Comment author: komponisto 20 January 2011 01:24:28AM *  11 points [-]

Many folk here on LW take the simulation argument (in its more general forms) seriously. Many others take Singularitarianism1 seriously. Still others take Tegmark cosmology (and related big universe hypotheses) seriously. But then I see them proceed to self-describe as atheist (instead of omnitheist, theist, deist, having a predictive distribution over states of religious belief, et cetera), and many tend to be overtly dismissive of theism.

The word "but" in the last sentence is a non-sequitur if there ever were one. Tegmark cosmology is not theism. Theism means Jehovah (etc). Yes, there are people who deny this, but those people are just trying to spread confusion in the hope of preventing unpleasant social conflicts. There is no legitimate sense in which Bostromian simulation arguments or Tegmarkian cosmological speculations could be said to be even vaguely memetically related to Jehovah-worship.

The plausibility of simulations or multiverses might be an open question, but the existence of Jehovah isn't. There's a big, giant, huge difference. If we think Tegmark may be correct, then we can just say "I think Tegmark may be correct". There is no need to pay any lip-service to ancient mistakes whose superficial resemblance to Tegmark (etc) is so slight that you would never notice it unless you were motivated to do so, or heard it from someone who was.

Comment author: BecomingMyself 20 January 2011 01:39:28AM *  1 point [-]

Tegmark cosmology is not theism. Theism means Jehovah (etc).

The way I read it, it seems like Will_Newsome is not using the word in this way. It may be a case of two concepts being mistakenly filed into the same basket -- certainly some people might, when they hear "Theism-in-general is a mistaken and sometimes harmful way of thinking about the world", understand "theism-in-general" to mean "any mode of thought that acknowledges the possibility of some intelligent mind that is outside and in control of our universe". Under this interpretation, the assertion is quite obviously false (or at least, not obviously true).

I wonder if there is still a disagreement if we Taboo "theism"? (Though your point in the last paragraph is a good one, I think.)

Comment author: ata 19 January 2011 04:16:40AM *  2 points [-]

Platonism can be a bit of a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can make certain concepts a bit easier to visualize, like imagining that probabilities are over a space of "possible worlds" — you certainly don't want to develop your understanding of probability in those terms, but once you know what probabilities are about, that can still be a helpful way to visualize Bayes's theorem and related operations. On the other hand, this seems to be one of the easiest ways to get caught in the mind projection fallacy and some of the standard non-reductionist confusions.

Generally, I allow myself to use Platonist and otherwise imaginary visualizations, as long as I can keep the imaginariness in mind. This has worked well enough so far, particularly because I'm rather confused about what "existence" means, and am wary of letting it make me think I understand strange concepts like "numbers", "universes", etc. better than I really do. Though sometimes I do wonder if any of my visualizations are leading me astray. My visualization of timeless physics, for instance; I'm a bit suspicious of it since I don't really know how to do the math involved, and so I try not to take the visualization too seriously in case I'm imagining the wrong sort of structure altogether.

It took me forever to figure out that these strange thingies were physical systems in the computers themselves, and a bit longer to realize that they didn't look anything like what I thought they did. (I still haven't bothered to look it up, despite having a non-negligible desire to know.)

Look what up, exactly?

...and (it seemed to me) all computations were embodiments of some platonic ideal, souls must exist. Which could have been semi-okay, if I had realized that calling it a "soul" shouldn't allow you to assume it has properties that you ascribe to "souls" but not to "platonic ideals of computation".

Well said.

Comment author: BecomingMyself 19 January 2011 02:04:12PM *  1 point [-]

It took me forever to figure out that these strange thingies were physical systems in the computers themselves, and a bit longer to realize that they didn't look anything like what I thought they did. (I still haven't bothered to look it up, despite having a non-negligible desire to know.)

Look what up, exactly?

Oh, sorry, I thought that was clear. I want to find out what the physical systems in a computer actually look like. Right now all I (think I) know is that RAM is electricity.

Edited to make this more clear.

