Comment author: Alicorn 31 January 2010 04:58:09PM 4 points [-]

Yeah, if you have no idea what "use" deontology is unless it's secretly just tarted-up consequentialism, I have failed.

Comment author: Breakfast 31 January 2010 05:07:57PM *  6 points [-]

Huh? To be fair, I don't think you were setting out to make the case for deontology here. All I am saying about its "use" is that I don't see any appeal. I think you gave a pretty good description of what deontologists are thinking; the North Pole - reindeer - haunting paragraph was handily illustrative.

Anyway, I think Kant may be to blame for employing arguments that consider "what would happen if others performed similar acts more frequently than they actually do". People say similar things all the time -- "What if everyone did that?" -- as though there were a sort of magical causal linkage between one's individual actions and the actions of the rest of the world.

Comment author: bogus 31 January 2010 04:50:38PM *  5 points [-]

Kant's point is not that "everyone doing X" matters, it's that ethical injunctions should be indexically invariant, i.e. "universal". If an ethical injunction is affected by where in the world you are, then it's arguaby no ethical injunction at all.

Wei_Dai and EY have done some good work in reformulating decision theory to account for these indexical considerations, and the resulting theories (UDT and TDT) have some intuitively appealing features, such as cooperating in the one-shot PD under some circumstances. Start with this post.

Comment author: Breakfast 31 January 2010 05:02:07PM 2 points [-]

I'm (obviously) no Kant scholar, but I wonder if there is any possible way to flesh out a consistent and satisfactory set of such context-invariant ethical injunctions.

For example, he infamously suggests not lying to a murderer who asks where your friend is, even if you reasonably expect him to go murder your friend, because lying is wrong. Okay -- even if we don't follow our consequentialist intuitions and treat that as a reductio ad absurdum for his whole system -- that's your 'not lying' principle satisfied. But what about your 'not betraying your friends' principle? How many principles have we got in the first place, and how can we weigh them against one another?

Comment author: Alicorn 31 January 2010 04:41:58PM 6 points [-]

Everyone doing X is not even a remotely likely consequence of me doing X.

AAAAAAAAAAAAH

*ahem* Excuse me.

I meant: Wow, have I ever failed at my objective here! Does anyone want me to keep trying, or should I give up and just sob quietly in a corner for a while?

Comment author: Breakfast 31 January 2010 04:55:39PM *  0 points [-]

Sorry. But then I said:

Maybe this is to beg the question of consequences mattering in the first place.

And added,

But I suppose I have no idea what use deontology is if it doesn't boil down to consequentialism at some level.

?

Comment author: RobinZ 30 January 2010 06:43:25PM *  7 points [-]

+10karma for you!

I have a bit of a negative reaction to deontology, but upon consideration the argument would be equally applicable to consequentialism: the prescriptions and proscriptions of a deontological morality are necessarily arbitrary, and likewise the desideratum and disdesideratum (what is the proper antonym? Edit: komponisto suggests "evitandum", which seems excellent) of a consequentialist morality are necessarily arbitrary.

...which makes me wonder if the all-atheists-are-nihilists meme is founded in deontological intuitions.

Comment author: Breakfast 31 January 2010 04:38:38PM *  3 points [-]

Certainly, many theists immediately lump atheism, utilitarianism and nihilism together. There are heaps of popular depictions framing utilitarian reasoning as being too 'cold and calculating' and not having 'real heart'. Which follows from atheists 'not having any real values' and from accepting the nihilistic, death-obsessed Darwinian worldview, etc.

Comment author: Alicorn 31 January 2010 02:54:21PM 3 points [-]

No two people can agree on how to characterize Kant, but it is a legitimate interpretation that I have heard advanced by a PhD-having philosopher that you can think about that formulation of the CI as referring to a possible world where the maxim is followed like a natural law.

Comment author: Breakfast 31 January 2010 04:30:31PM 1 point [-]

What has never stopped bewildering me is the question of why anyone should consider such a possible world relevant to their individual decision-making. I know Kant has some... tangled, Kantian argument regarding this, but does anyone who isn't a die-hard Kantian have any sensible reason on hand for considering the counterfactual "What if everyone did the same"?

