Comment author: Bugmaster 23 November 2011 07:48:37PM 2 points [-]

The existence of such an oracle is that which is diminishing the value of research and discovery

You seem to be saying that research and discovery has some intrinsic value, in addition to the benefits of actually discovering things and understanding them. If so, what is this value ?

The only answer I can think of is something like, "learning about new avenues of research that the oracle had not yet explored", but I'm not sure whether that makes sense or not -- since the perfect oracle would explore every avenue of research, and an imperfect oracle would strive toward perfection (as long as the oracle is rational).

Comment author: Alethea 11 February 2015 06:35:18PM *  0 points [-]

I would posit that divergent behaviors and approaches to the norms will still occur, despite the existence of such an oracle just for the sake of imagination, exploration, and the enjoyment of the process itself. Such oracle would also be aware of the existence of unknown future factors, and the benefits of diverse approaches to problems in the face of factors with unknown long term benefits and viability until certain processes has been executed. As you said, such an oracle would then try to explore every avenue of research, while still focusing on the ones deemed most likely to be fruitful. Such oracle should also be good on self-reflection, and able to question its own approaches and the various perspectives it is able to subsume. After all, isn't self introspection and self reflections part of how one improve themselves?

Then there's the Fun theory sequence that DSimon have posted about.

Comment author: MugaSofer 24 December 2012 04:47:47AM *  0 points [-]

As for the use of imagined positive reinforcer, that seems very similar to covert positive reinforcement (part of covert conditioning) which should be easy to find scientific tests on if you have access to libraries.

The only difference here is that the behavior itself is not imagined.

Whoops, I misread that last line as "The only difference here is that the reward itself is not imagined." Thanks for catching that.

Comment author: Alethea 24 December 2012 10:22:35AM 1 point [-]

Yw and thanks for the clarification. No more confusion then. :)

Comment author: MugaSofer 23 December 2012 05:49:13PM 1 point [-]

The only difference between actual rewards and imaginary rewards is that the former isn't imaginary?

Comment author: Alethea 23 December 2012 10:16:16PM *  4 points [-]

The reply was about how drethelin's situation where a real situation/behaviour is repeatedly associated with imagined reward, is very similar to covert positive reinforcement where one imagines even the situation/behaviour itself. I'm confused on the relevance of mentioning the original comparison between actual/imagined reward in the context?

We have a situation where there are scientific/empirical tests performed on 'a real behaviour with real positive reinforcement' and 'an imagined behaviour with imagined positive reinforcement' that seems to support each other.

In fact covert conditioning does have the requirement that the patient imagine the situation sufficiently vividly. There's no reason to believe that if the patient imagine (or perceive) the situation too vividly (or too real) it would somehow affect them less.

Comment author: FiftyTwo 23 December 2012 09:57:18AM 1 point [-]

Wow. If that works thats genuinely an incredibly powerful technique.

Has there been any empirical testing comparing that to controls or to external rewards?

Comment author: Alethea 23 December 2012 02:46:20PM *  3 points [-]

Unless I missed something, the little I had to read about Critch's unpublished work on hedonic awareness seemed to be a rephrasing of Skinner's Operant Conditioning/Reinforcement theory?

As for the use of imagined positive reinforcer, that seems very similar to covert positive reinforcement (part of covert conditioning) which should be easy to find scientific tests on if you have access to libraries.

The only difference here is that the behavior itself is not imagined. I'm inclined to believe that the situations are similar enough that the tests on covert positive reinforcement could be applied. The perception of the behavior itself being real may have some effect on our perception of the imagined reinforcer, but there's not enough reason to believe it would majorly change the effect of the imagined reinforcer on average.