like this?
[at the workshop]:
"Look to the left of you, now to the right of you, now in 12 other directions. Only one of you will have a strong positive effect from this workshop."
Is CFAR going to market themselves like this?
[at the workshop]:
"Look to the left of you, now to the right of you, now in 12 other directions. Only one of you will have a strong positive effect from this workshop."
I would expect not for a paid workshop! Unlike CFAR's core workshops, which are highly polished and get median 9/10 and 10/10 "are you glad you came" ratings, MSFP
was free and experimental,
produced two new top-notch AI x-risk researchers for MIRI (in my personal judgement as a mathematician, and excluding myself), and
produced several others who were willing hires by the end of the program and who I would totally vote to hire if there were more resources available (in the form of both funding and personnel) to hire them.
Among my friends interested in rationality, effective altruism, and existential risk reduction, I often hear: "If you want to have a real positive impact on the world, grad school is a waste of time. It's better to use deliberate practice to learn whatever you need instead of working within the confines of an institution."
While I'd agree that grad school will not make you do good for the world, if you're a self-driven person who can spend time in a PhD program deliberately acquiring skills and connections for making a positive difference, I think you can make grad school a highly productive path, perhaps more so than many alternatives. In this post, I want to share some advice that I've been repeating a lot lately for how to do this:
That's all I have for now. The main sentiment behind most of this, I think, is that you have to be deliberate to get the most out of a PhD program, rather than passively expecting it to make you into anything in particular. Grad school still isn't for everyone, and far from it. But if you were seriously considering it at some point, and "do something more useful" felt like a compelling reason not to go, be sure to first consider the most useful version of grad that you could reliably make for yourself... and then decide whether or not to do it.
Please email me (lastname@thisdomain.com) if you have more ideas for getting the most out of grad school!
1) Logical depth seems super cool to me, and is perhaps the best way I've seen for quantifying "interestingness" without mistakenly equating it with "unlikeliness" or "incompressibility".
2) Despite this, Manfred's brain-encoding-halting-times example illustrates a way a D(u/h) / D(u) optimized future could be terrible... do you think this future would not obtain, because despite being human-brain-based, would not in fact make much use of being on a human brain? That is, it would have extremely high D(u) and therefore be penalized?
I think it would be easy to rationalize/over-fit our intuitions about this formula to convince ourselves that it matches our intuitions about what is a good future. More realistically, I suspect that our favorite futures have relatively high D(u/h) / D(u) but not the highest value of D(u/h) / D(u).
I once asked a room full of about 100 neuroscientists whether willpower depletion was a thing, and there was widespread disagreement with the idea.
In which year did you do the asking?
Great question! It was in the winter of 2013, about a year and a half ago.
I once asked a room full of about 100 neuroscientists whether willpower depletion was a thing, and there was widespread disagreement with the idea. (A propos, this is a great way to quickly gauge consensus in a field.) Basically, for a while some researchers believed that willpower depletion "is" glucose depletion in the prefrontal cortex, but some more recent experiments have failed to replicate this, e.g. by finding that the mere taste of sugar is enough to "replenish" willpower faster than the time it takes blood to move from the mouth to the brain:
Carbohydrate mouth-rinses activate dopaminergic pathways in the striatum–a region of the brain associated with responses to reward (Kringelbach, 2004)–whereas artificially-sweetened non-carbohydrate mouth-rinses do not (Chambers et al., 2009). Thus, the sensing of carbohydrates in the mouth appears to signal the possibility of reward (i.e., the future availability of additional energy), which could motivate rather than fuel physical effort.-- Molden, D. C. et al, The Motivational versus Metabolic Effects of Carbohydrates on Self-Control. Psychological Science.
Stanford's Carol Dweck and Greg Walden even found that hinting to people that using willpower is energizing might actually make them less depletable:
When we had people read statements that reminded them of the power of willpower like, “Sometimes, working on a strenuous mental task can make you feel energized for further challenging activities,” they kept on working and performing well with no sign of depletion. They made half as many mistakes on a difficult cognitive task as people who read statements about limited willpower. In another study, they scored 15 percent better on I.Q. problems.-- Dweck and Walden, Willpower: It’s in Your Head? New York Times.