Everyone doing X is not even a remotely likely consequence of me doing X. Maybe this is to beg the question of consequences mattering in the first place. But I suppose I have no idea what use deontology is if it doesn't boil down to consequentialism at some level... or, particularly, I have no idea what use it is if it makes appeals to impossibly unlikely consequences like "Everyone lying all the time," instead of likely ones.

Comment author: Jack 06 January 2010 05:37:32PM 2 points [-]

Still I think we'd need some measure to prevent becoming permanently entrenched into factions. Maybe have an artificial time-limit for clearly defined factions. Every two weeks we tell everyone to give up factional loyalties and consider the evidence given. Then after a couple days re-form the factions along new boundaries.

Comment author: Breakfast 06 January 2010 09:55:47PM *  1 point [-]

That sounds pretty confusing. You might as well just not have officially sanctioned factions in the first place, right? People who agree on a given issue will naturally band together on it, but they won't be so afflicted with the bias or the pressure that comes of being on a well-defined Side, to have their whole range of opinions cohere with those held by the group. There are already de facto 'factions' on any issue we might discuss, and everyone is already felt to be continually obliged to examine the rationality of their positions, so it kind of seems like we're already there!

Comment author: bogus 05 January 2010 10:57:50PM *  5 points [-]

I think you need to add a fourth option: People with a blatant conflict of interest--most often a political affiliation. Even Wikipedia (which thrives on niceness and NPOV-seeking, if not truth-seeking) assumes bad faith when people try to edit their own articles, with its WP:COI policy. The legal system assumes bad faith about prosecutors and lawyers, which is why its standard of evidence is so extreme. And while the scientific method does not assume bad faith about scientists, it still protects against their naive errors of rationality, which is just as important.

Of course, we already know that prediction markets excel at integrating people with bad faith in a rational, truth-seeking institution; finding a way to do the same thing in a deliberative forum comparable to Less Wrong would be an extremely useful development. My hunch is that it would be useful to steal a page from the playbook of politics and support clearly-defined factions with different points of view and perhaps different policy proposals or decisions or what have you. But all of this is largely speculation.

tl;dr: I think Alicorn's post is definitely cogent when it comes to LessWrong as we know it. But there's a huge design space to be explored for more resilient institutions.

Comment author: Breakfast 06 January 2010 04:49:04PM 4 points [-]

Hrm. Well, if politics itself is any example to judge by, that may make for a resilient institution -- but the mess of allegiances and biases created by splitting people into well-defined factions probably entails that the institution would be much worse off in terms of truth-finding, because devoting too much of its energies to internecine squabbling.

I suppose you need to strike a balance between unproductive antagonism, and ending up as a group of like-minded folks just patting each other on the back. Thankfully, LW seems to have a strong dose of "Let's get to the bottom of this"-type norms, and the appropriately rigorous/persnickety personalities, to stop it from getting too back-patty.

Comment author: wedrifid 02 November 2009 05:33:20AM 3 points [-]

Welcome, Breakfast.

Comment author: Breakfast 02 November 2009 05:58:01AM 0 points [-]

Well, thank you again!

Comment author: wedrifid 02 November 2009 04:58:43AM 3 points [-]

To enhance the reading experience quote slabs of text by placing a '>' at the start of the line.

Comment author: Breakfast 02 November 2009 05:00:17AM *  2 points [-]

Done, thanks. (That was my first ever comment here)

In response to comment by taw on Our House, My Rules
Comment author: wedrifid 02 November 2009 02:35:49AM 8 points [-]

It's extremely hard to sacrifice yourself for someone else. There just aren't many situations where making yourself dead is the best and only way to make someone else stay alive.

Comment author: Breakfast 02 November 2009 04:59:06AM 5 points [-]

But parents — probably the vast majority of them — routinely make tremendous sacrifices in every area of their lives for their children, which seems to come pretty darn close.

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