Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions is all about how an old scientific approach is often more right than the new school -- fits the data better, at least in the areas widely acknowledged to be central. Only later does the new approach become refined enough to fit the data better.

"Yes, people with divergent ideas are more likely to be exiled."

I did mention creative achievement as well, not just divergent thinking. So are musicians and actors among these exiled? These seem like the type of professions that are lauded in mainstream culture more than exiled. Creativity correlates both with being attractive to the opposite sex and suicidal ideation (not to mention suicidal completion). Now, sexual attraction doesn't necessarily prove that these are socially acceptable professions, but I think it is premature to call these people "exiled" without additional evidence.

Sources:

• http://www.ajol.info/index.php/safp/article/view/13477 "Specialties with high suicide risk are musicians, dentists, nurses, social workers, artists, mathematicians, scientists and police officers"

• http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8726961 "This may partly explain the high suicide rates witnessed for occupations such as artists, High-risk occupations for suicide 7actors and entertainers, musicians and merchant seafarers. Nurses have previously been identified with high suicide rates. (I also want to point out nurses. While nurses aren't necessarily more creative, they are certainly not exiled social pariahs) "

• http://repository.unm.edu/handle/1928/10410

I still stand by the position that depression being rooted solely on the basis of tribal exile, or as an evo-psych emotional reaction to tribal exile, as grossly simplistic.

The discussions in moral uncertain normally use the consensual options of ethical theories(deontology, consequentialism), and then propose some kind of solution, like intertheoretical comparison. The decompositions posed in the post create more problems to solve, like the correct description of values. I assume the author would find some kind of consequentialism as a correct theory, with settle the third uncertain. Feel free to respond if thats not the case.

Yup. There exist established fields that study super intelligences with interests not necessarily aligned with ours -- polisci, socialsci and econ. Now you may criticize their methods or their formalisms, but they do have smart people and insights.

I think the research into Friendliness, if it's not a fake, would do well to connect with some subproblem in polisci, socialsci or econ. It ought to be easier than the full problem, and the solution will immediately pay off. I asked Vassar about this once, and he said that he did not think this would be easier. I never really understood that reply.

Do humans have goals in this sense? Our subsystems seem to conflict often enough.

I bet most people here have realized this explicitly or implicitly

A maybe tangential comment: what I often appreciate on Lesswrong is the capability of certain posts to put order to some vague ideas or concept I have in my mind. This is one of those posts. Good work!

We're just making fun of people treating any news as evidence for the superiority of their tribe. Then making fun of ourselves for asserting the superiority of our tribe by making fun of others.

I think the serious use of this post is to look at your own thinking, notice you're doing those mocked things, and stop.

I love the word "Unclipperific."

I follow the argument here, but I'm still mulling over it and I think by the time I figure out whether I agree the conversation will be over. Something disconcerting struck me on reading it, though: I think I could only follow it having already read and understood the Metaethics sequence. (at least, I think I understood it correctly; at least one commenter confirmed the point that gave me the most trouble at the time)

While I was absorbing the Sequences, I found I could understand most posts on their own, and I read many of them out of order without much difficulty. But without that extensive context I think this post would read like Hegel. If this was important to some argument I was having, and I referenced it, I wouldn't expect my opponent (assuming above-average intelligence) to follow it well enough to distinguish it from complicated but meaningless drivel. You might consider that a problem with the writing if not the argument.

Evidence search: is there anyone here who hasn't read Metaethics but still understood Eliezer's point as Eliezer understands it?

A tendency to thanks some randomness in life, like Taleb, could help. Maybe you should blame the incapability of perfectly prediction, or the fact that cars kill dozens of people, and yet you insist to drive.

Weatherson ask what could be done in other departments. R: all the formal methods(logic, decision and game theory), and empirical like x-phi. Besides, I don't want shut down philosophy departments, but I will be happy if they move to something like CMU + cogsci.