Isn't this an opportunity to allow them a line of retreat?

Part of my problem with arguing about AGW is that it has gotten to the point that it's not a science question, it's a political question at this point. So I can be reasonably sure that any "scientific evidence" that will be announced will come from one faction or another, and will have been carefully vetted by the policy board to ensure that it hews to the party line. (Whichever party it comes from. All sides are equally to blame as far as I can tell.)

In this kind of environment, it's hard to take any evidence at face value. Both (all) sides accuse the others of double-counting evidence, hiding unflattering data points, and shading results and simulations.

The only thing that makes any sense in this context is to compare historical projections to the world. Some AGW proponents seem to have over-predicted doom, so I heavily discount doom projections. It's not obvious that the worldwide climate is warmer than the (very) long term trend would indicate. There seems to be obfuscation about polar melting. It seems obvious that sea levels rising is miniscule to date. Climate change doesn't make any specific predictions AFAICT that have been upheld.

There are probably other rules of thumb that ought to be useful in this context, but that's all that comes to mind at the moment.

If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance: let us ask, "Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?" No. "Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?" No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. --- David Hume

(quoted in Beyond AI by JoSH Hall)

There's also a group of proponents of this style working on Caja at Google, including Mark Miller, the designer of E. And some people at HP.

Actually, all these people talk to one another regularly. They don't have a unified plan or a single goal, but they collaborate with one another frequently. I've left out several other people who are also trying to find ways to push in the same direction. Just enough names and references to give a hint. There are several mailing lists where these issues are discussed. If you're interested, this is probably the one to start with.

You didn't state a point of view. I'm surprised that MatthewB was willing to guess at what side you were taking.

I was aware of the case before, but hadn't looked into it in any detail. My reaction to the sites is that the site arguing innocence seems to be presenting facts and showing contradictions in the other side's arguments. I couldn't find any consistent argument on the other side. There were many scenarios, with inconsistent adherence to the facts, lots of innuendo and plausibility arguments for particular claims, but no coherent story.

1. Your probability estimate that Amanda Knox is guilty. less than 30%
2. Your probability estimate that Raffaele Sollecito is guilty. less than 30%
3. Your probability estimate that Rudy Guede is guilty. more than 40%
4. How much you think your opinion will turn out to coincide with mine. It seems likely. more than 75% overlap, if that means anything.

I routinely use "a couple" and "a few" to indicate vague quantities. A few is bigger than a couple, but they overlap. I know that not everyone does this (my S.O., in particular, thinks I'm wrong) but I also know that I'm not nearly alone in this habit.

Yes, certainly, there are circumstances in which "a couple" means exactly two. If I'm talking about some friends, and refer to them as "a couple" rather than "a couple of people", you'd be justified to think I meant exactly two people with some relationship. But if I say "I'm going to read a couple more pages", I think you'd be making a mistake to be upset as long as it was between 1.5 and 4 pages. When I say "a few" it might range from 1.7 to 5 or 6 depending on whether we're talking about potatoes or french fries.

So, to my ears, it could be the 16th century or the mid-18th century, and giving the benefit of the doubt, it's a reasonable statement.

Do you disagree with Eliezer substantively? If so, can you summarize how much of his arguments you've analyzed, and where you reach different conclusions?

Agreed.

I work on prediction markets, so I see it all as bets, and am used to thinking that both participants in a purely financial trade can gain from it, even though many people on the outside of the deal see it as zero sum. Sometimes you increase your variance because you think it's worth increasing your expected return, other times you reduce your variation.

Maybe uncertainty makes you nervous, [...]. Then either I'm weakly money pumping you [...], or I'm objectively granting you the removal of your worry as a service. Most people at the time feel that I'm granting them a service, but afterwards they feel I money pumped them. Especially if I repeat it.

Does this mean we should start treating certain types of money pumping as payment for a service rather than something rational agents always avoid?

The name of the service is "insurance". This is a business in which customers repeatedly make bets that they wish they hadn't made in retrospect, but it still makes sense to make the bet ex ante.