Erroneous Visualizations

9 BecomingMyself 19 January 2011 01:44AM

Buried somewhere among Eliezer's writings is something essentially the same as the following phrase:

"Intentional causes are made of neurons. Evolutionary causes are made of ancestors."

I remember this quite well because of my strange reaction to it. I understood what it meant pretty well, but upon seeing it, some demented part of my brain immediately constructed a mental image of what it thought an "evolutionary cause" looked like. The result was something like a mountain of fused-together bodies (the ancestors) with gears and levers and things (the causation) scattered throughout. "This," said that part of my brain, "is what an evolutionary cause looks like, and like a good reductionist I know it is physically implicit in the structure of my brain." Luckily it didn't take me long to realize what I was doing and reject that model, though I am just now realizing that the one I replaced it with still had some physical substance called "causality" flowing from ancient humans to my brain.

This is actually a common error for me. I remember I used to think of computer programs as these glorious steampunk assemblies of wheels and gears and things (apparently gears are a common visual metaphor in my brain for things it labels as complex) floating just outside the universe with all the other platonic concepts, somehow exerting their patterns upon the computers that ran them. It took me forever to figure out that these strange thingies were physical systems in the computers themselves, and a bit longer to realize that they didn't look anything like what I thought they did. (I still haven't bothered to find out what they really are, despite having a non-negligible desire to know.) And even before that -- long before I started reading Less Wrong, or even adopted empiricism (which may or may not have come earlier), I decided that because the human brain performs computation, and (it seemed to me) all computations were embodiments of some platonic ideal, souls must exist. Which could have been semi-okay, if I had realized that calling it a "soul" shouldn't allow you to assume it has properties that you ascribe to "souls" but not to "platonic ideals of computation".

Are errors like this common? I talked to a friend about it and she doesn't make this mistake, but one person is hardly a good sample. If anyone else is like this, I'd like to know how often it causes really big misconceptions and whether you have a way to control it.

Comment author: timtyler 15 January 2011 11:59:06PM 0 points [-]

I'm not sure Alyssa said she was religious!

Comment author: BecomingMyself 16 January 2011 01:51:43AM 1 point [-]

Now that I think of it I didn't say it explicitly, but I was. I called myself Catholic, but I had already rejected the Bible (because it was written by humans, of course) and concluded that God so loved His beautiful physics that He would NEVER EVER touch the universe (because I had managed to develop a fondness for science, though for some reason I did not yet accept e.g. materialism).

Comment author: BecomingMyself 15 January 2011 11:35:59PM 29 points [-]

Hi, I am Alyssa, a 16-year-old aspiring programmer-and-polymath who found her way to the wiki page for Egan's Law from the Achron forums. From there I started randomly clicking on links that mostly ended up leading to Eliezer's posts. I was a bit taken aback by his attitude toward religion, but I had previously seen mention of his AI Box thing (where (a) he struck me as awesome, and (b) he said some things about "intelligence" and "wisdom" that caused me to label him as an ally against all those fools who hated science), and I just loved his writing, so I spent about a week reading his stuff alternately thinking, "Wow, this guy is awesome" and "Poor atheist. Doesn't he realize that religion and science are compatible?" Eventually, some time after reading Religion's Claim to be Non-disprovable, I came to my senses. (It is a bit more complicated and embarrassing than that, but you get the idea.)

That was several months ago. I have been lurking not-quite-continuously since then, and it slowly dawned on me just how stupid I had been -- and more importantly, how stupid I still am. Reading about stuff like confirmation bias and overconfidence, I gradually became so afraid to trust myself that I became an expert at recognizing flaws in my own reasoning, without being able to recognize truth or flaws in others' reasoning. In effect, I had artificially removed my ability to consciously classify (non-obvious) statements as true: the same gross abuse of humility I had read about. After a bit of unproductive agonizing over how to figure out a better strategy, I have decided I'm probably too lazy for anything but making samples of my reasoning available for critique by people who are likely to be smarter than me -- for example, by participating in discussion on Less Wrong, which in theory is my goal here. So, hi! (I have been tweaking this for almost an hour and will submit it NOW.)