That was in reference to the labor issue, right?
AI that can't compete in the job market probably isn't a global catastrophic risk.
This is good news. In general, since all forms of existential risk seem underfunded as a whole, funding more to any one of them is a good thing. But a donation of this size for AI specifically makes me now start to wonder if people should identify other existential risks which are now more underfunded. In general, it takes a very large amount of money to change what has the highest marginal return, but this is a pretty large donation.
GiveWell is on the case, and has said it is looking at bio threats (as well as nukes, solar storms, interruptions of agriculture). See their blog post on global catastrophic risks potential focus areas.
The open letter is an indication that GiveWell should take AI risk more seriously, while the Musk donation is an indication that near-term room for more funding will be lower. That could go either way.
On the room for more funding question, it's worth noting that GiveWell and Good Ventures are now moving tens of millions of dollars per year, and have been talking about moving quite a bit more than Musk's donation to the areas the Open Philanthropy Project winds up prioritizing.
However, even if the amount of money does not exhaust the field, there may be limits on how fast it can be digested, and the efficient growth path, that would favor gradually increasing activity.
Why should we consider possible rather than actual experiences in this context? It seems that cryonics patients who are successfully revived will retain their original reward circuitry, so I don't see why we should expect their best possible experiences to be as good as their worst possible experiences are bad, given that this is not the case for current humans.
For some of the same reasons depressed people take drugs to elevate their mood.
Typo, "amplified" vs "amplify":
"on its motherboard as a makeshift radio to amplified oscillating signals from nearby computers"
Thanks for the correction! I changed "endorsed" to "discussed" in the OP. What I meant to convey was that these authors endorsed the logic of the argument given the premises (ignoring sim scenarios), rather than that they agreed with the argument all things considered.
It has been endorsed by Robin Hanson, Carl Shulman, and Nick Bostrom.
The article you cite for Shulman and Bostrom does not endorse the SIA-doomsday argument. It describes it, but:
- Doesn't take a stance on the SIA; it does an analysis of alternatives including SIA
- Argues that the interaction with the Simulation Argument changes the conclusion of the Fermi Paradox SIA Doomsday argument given the assumption of SIA.
We believe we can achieve trans-sapient performance by 2018, he is not that off the mark. But dangers as such, those are highly over-blown, exaggerated, pseudo-scientific fears, as always.
By "we" do you mean Gök Us Sibernetik Ar & Ge in Turkey? How many people work there?
It would be better than nothing. I am grinding one of my favorite axes more than I probably should. But those numbers make my case. My intuition says it would be hard to mine a few million SNPs, pick the most strongly associated 9500, and have them account for less than .29 of the variance, even if there were no relationship at all. And height is probably a very simple property, which may depend mainly on the intensity and duration of expression of a single growth program, minus interference from deficiencies or programs competing for resources.
"My intuition says it would be hard to mine a few million SNPs, pick the most strongly associated 9500, and have them account for less than .29 of the variance, even if there were no relationship at all."
With sample sizes of thousands or low tens of thousands you'd get almost nothing. Going from 130k to 250k subjects took it from 0.13 to 0.29 (where the total contribution of all common additive effects is around 0.5).
Most of the top 9500 are false positives (the top 697 are genome-wide significant and contribute most of the variance explained). Larger sample sizes let you overcome noise and correctly weight the alleles with actual effects. The approach looks set to explain everything you can get (and the bulk of heritability for height and IQ) without whole genome sequencing for rare variants just by scaling up another order of magnitude.
One problem is that for that approach, you would need, say, standardized IQ tests and genomes for a large number of people, and then to identify genome properties correlated with high IQ.
First, all biologists everywhere are still obsessed with "one gene" answers. Even when they use big-data tools, they use them to come up with lists of genes, each of which they say has a measurable independent contribution to whatever it is they're studying. This is looking for your keys under the lamppost. The effect of one gene allele depends on what alleles of other genes are present. But try to find anything in the literature acknowledging that. (Admittedly we have probably evolved for high independence of genes, so that we can reproduce thru sex.)
Second, as soon as you start identifying genome properties associated with IQ, you'll get accused of racism.
You can deal with epistasis using the techniques Hsu discusses and big datasets, and in any case additive variance terms account for most of the heritability even without doing that. There is much more about epistasis (and why it is of secondary importance for characterizing the variation) in the linked preprint.
Subscribe to RSS Feed
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
His article commentary on G+ seems to get more into the "dissing" territory:
See this video at 39:30 for Yann LeCun giving some comments. He said:
Also here is an IEEE interview: