The "Friendship is Witchcraft" expectation test

-2 PhilGoetz 15 January 2013 05:56PM

My mother won't watch animated movies.  It doesn't matter what the content is.  Whether it's Sponge Bob or Grave of the Fireflies, she believes that animation is used only for shows for children, and that adults shouldn't watch shows for children.  She's incapable of changing this belief, because even if I somehow convince her to sit and watch an animated film, she sees what she expects, not what's in front of her.

I think this is the same thing that creation scientists and climate-change deniers do.  They literally cannot perceive what is in front of them, because they are already convinced they know what it is.

Here's an interesting test, which I discovered by accident:  There's a hilarious series of fan-made parodies of My Little Pony: Friendship is Magic on YouTube called Friendship is Witchcraft.  They took show videos and redubbed them to have different stories in which various ponies are robots, fascists, or cult members planning to awaken Cthulhu.  I've shown these videos to four people without explanation, just saying "You've got to see this!" and bringing up "Cute From the Hip" on YouTube.

The same thing always happens.  They watch with stony, I-must-be-polite-to-Phil faces, without laughing.  Eventually I realize that they think they're watching an episode of My Little Pony.  I explain that it's a parody, and they say, "Oh!"  I'd think that lines like "I know we've taught you to laugh in the face of death," "If you think one of your friends is a robot, kids, report them to the authorities so that they can be destroyed!", "I'm covered in pig's blood!", or, "Are you busy Friday?  We need a willing victim for our ritual sacrifice" would prompt some questions.  They don't.  They are so determined to see a TV show for little girls that that's what they see, regardless of what's in front of them.

Stop Using LessWrong: A Practical Interpretation of the 2012 Survey Results

-37 aceofspades 30 December 2012 10:00PM

Link to those results: http://lesswrong.com/lw/fp5/2012_survey_results/

I've been basically lurking this site for more than a year now and it's incredible that I have actually taken anything at all on this site seriously, let alone that at least thousands of others have. I have never received evidence that I am less likely to be overconfident about things than people in general or that any other particular person on this site is.

Yet in spite of this apparently 3.7% of people answering the survey have actually signed up for cryonics which is surely greater than the percent of people in the entire world signed up for cryonics. The entire idea seems to be taken especially seriously on this site. Evidently 72.9% of people here are at least considering signing up. I think the chance of cryonics working is trivial, for all practical purposes indistinguishable from zero (the expected value of the benefit is certainly not worth several hundred thousand dollars in future value considerations). Other people here apparently disagree, but if the rest of the world is undervaluing cryonics at the moment then why do those here with privileged information not invest heavily in the formation of new for-profit cryonics organizations, or start them alone, or invest in technology which will soon develop to make the revival of cryonics patients possible? If the rest of the world is underconfident about these ideas, then these investments would surely have an enormous expected rate of return.

There is also a question asking about the relative likelihood of different existential risks, which seems to imply that any of these risks are especially worth considering. This is not really a fault of the survey itself, as I have read significant discussion on this site related to these ideas. In my judgment this reflects a grand level of overconfidence in the probabilities of any of these occurring. How many people responding to this survey have actually made significant personal preparations for survival, like a fallout shelter with food and so on which would actually be useful under most of the different scenarios listed? I generously estimate 5% have made any such preparations.

I also see mentioned in the survey and have read on this site material related to in my view meaningless counterfactuals. The questions on dust specks vs torture and Newcomb's Problem are so unlikely to ever be relevant in reality that I view discussion about them as worthless.

My judgment of this site as of now is that way too much time is spent discussing subjects of such low expected value (usually because of absurdly low expected probability of occurring) for using this site to be worthwhile. In fact I hypothesize that this discussion actually causes overconfidence related to such things happening, and at a minimum I have seen insufficient evidence for the value of using this site to continue doing so.

Enjoying musical fashion: why not?

2 alexflint 21 February 2011 04:22PM

I just downloaded the latest Radiohead album, and I love it.

Thinking back, I started listening to Radiohead years ago when I found out that some of the cool kids in school were into it. With all the hype about the new album, the status/fashion processors in my brain going to ensure that I enjoy listening to it. I would probably fail a double-blind test with a bunch of imitation bands' fake "new Radiohead albums".

But I'm really enjoying listening to the album, and that doesn't seem like a bad or contradictory thing at all, even in light of the statements above. If, hypothetically, I was enjoying it for purely non-fashion reasons, then presumably that enjoyment could also be traced back though a causal chain to facts about brain development, evolutionary psychology, or whatever. But we would have no problem accepting that enjoyment as A Good Thing since explaining enjoyment does not diminish it. And so it seems in this case.

