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But that's the first time Potter sees their magic interact, so what effect did Quirrell fake?
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Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, February 2015, chapters 105-107
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Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, February 2015, chapters 105-107
The sense of doom. I thought the magic-can't-interact was mostly just the strongest edge of that--e.g. (maybe "i.e." too) their magic could interact but it would hurt them enough that they don't try.
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Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, February 2015, chapters 105-107
I find it highly unlikely that he faked the Avada Kedavra/Patronus effect in Azkaban...
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Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, February 2015, chapters 105-107
That could just be a feature of the True Patronus, which is pretty anti-death and especially anti-indifference-to-other-people's-lives.
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Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, February 2015, chapters 105-107
1) It's not clear how easy it is to Memory-charm an Occlumens. 2) As far as we know, Quirrel & Harry can't directly use magic on each other.
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Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, February 2015, chapters 105-107
Your point 2 is another thing I'm getting pretty suspicious of. Quirrell has set up a very long plan, and could easily have faked this effect with wandless magic, or an enchantment he could later dispel, all along.
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Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, February 2015, chapters 105-107
I agree that Harry's actions weren't even close to optimal in that situation, but you have to cut him some slack; after all, he just found out that he was a fork of Lord Voldemort, that his best friend had been killed by his trusted mentor, and, oh, let's not forget that that mentor also happens to be Lord Voldemort. He'd have been hard-pressed to be thinking completely clearly after a series of revelations like that. (Mind you, all of these revelations sans the last one came from Quirrell himself, who's hardly the most trustworthy character out there, but the shock and emotional impact is real nonetheless.)
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Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, February 2015, chapters 105-107
Certainly, and in the actual situation, I would have done worse than he actually did. But, this kind of armchair analysis is extremely enjoyable, and a good way to improve your in situ skills.
In response to
Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, February 2015, chapters 105-107
Harry made some serious mistakes in chapter 105.
First, the parseltongue honesty-binding could just be Quirrell's (selective!) wandless magic--I mean, he just forged a note "from yourself" (and why do you even MAKE a self-recognition ("I am a potato") policy if you just forget all about it once you're in a life-stakes intrigue) so you need a lot of extra suspicions going forward. But assuming it's real... there are crucial questions Harry can now profitably ask, with his help conditional on getting immediate Parseltongue answers, along the lines of:
"Why did you set up this elaborate ruse instead of just asking me? Most of what you're saying right now sounds like something I would've probably agreed to if you were open about it, but no, you had to pretend you were dying and kill my friend, so it sure seems like you're planning nefarious things I'd rather not aid even at the cost of my life and the hostages' lives... does my CURRENT utility function actually prefer your planned results to the death of me and the hostages?"
(This isn't the perfect phrasing; for one thing Quirrell doesn't necessarily know Harry's utility function to high accuracy, for another Harry might have disagreed to the "open" proposal at weaker dispreference than "this is worse than my death". But something similar...)
Iff Quirrell is at all "innocent" at this point, he'd want to answer these, and never mind the "my policy is never to reveal that much or people will know I'm guilty later when I actually need to keep mum" stuff; these stakes seem high enough to outweigh any future similar dealings. If he's guilty, then just die like you'd apparently prefer.
[the only edits I made here after getting responses were to correct my spelling of "Quirrell", and this note]
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Rationality Quotes December 2014
Which [sports] teams win is largely a function of which teams have the best players, and each league has its own way of determining which players end up on which teams. So, in a sense, Team 1 vs. Team 2 is no more a contest of athletic prowess than chess is a test of whether queens are more powerful than bishops. The real battle is between groups of executives, and the sport is player acquisition.
-- Adam Cadre
This is similar to choosing strict determinism over compatibilism. Which players are the "best" depends on each of those players' individual efforts during the game. You could extend the idea to the executives too, anyway--which groups of executives acquire better players is largely a function of which have the best executives.
Efforts are only one variable here, and the quote did say "largely a function of". Those being said, look at how often teams replay each other during a season with a different winner.
I'm a professional computer programmer, a field founded on logic and reason. I've been doing it for a while, and am, if I say so myself, pretty good at it.
I still find myself frequently hitting places where the best argument I can make for a particular decision is "this feels intuitively like decision x and decision y, and those were the correct choices in those cases, therefore I think this is the correct decision too." And very often that's right.
My understanding of the evidence is that within specific fields, experts in that field develop intuitions that really can yield better decisionmaking than conscious reason. Logically, doesn't it seem like this would be true of living in general?
Mentioning a similarity to past successful decisions seems like it qualifies as "constructing a more contextually specific argument than 'you'll understand when you're older'".
In response to
Rationality Quotes November 2014
Teacher: So if you could live to be any age you like, what would it be?
Boy 2: Infinity.
Teacher: Infinity, you would live for ever? Why would you like to live for ever?
Boy 2: Because you just know a lot of people and make lots of new friends because you could travel to lots of countries and everything and meet loads of new animals and everything.
--Until (documentary)
While this is on My Side, I still have to protest trying to sneak any side (or particular (group of) utility function(s)) into the idea of "rationality".
[Vizzini has just cut the rope The Dread Pirate Roberts is climbing up]
Vizzini: HE DIDN'T FALL? INCONCEIVABLE.
Inigo Montoya: You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.
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Oh yeah. 18 too, I guess:
I think these are sufficient evidence that this is the real Dumbledore, not the mirror showing Quirrell what he wants.