While these are all interesting empirical findings, there’s a very similar phenomenon that’s much less debated and which could explain many of these observations, but I think gets too little popular attention in these discussions:
Willpower is distractible.
Indeed, willpower and working memory are both strongly mediated by the dorsolateral prefontal cortex, so “distraction” could just be the two functions funging against one another. To use the terms of Stanovich popularized by Kahneman in Thinking: Fast and Slow, "System 2" can only override so many "System 1" defaults at any given moment.
So what’s going on when people say "willpower depletion"? I’m not sure, but even if willpower depletion is not a thing, the following distracting phenomena clearly are:
... and "willpower depletion" might be nothing more than mental distraction by one of these processes. Perhaps it really is better to think of willpower as power (a rate) than energy (a resource).
If that’s true, then figuring out what processes might be distracting us might be much more useful than saying “I’m out of willpower” and giving up. Maybe try having a sip of water or a bit of food if your diet permits it. Maybe try reading lying down to see if you get nap-ish. Maybe set a timer to remind you to call that friend you keep thinking about.
The last two bullets,
are also enough to explain why being told willpower depletion isn’t a thing might reduce the effects typically attributed to it: we might simply be less distracted by anxiety or indignation about doing “too much” willpower-intensive work in a short period of time.
Of course, any speculation about how human minds work in general is prone to the "typical mind fallacy". Maybe my willpower is depletable and yours isn’t. But then that wouldn’t explain why you can cause people to exhibit less willpower depletion by suggesting otherwise. But then again, most published research findings are false. But then again the research on the DLPFC and working memory seems relatively old and well established, and distraction is clearly a thing...
All in all, more of my chips are falling on the hypothesis that willpower “depletion” is often just willpower distraction, and that finding and addressing those distractions is probably a better a strategy than avoiding activities altogether in order to "conserve willpower".
So I found this paper by Gelman, King, and Boscodarin (1998)
The link is dead. Here's the paper.
Note that the last name of the third author is Boscardin, not Boscodarin.
Thanks, fixed!
Hi all, CFAR is looking for a videographer in the Bay Area to shoot and edit a 1-minute video introducing us. Do you know anyone?
Let's clear things up a little: you cannot use the category of "quantum random" to actual coin flip, because an object to be truly so it must be in a superposition of at least two different pure states, a situation that with a coin at room temperature has yet to be achieved (and will continue to be so for a very long time). So let's talk about classic randomness from a Bayesian point of view: when you have no prior information that can correlate with the outcome of an event. That's the case with the coin flip (and also with the quantum case, according to many-worlds interpretation).
Since the face landing depends not only on thumb movement but also on the exact starting position and the movement of air molecules, it's surely not possible for you to know all this informations in the beginning to a degree precise enough to deduce the side landing up. In this situation, your "throw the coin" motor impulse and the coin landing are uncorrelated, and so the coin flip is random (from your perspective).
But the degree to which the coin depends on factors you don't control is very low: if you practice enough, you can control the movement of your thumb so that it lands, say, 9 times out of 10 the side you want. In this case you have formed a better model of the coin traveling through the air and you have learned to control your thumb more precisely. In this case the correlation with your motor cortex is much higher and the coin flip is of course no more random.
you cannot use the category of "quantum random" to actual coin flip, because an object to be truly so it must be in a superposition of at least two different pure states, a situation that with a coin at room temperature has yet to be achieved (and will continue to be so for a very long time).
Given the level of subtlety in the question, which gets at the relative nature of superposition, this claim doesn't quite make sense. If I am entangled with a a state that you are not entangled with, it may "be superposed" from your perspective but not from either of my various perspectives.
