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And the next time someone says that there are astronomical facts about the chemical make-up of water I will correct them as well. Which is to say I don't know what your point is and can only imagine you think I am arguing for something I am not. Perhaps it's worth clarifying things before we get glib?
In which case, you will be making a point - not that there are different facts, but that there are different languages. Of course, language is an invention - and there is no natural law that dictates the definition of the word "astronomy".
It is merely a convention that we have adopted a language in which the term "astronomy" does not cover chemical facts. But we could have selected a different language - and there is no law of nature dictating that we could not.
And, yet, these facts about language - these facts about the ways we define our terms - does not cause science to fall to its knees either.
So, what are you talking about? Are you talking about morality, or are you talking about "morality"?
Why pretend that there is a difference that makes any difference?
Because it makes a huge difference in our understanding of morality. "Alonzo expresses a strong distaste for murder" is a very different fact than "Murder is immoral" (as commonly understood), no?
ETA: Of course, given that I don't think facts like "murder is immoral" exist I'm all about focusing on the other kind of fact. But it's important to get concepts and categories straight because those two facts are not necessarily intensionally or extensionally equivalent.
Yes. Water is made up of two hydrogen and an oxygern atom is a different fact than the earth and venus are nearly the same size. It does not bring science to its knees.
"Objective" means "mind-independent" so if you're looking at someone's mind to determine those values they're, by definition, subjective. When we use the words "objective" and "subjective" in meta-ethics we're almost always using them in this way and now questioning, say, whether or not there are objective facts about other people's minds.
If "objective" is "mind independent", then are facts ABOUT minds not objective? We cannot have a science that discusses, for example, how the pre-frontal lobe functions because no such claim can be mind-independent?
For every so-called subjective statement, there is an objective statement that says exactly the same thing from a different point of view. If I say, "spinich, yumm" there is a corresponding objective statement "Alonzo likes spinich" that says exactly the same thing.
So, why not just focus on the objective equivalent of every subjective statement? Why pretend that there is a difference that makes any difference?
I initially wrote up a bit of a rant, but I just want to ask a question for clarification:
Do you think that evolutionary ethics is irrelevant because the neuroscience of ethics and neuroeconomics are much better candidates for understanding what humans value (and therefore for guiding our moral decisions)?
I'm worried that you don't because the argument you supplied can be augmented to apply there as well: just replace "genes" with "brains". If your answer is a resounding 'no', I have a lengthy response. :)
Evolutionary Biology might be good at telling us what we value. However, as GE Moore pointed out, ethics is about what we SHOULD value. What evolutionary ethics will teach us is that our mind/brains are maleable. Our values are not fixed.
And the question of what we SHOULD value makes sense because our brains are malleable. Our desires - just like our beliefs - are not fixed. They are learned. So, the question arises, "Given that we can mold desires into different forms, what SHOULD we mold them into?"
Besides, evolutionary ethics is incoherent. "I have evolved a disposition to harm people like you; therefore, you deserve to be harmed." How does a person deserve punishment just because somebody else evolved a disposition to punish him.
Do we solve the question of gay marriage by determining whether the accusers actually have a genetic disposition to kill homosexuals? And if we discover they do, we leap to the conclusion that homosexuals DESERVE to be killed?
Why evolve a disposition to punish? That makes no sense.
What is this practice of praise and condemnation that is central to morality? Of deserved praise and condemnation? Does it make sense to punish somebody for having the wrong genes?
What, according to evolutionary ethics, is the role of moral argument?
Does genetics actually explain such things as the end of slavery, and a woman's right to vote? Those are very fast genetic changes.
The reason that the Euthyphro argument works against evolutionary ethics because - regardless of what evolution can teach us about what we do value, it teaches us that our values are not fixed. Because values are not genetically determined, there is a realm in which it is sensible to ask about what we should value, which is a question that evolutionary ethics cannot answer. Praise and condemnation are central to our moral life precisely because these are the tools for shaping learned desires - resulting in an institution where the question of the difference between right and wrong is the question of the difference between what we should and should not praise or condemn.
In response to
Less Wrong views on morality?
I believe it is poosible to scientifically determine whether people generally have many and strong reasons to promote or inhibit certain desires through the use of social tools such as praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment. I also believe that this investigation would make sense of a wealth of moral practices such as the three categories of action (obligation, prohibition, and non-obligatory permission), excuse, the four categories of culpability (intentional, knowing, reckless, negligent), supererogatory action, and. - of course - the role of praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment.
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I suppose that is true... but surely that doesn't render the word meaningless? In the actual world where words mean the things they mean and not other things that they could have meant in a world with different linguistic convention "astronomy" still means something like "the study of celestial bodies", right? Surely people asking for astronomical facts about airplanes, as if they were celestial bodies is a sign of confusion and ought to be gently corrected, no?
Where in the world did you get the notion that I wanted science on its knees or that I thought it was? I'm as kinky as the next guy but I quite like science where it is. I'm completely bamboozled by this rhetoric. Do you take me for someone who believes God is required for morality or some other such nonsense? If so let me be clear: moral judgments are neither natural nor supernatura objectivel facts. They are the projection of an individuals preferences and emotions that people mistake for externally existing things, much as people mistake cuteness as an intrinsic property of babies when in fact it is simply the projection of our affinity for babies that makes them appear cute-to-us. That does not mean that there are not facts about moral judgments or that science is not on strong and worthy grounds when gathering such facts.
My chief concern in my initial comment to which you replied was getting everyone straight on what the meta-ethical terminology means. People enjoy freelancing with the meanings of words like "objective", "subjective", and "relative" and it creates a terrible mess when talking about metaethics because no one know what anyone else is talking about. I didn't have any kind of straightforward factual disagreement with the original commenter, bracketing the fact that I was quite sure what their position was and if they in fact thought they had succeeded in solve a two-thousand old debate by discovering and objective foundation for morality when they had in fact just rediscovered moral subjectivism with some choice bits of ev-psych thrown in. Note that hankx7787, at least, does seem to think Sam Harris has found an objective and scientific foundation for morality, so it seems this blustering isn't all semantics. Maybe words have meanings after all.
Here is the general form of my argument.
A person says, "X" is true of morality or of "moral judgments" in the public at large. This brings the talk of an objective morality to its knees. I answer that X is also true if science "or of "truth judgments" in the public at large. But it does not bring all talk of objectivity n science to its knees. Therefore, the original argument is invalid.
A case in point: whether somethis is moral depends on your definition of moral. But there is no objective way to determine the correct definition of "moral". Therefore, there is no chance of an objective morality.
Well, whether Pluto is a planet depends on your definition of "planet". There is no way todetermine an onjectively correct definition of "planet". Yet, planetology remains a science.
Yes, many moral judgments are projections of an individual's likes and dislikestreated as intrinsic properties. But, then, many of their perceptions and observations are theory-laden. This does not eliminate the possibility of objectivity in science. We simply incorporate these facts about our perceptions into our objective account.
The original post to which I responded did not provide a helpful definition. Defining "subjective" as "mind independent" denies the fact that minds are a part of the real world, and we can make objectively true and false claims about minds. Values may not exist without minds, but minds are real. They are a part of the world. And so are values.
Every "subjective" claim has an "objective" claim that says exactly the same thing.