Avoiding the Study of Being Sincere

1 Vaniver 07 January 2011 08:10AM

This is a mind-dump of sorts: I don't expect I can make a top-level post of this without extensive external input, and am not sure there's anything interesting here. But the possibility seems high enough to consider it openly (and if someone else sees something here they can run with, go for it).

 

I can't reproduce the entire train of thought (though a lot of it was based on thinking about Joseph Smith and Mormons), but I was just struck by something: the difference between the study of being sincere and the study of revolutions.

Most people spend their time thinking about sincerity: what do I like and dislike? What would a utopia look like? It's primarily speculation about and statement of desires, which are relatively easy to determine and manufacture. I should be clear here that I'm not talking about the study of lying or persuasion, but of your belief about something in particular: in truly believing something and that belief having power over you. I've read somewhat frequently around here people swearing on their 'strength as a rationalist', a phrase that utterly fails to move me but apparently does move them. I am not sincere about rationalism the way they are; that's what I mean by being sincere (does anyone have another word they would recommend I use instead?).

Studying revolutions, however, seems almost entirely different. It's not a question of like and dislike, but effective and ineffective. Rather than focusing on outcomes, it focuses on processes (judged by their outcomes). While morality is a central fixture of sincerity, amorality is a hallmark of effective revolutionaries- any moral actions are justified by amoral reasons.

Every distinction wants to be a dichotomy, but obviously that is not the case here- it's easy to be both sincere and a revolutionary (though a fairly large set of beliefs are difficult to be sincere about while a revolutionary).

The first example is a simplified one: the American and French revolutions of 1776 and 1789. The Americans talked a lot about checks and balances; the French talked a lot about liberty and brotherhood. Their outcomes suggest not that liberty or brotherhood are bad things to talk about, but that not talking about checks and balances is a terrible idea. The Americans were interested in the method of government while the French were solely interested in the outcome of government.

The relationship to rationalism is fairly clear: being rational is often the analog of studying revolutions. The question isn't "what belief would make my map the prettiest?" but "what belief best links up my map and the territory?" Indeed, when sincerity and efficacy conflict rationalism is explicit in supporting insincerity. It seems like one could go so far as to turn the distinction around: "sincerity" is what happens when you just have fervor, but "revolution" is what happens when you have fervor and rationality.

Perhaps thinking along these lines is useful simply as a warning? Mastery without intentions is empty, but intentions without mastery dangerous. Grow both your mastery and intentions, not letting a deficiency in one swallow your efforts in the other.

The Last Number

4 Stuart_Armstrong 10 April 2010 12:09PM

"...90116633393348054920083..."

He paused for a moment, and licked his recently reconstructed lips. He was nearly there. After seventeen thousand subjective years of effort, he was, finally, just seconds away from the end. He slowed down as the finish line drew into sight, savouring and lengthening the moment where he stood there, just on the edge of enlightenment.

"...4...7...7...0...9...3..."

Those years had been long; longer, perhaps, in the effects they had upon him, than they could ever be in any objective or subjective reality. He had been human; he had been frozen, uploaded, simulated, gifted with robotic bodies inside three different levels of realities, been a conscript god, been split into seven pieces (six of which were subsequently reunited). He had been briefly a battle droid for the army of Orion, and had chanted his numbers even as he sent C-beams to glitter in the dark to scorch Formic worlds.

He had started his quest at the foot of a true Enlightened One, who had guided him and countless other disciples on the first step of the path. Quasi-enlightened ones had guided him further, as the other disciples fell to the wayside all around him, unable to keep their purpose focused. And now, he was on the edge of total Enlightenment. Apparently, there were some who went this far, and deliberately chose not to take the last step. But these were always friends of a friend of an acquaintance of a rumour. He hadn't believed they existed. And now that he had come this far, he knew these folk didn't exist. No-one could come this far, this long, and not finish it.

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Pain and gain motivation

45 Kaj_Sotala 07 April 2010 06:48PM

Note: this post is basically just summarizing some of PJ Eby's freely available writings on the topic of pain/gain motivation and presenting them in a form that's easier for the LW crowd to digest. I claim no credit for the ideas presented here, other than the credit for summarizing them.

EDIT: Note also Eby's comments and corrections to my summary at this comment.

Eby proposes that we have two different forms of motivation: positive ("gain") motivation, which drives us to do things, and negative ("pain") motivation, which drives us to avoid things. Negative motivation is a major source of akrasia and is mostly harmful for getting anything done. However, sufficiently large amounts of negative motivation can momentarily push us to do things, which frequently causes people to confuse the two.

To understand the function of negative motivation, first consider the example of having climbed to a tree to avoid a predator. There's not much you can do other than wait and hope the predator goes away, and if you move around, you risk falling out of the tree. So your brain gets flooded with signals that suppress activity and tell it to keep your body still. It is only if the predator ends up climbing up the tree that the danger becomes so acute that you're instead pushed to flee.

