We should encourage and support self-experimentation by our members.

Unless the experiment is obviously harming the experimenter, encouraging this will help us find more efficient ways of doing things. I think that respecting a fellow rationalist's decision is a way of respecting their rationality as well.

Can you explain why this is a very high priority for you?

Any phrase beginning with "we should believe that" seems outright irrational. Rational beliefs are grow from evidence, not moral reasoning of any kind.

• Instead of saying "we should believe that the Earth is round because it looks round when seen from the space", just say "the Earth is round because it looks round when seen from the space". The latter sentence is clearer and doesn't lack anything important which the former has.
• If you rather had in mind something like "we should believe that the Earth is round because else, we are no rationalists", rather say "the belief in non-round Earth is not rational (given such and such definition of rationality)".
• If the proposed norms are intended rather procedurally, such as "we should believe that the Earth is round because whoever doesn't will be forever banished from this community", just say "whoever doesn't believe in round Earth will be forever banished from this community".

Except the last variant, the formulations without "should" don't sound like norms, and that's a feature, not a bug. Or at least should be.

Codifying taboos seems reasonable if we're codifying norms in general - taboos are basically norms of not doing certain things, after all.

We seem to have a pretty strong norm of not lying to each other, and a weaker (and possibly not generally endorsed) norm of not talking about any religious or spiritual practices that we might have.

Could you expand on the things about LDS that you don't want to see replicated among rationalists?

Eh?

I mentioned updating beliefs based on evidence, and acting based on one's beliefs, but not having particular beliefs in general. The last bit, about the list of common beliefs, was meant to be along the lines of "If you believe A, you should do B. If you believe C, you should do D. If you believe E...", not a list of endorsed beliefs.

Also, rationalist taboo is not about taboos in the usual sense.

It may be useful to codify beliefs in particular as "what we believed in (May of) 2011" rather than "what we believe". That seems to me like it will cut down on a lot of the overhead - there's much less implication that someone should believe any particular thing on the list, and it's more obvious that 'so what?' or 'yes, because...' are good responses to 'you don't believe [particular thing] any more!'.

I'm not sure that beliefs are an appropriate thing to have in a list of LW norms in the first place, though. There are some obvious ones that seem to belong here, like the belief that believing true things is generally likely to be helpful, but other than that, well, changing beliefs is what we're about; our norms should be something a bit more meta than that.

Well, it seems I misunderstand your statement, "It is possible to not control anger but instead never even feel it in the first place, without effort or willpower."

I know it is possible to experience anger, but control it and not act angry - there is a difference between having the feeling and acting on it. I know it is also possible to not feel anger, or to only feel anger later, when distanced from the situation. I'm ok with being aware of the feeling and not acting on it, but to get to the point where you don't feel it is where I'm starting to doubt whether it's really a net benefit.

And yes, I do understand that with understand / assumptions about other people, stuff that would have otherwise bothered me (or someone else) is no longer a source of anger. You changed your outlook and understanding of that type of situation so that your emotion is frustration and not anger. If that's what you meant originally, I understand now.

We should believe that our beliefs, taboos and practises are subject to change based on future evidence and circumstance, much of which is unknown, or even unknowable, at this time.

We also suppose that codifying them will add both a cognitive and administrative overhead to carrying out such changes.

But rationalism doesn’t have a well-defined set of norms/desirable skills to develop. As a result, we Less Wrongians unsurprisingly also lack a well-developed practical system for implementation.

Implementation of what? What's the purpose of these hypothetical norms? There's no point in propagating arbitrary norms. You are describing it backwards.