The way to deal with uncertainty is to analyze it into components. Most people who are reluctant to do something have about eight different reasons mixed together in their heads, and don't know themselves which are biggest. Some will be justified and some bogus, but unless you know the relative proportion of each, you don't know whether your overall uncertainty is mostly justified or mostly bogus.

--Paul Graham, same essay

Well, I dunno, if you describe physics as a Turing machine program, ala Solomonoff induction, special relativity may well be more incredible than god(s), chiefly because Turing machines may well be unable to do exact Lorentz invariance, but can do some kind of god(s), i.e. superintelligences. (Approximate relativity is doable, though).

I recommend trying to take the harmonic mean of a physical and an economic estimate when appropriate.

Here is a great simulation of two electrons in a wire that looks just like your drawing of a two particle configuration space, and is quite helpful for showing how it moves and what it means about the particles.

mwengler is offering the 2005 Mercedes CLK320a as an example of a luxury car that doesn't have "good, if sometimes absurd" cupholders, as a counterpoint to your own reported experience of always finding good cupholders in luxury cars.

In addition to making lists for "work," make one for things you want to watch, read, and/or play. You'll feel more productive and motivated even when taking a break from work.

Or it signals that you are comfortable asserting your own values in contradiction to a group. That's a very positive signal to me, but probably generally negative.

I feel like this is more of a problem with your optimism than with induction. You should really have a hypothesis set that says "humans want me to be fed for some period of time" and the evidence increases your confidence in that, not just some subset of it. After that, you can have additional hypotheses about, for example, their possible motivations, that you could update on based on whatever other data you have (e.g. you're super-induction-turkey, so you figured out evolution). Or, more trivially, you might notice that sometimes your fellow turkeys disappear and don't come back (if that happens). You would then predict the future based on all of these hypotheses, not just one linear trend you detected.

I think there seems to be a mismatch of terms involved. Ontological probability, or propensity, and epistemological probability, or uncertainty, are being confused. Reading over this discussion, I have seen claims that something called "chaotic randomness" is at work, where uncertainty results from chaotic systems because the results are so sensitive to initial conditions, but that's not ontological probability at all.

The claim of the paper is that all actual randomness, and thus ontological probability, is a result of quantum decoherence and recoherence in both chaotic and simple systems. Uncertainty is uninvolved, though uncertainty in chaotic systems appears to be random.

That said, I believe the hypothesis is correct simply because it is the simplest explanation for randomness I've seen.