What does this have to do with modern-day akrasia? Back in the tribal environment, elicting the disfavor of the tribe could be a death sentence. Be cast out by the tribe, and you likely wouldn't live for long. One way to elict disfavor is to be unmasked as incompetent in some important matter, and a way to avoid such an unmasking is to simply avoid doing anything where to consequences of failure would be severe.

You might see why this would cause problems. Sometimes, when the pain level of not having done a task grows too high - like just before a deadline - it'll push you to do it. But this fools people into thinking that negative consequences alone will be a motivator, so they try to psyche themselves up by thinking about how bad it would be to fail. In truth, this is only making things worse, as an increased chance of failure will increase the negative motivation that's going on.

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Loleliezers

5 dclayh 01 April 2010 04:04AM

Previously: Eliezer Yudkowsky facts, and Kevin's prediction.

 

A bit of silliness for the day.  Below the fold to spare those with delicate sensibilities. 

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Creating a Less Wrong prediction market

6 Kevin 26 February 2010 11:48AM

I will bet 500 karma that a funny picture thread will appear on Less Wrong within one year. If anyone is interested in the bet, we can better define terms.

Right now the LW software doesn't support karma transfers. Until it does and we can develop a more robust prediction market, let's just record the karma transfers on the wiki page that already exists for this purpose.

I will also give 100 karma to anyone that donates $10 to the SIAI before the current fundraising campaign is over.

10,000 karma for the first person with a karma transfer source code patch?

Common Errors in History

4 PhilGoetz 09 February 2010 07:27PM

I bought a copy of Common Errors in History, which someone mentioned recently on LW.  There were no copies on Amazon or other bookselling sites, but I found a copy on Ebay.  No wonder it was hard to get - it's a 24-page pamphlet that was printed once, in 1945, by "The Historical Association," London.

I tried to find some common failures of rationality underlying the "common errors" listed.  This is what I concluded:

English students in the mid-20th century learned a lot of history.

This booklet is full of statements such as, "The facts relating to the Corn Laws [of 1815-1849] are more often than not mis-stated in school examination papers," and, "The blockade of Brest and Toulon [during the Napoleonic wars] is usually misunderstood."  My history lessons consisted primarily of repeatedly learning about the American Revolution and making turkeys or pilgrim hats out of colored cardboard.

The English sincerely apologize for their history.

In other countries, textbook authors try to make their own countries look good.  In England, that would seem gauche.  The entries on "Religion in the New England Colonies", "The Causes of the American War of Independence", "The First Chinese War, 1839-42",  "Gladstone and the Turks", and "The Manchurian Crisis, 1931-32" complain that British textbook accounts place all of the blame on Britain.

History is simplified in order to assign blame and credit.

In numerous of the 20 entries, notably "The Dissolution of the Monasteries and Education", "Religion in the New England Colonies", "The Enclosure Movement", "The Causes of the American War of Independence", "The Great Trek", "The First Chinese War", "The Elementary Education Act", and "The Manchurian Crisis", the tract alleges that standard accounts are simplified; and they appear to be simplified in ways that allow a simple causal summary, preferably with one person, side, or act of legislation to receive credit or blame.

Not always.  "The Great Trek" says that the Boers' depart is usually explained as due to their [blameworthy] indignation that the British had freed their slaves; whereas in fact they had a variety of different, equally blameworthy, reasons for leaving.  And the entry on "Bismarck's Alliances" says that the textbook account is overly-complex in that it introduces a second treaty that did not exist.

This is the only general principle I could extract from the book, so it may just be a statistical accident.

 

If anyone would like a copy of the book, send me an email at gmail.

 

Debunking komponisto on Amanda Knox (long)

-5 rolf_nelson 02 February 2010 04:40AM

Rebuttal to: The Amanda Knox Test

If you don't care about Amanda Knox's guilt, or whether you have received unreliable information on the subject from komponisto's post, stop reading now.

[Edit: Let me note that, generally, I agree that discussion of current events should be discouraged in this site. It is only because "The Amanda Knox Test" was a featured post on this site that I claim this rebuttal of that post to be on-topic for this site.]

I shall here make the following claim:

C1. komponisto's post on Amanda Knox was misleading.

I could, additionally, choose to make the following claims:

C2. Amanda Knox is guilty of murder.
C3. The prosecution succeeded in proving Amanda's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
C4. Amanda Knox received a fair trial

I believe claims C2 through C4 are also true; however, time constraints prevent me from laying out the cases and debating them with every single human being on the Internet, so I shall merely focus on C1. (That said, I would be willing to debate komponisto on C2, since I am curious whether I could get him to change his mind on the subject.)

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