For example: a projection of the universe can be in state
(you observe NULL)⊗(I observe UP)⊗(photon is spin UP) + (you observe NULL)⊗(I observe DOWN)⊗(photon is spin DOWN) = (you observe NULL)⊗((I observe UP)⊗(photon is spin UP) + (I observe DOWN)⊗(photon is spin DOWN))
The fact that your state factors out means you are disentangled from the joint state of me and the particle, and so together the particle and I are "in a superimposed state" from "your perspective". However, my state does not factor out here; there are (at least) two of me, each observing a different outcome and not a superimposed photon.
Anyway, having cleared that up, I'm not convinced that there is enough mutual information connecting my frontal lobe and the coin for the state of the coin to be entangled with me (i.e. not "in a superposed state") before I observe it. I realize this is testable, e.g., if the state amplitudes of the coin can be forced to have complex arguments differing in a predictable way so as to produce an expected and measurable interference paterns. This is what we have failed to produce at a macroscopic level, and it is this failure that you are talking about when you say
a situation that with a coin at room temperature has yet to be achieved (and will continue to be so for a very long time).
I do not believe I have been shown a convincing empirical test ruling out the possibility that the state is not, from my brain's perspective, in a superposition of vastly many states with amplitudes whose complex arguments are difficult to predict or control well enough to produce clear interference patterns, and half of which are "heads" state and half of which are "tails" states. But I am very ready to be corrected on this, so if anyone can help me out, please do!
Hello rationality friends! I have a question that I bet some of you have thought about...
I hear lots of people saying that classical coin flips are not "quantum random events", because the outcome is very nearly determined by thumb movement when I flip the coin. More precisely, one can stay that the state of my thumb and the state of the landed coin are strongly entangled, such that, say, 99% of the quantum measure of the coin flips outcomes my post-flip thumb observes all land heads.
First of all, I've never actually seen an order of magnitude estimate to support this claim, and would love it if someone here can provide or link to one!
Second, I'm not sure how strongly entangled my thumb movement is with my subjective experience, i.e., with the parts of my brain that consciously process the decision to flip and the outcome. So even if the coin outcome is almost perfectly determined by my thumb, it might not be almost perfectly determined by my decision to flip the coin.
For example, while the thumb movement happens, a lot of calibration goes on between my thumb, my motor cortex, and my cerebellum (which certainly affects but does not seem to directly process conscious experience), precisely because my motor cortex is unable to send, on its own, a precise and accurate enough signal to my thumb that achieves the flicking motion that we eventually learn to do in order to flip coins. Some of this inability is due to small differences in environmental factors during each flip that the motor cortex does not itself process directly, but is processed by the cerebellum instead. Perhaps some of this inability also comes directly from quantum variation in neuron action potentials being reached, or perhaps some of the aforementioned environmental factors arise from quantum variation.
Anyway, I'm altogether not *that* convinced that the outcome of a coin flip is sufficiently dependent on my decision to flip as to be considered "not a quantum random event" by my conscious brain. Can anyone provide me with some order of magnitude estimates to convince me either way about this? I'd really appreciate it!
ETA: I am not asking if coin flips are "random enough" in some strange, undefined sense. I am actually asking about quantum entanglement here. In particular, when your PFC decides for planning reasons to flip a coin, does the evolution of the wave function produce a world that is in a superposition of states (coin landed heads)⊗(you observed heads) + (coin landed tails)⊗(you observed tails)? Or does a monomial state result, either (coin landed heads)⊗(you observed heads) or (coin landed tails)⊗(you observed tails) depending on the instance?
At present, despite having been told many times that coin flips are not "in superpositions" relative to "us", I'm not convinced that there is enough mutual information connecting my frontal lobe and the coin for the state of the coin to be entangled with me (i.e. not "in a superposed state") before I observe it. I realize this is somewhat testable, e.g., if the state amplitudes of the coin can be forced to have complex arguments differing in a predictable way so as to produce expected and measurable interference patterns. This is what we have failed to produce at a macroscopic level in attempts to produce visible superpositions. But I don't know if we fail to produce messier, less-visibly-self-interfering superpositions, which is why I am still wondering about this...
Any help / links / fermi estimates on this will be greatly appreciated!
Just donated $500 and pledged $6500 more in matching funds (10% of my salary).